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The Hidden History of Social Citizenship¹

MARTIN POWELL

Many accounts claim that social citizenship has declined during the last 20 years in Britain under the Conservative and New Labour Governments. However, the vague definition of social citizenship as given by T. H. Marshall means that it is difficult to see exactly which concepts best characterise social citizenship, let alone which indices measure the extent of their change over time. Some commentators imply an 'ideal type' model of change from a national statist model of post-war citizenship based on rights and equality to a hollowed-out, civil society model based on duties and inclusion. While there is some validity in these views, they do not represent the whole picture. An alternative account, 'the hidden history of social citizenship', points to a more limited, conservative notion of citizenship. It follows that recent trends do not signal such a sharp decline of Marshallian social citizenship as is conventionally assumed.

Introduction

Many accounts claim that social citizenship has declined during the last 20 years in Britain under the Conservative and New Labour Governments (for example, Culpitt, 1992; Dean *et al.*, 2000; Dwyer, 1998, 2000; Flynn, 1997; Lister, 1990, 2000; Mishra, 1999; Wilding, 1992, 1997). The usual point of reference for this claim is the account of T.H. Marshall (1963). As Esping-Anderson (1990, p. 21) argues, 'Few can disagree with T.H. Marshall's proposition that social citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state'. The problems of defining social rights have been clear since the original imprecise definition given by Marshall (1963, p. 74): 'from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society'. A number of writers point out the vagueness of this definition (for example, Culpitt, 1992; Dwyer, 2000; Esping-Anderson, 1990; Hay, 1996; Hill, 1994; Mishra, 1981; Rees, 1995a; Roche, 1992). Twine (1994, p. 106) claims that Marshall's work may be criticised for its failure to specify the level, form and content of social rights. This is a little unfair, since as Reisman (1977, p. 72) says of Titmuss, 'it is no criticism of an intellectual pioneer to say that he asked more questions than he

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answered'. Moreover, in the period of over half a century since Marshall delivered the original lectures, few have attempted this task. It follows that it is difficult to see exactly which concepts best characterise social citizenship, let alone which indices measure the extent of their change over time.

Some fear that the concept of citizenship may have become too elastic. Rees (1996, p. 13) warns that 'with fragmentation comes the danger that the concept will disintegrate into a cacophony of unrelated tunes, cross-cutting and obscuring each other'. One way to address this point is to examine Marshall's original tune. This paper revisits Marshall's framework, treating it on its own terms in its historical context. In other words, it focuses on the original model rather than on extensions of the model such as those which incorporate a gender dimension (see for example, Dean *et al.*, 2000; Dwyer, 2000, pp. 58–61; Lister, 1997b).

Jessop (1999) suggests that the Keynesian National Welfare State is being replaced by the Schumpeterian Postnational Workfare Regime. In a heuristic ideal type framework, he examines each of the four 'from-to' dualities. Drawing partly on this model and partly from an amalgam of recent arguments by other writers, it is possible to set out a similar 'ideal type' model of change from a national statist model of post-war citizenship based on rights and equality to a hollowed-out, civil society model based on duties and inclusion. While there is some validity in these views, they do not represent the whole picture.

This paper presents an alternative account—the hidden history of social citizenship—based on the less cited parts of Marshall's essay (the 'other T. H. Marshall'; Rees, 1995b) and other writings which point to a more limited, conservative notion of citizenship in the British post-war welfare state. In short, it is claimed here that many writers have stretched the elastic concept of social citizenship beyond its original meaning, mistakenly assuming a strong or maximalist version of a weak or minimalist concept (compare Rees, 1995b). This claim is examined in terms of four dualities: equality versus inclusion; rights versus responsibilities; national versus hollowed-out; and state versus civil society.

Equality versus Inclusion

According to Lister (1998, p. 215), 'from equality to social inclusion' effectively encapsulates an important paradigm shift in thinking about the welfare state. However, both terms need unpacking. It has been claimed that there have been a number of moves away from 'equality' in terms of abandoning redistribution; increasing charging; transforming equality of outcome into equality of opportunity; and increasing means-testing. Some see the reduction of vertical redistribution as diluting citizenship. Twine (1994, p. 140) considers that tax 'is a neglected yet crucial aspect of citizenship'. According to Ignatieff (1995, pp. 67, 69), taxation was explicitly conceived as the instrument for building civic solidarity among strangers, and taxation is the focal point of the crisis of citizenship. Lister (1997a) claims that we might once again use the tax system as an instrument of redistribution and as an expression of the responsibilities of citizenship. Others have seen free services (or de-commodification in a narrow

