12 'Revolution in trade'

The Americanization of distribution in Germany during the boom-years, 1949–1975

Harm G. Schröter

Introduction

Nothing short of a 'revolution in trade' happened during the boom years in West Germany and in Western Europe according to Robert Nieschlag.[1] Who was Robert Nieschlag, and why did he use such strong words? During the 1950s and 1960s Nieschlag became what Bruno Tietz had become during the 1970s and 1980s, the scientific pope of German distribution.[2] By using the term revolution, he wanted to underline the dramatic change which took place not only in the form and size of distribution systems, but in the fundamental change in the approach and understanding of it. At the beginning of this period, one of the leading economists in Germany, Burkardt Röper, wrote: 'Surprisingly small is the desire of retailers to compete with each other on prices.'[3] However, 10 years later Nieschlag established: 'While formerly a defensive attitude was widespread within retailers, there now is a remarkable change in the younger generation towards a truly traders' approach.'[4]

Before the Second World War all changes and new forms of distribution were met with disapproval by the established firms, since owners as well as employees thought such steps to be a threat against their existence. When the consumers' co-operative movement became more powerful it had to face massive hostility, including the boycott of wholesalers. During the interwar period, when the department stores became strong, the Nazi party promised to fight them, and by such propaganda successfully gained votes. With this background we can understand why the word revolution was employed when a conservative attitude such as 'we do not want any novelties!' was changed into a business-like one such as 'how can I exploit this innovation for my own business?' Openness to new ideas led to new strategies. According to Alfred Chandler, business structure follows strategy, which in this case meant the transfer of new forms of sales and sales organizations.[5] At the same time, development represented a change from a co-operative way of thinking towards a more competitive way of behaving in everyday life. Since such attitudes and forms of competitive behaviour were much more widespread in the US than in Germany, Alfred Chandler

has called these two basic types of doing business competitive and co-operative capitalism.[6] The latter attitude prevailed in the distributive sector in Germany up until the 1950s.

Substantial parts of the change towards a more competitive, more dynamic approach can be understood as an Americanization. We define Americanization as the adaptation and transfer of behaviour, institutions, culture, values, decision-making strategies, organizational structures, symbols and norms, away from the USA where they were widespread, to somewhere else.[7] Through the process of transfer to another nation and by its adaptation to specific needs, traditions and circumstances, such American cultures are changed, sometimes substantially. We cannot expect such transfers to take place in the same way as the import of a piece of machinery. There are specific transfer channels, translations and transformations which are part of this process of adaptation.[8] Furthermore, all transfer of culture needs time to adapt, proceeds stepwise, is open for a backlash, etc., which means that the whole issue is, on the one hand, extremely flexible and powerful but, on the other, cannot be measured and accounted for by quantitative methods.

In 1962, Max Gloor, at that time director of the marketing division of the Swiss transnational firm Nestlé, argued at an international symposium under the headline 'Today in the USA – tomorrow in Europe?' 'Basically I could tackle my task very easily – I would not be the first – by simply saying what is going on in the USA today will be the tomorrow in Europe. But this would be a simplification and only partly correct.'[9] In other words, while there was a lot of development, and most of it resembled patterns to be found in the USA, we had not only adaptations, but failures of Americanization as well as changes on an indigenous basis. Nearly all such changes can be understood as modernization. However, the problem is that not all modernization can be explained as part of an Americanization process.[10] Below we will provide an overview of successful and unsuccessful Americanization in the West German distribution sector.

Distribution is about the transfer of goods and services from production to consumption and incorporates the following aspects: space, time, organization, quality, quantity, price, credit, assortment, mentality etc. We will concentrate on forms and organization of distribution and explore these sectors for expressions of Americanization. In size the economic sector of distribution was substantial. In 1950 trade represented 8.2 per cent of GNP (wholesale 4.3, retail 3.9) while industry represented 32.4 and transport 6.5 per cent. In 1971 trade represented 12.2, industry for 41.2 and transport for 5.5 per cent.[11] In other words, trade mattered. At the beginning of the period German households spent about 50 per cent of their income on food and drink, a figure which sank to about 30 per cent at the end of the boom. The turnover of food at the beginning represented about 15 per cent of GNP and shrank to a little less than 10 per cent in 1975. Though there was a diminishing trend, the food sector remained one of the largest in the economy. Below we will concentrate on those sectors in which we found significant changes towards American patterns; that is generally more in retail than in wholesale trade and more specifically in the mail-order business and in the distribution of food and textiles. Our evaluation cannot be fully comprehensive. Some types of Americanization took place in management, internal organization of firms, advertising, use of consultants, etc. Because of space restrictions we refer to the respective studies without taking these issues up again.[12]

Forms of Americanization

Development of self-service

Self-service was invented in the United States. Around 1912, the first trial of this new sales system took place. At first it spread only slowly, but it grew during the interwar period. After the Second World War it took off. From 1948 onwards more and more shops changed to this system and, in 1958, 95 per cent of food turnover was sold in this way.[13] In the USA, as well as in Germany at a later time, self-service was most widespread in the food sector; therefore we shall concentrate on this area.

Herbert Eklöh, a private shopkeeper, was the first to open a self-service shop in Germany in 1938. Incidentally, it was also the first one in Europe. His shop in Osnabrück, a small town in Northern Germany, was neither a great success nor a total failure. Consumers showed little interest, and during the war the shop was bombed.[14] After the war the consumers' co-operatives were heading the trend to self-service. As a first step, on 30 August 1949, the co-operative *Produktion* opened the first self-service shop in Hamburg. The expansion of this new form of marketing was slow. In 1950, 38 shops had opened; 2 years later 100, in 1954, 203 and in 1956, 738. The trend could already be seen, but compared to more than 150,000 ordinary shops, it was negligible. The majority of consumers had never seen a self-service shop. However, from 1957 onwards numbers rocketed. It was not until 10 years later, in 1968, that the number of self-service shops surpassed the number of service shops, but these were just statistics. The economic element was decided much earlier. In 1961 the number of self-service shops stood at 14 per cent, but their turnover already represented 39 per cent! 50 per cent was reached in 1963 and at the end of the boom (1975), there were 76,122 self-service shops, taking 96.6 per cent of turnover, as opposed to 17,575 service shops. Thus it took two decades to reach the respective American figures.

