

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN GERMANY

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The Muslim Brotherhood gained its first foothold in Germany when the Geneva-based Egyptian Said Ramadan (1926–1995), a close confidant and son-in-law of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna, took over the Islamic Center in Munich (Islamisches Zentrum München) in 1960.

Arab students in Munich who wanted to build a new mosque had contacted him in 1958.¹ Ramadan had to leave Egypt after the Free Officers' government crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954. From exile in Geneva, he laid the foundations for the emergence of the Brotherhood network in Europe. Munich became an early center of these efforts. In the 1950s and 1960s, West Germany became an increasingly popular destination for Arab students who studied engineering, medicine, and sciences at its universities. Ramadan himself studied law at Cologne University and earned his PhD in 1959 with a thesis on Islamic law.²

A trusted aide of Ramadan, the Syrian-Italian Ghalib Himmat, who had arrived in the 1950s to study in Munich, and who later became a wealthy businessman, took over the Islamic Center. Under his leadership, it became the Brotherhood's early headquarters in Europe. Ever since, Germany has remained a focal point of the Brotherhood's activities in Europe.

From the Islamic Center in Munich grew the Islamic Community in Germany (Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland [IGD]), the main representative of the Brotherhood, headed by Himmat until 2001. The IGD has remained the German branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and the most important organization of Arab Islamism in Germany.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Germany has from its inception in the 1960s been divided between the Egyptian Brotherhood, with its headquarters in Munich, and the Syrian Brotherhood, with its headquarters in Aachen. Both have at times cooperated intensively but still have remained as separate entities. While the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has gained in importance, the Syrian branch has reduced its public visibility in recent years.

THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IN GERMANY

Since the end of the 1990s, the Islamic Community in Germany (IGD) has gained influence among the German Muslims. The organization became especially important after Ghalib Himmat resigned in late 2001. He stepped down because of his close connection to the Switzerland-based Al Taqwa bank, which had come under intense scrutiny after the September 11 attacks because of its alleged financing of terrorist organizations, most notably Palestinian Hamas, Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS), and Usama bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida. In November 2001, the U.S. treasury and UN Security Council listed Himmat as a terrorism financier.³

The Al Taqwa bank has been correctly labeled "the Bank of the Muslim Brotherhood," and it is therefore very likely that it had financial dealings with Brotherhood offspring like Hamas and the FIS. Concrete evidence was scarce, however, and proof for its financing of al-Qa'ida is highly dubious. As a consequence, investigations into Himmat's business dealings in Switzerland and Italy were dropped in 2005 and 2007, respectively. However, as a result of his designation, Himmat became undesirable as the IGD's chairman.

His successor was the German-Egyptian Ibrahim Faruk al-Zayat, born in 1968, who has since led the organization. Although unknown to the wider public, Zayat is the gray eminence of German Islamism. German security services have frequently named him as head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany—a claim Zayat himself frequently denied. In fact, he also denies being a member of the Brotherhood and has sued authors and journalists for claiming that he is.⁴

The IGD is structured as an umbrella organization of Arab mosque associations in Germany. Its headquarters remains in the Islamic Center in Munich, but it controls other Islamic centers in Frankfurt (Main), Marburg, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Cologne, Münster, and Braunschweig, and possibly other cities. Although German security sources speak of only 1,300 members of the organization, it is more influential among German Muslims than this number might suggest. One indicator is the IGD's yearly meetings, where up to several thousand predominantly young Muslims participate.⁵

The IGD controls a number of affiliated associations, the most influential of which seems to be the Islamic Center Cologne (Islamisches Zentrum Köln) and the German Muslim Students Association (Muslim Studenten Vereinigung in Deutschland). The Islamic Center in Cologne was founded in 1978 and has been closely connected to the Turkish Islamic Community Milli Görüş, which has its headquarters in Cologne as well. The embodiment of these connections is Ibrahim al-Zayat, the head of the center since 1997, who has established close ties with the Milli Görüş leadership in Germany, especially Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, born in 1967, the former Turkish prime minister Necmettin Erbakan's nephew and head of Milli Görüş from April 2001 until October 2002.⁶

