

Can Will Kymlicka Be Exported to Russia?

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Chances for the successful import of liberal political theory into Russia can be assessed, at least in part, by looking at the state of the theoretical debate on liberalism. Before 1989, attempts to adopt liberal policies in Eastern Europe were few and isolated.¹ In Russia, the 1990s have witnessed the emergence of what some Russian liberals call a 'conceptual liberalism', that is, a liberal interpretation of the country's problems after Communism.² This paper examines how this stream of liberalism approaches the question of ethnocultural diversity in Russia. What modes of accommodation of diversity and specific policy prescriptions does it propose? What are the prospects for liberal pluralism in Russia and, more specifically, for the adoption of Will Kymlicka's concepts of minority rights and ethnocultural justice?

In exploring these questions, I adopt a definition of Russian liberals proposed by a Russian liberalism expert, Susanna Matveeva. It emphasizes the modernization of Russia through its integration into the world economy and based on a vision of global liberal civilization. Oriented toward the future, this liberal view is in opposition both to Russia's imperial past and values, and to 'restorationist' forces in post-Communist society. In addition to their commitment to a market economy and private property, which is not linked to any specific form of capitalism or stage of socio-economic development, Russian liberals adopt human rights of individual citizens, the rule of law and the 'civic' concept of nationhood as the highest principles of nation-building. 'Nation', in their view, includes all communities within state borders whose members are officially recognized, and

who recognize themselves, as equal citizens accepting some responsibility for the fate of their state.³

Nation-Building, Traditional Russian Ideas of 'Nation', and Western Terminology

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the newly independent successor states embarked on the road of nation-building. This process defines who 'we the people' actually are and fosters that people's national identity, that is, their sense of belonging to a distinct community. The central problem of post-Soviet nation-building, whether in Russia or the other successor states, is the reconciliation 'between the dominant nationality and ethnic minorities of their civic identities, based on inclusive citizenship, and their exclusive ethnic identities, based on shared culture, religion, language, and common ancestry'.⁴

For Russia, these processes have been complicated by the fact that Russia had traditionally been the centre of an empire, which raises questions of the 'just borders' of the new state. In addition, Russians have always been the *Staatsvolk*—the dominating people of a multinational state—which has a profound impact on the national identity of ethnic Russians. These historical circumstances weigh heavily on the so-called '*russkii vopros*' (Russian question), that is, 'the question of the position of ethnic Russians in relation to the other groups in a multinational state'.⁵

In analysing the process of Russian nation-building and the nature of the Russian nation, contemporary Russian intellectuals refer both to Russia's current political situation and traditional concepts of 'nationhood' and 'nationalism'. Many look for inspiration in traditional, and largely obsolete, pre-revolutionary, émigré and Soviet sources. The most influential authors include the Slavophile thinkers of the 1840s, the late nineteenth century Pan-Slavist, Nikolai Danilevsky, historian Vasilii Klyuchevsky, and early twentieth century philosophers Nikolai Berdyaev, Georgy Fedotov, Ivan Ilin, and Vladimir Soloviev. The so-called 'Eurasianists', members of the émigré intellectual movement of the inter-war period, are also widely read.⁶ Soviet concepts of nation and nationalism, themselves strongly influenced by the pre-revolutionary thinkers mentioned above, remain influential. For example, Stalin's 1913 definition of nation remains, with very minor modifications, a cornerstone of present-day

Russia's nationalities policy.⁷ The theory of ethnos, including the socio-biological views of Lev N. Gumilev, had a strong impact on Soviet understandings of what makes a nation and how nations relate to each other. Finally, contemporary Western theories of nationalism and inter-ethnic relations, particularly models developed by Ernest Gellner, Donald Horowitz, Arend Lijphart, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson have had a discernible influence on a small group of advocates of a 'civic' definition of Russian nationhood. Their influence, however, is limited in comparison to that of the traditional approaches.

Three views, common in the current debate over the 'Russian question', reflect the impact of the traditional sources. The first is that the multinational Russian empire, which historically preceded the formation of Russian ethnic awareness, played a crucial role in defining Russians as a nation. The second idea is that the process of intermingling within the Russian and Soviet empires created a new type of community, different from European nations. The third view is that Russian national identity was historically shaped, and should continue to be shaped, in terms of opposition to the broadly defined 'West' and rejection of Western political theory.

These traditionalist views raise specific questions in the contemporary environment. Russians today—much like pre-revolutionary thinkers—are divided on whether the entanglement of national and imperial identities is a handicap or blessing for Russia. They also disagree on what the distinct Russian community implies for the present and future of their state: should Russians recreate the empire in some form, or should they see its collapse as an opportunity to engage in the long-overdue process of building a Russian nation-state?

Recently, several typologies have been offered that conceptualize post-Communist Russian nationhood.⁸ Most of them, in one way or another, place competing concepts of Russian nationhood on a scale bounded by two extremes: an ethnocultural understanding, identified by the term *Russkii*, and a state-territorial meaning, referred to as *Rossiiskii*. In common parlance, however, *Russkii* and *Rossiiskii* are used interchangeably in reference to the Russian state. The confusion generated by these terms and their relation to 'nation' and 'state', as well as the conflicting, vested political interests that are associated with them, run deep, as revealed in heated debates about whether new Russian passports should identify the nationality of their carriers.

The statist (*Rossiiskii*) identity is not synonymous with the Western concept of 'civil nation', understood as an ideal type, even though this is frequently implied, not least in English language sources and

English translations from Russian. Nevertheless, the statist identity implied by *Rossiiskii* comes closest to the Western model of democracy, civil society, and voluntary membership in a nation, all of which are central components of 'civic nationalism'. Thus, the statist notion inherent in the term *Rossiiskii* could conceivably serve as a springboard for the development of the concept of civil nation in Russian society, as some students of Russian nationalism suggest.

Both 'civil society' and 'civil nation' are new concepts in the Russian political vocabulary; they had no place in the political discourse of either pre-revolutionary or Soviet Russia. Neither did the distinction between 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalism take root in political or even academic discourse. Even today, when they appear in newer publications, these terms have all of the characteristics of 'imported intellectual novelties'.⁹ The Russian language has no separate term for 'ethnonationalism' because any form of nationalism is assumed to be 'ethnic'. In the words of Valery Tishkov, a leading academic and, in 1992, head of the State Committee on Nationalities, nationalism in the 1990s continued to mean 'all forms of political propaganda and activism on behalf of, and benefiting, a given ethnic group referred to as a "nation"'.¹⁰

Characteristics of Three Approaches to the 'Russian Question'

Current approaches to the 'Russian question' can be roughly divided into three categories: neo-imperial, ethnonationalist, and liberal.