To what extent can this 'triumphal march of self-service' (Herbert Eklöh) be understood as Americanization? It was recognized by representatives of the distribution sector, as well as by customers, as a learning process which had transferred from the USA. Herbert Eklöh visited the USA in 1935 for the first time. He opened the first self-service shop 3 years later based on the impressions he had gained in New Jersey.[15] Expanding from his one shop in 1938, he built up a chain of shops after the war. In doing so the USA remained his focus of learning. In the German distribution system Herbert Eklöh became quite famous as a first mover. Altogether he made thirty-three trips to the USA in order to get ideas. Surely we can presume that his travel frequency was exceptional. However, such journeys by decision-makers in the distribution sector internally were called 'the pilgrimage', and the USA the 'Mecca', which was an indication of how often such trips were made and how important it was that they were taken.[16] In 1953 Max Nixdorf, director of the German REWE chain, described the difference between the USA and West Germany in the following words: 'While food retailing in Germany still shows traces of narrow-mindedness, in America it shows genuine and generous entrepreneurship combined with the spirit of a modern merchant.'[17]

At the same time the USA tried to export their standards of productivity to Western Europe in all sectors of the economy. Consequently distribution, being an important sector, was included. In 1954 the evaluation of European self-service was not encouraging. The European Productivity Agency maintained in its report *Productivity in the Distribution Trade in Europe*: 'When Europe is taken as a whole, the tendency for self-service seems to be more an experiment than a development, which takes place on the basis of conviction and generally accepted principles.'[18] It seemed that Europe was not yet ready for self-service. The report suggested obstacles to self-service, and in Germany there were many. First of all there was no tradition, and only a few people could imagine what self-service entailed. At the beginning there was no vision of new and more productive organizations, better sales, etc., but instead reservations at all levels, such as the following.

1. Shopkeepers feared theft. They thought it an invitation for shoplifting when all goods were to be taken from the shelves by the customers themselves. Consumers who were not used to taking goods into their own hands could be tempted, and indeed shoplifting was widespread. Eklöh caught twenty-one thieves in his supermarket on one Saturday alone, and he suggested that there probably had been just as many who had slipped through![19] Of course, since he mentioned this figure, it was an exceptional one. But in any case shoplifting was a problem which had to be taken into account and was more important for small shopkeepers than for supermarkets. Often shoplifting was not a problem of hunger or of poverty, but a personal problem. For a small shopkeeper this translated into: What shall I do if a regular customer lifts something? Should I turn a blind eye or lose the customer?
2. It was argued that self-service would suit the American mentality well, but not the German one.

3 Many shops were simply too small to allow self-service. During the 1950s new local shops, often no bigger than 25 square metres, were still being built.
4 The switch to self-service meant a costly reconstruction of the interior of the shop. Usually shopkeepers did not have enough capital to invest, and banks, because of the lack of tradition, and also lacking the vision of what self-service could mean, were extremely reluctant to give credit. Even the well-known pioneer of self-service, who became officially honoured as a 'Konsul', Herbert Eklöh, could not obtain credit for his shops when he asked for it.
5 Last, but not least, the wholesale trade and industry were not used to servicing self-service shops. Only a very few items were pre-packed, which is a precondition for such shops.
6 The differentiation of goods on offer was rather limited.

At the same time owners feared negative reactions from their customers. Would they not feel neglected? Would they accept the shopping basket or trolley? Indeed, it took some months to teach the customers what to do with their own shopping bags and where to put them. At the beginning customers were queuing at the entrance of the shop. One person (a male) even refused to take a shopping trolley and argued he would not behave ridiculously by pushing a cart resembling a pram.[20] But all this happened only at the very beginning, and after self-service as an institution was established and became discussed by newspapers etc., even customers in remote villages had no problems. In the end all possible problems connected with self-service were much more widespread within the retail trade than with its customers.

In 1952, in order to overcome the gap between self-service and traditional shops a combination of the two kinds of shop was invented: these were called 'speed shops' (Tempoläden, Ratio-Läden). These speed-shops were initiated by the consumers' co-operatives, which acted as pioneers for self-service in Germany. In 1953 they commanded 200 of these shops. Even in these speed shops there was still service, but common goods such as flour or sugar could be obtained pre-packed, and some of these shops had a different cash point, which meant the customer did not have to wait until the customers who had been served had paid. Ten years later, in 1962, the Association of Consumers (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverbände) ordered an evaluation of the consumers' perception of self-service.[21] The German consumer was presumed to be very conservative with a mentality opposed to self-service. But the result turned out to be a surprising contrast to the initial presumption. Consumers liked self-service and drew up the following positive list: uninfluenced and undisturbed choice, open display of goods, comparison of price and quality, better information on goods, better hygiene, timesaving, easier checking of prices after purchase.

Self-service was indeed a bigger problem for the shop-owner than for the customer. For the customer the change was towards easier shopping and more freedom because no real personal contact was involved when it was not wanted. Shopping could also be done much quicker than before. If advice was sought, it could still be obtained. What the customer lost was a daily contact with other people. In contrast, the shopkeeper had to change profoundly the way his role was defined. In the service-shop he concentrated on contact with his customers. He was there not only to hand over goods and add up the bill, but to give advice. In doing so he could perhaps not only sell a bit more but – more importantly – he could bind the customer to his shop. Known customers could usually get their loaf of bread, their half a pound of sugar or their litre of milk at the back door even when the shop was closed. Advice to customers was, of course, differentiated advice; well-to-do people were advised differently from less wealthy ones. A precondition for such service was considerable personal information about the various customers. Often the shopkeeper could address his customers by name. Especially in villages and small towns, where the majority of people lived, shopkeepers used to inherit their job and their shop from their father, who in his turn had inherited it from his father. Later shopkeepers shared their tradition with their future customers. Dynasties of shopkeepers sold to dynasties of customers, knowing each other from cradle to grave. In this sector, besides know-how about products, the key to success was knowledge about people. However, with the introduction of self-service this type of knowledge was devalued and in the end became irrelevant.

In contrast, the idea of self-service is that goods should sell themselves. Therefore the presentation of goods, the windows, the interior design of the shop, packaging, etc. became important. At the same time small percentages of rebates, credit margins, the secrets of write-offs and tax reductions, and other financial issues suddenly became crucial. But all this was never taught to traditional shopkeepers. Hundreds of years of retailers' tradition became worthless during the decade between 1958 to 1968, when the share of sales through self-service jumped from 15 to 80 per cent. Under these conditions we can understand why traditional retailers reflected on their situation in a gloomy way: 'This bedevilled "triumphal march of self-service" held us in its claws.' At the same time the new generation was thinking along the following lines: 'We will adjust to the [growing – H.G.S.] speed of coming years and we will learn to swim, even in the whirlpool.'[22]

During the 1950s there was an intense debate within the distribution sector about self-service. An evaluation of the few existing self-service shops showed that with the switch to the new system, turnover jumped by 93 per cent. Sales per head of selling personnel was 51 per cent up, and turnover per square metre 27 per cent.[23] Though the basis of these figures was quite small, the figures themselves were very impressive. The discourse on self-service became so important that new institutions were set up. In 1957 the Institute for Self-Service (Institut für Selbstbedienung) was founded in Cologne, which acted as a centre. It promoted the idea of self-service among retailers, it evaluated this form of trade, it succeeded in its negotiations with industry about standard sizing of packages, and it acted as a political lobby. Its main voice was its periodical *Dynamik im Handel*. Other periodicals inspired by US-models such as *Supermarket Merchandising* or *Chain Stores Age* were launched. Even a special publishing house, Verlag Gesellschaft für Selbstbedienung, was created. However, one main difference between the American and the German model of running the economy remained. While in the US several periodicals and organizations competed with each other, in Germany everything focused on this one and only institute for self-service; all the different types of owners, shopkeepers, consumers' co-operatives, department stores, chain stores, etc. co-operated in this – their – institute.