sense) as the hallmark of citizenship: charges may be seen as reducing citizenship. 'Policies that involve de-commodifying social relations are considered as the basis for social rights' (Twine, 1994, p. 5). Moran (1991, p. 35) defines health care citizenship as a right of health care for all citizens free at the point of treatment. It has been claimed that equality of outcome has been redefined as equality of opportunity. This means that fairness is defined in terms of a meritocracy (see, for example, Le Grand, 1998; White, 1998). Perhaps the most popular claim is that the essence of social citizenship lies in universality while its antithesis is found in residualism (for example, Flynn, 1997, p. 336; Heater, 1990, p. 286; Hill, 1994, pp. 77–8; Twine, 1994, pp. 96–7).

None of the above characterisations *fully* fits with Marshall's account. Marshall (1963, pp. 83–4) recognised that the Poor Law was universal, but the minimal social rights of the New Poor Law were detached from the status of citizenship, treating the claims of the poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them. Stigma remained, leading to the 'divorce of social rights from the status of citizenship'. In the twentieth century the Liberals used social insurance to remove categories of need from the Poor Law. Although Beveridge (1942) based his 'universality' on contribution, pointing to the widespread popularity of the insurance mechanism, there is little doubt that it established a partial but *de facto* citizenship that was in tune with the spirit of the times. The feminist critique points out the inherent gendered assumptions. As benefits were dependent on previous employment status, married women were in the words of Barbara Castle, 'second class citizens entitled to third class benefits' (in Lister, 1990, p. 57).

The citizenship of Marshall is associated with equality of status and horizontal redistribution more than vertical redistribution. Bulmer and Rees (1996, pp. 273–4) argue that the equality of social citizenship is equality of access—entitlement rather than provision. Hay (1996, p. 73) considers that Marshall's remark that 'equality of status is more important than equality of outcome' is a 'deeply condescending suggestion'. It is true that 'this remark ... could perhaps only have been made by someone with both status and income. Equality of status does not buy many loaves of bread, or care for many children' (Hay, 1996, p. 73). Equally, however, Hay's argument could only have been made by someone unfamiliar with the historical context of qualitative socialism or citizenship theory. It is perhaps significant that Hay does not cite Tawney, Titmuss or Crosland (see Ellison, 1994; Harris, 1987; Powell, 1995a) in this section. It was appreciated at the time that the welfare state was concerned more with horizontal rather than vertical redistribution and that greater vertical redistribution could potentially be achieved by selective, residual strategies like the Poor Law (see Powell, 1995a). Ignatieff (1995, p. 67) regards citizenship as civic solidarity. Reisman (1977, p. 71) claims that 'Any *de facto* absence of universality may encourage redistribution but it impedes integration'. Marshall (1963) argued that some degree of class fusion or class abatement would result from the common experience of cash and kind benefits, with the extension of services having a profound effect on the *qualitative* aspects of social differentiation. As the labels of 'ex-elementary schoolboy' and 'panel patient' disappear, class differences are blurred and society becomes more homogeneous. Crosland

(1964, p. 85) is a little less optimistic: it seems rather doubtful whether the fact that everyone now has an insurance card, and repairs to the local post office, really does much to foster social equality. These cash benefits are too small in relation to the total incomes of better-off people to make much difference. However, high quality public services result not in 'a greater equality of real incomes, but certainly a greater equality in manners and the texture of social life'. Universal benefits symbolise the fact of social equality by conferring on everybody a badge of citizenship, eliminating any public distinction between the social classes, between rich and poor, the eligible and the non-eligible.

Marshall considered that services need not necessarily be free at the point of delivery. His discussion of legal aid considered the problem of combining social justice with market price (1963, pp. 101–5). What is important is that the 'rendering of the service should not be conditional on the ability to pay' (Marshall, 1981) but open to all, and used by the majority rather than merely by the poorer section of the community like the 'elementary schools' and 'panel patients'. Similarly, Crosland (1964, pp. 85–6) is clear that services need not necessarily be provided free to all, or without a test of means; nor need they be universally used. It is much more a matter of relative standards. The mark of inferiority attached to public services will disappear, whether or not these are provided entirely free, and whether or not they are *universally* used. Crosland gives examples of education, housing and health. For the latter, the service is neither free nor universally used. Private practice still continues; and a number of charges are made, subject to relief after a test of means. 'It appears, then, that while social equality requires universal *availability* of the public service (though not necessarily completely universal use), it does not always require universal *free* availability' (Crosland, 1964, p. 87). This is due to the difference between a test of means which determines the right to use a service (for example, if beds in state hospitals were to be provided only for national assistance beneficiaries), and one which determines only the question of payment. According to Crosland, the latter need neither offend against social equality, nor cause humiliation, provided that two conditions are fulfilled. First, the benefit or service must not be so essential, and so large in relation to the recipient's means that he or she may reasonably consider that he has a social right to it, so that both his real income and self esteem would be severely affected by a test of means. Second, the income line should be set as high as possible. In short, 'Social equality mainly requires the creation of standards of public health, education and housing so high that no marked qualitative gap remains between public and private provision. It will then matter little whether or not occasional charges are imposed, subject to the above conditions' (Crosland, 1964, p. 88). This begs the question of what are central, essential services (for example, prescriptions, optical and dental charges, long term care?) and what is a high income threshold?

