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Analyzing Secularism

History, Ideology, and Policy

On December 11, 2003, the Stasi Commission, including twenty French academics and social activists, submitted a report on secularism to President Jacques Chirac. The French executive and legislators embraced the commission's recommendation of a law to prohibit students' religious symbols in public schools. Although the primary target of the law was Muslim headscarves, it also included "large" Christian crosses, Jewish kippa, and Sikh turbans. A week after the Stasi Report, the U.S. Department of State released its "2003 Report on International Religious Freedom." At the accompanying press conference, Ambassador John Hanford answered the following questions:

Question: What was your reaction to President Chirac's headscarf ban…?

Ambassador: [A] fundamental principle of religious freedom that we work for in many countries of the world, including on this very issue of headscarves, is that all persons should be able to practice their religion and their beliefs peacefully without government interference.… President Chirac is concerned to maintain France's principle of secularism and he wants that, as I think he said, not to be negotiable. Well, of course, our hope is religious freedom will be a non-negotiable as well. One Muslim leader said this is a secularism that excludes too much.… [A] number of countries … restrict headscarves … where people are wearing these with no provocation, simply as a manifestation of their own heartfelt beliefs, that we don't see where this causes division among peoples.

Question: You're referring to Turkey, yes?
Ambassador: Turkey would be another country, yes.[1]

As the ambassador stresses, there is a sharp policy distinction among the United States, which allows students to display religious symbols; France, which bans such symbols in public schools; and Turkey, which prohibits them in all educational institutions, both public and private, schools and universities. What is puzzling about these three states is that although each has a different policy on student displays of religious symbols, they all are "secular states" regarding two main characteristics: (1) their legislative and judicial processes are secular in the sense of being out of institutional religious control, and (2) they constitutionally declare neutrality toward religions; they establish neither an official religion nor atheism.[2] Other states have established religious laws and courts as the basis of their legislative and judicial systems ("religious states"), recognized an official religion ("states with an established religion"), or shown an official hostility toward religions generally by establishing atheism ("antireligious states").[3] Table 1 differentiates among these four sorts of states in terms of their relationships to religion.[4]

Although they are secular states, the United States, France, and Turkey have been deeply concerned with religion and have engaged it on many fronts. The rules of these three states regarding the wearing of headscarves reflect a broad array of policy differences among them.[5] Historical and contemporary debates on secularism in all these three

[1] "Release of the 2003 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom," December 18, 2003, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/27404pf.htm.

[2] While defining a secular state, some scholars emphasize (1) separation of church/mosque and state, and (2) religious freedom. See Smith 1999, esp. 178–83. A complete separation is neither constitutionally declared nor a practical issue in many secular states. Religious freedom is both constitutionally declared and practical; yet, it is not necessary or sufficient to be secular for a state to provide religious freedom.

[3] By religion, I imply a set of beliefs and practices that refer to a supernatural being, generally God. In this definition, neither atheism nor ideologies like Marxism are a religion.

[4] For similar typologies, see Wood 1998, 81–8; Madeley 2003a; Durham 1996, 36.

[5] Several terms are used to define particular Muslim-woman dress. The following are English words and their French and Turkish equivalents, respectively. *Headscarf* (*foulard*; *başörtüsü* or *türban*) implies a cloth worn around the head, while *veil* (*voile*; *peçe*) covers the face. *Veil* may also be used interchangeably with *hijab* (*hijab*; *tesettür*) to mean dressing modestly in general. *Chador* (*tchador*; *çarşaf*) is a black robe that covers the entire body from head to toe. See also Liederman 2000, 373–5, 380n16.

TABLE 1. *Types of State-Religion Regimes*

	Religious State	State with an Established Religion	Secular State	Antireligious State
Legislature and Judiciary	Religion-based	Secular	Secular	Secular
The State toward Religions	Officially Favors One	Officially Favors One	Officially Favors None	Officially Hostile to All or Many
Examples	*Iran* *Saudi Arabia* *Vatican*	*Greece* *Denmark* *England*	*United States* *France* *Turkey*	*North Korea* *China* *Cuba*
Number in the World	12	60	120	5

Source: Appendix A.

cases have pointed to education as the main battlefield. State policies toward religion in schools are controversial because struggling groups try to shape the young generation's worldview and lifestyle. This study, therefore, focuses on six of the most publicly debated state policies on (1) student religious dress and symbols in public schools, (2) pledges recited in public schools, (3) private religious education, (4) religious instruction in public schools, (5) public funding of private religious schools, and (6) organized prayer in public schools.