Zayat rose to prominence as a leading member in several Islamist youth groups, most notably the German Muslim Students Association, which includes several Muslim student associations at German universities. It was founded in 1964 in Munich and was then closely connected to the Islamic Center situated in Munich. Today, it is located in Cologne. In 1997, Zayat became its head and Mehmet Erbakan his deputy. Since the 1990s, Zayat has become the symbol of the IGD's enhanced cooperation with Turkish circles.

THE SYRIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE ISLAMIC CENTER AACHEN

The Islamic Center Aachen, a town close to the Belgian and Dutch borders in the country's far west, serves as the headquarters of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Germany. In the 1960s, Arab students studying at the Technical University in Aachen started constructing the Bilal mosque. In 1978, the Islamic Center Aachen was founded as the body responsible for the mosque association.

Its head was Isam al-Attar, born in 1927, the former head of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood who left his native country in the 1950s. The Islamic Center Aachen became the headquarters of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. From the 1970s, the Brotherhood spearheaded an insurgency against the regime of Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, which culminated in a civil war from 1979 to 1982. Several writers have accused the center of having become the headquarters for the Syrian Islamists' insurgency against the Asad regime.⁷

The Damascus government shared that interpretation and sent secret agents who targeted the Syrian Muslim Brothers in Germany. In their most publicized attack, they killed Attar's wife in his Aachen home in March 1981.⁸ After the Syrian troops subdued an uprising in the city of Hama in the spring of 1982, however, the insurgency quickly lost momentum and the Brotherhood's center in Aachen some of its former importance. Attar continued activities in Belgium and France and remained a highly respected personality in Islamist circles in Western Europe.⁹ Nevertheless, he seems to have lost his political importance in the early 1980s.

The Islamic Center in Aachen maintained close relations with the Munich center just as the Syrian Muslim Brothers were closely connected to their Egyptian colleagues in Switzerland. Both Egyptians and Syrians cooperate in the Central Council of Muslims in Germany.¹⁰ Some critics consider its general secretary, the German-Syrian Aiman Mazyek, born 1969, as the Syrian branch's most important representative on the Central Council. Nevertheless, the Syrians and the Islamic Center Aachen insist on their independence from the more powerful Egyptian branch. Just like the IGD, they hold an annual conference. However, while the IGD conference takes place in different cities every year, the Islamic Center Aachen organizes its conferences in Aachen only—showing the limited appeal of the Syrian branch of

the Brotherhood. The yearly meetings regularly attract around 500 participants.¹¹ The Center publishes a print and online journal in Arabic, *al-Ra'id* (*The Pioneer*), founded by Isam al-Attar in the 1970s.¹²

THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF MUSLIMS IN GERMANY

Close relations between the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood were formalized in 1994, when their supporters jointly founded the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD), the umbrella organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany. The IGD is its most influential member group.

The Central Council has between 15,000 and 20,000 members but claims to represent all Muslims in Germany. Its head until February 2006 was the Saudi-born Nadeem Elias, born 1945, a prominent member of the Islamic Center Aachen (Islamisches Zentrum Aachen) and a former member of the IGD.¹³ Nadeem Elias embodies the Syrian Brotherhood's Saudi connection, most notably to the Muslim World League in Mecca, to which the Islamic Center Aachen and the Central Council are closely related, although relations seem to have weakened in recent years. While the Central Council is smaller than its Turkish equivalent, the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany, Elias succeeded in becoming the most prominent Muslim representative in Germany from the late 1990s.