It follows that a simple equation of citizenship with universalism and its denial with means-testing is too simplistic. The claim of Esping-Anderson (1990, p. 58) that 'Lord Beveridge and TH Marshall have exhorted to the world the peculiar and essentially ethnocentric assumption that universalism is the hall-

mark of an advanced welfare state' requires qualification. Universalism was not seen as an end in itself, rather as a means to an end of the objective of integration. Citizenship has some clear parallels with the 'Strategy of Equality' of Tawney (1964; see Ellison, 1994; Harris, 1987; Hindess, 1987; Powell, 1995a; Wright, 1999). Titmuss (1968, p. 129), echoing Tawney's ideas about citizenship as comradeship, claims that the fundamental historical reason for universality is the avoidance of stigma. Whether expressed in terms of Tawney's fellowship, Bevan's 'social mix' in local authority housing, Marshall and Crosland's equality of status, Ignatieff's civic solidarity or Titmuss's 'one nation', this concept is central to the welfare state (Powell, 1995a). Such universality was seen as vital to prevent selective services becoming a 'poor service for poor people' (compare Titmuss, 1968).

Thus, 'open to all' or *de jure* universalism is by itself insufficient. There must be further ingredients to transform this into *de facto* universalism. One possible criterion is that the quality or texture of the service (Twine, 1994, pp. 87–8) is an important factor discriminating between *de facto* and *de jure* universalism, or mass and residual services (see Crosland, 1964, above). This is clearly implied by Taylor-Gooby (1988, p. 18): 'The withdrawal of the state from a policy of national minimum provision in mass services, such as pensions and education, is now a possibility. National standards may continue but at so low a level as to be irrelevant to most people's experience. Use of basic state provision will then signify membership of a social minority rather than citizenship ... Such a crisis would signal the collapse of the post-war tradition of welfare citizenship ...' (see also Alcock, 1989, p. 33; Ignatieff, 1995, pp. 74–5; Wilding, 1997, p. 723). Just as Bevan argued for high quality public housing in order to *include* the middle class (Foot, 1975), declining services such as pensions and dentistry *exclude* the middle class (Timmins, 1996).

Titmuss differentiated between various types of means-tests (1968, pp. 115–8) and was not against selectivity *per se*, but when stigma or second class citizenship resulted (Reisman, 1977, p. 45). Indeed, he saw 'positive discrimination' as, in some ways, combining universality with selectivity. In a famous passage, Titmuss (1968, p. 135) considered that the real challenge was 'what particular infrastructure of universalist services is needed in order to provide a framework of values and opportunity bases within and around which can be developed socially acceptable selective services aiming to discriminate positively, with the minimum risk of stigma, in favour of those whose needs are greatest?'

It is unclear whether the second class status acquired through means-testing derives from the mechanism *per se*, discretion or the poor quality of service. Stigma may be contextual: not automatically associated with all means-tests in all places and times. For example, means-testing does not have clear negative connotations in Australia. In Britain student grants were means-tested. Tuition fees vary with income. However, there is little evidence that full grants or reduced tuition fees are associated with stigma.

Hay (1996, p. 73) argues that Marshall's assumption of a simple correspondence between equality of status and equality of opportunity does not stand critical scrutiny. However, like Crosland, Marshall was (*contra* Hay's account)

against *simple* equality of opportunity. For example, Crosland (1964) clearly argues that ‘equality of opportunity’ was not enough (compare Brown, 1999). Similarly, for Marshall, citizenship was the architect of *legitimate* inequality (Marshall, 1963, p. 73). Defining ‘simple’ equality of opportunity and ‘legitimate’ inequality is not straightforward (see, for example, Wolfe and Klausen, 1997), but it would be difficult to claim that post-war Britain represented a perfect realisation of these principles.