Reservations against self-service lay, to a large extent, with investors. As usual, owners were less willing to take a risk than managers. At the same time it was much easier for managers to take such a risk because investment did not involve their own property and usually they made decisions for much larger firms, which could venture into self-service with one or two shops, but not with their entire property. Therefore up to the mid-1950s the majority of self-service shops were owned by consumers' co-operatives such as *Produktion*, and chain-stores, such as REWE, but already in 1960 the picture had changed, since at that time 75 per cent of such shops were owned by the shopkeepers.[24]

In 1957 Germany's position in Europe concerning the trend towards self-service was a middle one.[25] Sweden, Norway and Switzerland were miles ahead with 5,000, 1,300 and 1,120 self-service shops, the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands were at about the same level, while others were far behind. There was a clear North/South difference. The percentage of self-service shops in Norway were 10.1, in Germany 2.2, in Austria 0.2 and in Spain 0.003. However, 2 years later, Germany was already leading in Europe with 11.8 per cent (Norway 11.5, The Netherlands 7.4, Switzerland 7.0, UK 4.3, France 0.9, Spain 0.14, Italy 0.11). Indeed, since the 1960s, Germany led self-service in Europe (perhaps with the exception of Scandinavia).

Development of supermarkets

Self-service supermarkets were invented in the USA. They emerged during the early 1930s when, during the World Economic Crisis, production sheds, garages, etc. stood empty. Goods were put on display and no service was offered in order to keep prices low. In fact the innovation was more a discount shop than a supermarket; however, out of this initial idea the US-supermarket developed very quickly.[26] A supermarket was understood to be a shop managed on self-service lines, which combined the traditional offer of food with that of fresh meat, vegetables and fruit, and sometimes even some non-food items. A US-supermarket needed a certain minimum space, a minimum turnover of $2 million, and a car park. The idea of the supermarket was to concentrate all the requirements of everyday shopping into one shop. Thus it was the natural extension of the idea of self-service. In the USA during the early 1960s two-thirds of food turnover was being sold in supermarkets. A proverb says the better is the enemy of the good; in this case the supermarket swallowed most of the small self-service shops, a development which was related to the spread of cars. In this respect Germany followed the US pattern with a time-gap of about 15 years, still well ahead of the comparative development in Japan.[27] Compared to the rest of Europe, Germany was not a forerunner in the trend towards the supermarket. The UK, Belgium and Denmark were well ahead.[28] The regulatory framework was somewhat different from the USA, though not decisively. Opening hours for shops, which were restricted by law in Germany, were different. While in this respect there was no change – and, more astonishing, no demand for a change – a price-binding suggestion set by producers for retail trade was given up during the 1960s. Beyond these facts there was little state intervention, since the government believed in a liberal policy.[29]

The first person to invest in large supermarkets in Germany was the same person who pioneered self-service: Herbert Eklöh. And again it was the first of such shops in the whole of Europe. In 1957 he started in Cologne with a shop of 2,000 square metres with a car park for 200 cars. Others followed and in 1961 about 250 supermarkets existed in Germany. Compared to the overall number of shops, this was a very small proportion. At that time supermarkets were still a 'widespread unknown phenomenon'.[30] Up to 1958, there were only sixteen supermarkets. The Institut für Selbstbedienung set up its own organization for the promotion of supermarkets, the Internationale Selbstbedienungs-Organisation and launched the respective periodical *Selbstbedienung und Supermarkt* (which later merged with *Dynamik im Handel*, its periodical for self-service). This new institution especially promoted the supermarket, among others, by pointing out the comparisons between supermarkets and ordinary, that is relatively small, self-service shops. In supermarkets turnover per employee was one-third higher. In 1962 calculations showed that the old rule of thumb that self-service needed one cashpoint per 50 square metres did not apply to supermarkets. They could do with 84 square metres per cashpoint. Both these facts reflected the jump in productivity that the supermarket stood for. Because of this the number of supermarkets grew quickly. In 1968 it reached 1700 and peaked in 1973 with 3889.[31] After that year the numbers contracted like the numbers of self-service shops from 1972 onwards. In parallel at the end of the boom, both self-service shops and supermarkets ended their phase of expansion and entered a period of consolidation, or in other words, a phase of maturity. As with self-service, Germany headed the development in supermarkets in Europe, both in the build-up and in the consolidation process.

Of course, capital investment to set up a supermarket was substantially larger than for a traditional self-service shop. In consequence private shopkeepers were reluctant, which meant that in 1961 only 3.7 per cent of supermarkets were owned by private people, while chains represented 64 per cent and department stores 30 per cent. In this respect development can be compared to the introduction of self-service. In contrast, and like private owners, the consumers' co-operatives hesitated, even though they had enough capital to invest. They probably felt that the supermarket terminated the relationship between shop and customer, which was a precondition for the success of consumers' co-operatives.[32] With the setting up of supermarkets new principles for locations of sales were adopted from the USA. Self-service shops had, initially, replaced traditional shops at their respective locations. But supermarkets where set up not so much in the city but along main roads in suburbs. Supermarkets needed a considerable amount of space. In contrast to department stores with several storeys they used to have only one floor. At the same time they needed a car park. Such space was expensive in the city, but the idea was to drive with the car to the shop. Therefore the city was not the best place for this type of shop. With the supermarket the topographical aspect of life became important. While at first work was separated from living, now shopping became separated from it as well.