After his resignation, however, a convert, Axel Köhler, born 1938, took over the presidency of the Central Council, narrowly defeating Ibrahim al-Zayat in the vote. Köhler seems to have been a compromise candidate in order to prevent Zayat's election. That choice was logical insofar as Köhler has a reputation of being relatively moderate, while the German media frequently criticizes Zayat because of his connections to the Brotherhood.

Among the German public, the Muslim Brotherhood is often alleged to be a key factor of modern jihadism and criticized because of its anti-semitism. Therefore, Zayat's election could have threatened the Central Council's public standing. It is unclear whether the choice of Köhler indicates any major rupture within the Central Council. For the time being, it rather seems as if Zayat preserved his old position of gray eminence to the organization. Köhler is much less visible than his predecessor Elias, and its general secretary, Aiman Mazyek, has become an important public face of the organization.

GOALS, STRATEGIES, AND ACTIVITIES OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN GERMANY

Just as in other European countries, the German Muslim Brotherhood tries to establish itself as representative of all Muslims, mainly through the Central Council. It is very likely no coincidence that they named the organization based on the model of the Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland), which, since its inception in 1950,

has successfully claimed to represent all Jews in the country and functions as a highly visible and powerful actor in German politics.¹⁴

Today, the relations between the German Muslim Brothers and Brotherhood organizations abroad have weakened. The first generation of Muslim Brothers in exile still had strong connections to their home countries—with personalities like Isam al-Attar playing a leading role in movements opposing the governments of their home countries. The new generation of leaders has mostly been born in Germany. In fact, some leading members of the Central Council and IGD like Zayat and Mazyek have German mothers—quite unlike their counterparts in the Turkish Islamist organizations—and are therefore more strongly oriented toward Germany than the older generation.

The IGD and the Central Council aim at establishing an autonomous space in German society where Muslims can live their lives according to the tenets of Islamic law (*Shari'a*) as interpreted by the Brotherhood and its representatives in Europe. Implicitly, as these organizations claim to represent all Muslims in Germany, they aim at controlling these spheres of Muslim life. In the German public, this vision is often depicted as one of a Muslim “parallel society” and rejected by large parts of the political spectrum, especially on its conservative side.

In order to reach this goal, the IGD and the Central Council follow a two-pronged strategy. First, they build the necessary infrastructure to promote their vision of Muslim faith and culture in Germany. In a country where mosques are often situated in poor backyards, they promote the construction of modern mosques and cultural centers for their constituencies. These projects often meet with problems, as large parts of the German public reject the building of big mosques, especially when the builder-owners are suspected of entertaining strong ties with the Muslim Brotherhood.

For instance, in 2006, Inssan, a small Muslim association in Berlin, was denied a construction permit for a cultural center with a mosque because it was (correctly) suspected of acting as a front for the IGD.¹⁵ When Inssan then tried to get a construction permit in another district of the German capital, a citizens' action committee protested and tried to thwart the project.¹⁶ Partly as a consequence of these suspicions, leading functionaries deny being members in or entertaining close relationships with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Second, the Central Council and IGD frequently demand to be recognized by the federal and the state governments as the main representatives of Muslims in Germany and as privileged partners in all matters pertaining to them. Until 2006, Nadeem Elias had been successful in positioning himself as a moderate Muslim leader and a partner in religious dialogue. Although suspicions concerning his person and the Central Council remained, he was accepted by large parts of the public as the representative of Muslims in Germany. And although the federal and state governments are aware of the strong Muslim Brotherhood influence on the Central Council, some have nevertheless opted to enter into a dialogue with it.