The neo-imperial view of the Russian nation is typically seen in terms of hegemonic nationalism. It defines Russians as an imperial people who have created a unique civilization, a new type of human community, or as a people whose defining characteristic is a historical mission to create a large, supranational state. Rooted in Pan-Slavist and Eurasianist thought, this approach made a vital contribution in shaping the concept of 'Soviet people', the new entity that had emerged from the Soviet melting pot. The mission of the ethnic Russians is to build a 'Eurasian home' for themselves and countless non-Russian nations residing on the territory of Russia. Historically, such 'homes' eventually became—as in the cases of tsarist Russia and the USSR—a playground for Russian language and culture. Vera Tolz observes that even those Eurasianists who went so far as to claim that all the peoples of Eurasia had merged into one anthropological entity within the USSR, 'never defined the community of peoples of the Russian empire in terms of common citizenship and political

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loyalties, but only in terms of cultural and religious assimilation, or harmonious coexistence.¹¹

Liberal critics of the neo-imperialist approach are concerned not so much by its potential for further territorial conquests but, rather, the continuous dependence of neo-imperialists on an imperial system of government and imperial values, which remains pervasive in Russia and which, they feel, is incompatible with modernization.¹²

The ethnonationalist approach, also referred to as ethnocentric or ethnocultural, encompasses a large cluster of concepts whose common denominator is a shared culture based on common ancestry. Accordingly, it understands the Russian nation as a linguistic and cultural community. Proponents of this view currently see ethnic Russians as stateless people: the dissolution of the USSR left them with no ethnically defined state to call their own, and in urgent need to conceive a nation-state with borders coinciding with Russian cultural territory. There are several territorial options for a Russian (*Russkii*) national state. It could coincide with the territory of the present Russian Federation, where the ethnic Russian majority is comparable to that of the ethnic French in France; be a part of that territory; or be a larger territory, by incorporating the Russian-inhabited areas in neighbouring republics.¹³

Some forms of the ethnonationalist view focus primarily on language as the main characteristic of national identity. This implies the inclusion of all Russian-speakers, regardless of their ethnicity, into a community based on language. The underlying vision of Russian society, however, goes far beyond language and assumes, as do all variations of the ethnonationalist perspective, a massive cultural assimilation of non-Russians.

Another popular variation of the ethnocultural approach, inspired by Klyuchevsky and more recently associated with the name of Solzhenitsyn, is often linked to hegemonic nationalism. It sees Russians as a nation of eastern Slavs, sharing with Belarusians and Ukrainians a common culture, language, religion, and descent from Kievan Rus. This idea was opposed by early Ukrainian nationalists who claimed that Russians' historical roots went back to the Moscow principality, while Ukrainians descended from Kievan Rus. In pre-revolutionary and Soviet times, the idea of reuniting the three separated Slavic brothers fostered policies aimed at undermining the sense of distinct identity in Belarus and Ukraine. In territorial terms, this meant a state comprising all three eastern Slavic republics and, potentially, territories outside their borders populated primarily by eastern

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Interestingly, some designs for an eastern Slavic/Russian state, notably one articulated by Solzhenitsyn, consider the *exclusion* of some non-Russian territories that are currently part of the Russian Federation.¹⁴

The neo-imperial and ethnonationalist approaches are sometimes tainted by racist views, wherein a nation is perceived as a phenomenon of nature rather than in strictly social terms. Like a great living organism, a nation emerges from the process of evolution, goes through a life cycle, interacts with its physical environment, possesses an individual character, mentality, and needs, and has a biologically defined potential for conflict. At its most extreme, this approach advocates endogamy.¹⁵

The third 'liberal' approach is implied in Matveeva's definition of Russian liberalism. This vision sees Russia as a 'bourgeois'-type nation aspiring to reach the level of development of advanced industrial and post-industrial societies. It opposes isolationism, that is, accepts the view that Russia can draw on the experiences of other societies in contributing to the formation of a liberal global civilization. Russian societal culture, the culture of an overwhelming majority of citizens, constitutes the basis of the nation-building process. Provinces and regions can keep their distinctive traits, including linguistic distinctiveness, so long as cultural preservation does not entail special 'privileges' and is compatible with Russia's 'national interest'. Minorities are entitled to state support in their quest to redress past injustices and establish equal chances in society—to the extent to which the latter is compatible with the 'national interest' and the principle of the equality of citizens. Liberal prescriptions on how to balance these potentially contradictory principles have ranged from various types of autonomous regimes to national self-determination. However, given the escalation of the ethnonationalist challenge in the former USSR, most liberals have moved toward more 'statist' positions, emphasizing the need for the compatibility of minority and majority rights and intensifying their criticism of minority nationalism.

Today, the liberals give priority to human rights over ethnocultural affiliation. Under ideal circumstances, the state should stay away from ethnic identity issues, which are more appropriately viewed as the private business of its citizens. Although in the imperfect conditions of post-Communist Russia ethnicity had to be accommodated, this was hardly the highest priority of the state. The most urgent task was to fight those forces opposing Western-style modernization. Because

of their propensity to underestimate the role of ethnicity in a modern state, liberal reformers were late in joining the debate on the management of ethnocultural diversity in Russia.

Russian liberals advocate a 'civic' nation that incorporates a non-ethnic, state-centred concept of Russian identity. It refers to a Russian nation whose members, regardless of their ethnic, racial, or cultural backgrounds, are united by their citizenship in the Russian Federation, and by their loyalty to the constitution and newly emerging political institutions. This fundamentally novel approach, for Russians, is referred to as *sograzhdanstvo* (co-citizenship) or *grazhdanskaya natsiya* (a citizenship-based nation). Critics dub it 'national nihilism', alluding to the 'thinness' of societal culture this concept implies, especially in comparison with the 'thickness' of the Soviet understanding of nation. Some opponents interpret the concept of 'civic' nation as a frontal, post-modernist, or idealist assault on the legacy of historical materialism, and as a radical rejection of rationality and objectivity.¹⁶ They say that the 'civic' concept's emphasis on identity, subjectivity, and the irrationality of national ties precludes any objective study of nation-related phenomena, let alone a rational ethnic policy.¹⁷

The Debate over Federalism

Liberals differ significantly in their understanding of federalism, a key issue in the debate over the direction of nation-building and state-building in Russia. This ambiguity is reflected in the absence of a common liberal position on federalism and its role in managing the country's ethnocultural diversity. The views expressed by Russian liberals range from the perception of federalism as the most suitable tool for integration in large multicultural states¹⁸—sometimes described as the only formula capable of preventing the country's disintegration¹⁹—to rejection of federalism. While most liberal sceptics criticize the type of federalism that exists today, and particularly its 'asymmetrical' quality, others reject the federalist principle itself, opting instead for the 'French' or other non-federal state models.

