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NATO expansion: A realist's view

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PART II: POWER AND PREFERENCES

NATO Expansion: A Realist's View¹

KENNETH N. WALTZ

The purpose of this paper is both to ask how well non-realist approaches to international politics serve us and to show how realist theory helps one to understand international-political events and changes. One of the charges hurled at realist theory is that it fails to explain the failure of a new balance of power to form since the end of the Cold War. Another charge is that the survival and flourishing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defeats realists' expectations.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the international-political system became unipolar. In the light of structural theory, unipolarity appears as the least durable of international configurations. This is so for two main reasons. One is that dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their own borders, thus weakening themselves in the long run. Ted Robert Gurr, after examining 336 polities, reaches the same conclusion that Robert G. Wesson had reached earlier: 'Imperial decay is ... primarily a result of the misuse of power which follows inevitably from its concentration'.² The other reason for the short duration of unipolarity is that even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behaviour. America's founding fathers warned against the perils of power in the absence of checks and balances. Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics? Throughout the Cold War, what the United States and the Soviet Union did, and how they interacted, were dominant factors in international politics. The two countries, however, constrained each other. Now the United States is alone in the world. As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power. Faced by unbalanced power, some states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance. The reactions of other states to the drive for dominance of Charles V

Hapsburg ruler of Spain, of Louis XIV and Napoleon I of France, of Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler of Germany, illustrate the point.

Will the preponderant power of the United States elicit similar reactions? Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others. The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice and well-being in the world. These terms, however, are defined to the liking of the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences and interests of others. In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it. With benign intent, the United States has behaved, and until its power is brought into balance, will continue to behave in ways that sometimes frighten others.

For almost half a century, the constancy of the Soviet threat produced a constancy of American policy. Other countries could rely on the United States for protection because protecting them seemed to serve US security interests. Even so, beginning in the 1950s western European countries, and beginning in the 1970s, Japan had increasing doubts about the reliability of the American nuclear deterrent. As Soviet strength increased, western European countries began to wonder whether America could be counted on to use its deterrent on their behalf, thus risking its own cities. When President Carter moved to reduce American troops in Korea, and later when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and strengthened its forces in the Far East, Japan developed similar worries.

With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer faces a major threat to its security. As General Colin Powell said when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 'I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung.'³ Constancy of threat produces constancy of policy; absence of threat permits policy to become capricious. When few if any vital interests are endangered, a country's policy becomes sporadic and self-willed.

The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices. A dominant power acts internationally only when the spirit moves it. One example is enough to show this. When Yugoslavia's collapse was followed by genocidal war in successor states, the United States failed to respond until Senator Robert Dole moved to make Bosnia's peril an issue in the forthcoming presidential election; and it acted not for the sake of its own

security but to maintain its leadership position in Europe. American policy was generated not by external security interests but by internal political pressure and national ambition.

Aside from specific threats it may pose, unbalanced power leaves weaker states feeling uneasy and gives them reason to strengthen their positions. The United States has a long history of intervening in weak states, often with the intention of bringing democracy to them. American behaviour over the past century in central America provides little evidence of self-restraint in the absence of countervailing power. Contemplating our history and measuring our capabilities, other countries may well wish for ways to fend off our benign ministrations. Concentrated power invites distrust because it is so easily misused. To understand why some states want to bring power into a semblance of balance is easy, but, with power so sharply skewed, what country or group of countries has the material capability and the political will to bring the 'unipolar moment' to an end? The expectation that following victory in a great war a new balance of power will form is firmly grounded in both history and theory. The last four grand coalitions (two against Napoleon and one in each of the world wars of the twentieth century) collapsed once victory was achieved. Victories in major wars leave the balance of power badly skewed. The winning side emerges as a dominant coalition. The international equilibrium is broken; theory leads one to expect its restoration.