When the Interior Ministry convened the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islamkonferenz) in September 2006, the Central Council was one among five Muslim umbrella organizations represented. The conference was planned to work out a binding agreement on guidelines for the interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims in Germany. Quite ironically, when Ibrahim al-Zayat appeared at the conference in May 2007, politicians protested his presence, but not the representation of the Central Council.¹⁷

THE ARAB MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND TURKISH MILLI GÖRÜŞ

The organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany closely cooperate with some of their Turkish counterparts, most notably the Milli Görüş (National Vision/Perspective) movement. In fact, this movement might be considered a Turkish branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its founder, former Turkish prime minister Necmettin Erbakan, born in 1926, was heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. Just as Erbakan and his movement stood in close contact with Muslim Brotherhood officials in the Arab world, the organizations affiliated with the Milli Görüş movement in Germany have followed suit. Representatives of both the Muslim Brotherhood and Milli Görüş have cooperated in different organizations in Germany and abroad. Furthermore, there are indications that this cooperation has been intensifying at an European level in recent years.

Since the 1970s, Milli Görüş has been the most influential and biggest Islamist movement among German Muslims of Turkish origin. Since 1995, it has been called Islamic Community Milli Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş [IGMG]). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz), the German domestic intelligence service, counts about 27,000 members of this organization, although the actual numbers might be higher.¹⁸

Since its foundation in 1976, the organization, originally called Turkish Union Europe (Türkische Union Europa/Avrupa Türk Birliği), repeatedly changed its name. In 1985, the Milli Görüş Association in Europe (Vereinigung der neuen Weltsicht in Europa/Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatları, AMGT) was founded, and in 1995 parts of this organization were named Islamic Community Milli Görüş. It is commonly known as either Milli Görüş or IGMG and has its headquarters in Kerpen, a small city close to Cologne. It is an umbrella organization for a wide variety of associations all over Germany, which are connected to it in different ways. About 300 mosque associations are affiliated with the IGMG in Germany.

Although Necmettin Erbakan's Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)¹⁹ has lost most of its influence in Turkey to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma or AK Party), it has retained its influence on the German IGMG. However, younger members who grew up in Germany gained importance and challenged the dominance of the "older guard" of Turkey-oriented functionaries in the 1990s.

However, while people like the general secretary of IGMG since 2002, Oğuz Uçüncü, born in 1969, try to present themselves as willing to integrate into German society, the traditional Islamist leadership with stronger connections to Turkey is still influential. The current president of Milli Görüş, Osman Döring (or Yavuz Karahan) is unknown to the German public but remains influential within the organization.

Relations between the IGMG and the IGD are strong. Their embodiment is Ibrahim al-Zayat, who is married to Sabiha Erbakan, sister of Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, Necmettin Erbakan's nephew.²⁰ Mehmet Erbakan has been a leading functionary in the IGMG in the 1990s and, from April 2001 until October 2002, headed the organization. All three have been active in the German Muslim Students Association. When Zayat became its head in 1992, Mehmet Erbakan became his deputy. It is highly doubtful whether Zayat would have been able to build his position without these family connections.

Zayat has established himself as the central figure in the Islamist real estate business. He is the chief representative of the European Mosque Construction and Support Company, which administrates about 300 IGMG mosques in Germany.²¹ Besides, he is the director of a private company called "Spezial-Liegenschafts-Management" based in Cologne, and which buys real estate for mosque constructions and advises mosque associations in legal and financial matters.²²

THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL AND THE COORDINATION COUNCIL FOR MUSLIMS IN GERMANY

In 1986, the IGMG founded the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland), with its headquarters in Cologne, as a larger umbrella organization.²³ Milli Görüş is by far the biggest member group and the president of the Islamic Council has always been one of its members. Most observers regard it as being an IGMG's front organization.

Just like the Central Council, the Islamic Council aims at gaining official recognition as a major representative of Muslims in Germany. However, due to its lack of success, it often cooperates with the Central Council in order to push through common aims. It came closer to gaining official recognition when it was invited to the German Islam Conference in September 2006. However, both the Islamic and the Central Council criticized the predominance of individual Muslim thinkers—some of them avowed secularists—and the relatively weak roles of the Muslim umbrella organizations, which held only five out of fifteen seats.²⁴

In order to assert themselves in this environment, in April 2007 four of the five organizations founded the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinierungsrat der Muslime in Deutschland). It claims to represent the Muslims in Germany and has been quite successful in establishing itself as the main contact for German institutions in all matters pertaining to Muslim life in the country. The Turkish DITIB (Religious Affairs

Turkish-Islamic Union), the German branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) in Ankara, is the strongest member of the council.²⁵ The Central and the Islamic Council have thereby compromised their goal of being accepted as the sole representatives of Muslims in Germany but have gained a privileged position in German religious politics.