Vladimir Pastukhov is among a handful of liberals to theorize on a federalist model for Russia. He posits that 'genuine federalism'—not to be confused with pseudo-federalism of a Soviet or post-Soviet variety—is a 'product of individualisation and rationalisation of modern social life', reflecting 'the quest for self-government' by individuals who desire to leave traditional society for a modern, rational

The freedom-seeking individual is the creator, real political subject, and main actor of federalism. His or her sovereignty can only be realized through 'splitting' state sovereignty. In this sense, federalism is an organic element of the state-building process. It can be conceptualized as a three-way power-sharing contract, involving the federation, the subject of the federation, and the individual. According to this view, federalism is particularly required when, as in Russia, there is no tradition of local self-government, and the population is unwilling or unable to self-organize. Large, ethnoculturally diverse states with a huge government apparatus, such as Russia, also need federalism to counterbalance the growth of bureaucracies at the expense of individual freedoms.

Federalism greatly increases the potential for states to establish a democratic order: it can be the fourth pillar in the division of powers in those states where the traditional division into legislative, executive, and judicial branches does not adequately protect the individual freedoms of citizens. In this sense, a federal state represents the most advanced form of democracy. Conversely, a unitarian state would spell disaster for the democratization process in Russia where, as Pastukhov posits, transformation into a modern nation can only be achieved through genuine federalism.²⁰

Given the current legislative basis for federal relations, including the 1993 constitution, 'genuine' federalism cannot be realized in Russia. Russia's current '*dogovornyi* (bargaining) federalism', based on a complex mix of legislative acts—the constitution, a federal treaty, and a collection of bilateral treaties with the republics—stands no chance of success. Federalism is a strictly constitutional arrangement rather than the outcome of a bargaining (*dogovornyi*) process between the subjects and the centre of a federation, or among its subjects.

In addition to constitutionality, Pastukhov argues, genuine federalism must meet at least three more conditions. First, unlike in today's Russia, all its subjects should be equal in their relations with the centre. Second, republican authorities should not be appointed by the centre, but democratically elected. Third, the executive branch should be reformed so that the centre and the subjects of the federation develop separate, non-overlapping bureaucracies, security forces, and tax systems.²¹

There is no indication that Pastukhov's model of federalism is conceived as an instrument of accommodating ethnocultural diversity, an omission not uncommon among liberal authors who, like Pastukhov, place individual rights and freedoms at the centre of their pro-federal argument. It also reflects the fact that in contemporary Russian

discussions, the management-of-diversity function of federalism is not well-theorized. The relationship between federalism and diversity is examined chiefly in the context of: (1) the pros and cons of 'ethnic' federalism, that is, the principle that bases a federal system on ethnically defined subjects; (2) the 'asymmetric' nature of federal arrangements, meaning legal inequalities among constituent units, primarily between those that are ethnically and territorially defined; and (3) territorial vs. non-territorial forms of minority autonomy and the related question of minority rights. Liberals can be found on all sides of these and related issues, even if a minority opposes federalism *in abstracto*. This broad distribution of liberal voices seems to echo the widespread view that federalism, in the words of a Russian official responsible for nationalities policy, is 'both a means of salvation and a destructive force'.²²

One of the main targets of the liberal criticism is the ethnic foundation of Russian federalism. Some liberals even equate 'federalization' with the proliferation of an aggressive, illiberal form of nation-building in the Russian 'periphery'.²³ According to this view, ethnic republics play a 'destructive' role by providing a breeding ground for ethnonationalism, which most liberals identify as their arch enemy and primary cause of political instability and ethnic unrest in Russia.²⁴ At the most extreme, it is claimed that 'nation-building based on whatever ethnicity—Tatar Kalmyk, Bashkir, Ossetian, Russian or otherwise—contradicts the basic principles of democracy, undermines efforts to build civil society and establish the rule of law in Russia, violates fundamental human rights, divides societies into first and second class citizens, fosters inter-ethnic conflict and threatens to destroy the unity of Russia as it destroyed that of the USSR'.²⁵

The evil inherent in ethnic federalism has many faces. Some liberals blame the 'territorial principle', that is, the idea that nations are organically tied to a territory on which they exercise their right to self-determination. Not accidentally, conflicts classified as 'ethnoterritorial' occupy a central place in social and political research, both of which have a strong focus on conflict studies.²⁶ Other critics stress the propensity for ethnic federalism to create and institutionalize inequalities among ethnic groups. Most agree that the ethno-republics should not be granted the status of states.

Liberal critics note that contemporary Russian federalism inherited from its Soviet predecessor a complex stratification of ethnic groups, with some favoured more than others; in fact, it further expanded and consolidated those ethnic hierarchies. As a result, nominally equal nations of the Russian Federation differ widely in terms of their political, legal, and economic standing, depending on whether they

are titular or non-titular, repressed or non-repressed under Stalinism, are titular or non-aboriginal; whether their status is that of minority, aboriginal or ethnic group; and whether they reside in or outside of their territorial autonomies. These differences in status, which were merely symbolic before the collapse of Communism, were translated into the language of power politics in the 1990s.

In multicultural societies, according to this view, a combination of territoriality and strong political stratification along ethnic lines tends to be explosive. In this respect Russia is hardly an exception. In addition to generating ethnic strife, separatism, and inequality, ethnically based federalism fosters authoritarianism in its constituent parts, turning national republics into centralized, oppressive 'ethnocracies' that engage in ruthless economic competition and isolate their citizens from the beneficial influences of universal culture.²⁷ In these circumstances, the prime objective of any reform of the federation is to curb the ability of titular nations to mobilize along ethnic lines.