Despite the dynamism of the policy formation process, states still follow distinct and relatively stable trajectories in their general policies toward religion. There is a sharp qualitative distinction between state policies toward religion in the United States and those in France and Turkey. In America, students are allowed to display religious symbols and recite the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the statement "one nation, under God." In France and Turkey, however, the state pursues totally opposite policies on these two points. Even regarding other policy issues, there is a positive tone toward religion in the United States, in contrast to two other cases. Religious instruction in Turkish schools is directly related to the state's desire to control religion and the fact that private religious education is prohibited. Similarly, in France, the state funds religious private schools as long as these schools sign

TABLE 2. *State Policies toward Religion in Schools*

	Ban on Students' Religious Symbols in Public Schools	A Pledge Referring to God Recited in Public Schools	Ban on Private Religious Education	Religious Instruction in Public Schools	State Funding of Religious Private Schools	Ban on Organized Prayer in Public Schools
United States	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
France	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Turkey	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes

a contract to accept certain state control over them. On the surface, the ban on the organized school prayer seems similar. Yet an in-depth analysis reveals a distinction. In France and Turkey, the main justification of the ban would be that the prayer contradicts the principle of secularism and the secular character of the public school. In the United States, however, an important rationale is that school prayer implies a "psychological coercion" over students with minority religious beliefs.[6] Table 2 compares my three cases regarding these six policies.

Beyond these specific policies in schools, the three cases also show two opposite attitudes toward religion in their public spheres. In the United States, there is clear, official, public visibility of religion, which is not the case in France or Turkey. "In God We Trust" appears on all American currency. Many official oaths, including the swearing-in of the president, customarily contain the statement "so help me God" and are often made by placing the left hand on a Bible. Sessions of the U.S. Congress begin with a prayer by a chaplain, and the sessions of the Supreme Court start with the invocation "God save the United States and this Honorable Court." Such public religious discourses do not exist in Turkey or France.

These differences point to my central question: why are American state policies inclusionary toward public visibility of religion while policies in France and Turkey are largely exclusionary? Stated differently, the main dependent variable of this work is the variation of

[6] *Lee v. Weisman*, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); *Santa Fe v. Doe*, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).

policies on religion, particularly the two opposite policy tendencies of three secular states.

STRUGGLING IDEOLOGIES: PASSIVE SECULARISM AND ASSERTIVE SECULARISM

I argue that state policies toward religion are the result of ideological struggles.[7] The main source of public policy making on religion in almost all antireligious states (such as North Korea, China, and Cuba) is diverse interpretations of the communist ideology, whereas in many religious states (such as Iran and Saudi Arabia) it is various understandings of Islamism.[8] Many states with established churches (such as Greece, Denmark, and England) lack the totalitarian ideologies like communism and Islamism. Yet they experience certain struggles between leftist and rightist groups to shape state policies on issues such as the elimination of religion from state identity cards, multiculturalism, and state neutrality toward all religions.[9]

Because the dominant ideology plays a crucial role in the formation of state policies, its change implies a substantial policy transformation. Two recent examples are post-Shah Iran and postcommunist Russia. Although the Iranian Revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union had multiple causes,[10] ideological transformation marked their results, in terms of new patterns of policy orientations. In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, Shia Islamism replaced the Shah's secularist ideology. This ideological rupture caused extensive policy repercussions on state-religion relations.[11] Similarly, the elimination of the communist ideology in former Soviet republics led to major

[7] I deliberately use the term *ideology*, rather than the term *culture*. Culture is practical and habitual, which makes it more inconsistent and fuzzier than ideology. Ideology is a set of ideas related to consistent utopias, which makes it easier to recognize, categorize, and analyze. As Stephen Hanson emphasizes, ideologies are "formal, explicit, and relatively consistent" and "articulated by political elites," whereas cultures are "informal, implicit, and relatively inconsistent" and "held by people within a given institutional setting." Hanson 2003, 356. See also Scott 1999.

[8] U.S. Department of State 2007; Kindopp and Hamrin 2004; Hefner 2005; Al-Rasheed 2002.

[9] Liederman 2003, 296–7; Mouritsen 2006; Fetzer and Soper 2005, 33.

[10] Skocpol 1982; Solnick 1999.

[11] Arjomand 1988.

policy transformations.[12] Today the Russian state is no longer anti-religious; instead, it is a secular state that has affirmative relations with the Orthodox Church.[13] It also tries to please Muslims with particular policies, such as being an observant member of the Organization for the Islamic Conference.