THE GERMAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ITS INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS

The German organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood have long-established contacts with other Muslim Brothers and like-minded groups in the Middle East and—in recent years—increasingly with European organizations close to the Muslim Brotherhood.

One of the most controversial questions regarding the Muslim Brotherhood in Germany is the nature of relations to the Muslim World League (*Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami*). The Muslim World League was founded in Mecca in 1962 as an organization of Muslim scholars and intellectuals. Although it is often described as a “Wahhabi” institution, it is rather the institutional embodiment of a rapprochement of the Saudi Arabian religious establishment and the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood.²⁶

The Muslim World League is officially labeled a nongovernmental organization, but the influence of the Saudi state is such that it should rather be considered a governmentally operated NGO (GONGO) or para-state organization. It draws most of its finances from the Saudi government, and—even more importantly—reflects Saudi Arabian government interests. In fact, the most important functionaries of the organization are Saudi citizens and its acting head, the general secretary, has always been a Saudi national.²⁷

The League and its affiliated organizations are instruments of Saudi religious foreign policy insofar as Riyadh tried to build international and transnational religious ties in order to promote the official Saudi Arabian interpretation of Islam in order to counter attacks on the legitimacy of Saudi rule—first by Nasserist Egypt and later by revolutionary Iran. Even before the foundation of the Muslim World League, the Islamic University of Medina was established in 1961. It was designed as the educational center of Saudi religious foreign policy. Students from the peripheries of the Muslim World—South and Southeast Asia, Africa, and increasingly Europe—study here and then carry Wahhabi teachings to their home countries.

The World League’s influence became an issue of contention in Germany, when in 2003, it was reported that Christian Ganczarski, a German convert and later al-Qa’ida member, was given a scholarship to study at the Islamic University in Medina in 1991. Allegedly, Nadeem Elias was present when a delegation of the World League screened young applicants in the Islamic Center in Aachen. The case highlighted the strong connections between the World League and Muslim Brotherhood institutions in Germany. Since then at least a dozen Germans have enrolled in the Islamic University of Medina.

A second organization close to the World League is the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). Although it is not organizationally affiliated with the World League, it maintains extensive contacts with the organization and shares its religious-political goals. WAMY's staff is largely drawn from the Muslim Brotherhood, while it is financed by Saudi Arabian sources. Established by the World League in Riyadh in 1972, where it still has its headquarters, its general secretary is a Saudi national too. WAMY's declared aim is to "preserve the identity of young Muslims" and build the necessary infrastructure to promote Muslim culture. In practice, WAMY coordinates the activities of a multitude of Muslim student and youth organizations around the world; it runs schools, orphanages, hospitals, and educational centers; and it tries to form future Muslim elite by granting scholarships for Saudi universities.²⁸ The head of the IGD and the Islamic Center Cologne, Ibrahim al-Zayat, has served as the European and Germany representative of WAMY since the 1990s.²⁹

The German organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood are part of a wide and constantly growing network of European institutions. The IGD is an important member of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE), an umbrella for all major national associations affiliated with or sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood. It was founded in 1989 and has been based in Brussels since 2007, after having moved its headquarters from Britain. Its importance grew with the increasing "Europeanization" of its member organizations. Just like its member organizations in their respective national societies, it aims at representing all Muslims in Europe.³⁰