Like equality, social inclusion is a complex concept. The neat progression ‘from equality to social inclusion’ (Lister, 1998, 2000) is deceptive, and hides the more difficult issues of identifying the more precise conceptions of the terms. Indeed, a number of writers have discussed citizenship in terms of relative poverty and social exclusion (Hill, 1994, Chapter 4; Levitas, 1996, p. 7; Twine, 1994, p. 78). The ‘Exclusive Society’ excludes the poor from citizenship (Lister, 1990). Scott (1994) has made the clearest link between the citizenship of Marshall and the relative poverty of Townsend (1979). ‘While the word “citizenship” is not used by Townsend, the concept permeates the whole of his work’ (Scott, 1994, p. 80). Scott sees participation as the central idea of citizenship, and uses the ‘poverty lines’ of Townsend and the Breadline Britain surveys in order to define citizenship. However, this is too strong (Rees, 1996). The ‘right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’ (Marshall, 1963, p. 74) is the *maximalist* part of the citizenship range, with ‘the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security’ at the *minimalist* end. In other words, participation is, at best, one of the two central ideas rather than *the* central idea, with the modicum approach seemingly having much more in common with absolute approaches to poverty. A minimalist rather than a maximalist conception may be compatible with a very limited type of citizenship. For example, according to Mishra (1981, p. 32), it could be argued that public elementary education of the kind provided in England towards the close of the nineteenth century met the requirements of citizenship.

Levitas (1998) points to three discourses of social exclusion. RED is a redistributive, egalitarian discourse that embraces notions of citizenship and social rights, with a primary objective of social justice. MUD is a moralistic discourse that uses images of the underclass and the dependency culture and focuses on individual behaviour and values. SID is a social, integrationist discourse which is focused on achieving social cohesion through paid work. In short, the excluded lack money in RED, morals in MUD and paid work in SID (Levitas, 1998, p. 27). She suggests that New Labour has tended to abandon RED in favour of MUD and SID. However, social citizenship was characterised more by SID and MUD and less by RED than Levitas allows. Social citizenship focuses on status rather than outcome, and on horizontal more than vertical equality. In this sense, the death of redistributive politics is not necessarily the end of citizenship. Similarly, work has always been central to social citizenship (see below). A moralist discourse has always pointed to a central fault line dividing the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor (Harris, 1987, pp. 80–2; Taylor-Gooby, 1988).

It follows that New Labour’s ‘diverse but inclusive society’ (Blair, 1998,

p. 12), 'egalitarian enough to be socially inclusive' (Wright, 1994, p. 143; see Levitas, 1998, pp. 63–7) is not such a radical break. Field's (1998) claim that 'the principle that all people—rich and poor—should be included in the welfare contract is as valid today as ever' has parallels with the citizenship school (Harris, 1987), the qualitative socialists (Ellison, 1994) and the 'Strategy of Equality' or more accurately the 'Strategy for Fraternity' of Tawney (1964; see Powell, 1995a; Wright, 1999). Bulmer and Rees (1996, p. 272) point out that Marshall's social citizenship is about inclusion and exclusion, even though he uses the terms 'equality' and 'inequality' instead'. Crowley (1998, pp. 174–5) writes that 'Marshall's analysis of citizenship can be read as a contribution to the broader theoretical issues of social integration in the classic Durkheimian tradition' (compare Wolfe and Klausen, 1997). In other words, Levitas (1996) regards social inclusion as 'neo-Durkheimian', but a similar claim could be made for the weak version of Marshall's citizenship. Flynn (1997, pp. 336–7) discusses Marshall's universalism in the context of Talcott Parsons's functionalism: 'universalism therefore comprises beliefs about the importance of solidaristic inclusiveness'. In short, Marshallian citizenship *is* inclusion.

Prowse (2000) claims that New Labour has largely replaced 'redistribution' with 'civic equality', where differences in wealth do not matter so long as citizens 'meet as equals in public places'. However, a number of points can be made. First, as Prowse admits, some 'backdoor' redistribution has taken place (compare Glennerster, 1999). Second, it is not clear how much income inequality can be tolerated among 'citizens'. (Ignatieff, 1995, p. 56; King and Waldron, 1988). While Plato had suggested a variation in wealth of no more than five-fold among *citizens* (excluding women and slaves) in the Greek city state (King and Waldron, 1988, p. 426), Tawney (1964), Marshall (1963) and Crosland (1964) are silent on this matter. Beveridge (1942, 1948) is clearly comfortable with a degree of inequality above the national minimum (Hewitt and Powell, 1998). Orwell (1982, p. 107) suggests that within an income ratio of 10 to one 'some sense of equality is possible. A man (*sic*) with £3 a week and a man (*sic*) with £1,500 a year can feel themselves to be fellow creatures, which the Duke of Westminster and the sleepers on the Embankment cannot'. Third, it is unclear whether the main problem is the arithmetic degree of income inequality or the degree of perceived unjustified inequality (compare Runciman, 1972). Popular criticism seems to be directed more at the 'overpaid', 'fat cat' executives of formerly nationalised industries, and those in charge of 'failing' enterprises such as Railtrack and 'the Dome' rather than even more highly paid footballers.