There is no demographic argument for the preservation of ethnic federalism, the liberals claim. They never tire of repeating that the number of direct beneficiaries of the system is, in fact, limited. The largest non-Russian nation, the Tatars, make up only 3.8 per cent of the population of the Russian Federation, followed by Ukrainians (2.3 per cent) and the Chuvash (1.2 per cent). Although nominally ethnic autonomies—twenty-one republics, ten okrugs and one oblast—make up 53 per cent of Russia's territory, the respective ethnic groups make up only 18 per cent of the combined population. Titular nations form majorities in eleven of the thirty-two autonomous districts, with only one being a significant majority. In contrast, twenty-one autonomous districts have Russian majorities, three of which feature large Russian majorities.²⁸ An overwhelming majority of non-Russians live outside ethnic autonomous districts, let alone autonomous districts in which they are the titular nation.²⁹

Liberals who share this view urge that ethnic federalism in Russia should be gradually abandoned, and replaced by less ethnic or, ideally, non-ethnic forms of federalism. The solutions they propose regarding the future architecture of the state frequently involve the German, American, and French models. Widely distributed on the scale between centralization and decentralization, their proposals range from a de-ethnicized federation—with ethnically neutral republics but robust, non-territorial cultural 'autonomies' at the local level—to the *gubernizatsiya* of Russia. The latter scenario sees the country divided into territorial-administrative and ethnically neutral *gubernii* (provinces), similar in name and function to those operating in pre-revolutionary Russia.³⁰ Here, the liberals come close to the

unitary vision of the state, a perspective shared by an assortment of nonliberals, including monarchists, great power nationalists, and the political gadfly Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.³¹

This quest for de-ethnicization of the federation and, by implication, for curtailment of the right to self-determination, is not exactly a new current in Russian political thought. In the early Soviet period, it was articulated by some Bolshevik activists who considered ethnic republics to be a temporary arrangement because, they argued, the ethnic principle had nothing to do with socialism.³² In the 1960s, calls were heard again for a quick transformation from federation to unitary state, based on the premise that the process of the voluntary merger of nations was close to completion, thereby eliminating the need for ethnic federalism.³³ The last and most powerful wave of criticism of the ethnic principle took shape in the late 1980s and gained momentum in the first half of the 1990s. One of its leading advocates was Valery Tishkov.³⁴

Questioning both the legitimacy and political advisability of preserving the ethnic character of the republics, Tishkov promoted a non-territorial form of cultural autonomy for those ethnic minorities who either do not possess their own administrative homeland or live outside the ethnorepublics claimed by their titular co-nationals. A departure from the idea that minorities can be best accommodated in their own ethnic states, the new liberal concept seems to have enjoyed some popularity in official circles in the early 1990s.³⁵ It was eventually embodied in a federal law on national and cultural autonomy in April 1996.³⁶

Inspired by the ideas of nineteenth-century Austrian Social Democrats Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, and Stalin's autonomization drive of the 1920s, this form of autonomy would be based on voluntary ethnic associations along cultural, socio-economic, and political lines. Because the republican and ethnic borders rarely overlap—for example, only a quarter of Russian Tatars live in Tatarstan—such cross-cutting networks and alliances would promote integration across administrative boundaries, dilute the existing ethnoterritorial divisions and, most importantly, reduce the fervour of ethnonationalist mobilization in the republics.³⁷ Cultural autonomy at the local level with no territorial base would be more easily compatible with a broader civic Russian (*Rossiiskii*) identity. In a political environment of cautious decentralization and strong local government, which most liberals favour, cultural autonomy could become the main tool for accommodating Russia's ethnocultural diversity. Tishkov stresses the important role of official bilingualism or multilingualism

in the republics, even if 'on the functional, non-official level, bilingualism in Russia will keep its "unequal"—that is, Russian-dominated—character.'³⁸

Predictably, this approach is criticized from many ideological quarters, ranging from liberals who remain loyal to the traditional concept of national self-determination to neo-Marxists. The critics object to the juxtaposition of territorial autonomy and cultural non-territorial forms of autonomy, which they deem artificial and unnecessary. The two, they argue, have a vital role to play in the Russian mosaic and should complement each other. If the ethnorepublics are 'neutralized', cultural autonomy will not sufficiently accommodate diversity, and could never meet the needs of non-Russians.³⁹ Still more radical critics see cultural autonomy as an attempt to water down the status of ethnorepublics as states in order to promote unitarianism and russification.⁴⁰

Using the language of ethnocultural justice, similar to the intentions of Soviet federalism that were meant to compensate for tsarist policies, the critics of the liberal approach point out that until 1991, federalism and other forms of minority autonomy existed mostly on paper. The acute crisis of inter-ethnic relations that followed the collapse of the USSR was not caused by a federal system unleashing the monster of ethnonationalism. On the contrary, the source of Russia's predicament was the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state that precluded the implementation of any genuine federalist arrangements. Both Russian and Soviet empires destroyed states and state-like structures built by peoples they subjugated, a fact that fully justifies offering them national-territorial autonomy: the national sovereignty of non-Russians is an act of historical justice. The proponents of de-ethnicization, their critics also argue, forget that national republics accommodate not just loose collections of individual citizens, but ancient ethnic groups living in their historic homelands. These groups are distinct social organisms for whom, at their present level of historical development, state-building is the most natural form of self-expression.⁴¹

Russian critics of territorial autonomy show little patience for arguments based on the concept of ethnocultural justice. Their responses to suggestions for rehabilitation, upgrades of political and administrative status, and other attempts to redress the injustices of the past, are profoundly ambivalent. They present extensive evidence to show how such compensatory measures aggravate inter-ethnic tensions by reinforcing and deepening the ethnic cleavages established under Communism.⁴² More importantly, such proposed actions are

misguided, and even counter-productive, because they are rooted in the idea of collective rights, which many liberals oppose. They blame past excesses of collectivism for the establishment of a political culture that gives 'low priority to individual lives and human rights', a major reason for Russia's current predicament.⁴³ Some liberals warn that even measures intended for minority protection, if based on collective rights, can backfire by deepening and politicizing intergroup divisions. As such, they harm the very minorities they are seeking to protect.⁴⁴