Though the idea of the supermarket was based on that of self-service, it went much further. Self-service was one step in the division of the old personal commitment between shopkeeper and customer, but in relatively small shops such a relationship could be kept up to a certain extent. In contrast the supermarket created a gap between these groups, the organization of the shop prevented any personal contact. The old European idea that the shopkeeper cared for the supply and well-being of his known customers was terminated not so much by self-service but by the establishment of supermarkets. In a supermarket the division between the management and the customer became even wider than in ordinary self-service shops. While in the latter the owner used to do all necessary work, e.g. at the cash-point, arrange goods at the display, talk to customers, etc., the manager of a supermarket had little or no contact with his customers. His task was to take care of the whole, supervise the heads of divisions (e.g. for fresh meat, non-food, etc.), ensure supplies were on time, etc.; in general, to organize. He no longer needed to be a good seller himself, his success was based on management skills. Logistics became important. With an annual turnover of 3 million DM it was calculated that 1,500 tons of goods passed through the shop. 2,800 different deliveries of goods were needed and only four people were needed in this part of the shop.[33] With the introduction of the supermarket part-time work emerged. Previously,

part-time work, as such, had not been widespread in Germany, retail service was one of its pioneers. While at traditional shops full-time employment was the rule, in supermarkets half of the personnel often worked part-time. This illustrates that in order for a supermarket to be successful, a very different type of person was required compared to the traditional shopkeeper's virtues.

On their study trips to the USA, delegations and private persons were impressed by the large assortment of products in shops. The range was much bigger than in German shops and its numbers grew quickly. In 1955 a typical US-supermarket offered 2,200 different types of goods, by 1960, 4,500, 1969, 8,000 and at the end of the period in 1974, 9,000.[34] In Germany it was a deep-rooted idea to have a rather small range of goods, offering little or no choice for customers. The advantages of a small assortment were that less capital was tied up and less work was involved regarding supervision, orders, etc. The conviction was that customers would buy what was on offer and thus meet their needs. Why start competition between own goods? The German vision of a customer was of a person who would buy for his requirements. The US idea was to sell to the customer and make him happy. It took quite a long time before the German distribution sector understood that competition between offers did not lead to what was called *cannibalism* but to additional sales in quality and quantity. The first German self-service shop started with only 600 different products. During the next decades those who switched from service to self-service offered about 600 to 800 products. The average number of products in self-service shops grew from 1,086 in 1958 to 1,394 in 1961, that is by 100 per year.[35] The variety of goods in American shops was never matched in Germany. In 1988 supermarkets still sold no more than about 4,000 different products.[36]

Supermarkets by definition included fresh vegetables, fresh meat, etc. While today we simply expect such goods to be on offer, in the beginning they caused problems. In the 1950s it was questioned in Germany whether fresh meat should be sold through self-service since its nature seemed not to be compatible with this system.[37] In contrast, because of the higher standard of living in the USA, American shops did not have the same problem. All shopkeepers agreed that fresh meat acted as a 'magnet' for customers, but because a substantial amount of losses could be generated, many retailers thought it to be a 'hot iron'. While the management of some large shops thought its function of being a 'magnet' was so important that they were prepared to absorb constant losses on fresh meat, others maintained this sector had to come up with similar results as for the other sectors. However, retailers agreed that fresh meat was by far the 'most dangerous' division of all. The basic problem with fresh meat was its perishability; Monday's fresh meat is no longer fresh on Friday. The mentioned 'danger' grew out of (1) the fluctuations in demand, (2) the quality of meat sold, and (3) packaging. The problem can be explained by an admittedly extreme case.[38] On Monday turnover in meat was DM600, on Tuesday DM2,000, and on Saturday DM16,000, in other words sales on Mondays were less than 5 per cent compared to sales on Saturdays.

Even with part-time personnel such a structure of demand is difficult to meet. Part-time personnel can be used for organizational reasons and information in addition to ordinary full-time personnel. Swings up to 1:5 – but no more – could be met with service shops. Thus self-service should have been the appropriate answer to the problem. However, even for these types of sales the swing was too wide. But how could traditional butchers survive these problems? For two reasons they had different swings: first, they not only sold, but also partly produced their goods. Second, they sold not only meat but sausage etc., which was bought throughout the whole week. Third, the self-service shops attracted customers who ate meat less regularly than others.

A second problem with fresh meat in self-service was the quality of meat. The quality was lower compared to US-standards.[39] In Germany at that time demand in self-service shops was primarily for medium quality. Naturally medium quality did not look as good as top quality. However, sales went by the look of the meat. Self-service found itself trapped: better off customers bought at the butchers, therefore supermarket demand was for medium quality. But while the butcher had little problems in selling this type of quality too, it had little appeal to the eye, which is a precondition for self-service. Even those retailers who were convinced to include the offer of fresh meat in the future were reluctant. It is revealing for the situation that even pioneers like Eklöh did not find making the decision straightforward. On the one hand he exclaimed: '… without sufficient cooling there is no successful self-service! Refrigeration is the key to success.'[40] On the other hand difficulties in his shops made him resort to traditional thoughts: '… furthermore, we think it is not entirely sound and fair to the handicraft of butchers if we, as owners of large shops, use our opportunities to subsidize the meat sector above other sectors, and force down those prices on which a respected and competent profession has to live.'[41] Here the traditional approach of *do not compete too much*, but *live and let live alongside your competitor* was proposed.

A third problem was packaging. For undefined reasons, but probably because of high prices (the German currency was undervalued in order to promote exports), original US-packaging could not to be obtained. It took years until the various aims of quality, appearance, cheapness, and keeping meat fresh as long as possible could be met by packaging. In the end all these difficulties were overcome. To a certain degree problems were solved by new and better products, but more important was the rise in the standard of living which enabled people to eat meat every day and not just on Sundays. They demanded higher quality, and better appearance and thus meat was better adapted to be sold through self-service.

While fresh meat established itself as a widespread product, other groups of products followed. In the USA frozen food was first offered in the 1930s, and in spite of the economic crisis became a success. During the 1950s it became widespread as an every-day product. It entered German shops only during the second half of the 1960s. Frozen food led to another new investment, the freezer, which had the great advantage of enabling food to remain fresh for more than a couple of days. For the retailer the decision was straightforward, just a question of investment and space within the shop. In spite of this, many were reluctant to take frozen food.[42] The reason was their customers who hesitated over buying it. First of all there was no tradition of eating frozen food, second it was considered of lower quality compared to fresh food, and third only very few customers had their own freezer at home, which meant frozen food was to be consumed at once, and in view of this the majority preferred fresh food. Therefore it took some time until substantial amounts of it were consumed. The figures rose (per head and year) from 2.0 kg in 1966 to 4.8 kg in 1974.[43] Though nearly all shops (93%) offered frozen food at the end of the boom, today we are not very impressed by a consumption of 5 kilos per head. But we have to take into account the fact that the era of pizza and ice-cream at home in every household had still to come. Five kilos of frozen food was, of course, much less than consumption per head in the USA. It took one more generation before consumption patterns narrowed closer to the US-standard. Furthermore, a certain group of food never achieved the same role as in the USA: processed food. Although several attempts were made to introduce products such as peeled potatoes, frozen juices, etc., up until 1975, they never played a role in Germany.