To sum up, citizenship has always focused on civic equality or civic solidarity. Perhaps this is limited and naive; perhaps New Labour will not achieve greater equality in this sphere. However, the potential significance of pledges such as that to introduce 'for the first time' a national target on reducing health inequalities (Department of Health, 2000) should not be lightly dismissed. Similarly, Gordon Brown (1999) has argued that New Labour offers a 'real' and dynamic equality of opportunity that is radical and achievable. This is vaguely defined, but certainly compatible with the broad citizenship agenda of Tawney, Orwell, Marshall and Crosland.

Rights versus Responsibilities

Many writers claim that the Conservative and New Labour governments have broken the post-war settlement based on social rights and have moved towards conditional welfare (Dwyer, 1998, 2000; Faulks, 1998; King, 1999; Lister, 1990, 2000; Mishra, 1999). This argument is based on establishing that rights were unconditional, but have more recently been linked with duties as part of a contract. The second element is relatively clear. New Labour's third way is based on rights and duties (see Blair, 1998; Dean, 1999; Dwyer, 1998, 2000; King, 1999; Le Grand, 1998). According to Giddens (1998, p. 65), the prime motto for the new politics is 'no rights without responsibilities'.

The first element is more problematic. Some writers (for example, Marquand, 1997, p. 45) are clear that citizenship involves 'dutiless rights'. Dahrendorf (1996, pp. 32–3) has argued forcefully that rights cannot be linked with obligations as a *quid pro quo*: citizenship is a social contract; work is a private contract. Social citizenship is a non-economic, unconditional status, like the political citizenship of voting. In workfare rights are dissolved into marketable commodities: they are offered for sale. On the other hand, writers such as Janowitz (1980) and Janoski (1998) explicitly link rights and responsibilities. There is growing and diverse body of work which stresses obligations (see Dwyer, 2000; Rees, 2000), including those from the right for example, Mead (1997) and Green (1999), and communitarian writers such as Etzioni (1994) and Selbourne (1994).

This debate has clear parallels with the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) on de-commodification, which draws on Marshall (1963). Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 21–3) claims that if social rights are inviolable and if they are granted on the basis of de-commodification rather than performance, they will entail a de-commodification of the status of individuals *vis-à-vis* the market. De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market.

In spite of some similarities, there appear to be three main differences between de-commodification and Marshallian citizenship. First, as we have seen, writers such as Marshall and Crosland did not consider that all services should be free. Second, de-commodification assumes no relationship between market position and welfare: as Twine (1994, pp. 102–4) argues, living standards should be *independent* of pure market forces. In contrast, Marshall argued that welfare should not be *proportionate* to the market. Moran (1991, p. 35) is mistaken in his claim that the rights of citizenship bear *no* relation to individual income or wealth. In statistical terms, de-commodification requires a zero correlation between market and welfare, while citizenship merely requires that the correlation is less than perfectly positive. Citizenship rights do not replace, but restrict the domain of the market (compare Harris, 1987). Both may be differentiated from redistribution, which requires a negative correlation between market and social income. Third, with particular reference to cash benefits, de-commodification is clear that benefits are inviolable and pitched at replacement wage levels. If benefits are low and associated with social stigma the relief system will compel all but the most desperate to participate in the labour market.

In contrast, benefit levels (see above) and obligations associated with Marshall's citizenship are less clear.

Notwithstanding these differences between de-commodification and citizenship, it is clear why Esping-Andersen (1990) terms Britain a 'liberal' welfare state. Poor Law and social insurance programmes were deliberately designed to maximise labour market performance. In short, they were liberal because they aimed to avoid de-commodification. Mead (1997, p. 211) writes that in the USA, another 'liberal' welfare state, work is 'unquestionably' an obligation of citizenship. On the other hand, many benefits in kind such as the NHS do fit the criteria of de-commodification as they bear no relationship with the labour market, behaviour or obligations.