Tishkov's definition of a national republic as 'a state of an ethnos for that ethnos alone', and his tendency to blur the distinction between republican nationalism and ethnonationalism, are indicative of the distaste of some liberals for minority nationalism.⁴⁵ Critics argue that the concept of nation in some of the national republics may be far less exclusive than these liberals believe, and that the illiberal impulses of minority nationalists are defensive in nature, and largely due to past abuses by the centre. Sovereignization is just a stage of a process, a *maladie de croissance*.⁴⁶ Moreover, they discern a growing consensus among the republics that they are states for all citizens, not exclusive domains for the titular nations. This is reflected in the constitution of the Russian Federation—which identifies the 'multi-ethnic Russian nation' as the only source of power—and in the constitutions of many other ethnically defined republics, including Sakha, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Khakassya, and Buryatya. The advocates of de-ethnicization, say their opponents, unfairly dismiss the potential of the republics for civic nationalism.⁴⁷

The defenders of the ethnic principle warn against attempts to radically divorce the process of nation-building from the ethnic principle. Russia's best choice at its present stage of transition, some say, is to tolerate the uneasy coexistence of ethnic identities with a Russian civic (*Rossiiskii*) identity. For example, the Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council, Ramazan Abdulatipov, opposes the concept of civic nation not so much as a matter of principle, but in terms of its feasibility and advisability under present socio-political conditions. Rushing the process would mean repeating the mistakes of the Bolsheviks as they pushed for the merger of nations. The nations of Russia, Abdulatipov posits, are unprepared for this. They value collective ethnic rights over individual human rights. In Russia, the latter have not acquired, and will probably never acquire, the status they enjoy in the West. Moreover, their victory in the West has been achieved through 'the eradication of entire tribes and nations, which were sacrificed on the altar of "humanism"'.⁴⁸

Defenders of ethnic federalism also point to the inconsistencies in the critique of minority nationalism. Why is the ethnic principle acceptable at a lower level of the federal structure, but unacceptable at a higher echelon? Why do liberals assume that cultural autonomy will prevent minority mobilization? Why do they reject the idea of 'Soviet people', the closest approximation of the concept of civic nation?⁴⁹ Paradoxically, arguments in defence of ethnic federalism strike a chord with some more old-fashioned Russian liberals who still believe that 'the essence of liberal policy is to guarantee the rights of nations to self-determination'.⁵⁰

Reshaping Russia's Nationalities Policy

In addition to promoting non-territorial cultural autonomy, calls for the limitation of the ethnic principle entail appeals for changes in Russia's nationalities policy. Among those current practices most criticized by the proponents of greater 'de-ethnicization' is that of delegating the management of inter-ethnic relations to the republican governments. This practice, it is argued, leaves minorities within the republics, the so-called double minorities, at the mercy of titular nations and their illiberal nation-building. Therefore, nationalities policy in the Russian Federation should be recentralized and executed from Moscow, bypassing local authorities.⁵¹ Underlying this and many similar policy recommendations is the assumption that majority nationalism is quantitatively different from, and preferable to, minority nationalism.

The proponents of greater ethnocultural neutrality of the state also recommend an aggressive promotion of ethnically neutral, inclusive national symbols.⁵² In the early and mid-1990s, they frequently called for an end to Russian domination of the federal system, and its replacement by a legally enshrined, pluralistic system of proportional representation. The discussion of cultural autonomy spawned the idea of establishing a new body, the Assembly of the Nations of Russia, which would provide adequate federal representation to ethnic groups. Representation in that body would be non-territorial and free of republican domination, and would downplay the role of the republics as states. In this way, the Assembly would provide, for example, adequate representation to all ethnic Tatars of the Russian Federation, not just the minority that happens to reside in, and be recognized as, citizens of Tatarstan.⁵³ Laws should be based on individual rights only. Tishkov has repeatedly suggested basing Russia's

nationalities policies on the 1992 UN Declaration of the Rights of Individuals Belonging to National Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.⁵⁴ Any differentiation along ethnic lines—for example ethnically based political parties—should be banned from public life. Political coalitions that cut across ethnic lines should be fostered by central authorities.⁵⁵

It should be noted that liberals are not the only users of the rhetoric of individual rights and freedoms when discussing ethnicity. Ironically, this rhetoric is also used by some Russian nationalists in the defence of majority rule. Their rejection of group rights and promotion of individual rights is bound up with reclaiming their own national homeland of Russia from the Soviet regime which was perceived as promoting territorial rights of minorities.⁵⁶

Obstacles to the Creation of a Civic Nation

Tishkov identifies three major obstacles in Russia to the adoption of the idea of civic nation. Other liberal intellectuals generally echo his views.

The first is the persisting weakness of civil society in Russia. Accordingly, Russians should be considered a proto-nation, rather than a mature nation in the Western liberal sense of the term⁵⁷—some liberals suggest that the immaturity of the Russian nation may be a blessing in disguise if it makes Russians less prone to create ethnocracies.⁵⁸ Because of its weak civic culture, Russia lacks 'societies structured by other interests and ideologies than ethnicity', which, in turn, accounts for its 'vulnerability to ethnonationalist ideology and practice.'⁵⁹

The second obstacle is opposition from an important segment of non-Russian political leaders and intelligentsia who see minority nationalism as a democratizing, constructive, anti-totalitarian and pro-Western impulse. Acutely aware of the negative connotation of nationalism, minority nationalists seek to rehabilitate its tarnished image. They do this by promoting a distinction between minority nationalism, which they describe as 'liberal' or 'democratic', and the aggressive hegemonic nationalism of the Big Brother.⁶⁰ Seeing the proposed de-ethnicization of Russian federalism as a potential threat to their minority rights, and as russification in disguise, republican élites oppose the civic definition of nationhood. For the same reason, they have been 'in unison' in condemning attempts to abolish the declaration of nationality in Russian internal passports.⁶¹ This opposition is

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usually rooted in the Soviet understanding of nation as a primordial, socio-biological phenomenon. Paradoxically, minority leaders share this stance with their main opponents—Russian nationalists.

Proponents of civic nationalism and the ethnocultural neutrality of the state tend to portray 'ethnic entrepreneurs', as they often refer to non-Russian élites, in the same way they portray minority nationalism: as inherently illiberal. Republican leaders, say the liberals, foster prejudice, discourage integration, campaign against mixed marriages, and cynically manipulate human rights. Having little respect for the latter, minority élites are driven by narrow ethnonationalist ambitions and personal careerism. By defending the national autonomous districts, they merely seek to preserve their power-base in the Russian Federation. Although some liberals portray majority and minority nationalism even-handedly, that is, in equally unflattering terms, majority nationalism generally comes across in their discourse as more civil and benign, and certainly more responsive to state control.