Clearly something has changed. Some believe that America is so nice that, despite the dangers of unbalanced power, others do not feel the fear that would spur them to action. Michael Mastanduno, among others, believes this to be so, although he ends his essay with the thought that 'eventually power will check power'.⁴ Others believe that the leaders of states have learned that playing the game of power politics is costly and unnecessary. Instead the explanation for sluggish balancing is a simple one. In the aftermath of earlier great wars, the materials for constructing a new balance were readily at hand. Previous wars left a sufficient number of great powers standing to permit a new balance to be rather easily constructed. Theory enables one to say that a new balance of power will form but not to say how long it will take. International conditions determine that.

Those who refer to the unipolar moment are right. In our perspective, the new balance is emerging slowly; in historical perspectives, it will come in the blink of an eye.

I ended a 1993 article this way: 'one may hope that America's internal preoccupations will produce not an isolationist policy, which has become impossible, but a forbearance that will give other countries at long last the chance to deal with their own problems and make their own mistakes. But I would not bet on it.'⁵ I should think that few would do so now. Charles Kegley has said, sensibly, that if the world becomes multipolar once again, realists will be vindicated.⁶ Seldom do signs of vindication appear so promptly.

The candidates for becoming the next great powers, and thus restoring a balance, are the European Union, China and Japan. Since the Cold War's end, the policies and behaviours of western European states lead one to believe that for the first time in modern history the new balance of power will be made in the East rather than in the West.

The countries of the European Union have been remarkably successful in integrating their national economies. The achievement of a large measure of economic integration without a corresponding political unity is an accomplishment without historical precedent. On questions of foreign and military policy, however, the European Union can act only with the consent of its members, making bold or risky action impossible. The European Union has all the tools – population, resources, technology and military capabilities – but lacks the organizational ability and the collective will to use them. As Jacques Delors said when he was President of the European Commission: 'It will be for the European Council, consisting of heads of state and government ..., to agree on the essential interests they share and which they will agree to defend and promote together.'⁷ Policies that must be arrived at by consensus can be carried out only when they are fairly inconsequential. Inaction as Yugoslavia sank into chaos and war signalled that Europe will not act to stop wars even among near neighbours. Western Europe was unable to make its own foreign and military policies when it was an organization of six or nine states living in fear of the Soviet Union. With less pressure and more members, it can hardly hope to do so now. Only when the United States decides on a policy are European countries able to follow it. As far ahead as the eye can see, western Europe will be a follower rather than a leader internationally.

The fate of European states continues to depend on decisions made in America. NATO's expansionist policy illustrates how the absence of

external restraints on the United States affects its policy. The states of the European Union generally have shown no enthusiasm for expanding NATO eastward and have revealed little willingness to bear a share of the costs entailed. German officials, notably Volker Rühle, were among the few western Europeans to show enthusiasm. While the United States pressed ahead with expansion, the European Union, as expected, was content to stand by meekly and watch. In a statement that would be hard to credit were it not made by a European Union official, Hans van der Broek, commissioner for external relations with countries from central Europe to Russia, has said that the Union takes no position on NATO's expansionist policy because it has no 'competence' on NATO enlargement.⁸

In the old multipolar world, the core of an alliance consisted of a small number of states of comparable capability. Their contributions to one another's security were of crucial importance because they were of similar size. Because major allies were closely interdependent, the defection of one would have made its partners vulnerable to a competing alliance. The members of opposing alliances before the First World War were tightly knit because of their mutual dependence. In the new bipolar world, the word 'alliance' took on a different meaning. One country, the United States or the Soviet Union, provided most of the security for its bloc. The defection of France from NATO and of China from the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) failed even to tilt the central balance. Early in the Cold War, Americans spoke with alarm about the threat of monolithic communism arising from the combined strength of the Soviet Union and China, yet the bloc's disintegration caused scarcely a ripple. American officials did not proclaim that with China's defection America's defence budget could safely be reduced by 20 or 10 per cent or even be reduced at all. Similarly, when France withdrew from NATO, American officials did not proclaim that defence spending had to be increased for that reason. Properly speaking, NATO and the WTO were more treaties of guarantee than military alliances old-style.⁹ The end of the Cold War quickly changed the behaviour of allied countries. In early July 1990, NATO announced that the alliance would 'elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe'.¹⁰ By the end of July, without waiting for any such plans, the major European members of NATO unilaterally announced large reductions in their force levels. Even the pretence of continuing to act as an alliance in setting military policy disappeared.