Marshall in stressing rights wrote relatively little on obligations and his views on obligation remain unclear (Dwyer, 2000; Hay, 1996, p. 77; Marquand, 1997, p. 45; Rees 1995b, 2000; Roche, 1992). However, it is clearly untrue that Marshall totally neglected obligations. 'Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed' (Marshall, 1963, p. 87). In the first phase of public education, 'rights were minimal and equal. But ... a duty was attached to the right' (p. 111). Obligations involve the duty to pay taxes and insurance contributions (for example, Sjoberg, 1999). Education and military service are also compulsory. The other duties are vague, and are included in the general obligation to 'live the life of a good citizen', giving such service as one can to promote the welfare of the community'. Of paramount importance is the 'duty to work'. It is no easy matter to revive the sense of the personal obligation to work in a new form in which it is attached to the status of citizenship. It is not made any easier by the fact that the 'essential duty is not to have a job and hold it, since that is relatively simple in conditions of full employment, but to put one's heart into one's job and work hard' (pp. 122-4). What is not clear from these fragments (see also Marshall, 1981) are Marshall's views on what follows if someone fails to carry out their duties, or how these vary in times or places of high unemployment.

However, liberal contractarianism or conditionality has a long history in Britain including the New Poor Law and test work in the inter-war period (Green, 1999; King, 1999). The Beveridge Report (1942) advocated attendances at a training course as a condition of receiving unemployment assistance. Beveridge argued that people ought not to be able to hold out for work that they were accustomed to do nor need it be near their place of residence (Hewitt and Powell, 1998). One interpretation of this coercive regime is that unemployed doctors in Glasgow could be forced to work in burger bars in London. King (1999, p. 234) claims that 'it was the Beveridgean view which was dominant amongst policy-makers after 1945'. Training courses were not enforced, but time limits were placed on insurance benefits. However, these were substantial, and rarely tested in periods of full employment. An alternative reading of King's work stresses not the sharp break of the introduction of conditional welfare in the 1980s, but the puzzle of why the period between the 1940s and the 1970s was relatively *unconditional*. Beveridge disliked the term 'welfare state'. He saw 'citizens' as insured persons, as this emphasised that the State was not a

‘dispenser of gifts for which no one needs to pay’. Such earned entitlements should give no more than the national minimum. This amounts to a bilateral rather than a unilateral transfer—certainly not a ‘gift relationship’.

Glennerster (1999, pp. 30, 35) argues that New Labour’s stress on paid work is nothing new. It was there in Beveridge and Marshall. Rights and responsibilities are firmly embedded in Marshall, especially the later Marshall (see, for example, Marshall, 1981)—even if some superficial readings of his work missed the point. New Labour clearly favours a more conditional regime, but it is less conditional than some earlier periods in Britain and some other places. For example, Green (1999, p. 77) writes approvingly of Wisconsin where he claims that claimants are told: ‘Here is a job. Here is the address. Report at 9.00 in the morning or your benefit will be stopped’.

National versus Hollowed-out

A number of recent arguments suggest clear limitations on the national welfare state. There has been a process of ‘hollowing-out’ with powers moving upwards to the supra-national level and downwards to the local level (for example, Jessop, 1999; Mishra, 1999). On the one hand, it is claimed that powers have been transferred from the nation state to multinational companies and to supra-national organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Within Europe, powers have moved outwards through Europeanisation or Social Europe to the European Union. On the other hand, there has been some ‘localisation’ as powers are devolved to local government, regions and nations such as Scotland and Wales

All this assumes that the nation state is the ‘natural’ location for citizenship (Marquand, 1997, p. 153; Crowley, 1998). A number of accounts (Ashford, 1986, 1990; Page, 1991; Segalman, 1986; de Swann, 1990) stress the historical roots of local welfare systems. Indeed, Segalman (1986) traces the move from the ‘*gemeinschaft*’ of the poor law relief systems to the ‘*gesellschaft*’ of the national welfare state. In the UK the ‘Welfare State’ is often portrayed in national terms, and social citizenship is associated with the national level, often with citations to Marshall (1963). One of the objectives of the national welfare state has been the promotion of national social solidarity (Giddens, 1994, pp. 136–7) and a particular conception of ‘the nation’ (Dean and Melrose, 1999, pp. 80–1; Dwyer, 2000, pp. 58–61; F. Williams, 1989).

However, Marshall’s definition of citizenship as ‘membership of a community’ seems to suggest a local focus (compare Rees, 1995b, pp. 345–6), as ‘local welfare states’ or ‘local citizenship’ (Ashford, 1990). Ironically, the less cited section of Marshall’s essay examines earlier traditions of localised welfare. Both the historical importance of localism in British welfare policy (Powell, 1995b) and localist systems in other countries should be noted. Local voluntary welfare existed in combination with the decentralised Old Poor Law (Ashford, 1986; Segalman, 1986; de Swann, 1990). In the Nordic countries there is a long tradition of municipal services (for example, Page, 1991). Sub-national units of Federal systems by definition have considerable autonomy. Indeed, it is difficult to speak of ‘the national’ welfare state in countries such as the USA and Canada

as policies vary between states and provinces, respectively (Banting, 1987; Peterson, 1995). Thus, historically and comparatively, the 'national' welfare state may be the exception rather than the norm.