The third barrier is a political culture based on the 'objective' primordial understanding of ethnicity. 'Primordialism', which has been on the decline in the West for some time, continues to dominate post-Soviet social and political sciences, and is deeply ingrained in the political culture. Because of its importance, it is worth discussing this approach more fully.

According to primordialism, ethnicity is apparent in objective entities such as territory, language, recognizable membership, and a distinct collective 'mentality'. At the most extreme, it is thought of in socio-biological categories of natural selection and kinship ties. This understanding of ethnicity is reflected in Stalin's 1913 definition of nation, according to which a nation represents a higher, more advanced form of ethnicity.⁶² An influential pseudo-science was developed around the concept of ethnicity, defining and classifying such terms as 'ethnos', 'super-ethnos', and 'meta-ethnos'. Such notions provided the conceptual framework for Soviet and post-Soviet ethnonationalism. Having permeated the political and judicial systems, and state institutions at both the central and local levels, its position was unchallenged under Communism.

The theory of ethnos, rejected as unscientific by liberals, was developed by generations of Russian academics. It acquired its mature shape and influence thanks to the efforts of Lev Gumilev, as well as Yulian Bromley and his many followers.⁶³ According to this theory, ethnoeses are socio-biological phenomena created in the course of evolution. As living organisms, they become integrated, to the extent of

achieving total internal homogeneity. As 'carriers of biological energy', ethnoses are subjected to the 'laws of nature', which differ from strictly social laws. The lifecycle of an ethnos is typical of a living organism—birth, maturity, ageing, and death—and possesses countless anthropomorphic features, including an ability to express will, sense emotions—it appears that the fear of extinction is endemic among post-Soviet ethnoses—and develop distinct psyches, compatible or incompatible with those of other ethnoses. According to Gumilev, the coexistence of diverse cultures and peoples on the territory of Russia was possible only because of the natural compatibility between Russian, Siberian, and 'Grand Steppe' ethnoses.⁶⁴

Gumilev distinguished three types of relations among ethnoses. The first, 'symbiosis', amounted to a peaceful coexistence of self-contained ethnoses occupying specific ecological niches and preserving their cultural distinctiveness. The second, 'xenia', was a parasitic relationship in which a smaller ethnos lived on the 'body' of a larger ethnos. As long as the guest-ethnos inflicted no harm on the host-ethnos, inter-ethnic peace could be preserved. 'Xenia', however, easily slipped into 'chimera', the third pattern of inter-ethnic relations, which made bloody conflicts unavoidable, and typically resulted in the annihilation of one of the sides. 'Chimera' also occurred when a territory was shared by ethnoses belonging to mutually incompatible super-ethnoses that possessed different levels of 'bioenergy'. The Jews, for example, were perceived as a permanent source of chimera. Although they were seen as one of the seven super-ethnoses inhabiting Russia, they never occupied their own territorial niche. In this theory, the enormous energy of the Jews was additionally heightened by their urban lifestyle and alienation from nature.⁶⁵

Ethnoses grew deep territorial roots. But only one ethnos, the indigenous one, could lay claim to a specific territory. To establish the socio-cultural development of ancient ethnoses, which invariably began with the discussion of archaeological artefacts, anthropologists and ethnographers spent decades tracing the evolution of ethnoses from Neolithic times and mapping their material culture.

With the emergence of ethnic politics in the crumbling USSR, ethnographic primordialism took on an added dimension. It held potential for the construction of new identities as well as for the purposes of political discourse. The latter days of perestroika and the early post-Communist period witnessed a proliferation of ethnographic and historical publications tracing the origins of ethnic groups, especially of titular nations. The term ethnos became a central theme in intellectual and political debates of that time. Today, the

historical records are being reworked and reinvented on a massive scale by ethnic élites seeking to elevate the status of their groups in the political hierarchy of ethnoses. Even the Cossacks, a military caste, embarked on a massive campaign to prove that they, too, were an ancient ethnos, or super-ethnos, in an effort to claim a higher political status.⁶⁶ Non-Russian élites fiercely reject the liberal notion that many of these identities are relatively modern, construed and reconstructed by arbitrary political decisions, and sometimes elevated to the status of autonomy.⁶⁷

The intellectual mess left by Soviet nationalities policy and its theoretical underpinnings requires a massive clean-up effort. Rethinking the concepts of nation and ethnicity and their relationship to the state, Tishkov writes, is a precondition for the political modernization of Russia.⁶⁸ So far, however, the liberals have suffered more setbacks than victories in their promotion of civic nationalism.

Among their brief victories were President Yeltsin's support of the concept of *grazhdanskaya natsiya*, and a short tenure of liberals, such as Galina Starovoitova and Valery Tishkov, as chief presidential advisers on nationalities policy. Their impact on the Concept of State National Policy of the Russian Federation, a document signed by the President in 1996, is discernible.⁶⁹ In the end, though, the liberals could not prevent the subsequent shift of presidential support from the concept of civic nation to more nationalist positions.⁷⁰ Analysing early symptoms of the new trend, sociologist Vladimir Solovei accurately predicted the continuous 'ethnicization'—that is, 'nationalization' in the *russkii* sense of the term—of Russian politics. He linked it, among other factors, to the short- and long-term impact of the Chechen war.

Conclusions

Russian liberals are still at an early stage in their efforts to articulate a vision of post-Soviet Russia, and have only begun to translate it into policy prescriptions. Uniting them conceptually are the priority given to individual rights and freedoms, an aversion to a societal culture rooted in collectivist and primordial values, the yearning for an ethnically neutral state based on the civic loyalties of citizens, and a universal culture mediated by the Russian language. On the other hand, Russian liberals lack a common position on a number of crucial issues that preclude the formulation of even a consensual liberal nationalities policy. They differ widely on the price they are willing to pay for

controlling minority nationalism. This is reflected, for example, in the absence of a common liberal stand on federalism in Russia and, despite a formal commitment to decentralization, flirtation with a centralized, and even unitary, vision of Russia. A superficial examination of current discussions of federalism suggests little or no correlation between stances on federalism and the ideological credentials of Russian liberals. If this is true of intellectuals matching the narrow definition of 'liberals' adopted in this paper, the same is likely to apply to a much broader stratum of those who are commonly described in Russia as 'liberal'.