I expected NATO to dwindle at the Cold War's end and ultimately to disappear as the four previous grand coalitions had done once their principal adversaries were defeated.¹¹ To some extent, the expectation has already been borne out. NATO is no longer even a treaty of guarantee since one cannot answer the question, guarantee against whom? Glenn Snyder has remarked that 'alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response'.¹² How then can one explain NATO's survival and growth? An obvious part of the explanation is found in what has long been known about organizations in general. Organizations, especially big ones with strong traditions, have long lives. The March of Dimes is an example sometimes cited. Having won the war against polio, its mission was accomplished. Nevertheless, it cast about for a new malady to cure or contain. Even though the most appealing ones – cancer, heart, lungs, multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis – were already taken, it did find a worthy cause to pursue, the amelioration of birth defects. One can fairly claim that the March of Dimes enjoys continuity as an organization, pursuing an end consonant with its original purpose. How can one make such a claim for NATO?

The question of purpose may, however, not be a very important one; create an organization and it will find something to do.¹³ Once created, and the more so once it has become well established, an organization becomes hard to get rid of. A big organization is managed by large numbers of bureaucrats who develop a strong interest in its perpetuation. According to Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, NATO headquarters was recently manned by 2,640 officials, most of whom presumably want to keep their jobs.¹⁴ Twenty-five years ago, Bernard Brodie wondered whether NATO's useful life was over. Its founding fathers thought of it as a defensive alliance needed until Europe's recovery would enable it to provide its own defence. That time had surely come. Yet, as Brodie remarked, 'The inertias built into' NATO's international bureaucracy 'can only be imagined by those who have not experienced them'. He concluded by saying 'we are either blessed or burdened with this creation of a time that was very different from our own days'.¹⁵ Clearly, Brodie thought that by 1973 the burden outweighed the blessing, and the burden continues to be borne disproportionately by the United States.

A second part of the explanation of NATO's longevity is more important than the first part. Liberal institutionalists take

NATO's seeming vigour as confirmation of the importance of international institutions and as evidence of their resilience. Realists, noticing that as an alliance NATO has lost its major function, see it simply as a means of maintaining and lengthening America's grip on the foreign and military policies of European states. The survival and expansion of NATO tell us much about American power and influence and little about institutions as multilateral entities. The ability of the United States to extend the life of a moribund institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests.

The Bush administration saw, and the Clinton administration continued to see, NATO as the instrument for maintaining America's domination of the foreign and military policies of European states. In 1991, Under-secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew's letter to the governments of European members of NATO warned against Europe's formulating independent positions on defence. France and Germany had thought that a European security and defence identity might be developed within the European Union and that the Western European Union (WEU), formed in 1954, could be revived as the instrument for its realization. The Bush administration quickly squelched these ideas. The day after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, President Bush could say with satisfaction that 'we are pleased that our Allies in the Western European Union ... decided to strengthen that institution as both NATO's European pillar and the defense component of the European Union'.¹⁶

The European pillar was to be contained within NATO, and its policies were to be made in Washington. Weaker states have trouble fashioning institutions to serve their own ends in their own ways, especially in the security realm. Think of the defeat of the European Defence Community in 1954 and the inability of the WEU in the more than four decades of its existence to find a significant role independent of the United States. Realism reveals what liberal institutionalist 'theory' obscures: namely, that international institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests.¹⁷ Keohane and Martin, replying to Mearsheimer's criticism of liberal institutionalism, ask how we are 'to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions if such institutions are lacking in significance'.¹⁸ If the answer were not already obvious,

the expansion of NATO would answer it: to serve what powerful states believe to be their interests.