In secular states, ideological struggles to shape state policies generally take place between two different notions of secularism – what I call "assertive secularism" and "passive secularism."[14] Assertive secularism requires the state to play an "assertive" role to exclude religion from the public sphere[15] and confine it to the private domain. Passive secularism demands that the state play a "passive" role by allowing the public visibility of religion. Assertive secularism is a "comprehensive doctrine,"[16] whereas passive secularism mainly prioritizes state neutrality toward such doctrines.

In Mexico, assertive secularism has been the dominant ideology despite the challenge of the conservatives, who want more public visibility of religion. State policies reflected assertive secularism with strong anticlericalism in the early twentieth century, whereas

[12] Ramet 1999. For the Soviet Union's Marxist and atheistic policies toward Islam, see Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay 1981. For Marxist ideology's impact on Soviet policies in general, see Hanson 1997.

[13] Papkov 2006; Anderson 2007; Krindatch 2006.

[14] Two scholars have already discussed distinct meanings of secularism in their insightful but short philosophical essays. Charles Taylor defines the first mode of secularism, which existed in American history, as secularism based on a "religious common ground." The second mode, for him, depends on a "political ethic independent of religion." The first mode is slightly different from passive secularism, while the second mode is similar to assertive secularism in my terminology. Taylor 1999. Wilfred McClay uses the terms *negative* and *positive* conceptions of secularism. Negative secularism is similar to my passive secularism because it "is a minimal, even 'negative' understanding of secularism, as a freedom 'from' establishmentarian imposition." It "is merely a provisional lingua franca that serves to facilitate commerce among different kinds of belief, rather than establish some new 'absolute' language, an Esperanto of postreligious truth." Positive secularism is similar to my assertive secularism, because it is a "more robust, more assertive, more 'positive' understanding of secularism … the one that affirms secularism as an ultimate faith. …" McClay 2002, 63–4.

[15] "The public sphere is a common space in which the members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these." Taylor 2004, 83. See also Habermas 1999.

[16] For comprehensive doctrines, see Rawls 1996.

they became relatively moderated in the 1990s.[17] India is a country where passive secularism has been dominant. Although there are ongoing academic and political debates about different interpretations of passive secularism, state policies constantly accommodate religions in the public sphere.[18] The challenge to passive secularism did not come from assertive secularism in India, but it has come from Hindu nationalism.[19] The Netherlands is another case where passive secularism is dominant. Despite the fall of the "pillarization model," all four main "pillars" – Protestants, Catholics, socialists, and liberals – still have strong public roles. Until the recent debates about the Muslim immigrants, the Netherlands was regarded as a stable model of state-religion relations that accommodated all religious groups.[20]

Passive and assertive secularist ideologies are particularly important for my three cases. In France, the supporters of assertive secularism (*laïcité de combat*) are dominant, while those of passive secularism (*laïcité plurielle*) are in opposition. Similarly, in Turkey, there is a conflict between the dominant assertive secularists (the Kemalists) and the resisting passive secularists (mainly the pro-Islamic conservatives). The United States is the only one among the three where passive secularism is dominant. Yet it faces a struggle between two interpretations of passive secularism (accommodationism and separationism).

The constitutions of these three states indicate the dominance of these two types of secularism. Both the French and Turkish constitutions identify their particular state as "secular": "France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic" (Art. 2), and "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State" (Art. 2). However, neither defines the limits of state intervention in the religious realm. In other words, the French and Turkish constitutions point to secularism as an official ideology and as an identity of the state rather than as a functional legal principle delineating the relationship of the state to religion. In the United States, by contrast, the

[17] Marshall 2000, 216–20; Blancarte 2005, 250–4.
[18] Bhargava 1999; Pantham 1999.
[19] Sahu 2002.
[20] Knippenberg 2006; Dekker and Ester 1996; Monsma and Soper 1997, 51–86.

First Amendment to the Constitution does not identify the state as secular. It simply states "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Both the first part (the Establishment Clause) and the second part (the Free Exercise Clause) require state neutrality toward religions. Moreover, the First Amendment is a part of what is known as the Bill of Rights. This implies that secularism in the United States is primarily an issue of individual rights, rather than an established comprehensive doctrine that defines the good life.