However, while institutions like the Central Council and the IGD had some success in lobbying the German government, the FIOE has not established itself as an important factor on the European level. Again, Ibrahim al-Zayat is an important functionary in this organization. He represents the German Brotherhood as a member of its board of directors, responsible for public relations.³¹ Zayat was also the co-founder of the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO) in 1996 and served as its president until 2002. Other Germans held and continue to hold important positions. FEMYSO is an organization closely connected to the FIOE and seems to have extensive links to WAMY as well. It has its headquarters in Brussels and represents organizations from some two dozen European countries. It claims to represent the Muslim youth in Europe and lobbies the European Union on youth issues.³² Its establishment is a logical result of the Brotherhood's focus on the recruitment and education of the Muslim youth in Europe.

CONCLUSION

The Muslim Brotherhood in Germany has strengthened its position in Germany since the end of the 1990s. Its organizational efficiency has placed it at the center of German religious policy. Through the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, it is represented as one of the four major players in the

German Islam Conference and will most likely remain one of the main actors among Muslims in Germany for the foreseeable future. The founding of the Coordination Council for Muslims in Germany in 2007 proved that the IGD and the Central Council were ready to compromise in order to expand their influence in German politics. As only one among four strong umbrella organizations, the Central Council will be able to influence German religious policy toward Muslims, but it will have to compromise with its three Turkish counterparts.

Perhaps this move indicates that the IGD and the Central Council have realized that the role of any Arab organization will remain limited in a country where the overwhelming majority of Muslims is of Turkish descent (about 2.5 million out of 3.5 million). The dominance of the Turkish organizations is made acceptable, however, by the fact that the Arab Muslim Brotherhood entered a close alliance with the Turkish Islamists of Milli Görüş some years ago. It remains to be seen whether this alliance will persist, especially because the Islamist scene in Turkey itself has been in upheaval since the founding of Prime Minister Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party in 2001. The long-term repercussions of this move on the Islamist scene in Germany have not become clear yet.

However, even in cooperation with the Turkish Islamists, the German Muslim Brotherhood has not generated any mass following, although its ideas are popular among a wider spectrum of German Muslims. With a membership of not more than 20,000, the Central Council and the IGD will only play a major role in German religious policy if they succeed in enhancing their public standing through cooperation with the German federal or sixteen state governments. As it seems from the history of the German Islam Conference, the federal government is—for the time being—willing to grant them a limited role.

Ibrahim al-Zayat has established himself as both the gray eminence of German Islamism—among Arabs and Turks as well—and the leading German voice in the European Muslim Brotherhood movement. He has not yet, however, managed to establish himself as a leading Muslim representative vis-à-vis the German government and the general public. His strong affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood has proved to be a serious public relations disadvantage and might keep him from reaping the fruits of the work he has done behind-the-scenes since the early 1990s. In order to reduce this weak spot, Zayat—like other important Muslim protagonists—has steadfastly denied any affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. It is exactly this lack of transparency that has raised doubts about the motives and aims of the Muslim Brothers in Germany.

NOTES

1. On the early history of the center, see Ian Johnson, "The Beachhead: How a Mosque for Ex-Nazis Became Center of Radical Islam," *Wall Street Journal*, July 12, 2005.