Localists such as Robson (1953) have pointed out that local autonomy is an essential ingredient in citizenship (Jenkins, 1996; Marr, 1996; Powell and Boyne, 2001; Regan and Stewart, 1992). There has been a recent return of interest to localism (Marr, 1996; Freedland, 1998). Writers in a number of traditions such as associational democracy (Hirst, 1994), communitarianism (Tam, 1998) and Christian socialism (Field, 1996) have all explored more local mechanisms of delivering welfare. As Ashford (1990, p. 230) puts it, the eclipse of localities, so common in the early development of the welfare states, is probably coming to an end. Hollowing-out means that it is possible that the heyday of the *national* welfare state has passed.

However, the evidence for such hollowing-out is not clear. While there may be some moves internationally and 'outward' ('globalisation' and 'Europeanisation'), there are few signs of moves in the reverse direction locally and 'inward'. While both Conservative and Labour governments have stressed aspects of 'devolution', most commentators have pointed evidence of centralisation (Boyne, 1998; Jenkins, 1996; Marr, 1996). Even with devolution to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London, the Labour leadership has found great difficulty in letting go of the central reins.

State versus Civil Society

Recent accounts have noted moves away from the state towards the private and voluntary sector, resulting in a greater mix in the mixed economy of welfare (Flynn, 1997; Johnson, 1999). The Conservatives 'privatised' or 'voluntarised' some state activities (Drakeford, 2000; I. Williams, 1989). New Labour also stresses partnerships with the private sector and with 'the community' within civil society (Blair, 1998; Giddens, 1998; Wright, 1994). Labour places less emphasis on charitable activity than the Conservatives, but favours using National Lottery money to fund some developments in health. This raises questions about public responsibility and the division into 'essentials' and 'luxuries'.

However, Beveridge was clear about the limited role for the state, leaving space for voluntary action (Beveridge, 1942, 1948; Hewitt and Powell, 1998). The views of Marshall are less clear. Marshall (1963, p. 105) argues that the State 'guarantees a minimum supply of certain goods and services ... or a minimum money income ... Anyone able to exceed the guaranteed minimum out of his own resources is at liberty to do so'. Marshall (1970) also claims that whoever provides services, the overall responsibility for the welfare of citizens must remain with the state. This suggests that the role of the state is not necessarily a direct provider, but a guarantor or enabler, compatible with voluntary or private provision coupled with state finance and regulation. Moreover, it stresses the minimalist provision, similar to Beveridge's views on the extension ladder above the national minimum. Elsewhere, Marshall (1970) distinguishes between the minimum of cash benefits and the optimum of benefits

in kind such as education and health. However, he appears unsure about whether benefits in kind are part of the rights of citizenship or 'legitimate expectations' (for example, Marshall, 1963, pp. 108–9; Marshall, 1981; Rees, 1995a,b).

Finlayson (1994) and Hudson (1998) distinguish between the politics of entitlement and the politics of contribution. Both right (for example, Green, 1996) and left (Field, 1996; Hirst, 1994) have advocated moves from centralist and statist welfare (see also Freedland, 1998). At one level, this may be criticised as privatising citizenship (Hudson, 1998; Lister, 1990). At another level, it may be seen as a revival of civic-republican citizenship, reinvigorating communities and turning passive subjects into active citizens and welfare states into welfare societies (see, for example, Blair, 1998; Giddens, 1998; King and Waldron, 1988; Oldfield, 1990). Using Hirschman's (1970) triad of 'Exit, Loyalty and Voice', Marquand (1997) argues that there was little 'Voice' in Marshall's centralist, statist, 'bureaucratic, top-heavy and remote' citizenship: 'Were the institutions of social citizenship effectively subject to popular control? More importantly still, did the supposed social citizens themselves—the patients in the doctor's waiting room, the parents outside the school playground, the tenants on the council estate, the crowd waiting to approach the DHSS counter—feel that they controlled the institutions which acted in their names?' (p. 151). As Ignatieff (1995, pp. 70–1) puts it, the active elements of citizenship were underemphasised in the Beveridgean welfare state. The problem was that Marshall and Crosland had been dangerously over-optimistic in trying to build the top floor of social citizenship before the first floor of political citizenship was in place (Marquand, 1997, pp. 151–2). As 'Loyalty' declined the Conservative Government of 1979 advocated the 'Exit' of the market and the concept of 'active citizenship'. Marquand criticises both options, rejecting the latter as the Conservatives' 'active citizen' has little connection with either Marshall liberal-individualist citizenship or civic-republican citizenship. Although 'we cannot go back to ancient Greece or Renaissance Italy', we can create decentralized structures—at work and in public services, as well as in the formal political sphere (Marquand, 1997, p. 51). The debate turns on the issue of whether 'the shift away from direct state provision is not necessarily a cause for concern about the diminution of citizenship rights' (Taylor-Gooby, 1993, p. 463). Is active citizenship possible within existing welfare state structures, or can this be achieved only in civil society or welfare society (see, for example, Flynn, 1997; Hirst, 1999; Stears, 1999)?