The ideological distinction and its policy implications can easily be observed in the public spheres of the three countries. In the words of Nilüfer Göle, Turkey "suffers from an excess of secularism … which involves the forced secularization of the public sphere [and] … a total repression of any symbols or organizations of faith.…Today we see how the public sphere was really under the tutorship of state, which through authoritarian means imposed a secular way of life."[21] French philosopher Regis Debray stresses the same issue by comparing France and the United States in an exaggerated manner:

> Above the nation, in France, there is humanity. Above the society, in America, there is God. The President in Paris takes an oath on the constitution voted by the people from the world, and in Washington on the Bible, which came from the heavens. The first one, after saying, "Long live the Republic, long live France," will be painted in his library with the *Essays* of Montaigne in his hands. The other will end his discourse on "God Bless America" and will be photographed in front of the starred flag.[22]

From a Marxist point of view, dominant ideology is a mere reflection of the economic structure and a means for the dominant economic class to exert power.[23] In my analysis, however, ideology is neither a superstructure nor a simple instrument of power. Ideology and material conditions are separate but interrelated. I attach importance to

[21] Göle 2004, 93.

[22] Debray 1992, 22–3.

[23] In the words of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "In every epoch the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas [which] … are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships." Marx 1994, 129. Antonio Gramsci, a neo-Marxist, however, rightly challenges this perspective by emphasizing the independent role of ideology for the establishment of hegemony. Gramsci 1991. See also Billings 1990, 4–6; Williams 1996, 373–4.

struggles between two secular ideologies within a country, rather than take countries as monolithically passive or assertive secularist. Dominant ideologies in my three cases always face ideological resistance. They are in a constant struggle with opposing ideologies. Due to this struggle, state policies toward religion experience several exceptions, contradictions, and changes. In some empirical chapters, I use the metaphor of a "swinging pendulum" to stress the recurring shifts of state relations to religion, which move back and forth along the spectrum of diverse policies based on the balance of power between struggling ideological groups.

In sum, ideological struggles between the supporters of passive and assertive secularism shape the two opposite policy tendencies in my three cases. Passive and assertive secularism became dominant in these cases as a result of particular historical conditions during their secular state-building periods. In France and Turkey the presence of an *ancien régime* based on the alliance of monarchy and hegemonic religion was a crucial reason for the emergence of anticlericalism among the republican elite. The antagonistic relations between the republicans and the religious institutions underlay the historical dominance of assertive secularism. America, however, was a relatively new country of immigrants that lacked an *ancien régime*. Therefore secular and religious elites sought and achieved an overlapping consensus on the separation of church and state at the federal level. The result was the dominance of passive secularism. This historical explanation completes my argument summarized in Figure 1.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I examine three alternative theories that would explain this policy divergence differently. I then elaborate my historical explanation based on the presence or absence of an *ancien régime*. The next section discusses the conceptual categories. The final section focuses on methodology.



FIGURE 1. Dependent and Independent Variables

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES: MODERNIZATION, CIVILIZATION, AND RATIONAL CHOICE

Modernization theory, civilizational approach, and rational-choice theory are three important theories that scholars refer to while analyzing religion and politics. Modernization theory has different versions. Some scholars emphasize the epochal impact of modernization to explain the transformation of medieval sociopolitical systems to modern ones.[24] They offer important insights for the analysis of the historical ruptures in the United States, France, and Turkey through secular state building. However, their broad perspectives do not provide parsimonious explanations for particular state-religion relations. I focus therefore on the parsimonious version of modernization theory, which emphasizes economic development as the determining factor.

Modernization theory predicts the decline of religion's political role through economic development.[25] According to Norris and Inglehart, the process of modernization includes "[t]he division of church and state, and the rise of secular-rational bureaucratic states."[26] Modernization theory would explain the variation in different states' policies toward religion regarding their various levels of modernization, which are generally measured by three criteria of human development: GDP per capita, literacy rate, and life expectancy.

According to the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) "Human Development Index for 2007–2008," the United States and France have close scores and rankings of development: the United States (0.951/12th) and France (0.952/10th). Turkey, however, has a much lower score and ranking of development (0.775/84th).[27] The first two cases are located among the countries of high development whereas Turkey is among the ones of medium development. Modernization theory, therefore, would not successfully explain why a highly developed country (France) differs from another highly developed country (the United States) while being relatively similar to a moderately developing case (Turkey) in terms of state policies toward religion.

[24] Anderson 1998; Gellner 1983a; Taylor 2001; Taylor 2004.
[25] Inglehart 1997; Inkeles and Smith 1976.
[26] Norris and Inglehart 2004, 8; also 208–10.
[27] UNDP, "Human Development Reports," http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/, accessed on May 19, 2008.