Domestic politics supply a third part of the explanation for America's championing NATO's expansion. With the administration's Bosnian policy in trouble, Clinton needed to show himself to be an effective leader in foreign policy. With the national heroes, Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel, clamouring for their countries' inclusion, foreclosing NATO membership would have handed another issue to the Republican Party in the congressional elections of 1994. To tout NATO's eastward march, President Clinton gave major speeches in Milwaukee, Cleveland and Detroit, cities with significant numbers of eastern European voters.¹⁹ Votes and dollars are the lifeblood of American politics. New members of NATO will be required to improve their military infrastructure and to buy modern weapons. The American arms industry, expecting to capture its usual large share of a new market, lobbied heavily in favour of NATO's expansion.²⁰

The reasons for expanding NATO are weak. The reasons for opposing expansion are strong.²¹ It draws new lines of division in Europe, alienates those left out, and can find no logical stopping place west of Russia. It weakens those Russians most inclined towards liberal democracy and a market economy. It strengthens Russians of opposite inclination. It reduces hope for further large reductions of nuclear weaponry. It pushes Russia towards China instead of drawing Russia towards Europe and America. NATO, led by America, scarcely considered the plight of its defeated adversary. Throughout modern history, Russia has been rebuffed by the West, isolated and at times surrounded. Many Russians believe that, by expanding, NATO brazenly broke promises it made in 1990 and 1991 that former WTO members would not be allowed to join NATO. With good reason, Russians fear that NATO will not only admit additional old members of the WTO but also former republics of the USSR. In 1997, NATO held naval exercises with Ukraine in the Black Sea, with more joint exercises to come, and announced plans to use a military testing ground in western Ukraine. In June 1998, Zbigniew Brzezinski went to Kiev with the message that Ukraine should prepare itself to join NATO by the year 2010.²² The further NATO intrudes into the Soviet Union's old arena, the more Russia is forced to look to the south and east rather than to the west. This seems all the more ironic when one

recalls that during the 1980s Russian military analysts began to believe that long-range threats to Russia would come from the south and east, not the west.²³

Late in 1996, expecting a measure of indifference, I asked an official in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs whether India was concerned over the expansive NATO policy. He immediately replied that a policy seemingly designed to bring Russia and China together of course was of great concern to India. Despite much talk about the 'globalization' of international politics, American political leaders to a dismaying extent think of East *or* West rather than of their interaction. With a history of conflict along a 2,600-mile border, with ethnic minorities sprawling across it, with a mineral-rich and sparsely populated Siberia facing China's teeming millions, Russia and China will find it difficult to co-operate effectively, but we are doing our best to help them do so. Indeed, the United States provides the key to Russian-Chinese relations over the past half-century. Feeling American antagonism and fearing American power, China drew close to Russia after the Second World War and remained so until the United States seemed less, and the Soviet Union more, of a threat to China. The relatively harmonious relations the United States and China enjoyed during the 1970s began to turn sour in the late 1980s when Russian power visibly declined and American hegemony became imminent. To alienate Russia by expanding NATO, and to alienate China by pressing it to change its policies and lecturing its leaders on how to rule their country, are policies that only an overwhelmingly powerful country could afford, and only a foolish one be tempted, to follow.

Once some countries are brought in, how can others be kept out? Secretary Albright has said that no democratic country will be excluded from NATO because of its position on the map. A hurt and humiliated Russia can expect to suffer further pain. Secretary Albright thinks it ridiculous of Russia to fear NATO's inclusion of a distant Hungary, but the distance between additional members of the alliance and Russia would be shorter.²⁴ Anyway, it is not so much new members that Russia fears as it is America's might moving ever closer to its borders. Any country finds it difficult to understand how another country feels. Americans should, however, be able to imagine what their fears would be if they had lost the Cold War and Russia expanded the WTO into the Americas, all the while claiming that it was acting

for the sake of stability in central America with no threat to the United States implied. Adept statesmen keep their countries' potential adversaries divided. The Clinton administration seemed to delight in bringing them together.

Even while American leaders were assuring Russia that NATO's expansion was not motivated by animosity towards Russia, American and NATO estimates of the costs entailed depended in large measure on speculations about when Russia would once again pose a military threat to Europe.²⁵ As Boris Yeltsin said in Moscow, with President Jiang Zemin at his side, 'someone is longing for a single-polar world'.²⁶ Pressure from the West helps to unite them in opposition to this condition. Both parties now speak of a 'constructive partnership aimed at strategic co-operation in the twenty-first century'.²⁷ The American rhetoric of globalization turns out to be globaloney: we fail to understand how our policy for one region affects another.