By identifying minority nationalism as a major source of political instability in the country, the liberals seek primarily to neutralize, contain, dilute, or in other ways minimize the impact of mobilized ethnicity. The problems they confront resemble those of the previous generation of Western liberals who built their vision of modern society on the assumption of the ethnocultural neutrality of the state. Russian liberals may have a much keener sense than their Western colleagues of the ethnic challenges that lie ahead in Russia, but for a variety of reasons—including the newly won freedom to think of society in individualistic terms—they are unlikely contributors to, and consumers of, a liberal theory of minority rights as conceptualized by Will Kymlicka.

But if the liberals, a minority with limited—and decreasing—political influence, are unlikely to act as transmitters of liberal pluralism into Russia, this is not to say that Kymlicka's ideas could gain more support from the dominant political culture. Slow to liberate itself from the legacy of the Soviet system, this culture continues to rely heavily on the language of institutionalized ethnicity, ethnic federalism, and ethnic group rights. Underlying this culture is the assumption that, as Aleksandr Ossipov puts it, society is a collection of 'collective individuals possessing ethnic rights and ascribing ethnic sense to social relations'. Built on the assumptions of ascribed status, collectivism, and primordialism, Russia's current political culture provides no fertile soil for the adoption of Kymlicka's model of liberal pluralism.

NOTES

1. Jerzy Szacki, 'Avtonomiya lichnosti i grazhdanskoe obshchestvo', *Polis*, 5, 1997, 71.

2. Susanna Matveeva, 'Sovremennyyi kontseptualnyi liberalism v Rossii', *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost'*, 2, 1993.
3. Susanna Matveeva, 'Vozmozhnost' natsii gosudarstva v Rossii: popytka liberalnoy interpretatsii', *Polis*, 1, 1996, 154; see also 'Natsional'nye problemy Rossii: sovremennye diskussii', *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost'*, 1, 1997, 52-62.
4. Vera Tolz, 'Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50/6, 1998, 993.
5. Sven Gunnar Simonsen, 'Raising the "Russian Question": Ethnicity and Statehood, "Russtie" and "Russia"', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 2, Spring 1996, 91.
6. Andrei Zdravomyslov, *Mezhnatsionalnye konflikty v post sovietskom prostranstvie* (Moscow 1997) 204-5; Tolz, 'Forging the Nation', 944-5.
7. Valery Tishkov, 'O natsii i natsionalizme', *Svobodnaya mysl'*, 3, 1996.
8. See, for example Simonsen, 'Raising the "Russian Question"'; Valery Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame* (London and New Delhi: Thousand Oaks, 1996) 228-45; Tatyana Solovci, 'Russkoye i sovietskoye v sovremennom samozdani Russkikh', *Identichnost' i konflikt v postsovietskikh gosudarstvakh*, (Moscow 1997) 346-57; and Tolz, 'Forging the Nation'. I have used some of Tolz's suggestions in my own typology outlined below.
9. Tolz, 'Forging the Nation', 993-1022.
10. Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism*, 1996, 230.
11. Tolz, 'Forging the Nation', 997.
12. Matveeva, 'Vozmozhnost', 154-62; Anatoly Vishnievsky, 'Edina i nedelimaya', *Polis*, 2, 1994, 26-38.
13. Viktor Kozlov, *Etnos. Natsia. Natsionalizm* (Moscow, 1999) 340; Simonsen, 'Raising the "Russian Question"'.
14. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *Kak nam obustroit Rossiu* (Leningrad, 1990) reprinted in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, September 18, 1990.
15. Yulian Bromley, 'Etnos i endogamiya', *Sovietskaya etnografiya*, 6, 1969.
16. Kozlov, *Etnos*, 19-22.
17. See, for example, Sergei Cheshko, 'Chelovek i etnichnost', *Etnograficheskoye obozrenie*, 6, 1993 and his critics, Eduard Tadevosian, 'Rossiiskii federalizm i natsional'no-gosudarstvennyi nigilizm', *Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 10, 1996; Kozlov, *Etnos*; and Viktor Kozlov, 'Problematika etnichnosti', *Etnograficheskoye obozrenie*, 4, 1995.
18. Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism*, 276; and Valery Tishkov, *Ocherki teorii i politiki etnichnosti v Rossii* (Moscow, 1997) 161.
19. Vladimir Pastukhov, 'Novyi federalizm dlia Rossii. Institutstionalizatsiya svobody', *Polis*, 3, 1994, 98.
20. *Ibid.*, 95-105.
21. *Ibid.*, 101-4.
22. Interview with Vadim Pechenev, First Deputy Minister for Nationalities Policy, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, April 28, 1999.
23. Aleksander Ossipov, 'Krasnodarskii Krai: Migration, Nationalism and Regionalist Rhetoric', in M. Opalski (ed.), *Managing Diversity in Plural Societies: Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in Post-Communist Europe* (Ottawa, 1998) 273-4.
24. Tishkov, 'O natsii i natsionalizme'; Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism*, 273-4. Cf. 'Rossiiskii sotsium 1994', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya*, 2, 1995.