As Mika Takaoka and Takeo Kikkawa show in Chapter 13 of this volume, the small convenience-store continued to remain a stable issue in residential areas in Japan. In contrast, this type of shop was squeezed out in Germany. Shopping at arm's length was no match for lower prices after cars became widespread. This caused a process of concentration. The supermarkets took over the small self-service shops, and they were taken over by self-service centres (SB-Centre) or self-service department stores (SB-Warenhäuser). Again these types, emerged first in the USA before they were known in Germany. Self-service centres differed from supermarkets in size and in the variety of goods on offer. Their size was between 1000 square metres and 20,000 square metres or more. While they usually sold all types of goods, the rule was the larger the centre the smaller the amount of food was sold. The difference between a traditional and a self-service department store was that in the traditional shop, cash points were scattered all over the building, while in the latter there was only one at the check-out. This made it possible to use shopping carts in a self-service department store. In contrast, in a traditional department store, customers had to carry the goods themselves. There was therefore a larger turnover per head in the new type of shops. Furthermore such centres were situated on main roads and always had a large car park. This too enhanced the amount of sales compared to old-style department stores in the centre of towns with no, or only a small, car park.

Self-service centres and self-service department stores emerged during the second half of the 1960s, towards the end of our period of investigation. In 1966 there were only 66 of these centres in Germany. After 1967 more than 100 were built annually, which increased their total to 1,137 in 1975.[44] The smaller ones with up to 2,000 square metres mainly concentrated on food, using most of their space for it (65.2 per cent) and achieving the biggest share of turnover (84.6 per cent).[45] The larger ones with more than 4,000 square metres concentrated on non-food items, using less than one quarter of their space for food (23.3 per cent). Still their turnover was two-thirds in food (66.9 per cent). For the medium-sized centres the figures were 35.8 per cent of space and 63.2 per cent of food turnover. Because earnings on 'non-food products used to be much higher, big centres promoted these products. But food was considered to be necessary as the so called magnet. Those who bought food often bought something else when they saw it on offer. Thus the factor habit was calculated. Customers who used to buy food in such a centre would go there first but would look for other goods as well. Thus the food-department was considered to be a necessity.

However, although self-service centres and self-service department stores were invented and expanded in the USA, Germany was gaining confidence in this market. While with self-service shops and supermarkets it was self evident that all could and had to learn from America, there was comparatively little reference to the USA to be found in the case of self-service centres and self-service department stores. It seems that during the last years of the boom the gap between the USA and West Germany had narrowed and the US model was no longer as important as it had been up to the mid-1960s.

Development of chain-stores

While self-service centres and self-service department stores no longer accepted the USA as a model for their ongoing business as they had with its introduction, the situation with chain-stores was different. When the idea of chain-stores entered Germany, common chain-stores were already widespread in the USA as well as in Germany. The chain Thams und Garfs from their headquarters in Schwerin, Northern Germany, for example, already commanded 1,184 retail shops in 1934. While this common type of chain-store owned by one person or an institutional investor was well known, the new type was the so called voluntary chain, that is a group of shopkeepers who joined such a group in order to enjoy the advantages of a chain, without selling their own shops. In contrast to co-operatives, in

the USA as well as in Europe, such voluntary chain stores were usually initiated by wholesale traders. By creating such a chain wholesalers organized their own market, obtaining a group of shops which they could deliver to exclusively themselves. The shopkeeper in return promised to buy only from his chain-wholesaler.

Voluntary chains emerged in the 1920s and grew especially during the 1930s when competition was tough. The first, and up to the 1950s, the biggest, the Red and White Corporation was founded in 1921. It seemed that in the USA after the First World War the time was ripe for such an idea, since three persons from three different states, S.M. Flickinger from New York, H.A. Marr from Colorado and A.M. Scokum from Minnesota, had the same idea. Each set up such an organization, but when they learned about each other they merged to set up the Red and White Corporation. Other organizations were formed on the same basic idea. In 1940 chains represented 24 per cent of turnover in food.[46] After a period of growth their market-share shrank during the war, because of the general price-freeze. Then single retailers grew by offering additional service such as free delivery to homes. However, when the price-freeze was lifted in 1946 the chain-stores expanded again, taking 55 per cent of turnover in 1955.[47] The advantages of such chains were large. Together they could act as wholesalers, and thus could save a lot of money; they combined their efforts in marketing and advertising; they used standardized forms for calculation which offered the possibility of instant comparisons; and they combined their efforts in continuing their education.

In contrast to Japan credit was not usually given by wholesalers. It was one of the principles that the private shop-owner had to pay for his goods on delivery. Therefore the financial system had to be based on different principles. Shopkeepers as well as other small businessmen could rely on their local bank or, even more widespread, their local savings bank. It was the task of such local savings banks to channel savings from private persons to small and medium-sized business in the locality of the respective bank or branch. Thus the financial network was a local one, with no direct links to the distribution itself.

The first European voluntary chain was founded in the Netherlands by a wholesaler in 1932. In order to save costs he used the same trademark for the chain that he had already registered just for tea. In this way the SPAR chain was initiated and is well known in the whole of Europe today. *Spar* is the Dutch word for fir tree, and incidentally means 'save!' The symbol of this chain still is the fir tree, but for customers the word 'save!' was of course more appealing. Another advantage sprang up just by chance. When such chains were set up abroad, it was discovered that the word 'spar' ('save!') had the same meaning in German and in the Scandinavian languages, that is in markets which were six times larger than the Dutch one. The German SPAR-organization was founded in 1952. The Dutch did not invest but gave advice for a long time. While the

Dutch SPAR was designed after American models, the German one focused on the Dutch experience. Therefore it was in the beginning at most an indirect Americanization. However, internal rules, such as the so called 'cost-plus' system of calculation and others were taken directly from the USA, as well as all initiatives for public relations. Thus a certain Americanization was to be found within voluntary chains such as SPAR and others.