Winners of wars, facing few impediments to the exercise of their wills, have often acted in ways that created future enemies. Thus Germany, by taking Alsace and most of Lorraine from France in 1871, earned its lasting enmity; and the Allies' harsh treatment of Germany after the First World War produced a similar effect. In contrast, Bismarck persuaded the Kaiser not to march his armies along the road to Vienna after the great victory at Königgrätz in 1866. In the Treaty of Prague, Prussia took no Austrian territory. Thus Austria, having become Austria-Hungary, was available as an alliance partner for Germany in 1879. Rather than learning from history, the United States is repeating past errors by extending its influence over what used to be the province of the vanquished.²⁸

Can one find any reason to be optimistic about the pointless policy of expansion? Perhaps this to start with: in a co-ordinated organization, more is less. The larger the number of members, the greater the number of interests to be served and the more varied the views that have to be accommodated. In the absence of a final arbiter, aligning interests becomes more difficult as their numbers increase. Just as a wider European Union means a shallower one, so a more inclusive NATO means a less coherent and focused alliance. Western Europeans think of NATO's expansion as being of low cost because with no foe to fear additional military expenditure would have little purpose. Thus French President Jacques Chirac said in effect not a

centime for NATO's expansion, and British leaders said not a penny. Yet American leaders continued to claim that old and new European members would pay the major share of the costs. NATO argued enough about burden-sharing during the Cold War, and America by and large lost because it believed that fairly or not it had to do what Europe's and its own security required. A larger NATO will have more to argue about and, lacking the disciplining threat of a serious opponent, the arguments are likely to become more frequent and bitter than they used to be.

One can turn this the other way and say that differences will be muted precisely because the absence of a threat means it matters little whether they are resolved. The members of NATO, however, will still have the obligation to come to one another's defence. The American military will certainly take the obligation seriously, as it should. Moreover, because nuclear deterrence covers only a country's manifestly vital interests, it will not cover newly admitted members of the alliance. Deterrence is cheaper than defence. The increase in American commitments makes reliance on deterrence more desirable and less possible.

The expansion of NATO extends its military interests, enlarges its responsibilities and increases its burdens. Not only do new members require NATO's protection, they also heighten its concern over destabilizing events near their borders. Thus Balkan eruptions become a NATO and not just a European concern. In the absence of European initiative, Americans believe they must lead the way because the credibility of NATO is at stake. Balkan operations in the air and even more so on the ground exacerbate differences of interest among NATO members and strain the alliance. European members marvel at the surveillance and communications capabilities of the United States and stand in awe of the modern military forces at its command. Aware of their weaknesses, Europeans express determination to modernize their forces and to develop their ability to deploy them independently. Europe's reaction to America's Balkan operations duplicates its determination to remedy deficiencies revealed in 1991 during the Gulf War, a determination that produced few results.

Will it be different this time? Perhaps, yet if European states do achieve their goals of creating a 60,000 strong rapid reaction force and enlarging the role of the WEU, the tension between a NATO

controlled by the United States and a NATO allowing for independent European action will again be bothersome. In any event, the prospect of militarily bogging down in the Balkans tests the alliance and may indefinitely delay its further expansion. Expansion buys trouble, and mounting troubles may bring expansion to a halt.

European conditions and Russian opposition work against the eastward extension of NATO. Pressing in the opposite direction is the momentum of American expansion. The momentum of expansion has often been hard to break, a thought borne out by the empires of Republican Rome, of Tsarist Russian, and of Liberal Britain.