2. The first English edition of the text was published in 1961. Said Ramadan, *Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity* (London: Macmillan, 1961). The thesis has been published in numerous German and English editions.
3. Lorenzo Vidino, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe," *Middle East Quarterly*, 12(1) (Winter 2005), <http://www.meforum.org/article/687>.
4. In 2007, German newspapers reported that the head of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Mahdi Akif (who had served as head of the Islamic Center in Munich from 1984 to 1987), had called Zayat "the head (*ra'is*) of the Muslim Brethren in Germany." *Die Welt* (Hamburg), February 26, 2007. Zayat published a counterstatement in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), April 10, 2007.
5. On the conference in 2007, see Bundesministerium des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2007*, Berlin 2008, p. 214. The reports of the German domestic intelligence agency (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) can be downloaded from <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/publikationen/verfassungsschutzbericht/>. The states (*Länder*) publish their reports as well.
6. On the Turkish Islamists in detail, see Guido Steinberg, "Germany," in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Global Survey of Islamism* (in print).
7. Karl Binswanger, "Fundamentalisten-Filz—Getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen?" in Bahman Nirumand (ed.), *Im Namen Allahs: Islamische Gruppen und der Fundamentalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Köln: Dreisam 1990), pp. 129–148 (143).
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 129–132.
9. According to Brigitte Maréchal, the Da'wa mosque in Paris and the Al-Khalil mosque in Brussels were affiliated with Attar and the Syrian Brotherhood. Brigitte Maréchal, *The Muslim Brothers in Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), p. 62.
10. Until 1981, the Islamic Center Aachen had been a member of the IGD. Johannes Grundmann, *Islamische Internationalisten* (Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2005), p. 59.
11. On the congresses, see the yearly reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in North Rhine-Westphalia, <http://www.im.nrw.de/sch/41.htm#>. On the conference in Aachen 2007, see Innenministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, *Verfassungsschutzbericht des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen über das Jahr 2007*, Düsseldorf 2008, p. 185.
12. www.alraid.de.
13. A short biography in Arabic can be found on the website of al-Ra'id, <http://www.iid-alraid.de/Alraid/aboutauthor/Nadeem.pdf>.
14. See the website of the organization, www.zentralratjuden.de.
15. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 4, 2006. ("Wir müssen die gemäßigten Muslime schützen.") The association's website is: www.inssan-ev.de.
16. *Tagesspiegel* (Berlin), April 16, 2008. The project was later thwarted but for reasons not related to the Islamism debate.
17. See for example the interview with the conservative parliamentarian Kristina Köhler (CDU) in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 11, 2007 ("Sie täuschen uns in der Maske der Medienprofis").
18. Bundesministerium des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2007*, Berlin 2008, p. 217.
19. After Erbakan was forced to resign as prime minister in June 1997, his Welfare Party was prohibited. In 2001, he founded the Felicity Party.
20. Sabiha al-Zayat (b. 1970) herself is a leading Islamist functionary and mainly covers women's issues. Officially, she heads the "Center for Islamic Women's

Research and Women's Advancement" in Cologne, teaches Islamic hermeneutics and didactics there.

21. Europäische Moscheebau und Unterstützungsgemeinschaft e.V. (EMUG).
22. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 11, 2007. Oğuz Uçuncü has a leading position at "Spezial-Liegenschafts-Management."
23. The headquarters was moved from Bonn to Cologne in 2005.
24. The other organizations were the non-Islamist Religious Affairs Turkish-Islamic Union (Türkisch Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion/Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği, DITIB), the Federation of Alevi Communities in Germany (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu), and the Federation of Islamic Cultural Centers (Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren, VIKZ).
25. See the internal rules of procedure as published on the website of the Central Council, http://islam.de/files/misc/krm_go.pdf.
26. Reinhard Schulze, *Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga* (Leiden: Brill, 1990).
27. The current general secretary is Abdallah ibn Abd al-Muhsin al-Turki, a Wahhabi scholar.
28. Grundmann, *Internationalisten*, pp. 93–95.
29. Steve Merley, *The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe*, NEFA Foundation October 1, 2008, p. 25, <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafioreport1008.pdf>. In a 2005 interview with the *Wall Street Journal*, Zayat stated that he was a members of WAMY's board of trustees and its representative in Germany. *Wall Street Journal*, December 29, 2005.
30. Maréchal, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 63f.
31. Merley, *Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe*, p. 25.
32. Lorenzo Vidino, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe," in *Middle East Quarterly*, 12(1) (Winter 2005), <http://www.meforum.org/article/687>. Steve Merley, *The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe*, NEFA Foundation October 1, 2008, pp. 14–17, <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafioreport1008.pdf>.