Development of discount-markets

The idea of the discount-market is to a certain extent the idea of self-service thought through to its logical conclusion. There is no service in a discount shop and all goods are presented as they came into the shop without repackaging, arranging, etc. The shop is simple both inside and out. The amount of goods on offer is very limited, it concentrates on products which will produce a high turnover. All these disadvantages for the customer are balanced by low prices. The basic idea of a discount shop was best developed in the USA by the so called *box stores*. The viability and success of such stores was measured by a set of target figures which had to be met. These were, among others: minimum purchase $50, labour-cost below 6 per cent of turnover, turnover per employee an hour $175, prices at least 15 per cent lower when compared to the average supermarket.[48]

The first German discount-markets, which were created following the US-design, came into being between 1954 and 1956. And as in the US, nearly all of them first watered down their initial idea by offering more articles, some services, etc. In the end they ceased their original form of organization but became a variation of the low-price supermarket instead.[49] In contrast, one special discount-firm which entered the market using this form relatively late had a great success. In 1946 the brothers Karl and Theo Albrecht inherited one small shop in Essen. By 1950 they already owned thirteen shops, all of which were very traditional. They concentrated on only a number of cheap goods and by doing so used one of the main ideas of discount-markets. However, they did not employ the discount-system in its pure sense until 1962, when they founded their ALDI system. It seems that while a couple of discount-firms, which quitted this segment relatively early, looked to the USA and tried to learn from the American experience, ALDI did not, but the two brothers experimented until they re-invented the discount-system for a second time.[50] Instantly they developed a similar system of target-figures to the box shops in the USA. If ALDI had looked for more international information instead of developing it from scratch, the firm would probably have saved a lot of investment.

Cash and carry markets, that is wholesale discount-markets, were taken over from the USA as well. But during the period discussed here, their success was rather limited. Their leap forward came only after the boom; from the 1980s onwards the cash-and-carry market Metro became one of the biggest distribution firms in Europe.

In the late 1960s news about a new system of shops reached the German special journals: franchise. In 1898 it was first developed in the USA by General Motors which handed out a license to sell and service General Motors cars. It became widespread in the USA in retail trade; many chains such as Macdonald's were based on it. In the franchise system one contractor provides the investment on the site while the other gives an exclusive license to sell and serve a certain good, use the respective trademark, deal with advertising, etc. Both firms stay independent and can, after the termination of the contract, re-orientate themselves. The core idea of franchising is a long-term binding contract which can save both sides substantial amounts of capital. Though some American firms (e.g. Coca Cola) had introduced it into Germany, it was generally unknown. The basic idea of long-term contracts was rather uncommon in the retail sector. Similar contracts used to be open-ended, as in the voluntary chains. In evaluating the concept of franchise the German journal *Blätter für Genossenschaftswesen* headlined: 'Another step towards a contract-oriented market economy.'[51] This was exactly what franchise meant to the German distribution system: another step towards Americanization.

Change in language

Since Americanization is a cultural concept, it is hard to measure. However, since culture expresses itself to a large extent through language, the use of words can be taken as an indicator. In our context this is the use of American words within a German context. There are several reasons why foreign words are incorporated into another language, among others for greater precision, in case there is no equivalent, or simply to show modernity.[52] The use of American words became widespread especially during the 1950s, and instantly provoked criticism. Heinz Weinhold castigated 'the epidemic course of Anglo-Saxon foreign words'[53] and Carl Hundhausen became upset that 'the good and hundred per cent sufficient word "Absatz" [distribution – H.G.S.] or "Absatzwirtschaft" will be eliminated from our language in order to give room to another sloppiness of our German language.'[54]

Eklöh for instance, as well as many other authors, used American words for key expressions (Drug-Stores, Super-Markets), while in some cases they mixed American with German (Non-food-Artikel, Discount-Häuser).[55] Though there were German expressions, in many cases the authors used the American ones.

Marktinformationsdienst, the volume on chain-stores in the USA, had a German headline ('Kettenläden'), but in the text the American word 'chain-store' was used. The periodical *Versandhandel* published an article on 'odd-prices', translating it to 'ausgefallene Preise' but used in its text only the US-expression. During the 1960s, however, the situation became more settled. Some expressions were absorbed into German by Germanization, thus 'super-markets' became 'Supermärkte' at that time. Others were used by applying the original US-words ('non-foods') or in an American-German mixed version ('cash-and-carry Märkte');[56] a third group was used totally in German, showing no traces of a previous use of foreign words, for example since the 1960s only eccentrics refer to 'shopping centres' and not to 'Einkaufszentren', to 'food-brokers' instead of 'Handelsvertreter'. It seems that during a period of admiration, many people were ready to take over anything from the Americans, while, when the uncritical admiration had petered out, it became more obvious which expressions could be translated and which were taken into everyday use as foreign words.

Conclusion

In the West German distribution system, especially in retail trade, we traced a substantial transfer of US-everyday culture; clearly an Americanization took place. It could well be called a 'revolution in trade' since it changed everything: rules, organization, sites, relations, values and behaviour. It was, to a large extent, a reflected process, since organization, proceedings, goods on offer, etc. were obviously superior in the USA compared to Germany. The transfer was very clear in the introduction of self-service, supermarkets, chain-stores, discount-markets, etc. In some sectors, such as frozen food, Americanization took time to establish, whilst in others, such as processed food, it did not occur, at least not before the end of the boom.

During the period of the boom-years (1950–75), the various transfers speeded up the economic basis of mass consumption which started in West Germany during the 1950s. While it took Germany about 20 years to reach US-percentages in self-service, the subsequent introduction of, for example, the supermarkets took less, and that of self-service centres even less time. The reasons for the acceleration were manifold. Of course, at first the initial reservation against the former enemy of war had to be overcome. Second, during the initial years many people focused on a simple reconstruction before they reoriented their business. But a general Americanization of life helped to change the economic sector as well.[57] With Americanization, as with many other things, first steps are always the most difficult ones, while it is simpler later to continue using given structures of influence. Of course, economic growth enabled customers to diversify their demands, and conditions for consumption became more similar to those in the USA. A key issue in this respect was the use of cars for shopping, which became a common feature in Germany during the 1960s.

In contrast, while there was a speeding up of transfers during the second half of the boom-period, it seems at first glance that American influence diminished. During the 1960s there was not the same amount of admiration towards the USA compared to the previous decade. Organized information-seeking travel ended, firms compared themselves not only to the US, but to European competitors, etc. Decision-makers became more critical in general. The Germans had learned some lessons and the gap between the two different systems of distribution had narrowed. In some sectors the Germans developed even better than their former American teachers. At the end of the boom an expert exclaimed: 'American know-how in distribution governed the world for many decades. Today in this field the leading position of the USA is no longer as self evident as before.'[58]

Decisive for the Americanization of the German distribution system were less the customers than the owners or managers. While the customers discovered the respective advantages or disadvantages fairly quickly, changes in management needed time. Of course, the supply-side had to think more precisely since it was much less flexible than the demand side. The former had to act and to invest while the latter could pick the best offer without any commitment. But more important than financial considerations was the mental change. Initially, especially in the food retail trade, the German shopkeeper was thinking in terms of supply for his customers with whom he was often familiar, he had a leaning towards co-operation with colleagues, towards tradition, etc. The new way of thinking in a competitive way, e.g. in sales as in contrast to supplies, in offering choices to his customers, and not only caring for their known requirements, took some time. During the second half of the boom this new and different attitude towards business proceedings deepened. The transfer was facilitated by trade associations which offered guided tours for selected groups and afterwards provided a forum for publication of impressions. The German organization RKW (Rationalisierungs-Kuratorium der deutschen Wirtschaft), which acted as part of the American Productivity Mission played an important role in this.