25. V. M. Delaev, *Paradigma federalism v kontekste reform Rossiiskoy gosudarstvennoi ennosti* (Moscow 1999), 123.
26. E. Stepanov, 'Otchestvennaya konfliktologiya: k voprosu o stanovlenii i razvitiu', *Sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie*, 1998, 50–6; Vladimir Streletskiy, 'Etnoterritorial'nye konflikty: sushchnost', genezis, tipy', *Identichnost' i konflikt v postsovietskikh gosudarstvakh* (Moscow, 1997) 225–49.
27. Tishkov, 'O natsii i natsionalisme'; Tadevosian, 'Rossiiskii federalism', 1–14; and Boris Fedorov, *Shto i kak my budem delat* (Moscow, 1994).
28. Cameron Ross, 'Federalism i demokratiya v Rossii', *Polis*, 4, 1999, 21.
29. Valery Tishkov, 'Strategiya i mekhanizmy natsional'noy politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii', *Etnograficheskoye obozrenie*, 5, 1993, 12–34.
30. Fedorov, *Shto i kak*.
31. Interview with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, *Izvestiya*, April 23, 1994. Zhirinovskiy urged Russians to 'forget about the federation as one forgets a bad dream'.
32. Eduard Tadevosian, *Sovietskaya natsional'naya gosudarstvennost'* (Moscow, 1972) and his 'Edinstvo internatsionalnogo i natsionalnogo v gosudarstvennosti narodov SSSR', *Kommunist*, 18, 1973, 66–76.
33. Tadevosian, *Sovetskaya natsional'naya*; Grey Hodnett, 'The Debate Over Soviet Federalism', *Soviet Studies*, 28/4, 1967.
34. Valery Tishkov's article, 'Narody i gosudarstvo', *Kommunist*, 1, 1989, opened public debate on the issue.
35. Roundtable on 'Interethnic Contradictions in Russia. The Strategy of Political Parties and Social Movements', *Russian Politics and Law*, September–October, 1994, 6–31.
36. For a detailed discussion of the law and the concept of cultural autonomy, see Mikhail Goboglo, *Mozhet li druglovyyi orel letat's odnom krylom?* (Moscow, 2000).
37. V. A. Pechenev, 'O natsional'noy i regionalnoy politike v Federativnoy Rossii', *Etnopolis*, 1, 1994, 84.
38. Tishkov, 'Strategiya i mekhanizmy'.
39. Tadevosian, 'Rossiiskii federalism'; and 'Etnonatsia: mif ili sotsial'naya realnost'?' *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya*, 6, 1998, 61–8.
40. Mikhail Nikolaev, (President of the Republic of Sakha), 'V bratskoy sem'e—no bez ottsa narodov', *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 9 August 1996.
41. Tadevosian, 'Rosiski federalism', 2nd 'Etnonatsia'.
42. For a discussion of federalism as the institutionalization of complex ethnic hierarchies, see for instance Galina Soldatova, *Psikhologiya mezhbetrnicheskikh napravlenosti* (Moscow, 1998). Soldatova presents Russia's rehabilitation of nations deported by Stalin as a source of ethnic unrest in the Caucasus.
43. Tishkov, *Ethnicity and Nationalism*.
44. Ossipov, 'Krasnodarskii Krai', 260–73.
45. Valery Tishkov, 'Sotsialnoye i natsional'noye v istoriko-antropologicheskoy perspektive', *Kommunist*, 1, 1990; 'Narody i gosudarstvo', *Kommunist*, 2, 1992; Vestnik RAN (Rossiiskoy Akademii Nauk) 8, 1993.
46. Interview with Nikolai Ryzhov, the head of the Narodovlaste faction in the State Duma, *Etnograficheskoye obozrenie*, 3, 1999, 126.
47. Ildus Ilishev, 'Russian Federalism: Political, Legal and Ethnolinguistic Aspects', *Nationalities Papers*, 26/4, 1998; Tadevosian, 'Etnonatsia', 67–8.
48. Ramazan Abdulatipov, 'Poslanie Prezidentu Rossiiskoy Federatsii B. N. Yeltsinu. O federativnoy i natsional'noy politike rossiiskogo gosudarstva', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, March 14, 1995, 3.

49. Ibid.; and Kozlov (1995).
50. Roundtable on 'Interethnic Contradictions', 22.
51. Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism*, 64; 'Konceptsiia gosudarstvennoy natsional'noy politiki Rossiiskoy Federatsii utverzhdena spetsialnym ukazom prezidenta ot 15 yunia', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 21, 1996. Goboglo, Mozhet.
52. Ibid.
53. Vladimir Kalamanov, 'Rossii nuzhna Assambleya narodov', *Rossiiskaya Federatsiia*, 7, 1997; Sergei Alekseev, Vladimir Kalamanov, and Andrei Chernenko, *Ideologicheskie orientiry Rossii*, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1998) 30-6.
54. Valery Tishkov, 'Rossiia kak natsional'noye gosudarstvo', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 26 January 1994.
55. Ibid.
56. Graham Smith, 'Russia, Multiculturalism and Federal Justice', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 50/8, 1998, 1398-9.
57. T. Alekseeva, B. Kapustin, and I. Pantin, 'Kakovy ideologicheskie uslovia obshchestvenno sogleasia v Rossii?', *Polis*, 7, 1999, 19, 41; Solovei, 'Russkoye i sovetskoye'; Matveeva, 'Vozmozhnost', 162. See also Eduard Bagramov, 'Natsiya kak sograzhdanstvo?', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 15 March 1994, 5.
58. Matveeva, 'Vozmozhnost'.
59. Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism*, 274.
60. See the papers and comments by Faazia Bayramova, Davit Berdzenishvili, Vyacheslav Chernivil, Refat Chubarov, Paruir Hairikyan, Mart Nutt, and Ali Kerimov at the conference, 'The Rise of Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union', Kyiv, Ukraine, November 29-December 1, 1996, *Uncaptive Minds*, 9/3-4, 1997.
61. For an extensive discussion on the so-called 'fifth point' see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, 'Inheriting the Soviet Toolbox: Russia's Dilemma Over Ascriptive Nationality', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51/6, 1999, 1069-87.
62. Joseph Stalin, 'Natsional'nyi vopros', in *Voprosy Leninizma* (Moscow, 1945) 45-52.
63. Sergei Shirokogorov is best known for his classification of ethnoses. Yulian Bromley's typology of ethnoses and 'ethno-social processes' identified the 'socialist nation' as the highest evolutionary form. Lev Gumilev offered a sociobiological interpretation of the theory.
64. On the 'negative' and 'positive' 'mutual compatibility' of ethnoses see Igor Shishkin, 'Simbiosis, xenia i khimera: Lev Gumilev o etnosakh Rossii', *Zavtra*, 4, 1995, 60.
65. Ibid.
66. In the authoritative encyclopedia *Narody Rossii*, edited by Valery Tishkov (Moscow, 1994) 169-74, the Cossacks are presented as an ethnos. On the Cossack struggle for the status of a nation, see Magda Opalski, 'The Cossack Revival: Rebuilding an Old Identity in a New Russia', in M. Opalski (ed.), *Managing Diversity in Plural Societies: Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in Post-Communist Europe* (Ottawa, 1998) 75-101.
67. Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism*.
68. Ibid.
69. Tishkov, *Ocherki teorii*, 138-73.
70. Valery Solovei, "'Natsionalizatsiia" rezhima budet prodolzhat'sia', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 7 March 1996.