One is often reminded that the United States is not just the dominant power in the world but that it is a *liberal* dominant power. True, the motivations of the artificers of expansion – President Clinton, national security adviser Anthony Lake, and others – were to nurture democracy in young, fragile, long-suffering countries. One may wonder, however, why this should be an American rather than a European task and why a military rather than a political-economic organization should be seen as the appropriate means for carrying it out. The task of building democracy is not a military one. The military security of new NATO members is not in jeopardy; their political development and economic well-being are. In 1997, Assistant Secretary of Defense Franklin D. Kramer told the Czech defence ministry that it was spending too little on defence.²⁹ Yet investing in defence slows economic growth. By common calculation, defence spending stimulates economic growth about half as much as direct investment in the economy. In eastern Europe, economic not military security is the problem and entering a military alliance compounds it.

Using the example of NATO to reflect on the relevance of realism after the Cold War leads to some important conclusions. The winner of the Cold War and the sole remaining great power has behaved as unchecked powers have usually done. In the absence of counterweights, a country's internal impulses prevail whether fuelled by liberal or by other urges. The error of realist predictions that the end of the Cold War would mean the end of NATO arose not from a failure of realist theory to comprehend international politics, but from an underestimation of America's folly.

Do liberal institutionalists provide better leverage for explaining NATO's survival and expansion? According to Keohane and Martin, realists insist 'that institutions have only marginal effects'.³⁰ On the contrary, realists have noticed that whether institutions have strong or weak effects depends on what states intend. Strong states use institutions, as they interpret laws, in ways that suit them. Thus, Susan Strange, in pondering the state's retreat, observes that 'international organization is above all a tool of national government, an instrument for the pursuit of national interest by other means'.³¹

Interestingly, Keohane and Martin, in their effort to refute Mearsheimer's trenchant criticism, in effect agree with him. Having claimed that his realism is 'not well specified', they note that 'institutional theory conceptualizes institutions both as independent and dependent variables'.³² Dependent on what? – on 'the realities of power and interest'. Institutions, it turns out, 'make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities'.³³ Yes! Liberal institutionalism, as Mearsheimer says, 'is no longer a clear alternative to realism, but has, in fact, been swallowed up by it'.³⁴ Indeed, it never was an alternative to realism. Institutional theory, as Keohane has stressed, has as its core structural realism, which Keohane and Nye sought 'to broaden'.³⁵ The institutional approach starts with structural theory, applies it to the origins and operations of institutions, and unsurprisingly ends with realist conclusions.

Alliances illustrate the limitations of institutionalism with special clarity. Keohane has remarked that 'alliances are institutions, and both their durability and strength may depend in part on their institutional characteristics'.³⁶ In part, I suppose, but one must wonder on how large a part. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were quite durable. They lasted not because of alliance institutions, there hardly being any, but because the core members of each alliance looked outwards and saw a pressing threat to their security. Previous alliances did not lack institutions because states had failed to figure out how to construct bureaucracies. Previous alliances lacked institutions because in the absence of a hegemonic leader, balancing continued within as well as across alliances. NATO lasted as a military alliance as long as the Soviet Union appeared to be a direct threat to its members. It survives and expands now not because of its institutions but mainly because the United States wants it to.

NATO's survival also exposes an interesting aspect of balance-of-power theory. Robert Art has argued forcefully that without NATO and without American troops in Europe, European states will lapse into a 'security competition' among themselves.³⁷ As he emphasizes, this is a realist expectation. In his view, preserving NATO, and maintaining America's leading role in it, are required in order to prevent a security competition that would promote conflict and impair the institutions of the European Union. The secondary task of an alliance, intra-alliance management, should continue to be performed by the United States even though the primary task, defence against an external enemy, has disappeared. The point is worth pondering, but I need to say here only that it further illustrates the dependence of international institutions on national decisions. Balancing among states is not inevitable. As in Europe, a hegemonic power may suppress it. As a high-level European diplomat put it, 'it is not acceptable that the lead nation be European. A European power broker is a hegemonic power. We can agree on US leadership, but not on one of our own'.³⁸ Accepting the leadership of a hegemonic power prevents a balance of power from emerging in Europe, and better the hegemonic power should be at a distance than next door.

Keohane believes that avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized co-operation.³⁹ If one accepts the conclusion, the question that remains is what sustains the 'pattern of institutionalized cooperation'? Realists know the answer.

NOTES

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