In the end a somewhat complicated picture emerged of the Americanization of German distribution. It started with admiration and less reflected and less adapted transfers of American culture. Then, with the acceleration of knowledge about the American distribution methods, there were fewer open signs of Americanization, e.g. in the form of the take-over of words. However, there were better adaptations to German conditions and the American character of the transferred issue was better hidden. While the introduction of self-service openly and often reflected the American model, we do not find the same amount of open reflection with the introduction of, for example, the supermarket. But it was the supermarket, not self-service as a system, which broke down the traditional relation between the shopkeeper and his customer. While self-service was a transfer of a new form of sales, it was still a form which tolerated traditional relations of supply (with a sense of care-taking), money (even borrowing), it involved people, etc. In contrast supermarkets reduced these relations to the issues of capital, investment and turnover, leaving out any personal considerations. As a result the process of Americanization deepened, though German decision-makers became more critical. It deepened because the American values of competition in contrast to co-operation were taken over – without ever reaching true US-standards. Financial considerations became more important, personal relations were reduced. At the beginning of this process managers voiced views such as: 'We all have to learn how to get along better with each other.'[59] It ended with the feeling that competition is basically something good, not bad. Though even today (2002) German managers see competition differently from their US-counterparts, a profound change in attitude in favour of competitive behaviour took place during the boom period in Germany.

The fact that during the 1960s less admiration can be traced, less organized visits were carried out, less American words were taken over (or they became 'Germanized') is no contradiction to the process of Americanization. It is rather the result of this process. The gap between the American and the German approach had narrowed indeed. During the 1960s American values of competition had taken deeper roots in Germany's distribution system than in the previous decade. This result, that there was a more profound change during the 1960s compared to the 1950s is in tune with parallel findings on, for example, the development of thinking of business elites,[60] or how and when managers changed their views on cartels, or on the reasons for the decline of the co-op shops.[61] It is well in tune with Alfred Chandler's views on the downswing of co-operative capitalism in Germany after the Second World War.

Notes

1 R. Nieschlag, 'Strukturwandlungen im Handel', in H. König (ed.), *Wandlungen der Wirtschaftsstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1962, pp. 493–524.

2 As a professor Nieschlag taught the economics of trade at the High School in Nuremberg. He was engaged in setting up one of the first scholarly marketing institutions in Germany.

3 B. Röper, *Die vertikale Preisbindung bei Markenartikeln. Untersuchungen über Preisbildungs- und Preisbindungsvorgänge in der Wirklichkeit*, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1955, p. 42.

4 Nieschlag, 'Strukturwandlungen im Handel', p. 499.

5 A.D. Chandler, *Strategy and Structure*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962.

6 A.D. Chandler, *Scale and Scope*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.

7 H.G. Schröter, 'What is Americanization? Or About the Use and Abuse of the Americanization-Concept', in D. Barjot, I. Lescent-Giles and M. de Ferrière le Vayer (eds), *Américanisation en Europe au XXe Siècle: Économie, Culture, Politique. Americanisation in 20th Century Europe: Economic, Culture, Politics*, vol. 1, Lille: Centre d'Histoire de l'Europe du Nord-Ouest, Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille 3, 2002, pp. 41–57; E. Moen and H.G. Schröter, 'Americanisation as a Concept for Deeper Understanding of Economic Changes in Europe, 1945–1970', in E. Moen and H.G. Schröter (eds), *Entreprise et Histoire*, 1998, no. 19, pp. 5–13, here p. 6.

8 M. Kipping and O. Bjarnar (eds), *The Americanisation of European Business. The Marshall Plan and the transfer of US management models*, London: Routledge, 1998.

9 M. Gloor, 'Ausblick auf zukünftige Distributionsformen', in M. Gloor *et al.* (eds), *Neuzeitliche Distributionsformen*, Bern: Paul Haupt, 1963, pp. 103–115, here p. 104.

10 See H.G. Schröter, 'Perspektiven der Forschung: Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung als Interpretationsmuster der Integration in beiden Teilen Deutschlands', in E. Schremmer (ed.), *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Integration in historischer Sicht*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996, pp. 259–289, here p. 260.

11 *Statistical Yearbooks.*

12 E.g. M. Kipping, 'American Management Consulting Companies in Western Europe, 1920 to 1990: Products, Reputation, and Relationships', *Business History Review*, Summer 1999, vol. 73, no. 2, 190–220; H.G. Schröter, 'Advertising in West Germany after World War II. A Case of an Americanization', in Schröter and Moen (eds), *Entreprise et Histoire*, pp. 15–33.

13 K.-H. Henksmeier, *Die wirtschaftlichen Leistungen der Selbstbedienung in Europa*, Köln: Verlag für Selbstbedienung, 1961, p. 11.

14 For the following figures as well: Anon., *Dynamik im Handel*, Special edition '50 Jahre Selbstbedienung', 1988, no. 10, p. 11 and p. 36 f.

15 H. Eklöh, 'Der Siegeszug der Selbstbedienung', in *Neure Aspekte der Selbstbedienung*, Rüschlikon: Stiftung 'Im Grüne', 1958, pp. 9–19.

16 H. Jakubik, 'Der Umbruch zur Selbstbedienung bei Management und Mitarbeitern', in *Dynamik im Handel*, 1988, no. 10, pp. 204–217, here p. 204.

17 M. Nixdorf, 'Der Lebensmitteleinzelhandel in den USA', in Rationalisierungs-Kuratorium der Deutschen Wirtschaft (ed.), *Der Einzelhandel im Konkurrenzkampf. Eindrücke einer Studiengruppe deutscher Genossenschafter über Ein- und Verkaufsmethoden im amerikanischen Handel*, Munich: Carl Hanser, 1955, pp. 34–43, p. 34.

18 Quoted from: Henksmeier, *Selbstbedienung*, p. 11.

19 Eklöh, 'Siegeszug', p. 15.

20 Ibid., p. 12 f.

21 *Dynamik im Handel*, p. 22.

22 Both quotations: Eklöh, 'Siegeszug', p. 17.

23 *Dynamik im Handel*, p. 14.

24 B. Tietz, *Konsument und Einzelhandel. Strukturwandlungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1950 bis 1975*, Frankfurt/M: Lorch, 1967, p. 358, Table 92.