Conclusion

This account has presented an alternative, more limited interpretation of Marshall's citizenship. It is based on a re-reading of Marshall grounded in its historical context rather than the hindsight views of 'armchair theorists'. As Harris (1996, pp. 124–5) argues, the Poor Law was a system of relief rooted not in contribution and contract, but in membership of the community. Poor relief was, in the last resort, available to all who needed it as a matter of citizen right. 'An armchair political theorist who analysed the two systems ... might conclude that ... it was the Poor Law that carried connotations of universality, communi-

tarianism and citizenship, while it was social insurance that entailed exclusion, differentiation and limited contractual rights'. It is ironic that Hay (1996, p. 72) warns that selective readings of Marshall can sustain a great variety of mutually contradictory accounts as this account of the 'hidden history of social citizenship' has suggested that the decline of social citizenship thesis is misleading in some respects. Just as Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 33) claims that Adam Smith is often cited but rarely read, Marshall has suffered from secondary quotations which at best oversimplify and at worst distort a complex, and at times an unclear and possibly inconsistent argument (but see the sympathetic, yet critical and nuanced accounts of Barbalet, 1988; Janoski, 1998; Jayasuriya, 1996; King and Waldron, 1988; Rees, 1995a,b, 2000).

This revisionist account leads to three main conclusions. First, it has suggested a weak rather than a strong version of citizenship, with a less centralist, statist citizenship incorporating duties and inclusion more compatible with Marshall's citizenship and the wider post-war settlement than is often granted. This fits with some citizens' limited and conditional definitions of citizenship which are linked with 'earned entitlements' from work and taxes (for example, Conover *et al.*, 1991; Dean and Melrose, 1999; Dwyer, 1998, 2000; van Oorschot, 2000). Pinker (1971, p. 142) has gone one step further, arguing that citizenship is an intellectual conceit of socialists and social scientists: 'most applicants for social security remain paupers at heart ... The ghosts of less eligibility still haunt the social consciousness of the British people'.

Second, it is important not to see citizenship as an undifferentiated mass. It needs to be disaggregated into the minimalist, conditional citizenship of cash with the maximalist unconditional citizenship of kind, reflecting the minimum and the optimum (Marshall, 1970, p. 90). This contrasts the 'liberal' element of social security with the social democratic element of the NHS (see Esping-Andersen, 1990). Rather than being a unified status, citizenship is more variegated, as suggested in Marshall's use of the range 'from ... to' (Marshall, 1963, p. 74).

Third, it is a mistake to simply equate the British welfare state with citizenship, as it contained a mixture of universal (citizenship), contributory and selective benefits and services. Citizenship was to be achieved primarily through equalising status in the use of services rather than equalising cash incomes. Moreover, citizenship is more nuanced than a simple equation with universalism. Conversely, means-tests may be associated with differing degrees of stigma over time and space: for example, between students and pensioners in Britain, and between Britain and Australia.

With these caveats, a *simple thesis* of the decline of citizenship in recent years is difficult to sustain. This is not to deny that income inequality has increased; fiscal redistribution has declined; means-testing has increased; and there has been a change in the mix between the elements of welfare pluralism. It is simply to claim that the Marshallian citizenship of the British welfare state is more complex than is often assumed. It is also not certain whether a 50-year-old yardstick is an appropriate instrument for measuring change in today's welfare state. For example, arguments to reduce income inequalities should perhaps not look to Marshall for ammunition. However, an examination of the 'other T. H.

Marshall' and the 'hidden history of social citizenship' suggests that citizenship is not merely a 'legitimation, a rhetorical device, a mirage, an illusion, a myth' (Hay, 1996, pp. 80–1), but in its historical context a vital concept for understanding the evolution of the British welfare state.

Note

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