25 Henksmeier, *Selbstbedienung*, p. 17. The numbers include *all* self-service shops, not only food.

26 T. Deutsch, 'From "Wild Animal Stores" to Women's Sphere: Supermarkets and the Politics of Mass Consumption, 1930–1950', *Business and Economic History*, Fall 1999, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 143–153; Nieschlag, *Dynamik*, p. 13 ff; K.-H. Henksmeier, 'Der Supermarkt – seine technischen und organisatorischen Probleme', in Gloor (ed.), *Distributionsformen*, pp. 34–43.

27 See Chapter 13 by Takaoka and Kikkawa in this volume.

28 I. Lescent-Giles, 'The Americanization of Food Retailing in Britain and in France since the 1960s', in M. Kipping and N. Tiratsoo (eds), *Americanization in 20th Century Europe: Business, Culture, Politics*, vol. 2, Lille: Centre d'Histoire de l'Europe du Nord-Ouest, Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille 3, 2002, pp. 291–308.

29 H.G. Schröter, 'Konsumpolitik und "Soziale Marktwirtschaft". Die Koexistenz liberalisierter und regulierter Verbrauchsgütermärkte in der Bundesrepublik

der 1950er Jahre', in H. Berghoff (ed.), *Konsumpolitik*, Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1999, pp. 113–133.

30 Anon., 'Supermärkte 1962', *Selbstbedienung und Supermarkt*, 1962, no. 10, pp. 6–10, here p. 6.

31 *Edeka Handels-Rundschau*, 1975, no. 21, p. 8.

32 H.G. Schröter, 'Der Verlust der "europäischen Form des Zusammenspiels von Ordnung und Freiheit". Vom Untergang der deutschen Konsumgenossenschaften, *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 2000, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 442–467.

33 Henksmeier, *Supermarkt*, p. 42 f.

34 Anon., Supermärkte in den USA, *Selbstbedienung und Supermarkt*, 1975, no. 8, pp. 40–44, here p. 42; Eklöh, 'Siegeszug', p. 14; Nixdorf, 'Der Lebensmitteleinzelhandel in den USA', p. 35 f.

35 K.-H. Henksmeier, 'Den Konsumwünschen nachkommen – doch mit der nötigen Vorsicht', *Selbstbedienung und Supermarkt*, 1962, no. 10, pp. 11–12, here p. 11.

36 *Dynamik im Handel*, p. 24.

37 '. . . für unsere Begriffe artfremder Artikel wie Frischfleisch . . .' (Nixdorf, 'Der Lebensmitteleinzelhandel in den USA', p. 34).

38 H. Eklöh sen. and H. Eklöh jun., 'Ein heißes Eisen: Selbstbedienung bei Frischfleisch', in *Dynamik im Handel*, pp. 140–144, here p. 142.

39 Ibid., p. 142.

40 Eklöh, 'Siegeszug', p. 13.

41 Ibid, p. 141.

42 H. Nixdorf, 'Zweckmäßiger Sortimentsaufbau', *Selbstbedienung und Supermarkt*, 1962, no. 10, pp. 12–13, here p. 12.

43 *EDEKA-Handelsrundschau*, 1975, no. 20, 3; ibid., 1975, no. 21, 5.

44 K.-H. Henksmeier, 'SB-Center und SB-Warenhäuser am 1.1.1975', *Selbstbedienung und Supermarkt*, 1975, no. 5, pp. 10–19, here p. 10.

45 K.-H. Henksmeier, 'Kosten und Leistungen von SB-Center und SB-Warenhäuser 1973', *Selbstbedienung und Supermarkt*, 1975, no. 1, pp. 2–8, here p. 1.

46 Anon., 'Die Bedeutung der Kettenläden im amerikanischen Einzelhandel', *Marktinformationsdienst der Bundesstelle für Aussenhandelsinformation*, December 1956, no. A/133, 2.

47 They grew quickly. One year previously they obtained 52 per cent (ibid.).

48 The figures were given for 1980 (B. Tietz, 'Die Fachmärkte – ein neuer Betriebstyp des Einzelhandels', *Marketing ZFP*, November 1981, vol. 4, pp. 241–250, here p. 242.

49 Tietz, *Konsument*, p. 510 f.

50 D. Brandes, *Konsequent einfach. Die ALDI-Erfolgsstory*, Frankfurt/M: Campus-Verlag, 1998.

51 B. Tietz, 'Typologie und Bedeutung des Franchising', *Blätter für Genossenschaftswesen*, 25 June 1969, vol. 115, pp. 193–196.

52 H. Fink, *Amerikanisierung in der deutschen Wirtschaft. Sprache, Handel, Güter und Dienstleistungen*, Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 1995; '"Know-How" and "Hi-Fi": Zum Verständnis englischer Ausdrücke in der deutschen Werbesprache', *Muttersprache*, 1975, no. 85, pp. 186–204; H. Galinsky, and B. Carstensen, *Amerikanismen in der deutschen Gegenwartssprache*, Heidelberg: Winter, 1963.

53 H. Weinhold, 'Distributionsleistung und Distributionsform', in *Neuzeitliche Distributionsformen*, pp. 9–33, p. 9.

54 C. Hundhausen, 'Geleitwort zur deutschen Ausgabe', in R.D. Crisp, *Absatzforschung, Marketing Research*, Essen: G. Girardet, 1959, p. 6.

55 Eklöh, 'Siegeszug', p. 14, Nieschlag, Betriebsformen.

56 B. Tietz, *Die Tendenzen im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel*, ms. (Hamburg 1982), p. 80.

57 K. Jarausch and H. Siegrist (eds), *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945–1970*, Frankfurt/M: Campus, 1997; A. Lüdtke, I. Marßolek and A. von Saldern (eds), *Amerikanisierung. Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996.

58 M. De Bernardi, 'International tätige Handelsunternehmen', *Selbstbedienung und Supermarkt*, 1975, no. 12, pp. 47–51, here p. 47.

59 'Wir müssen alle lernen, uns miteinander besser zu vertragen' (*Versandhandel*, 1953, no. 12, p. 5).

60 Paul Erker criticized Volker Berghahn's periodization of an Americanization of business elite as wrong, and pointed out the fact that it is based on only a handful of case studies. According to Erker the change in the heads of managers took place in the second half of the boom, rather than in the first; V. Berghahn, *The Americanization of West German Industry, 1945–1973*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986; P. Erker, 'Einleitung: Industrie-Eliten im 20. Jahrhundert', in P. Erker and T. Pierenkemper (eds), *Deutsche Unternehmer zwischen Kriegswirtschaft und Wiederaufbau. Studien zur Erfahrungsbildung von Industrie-Eliten*, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999, pp. 1–18.

61 H.G. Schröter, 'Cartelization and Decartelization in Europe, 1870–1995: Rise and Decline of an Economic Institution', *Journal of European Economic History*, 1996, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 129–153; 'Der Verlust'.