TABLE 3. *Human Development and Official Religion*

	States with Official Religions	States without Official Religions	TOTAL
High Development	30 (43%)	39 (57%)	69 (100%)
Medium Development	35 (41%)	50 (59%)	85 (100%)
Low Development	1 (5%)	21 (95%)	22 (100%)
TOTAL	66 (36%)	110 (64%)	176 (100%)

Source: Appendix B

Modernization theorists would respond by saying that they provide a general explanation of an international trend of state-religion relations, rather than of specific state policies in a few cases. I analyzed 176 countries in terms of their levels of development and official religion, using UNDP's "Human Development Index" and my own dataset for state-religion regimes. Table 3 summarizes the results. Countries with high development have a much higher percentage (43%) of having official religions than countries with medium (41%) and low development (5%). Such a result is the opposite of what modernization theory would predict.

Other large-N analyses also provide similar results. Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary examine 188 states and conclude that although "[t]he standard view is that richer countries are less likely to have state religions … per capita GDP has an ambiguous effect on the probability of state religion."[28] By analyzing 175 states, Jonathan Fox also notes that "economically developed states have lower levels of separation of religion and state."[29] In sum, although modernization is an important factor in the analysis of state-religion relations, its mono-causal and linear perspective does not explain diverse state-religion regimes, let alone specific secular state policies.

The second theory is the civilizational approach, which is generally called "essentialism" by its critics.[30] This approach focuses on text-based religious essentials to explain religion's impact on sociopolitical

[28] Barro and McCleary 2005, 1348.

[29] Fox 2006, 560; Fox 2008, 99.

[30] Bulliet 1996; Yavuz 2003, 16–18; Stepan 2001; Roy 2007, 15, 43. A particular version of civilizationalism has also been called "Orientalism." Said 1979; Said 1997,

life. According to this approach, for example, "Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society.… These rules are to be implemented throughout social life."[31]

Civilizational approach mainly argues (1) inherent distinctions between certain religions and religious communities and (2) direct causal impacts of these religious differences on politics.[32] According to Bernard Lewis, Islam and Judaism are similar to each other and different from Christianity in the sense that these two do not have clear and distinct conceptions of "clergy" versus "laity," or "sacred law" versus "secular law." Therefore, he defines state-religion struggles as a "Christian disease" and secularism as a "Christian remedy."[33] Lewis claims clearly divergent stands for Christianity and Islam toward state-religion relations: "The distinction between church and state, so deeply rooted in Christendom, did not exist in Islam."[34] Lewis and other defenders of civilizationalism often refer to a well-known verse of the Bible to prove the compatibility of Christianity and secularism: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar's, and unto God the things which be God's."[35] Samuel Huntington expands Lewis's thesis to other religions and cultures: "In Islam, God is Caesar; in China and Japan, Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar's junior partner. The separation and recurring clashes between church and state that typify Western civilization have existed in no other civilization."[36]

Civilizational approach rightly alerts us to the importance of religion in post–cold war world politics. It focuses our attention on key theological differences, which can have impacts on individuals' political preferences. Beyond this general concern, however, it has few specific things to say about state-religion relations. Civilizationalism would explain various state policies toward religion through the diverse

esp. 36–68. Civilizational approach is not always critical of Islam. For a pro-Islamic civilizational perspective, see Davutoğlu 1994.

[31] Gellner 1983b, 1. See also Gellner 1992, 5–7. For a critique of Ernest Gellner's civilizationalism, see Varisco 2005, 53–80; Sunar 2004, 175–86.

[32] Lewis 1990; Lewis 2003; Huntington 1993; Smith 1999, 185–91.

[33] Lewis 1991b, 10–12, 26; also Lewis 1996, 62.

[34] Lewis 1991a, 2–3.

[35] Luke 20:25, quoted by Lewis 1991b, 15.

[36] Huntington 1996, 70.

TABLE 4. *State-Religion Regimes in Forty-Six Muslim Countries*

Religious (Islamic) States	States with an Established Religion (Islam)	Secular States	Antireligious States
11	15	20	0

Sources: Appendices A and C.

religious backgrounds of particular states. Because it overemphasizes the similarities within the West and the differences between Western and Muslim countries, civilizationalism cannot explain why a "Western" country (France) pursues policies toward religion that are different from those of another "Western" country (the United States) and similar to those of a "Muslim" country (Turkey).

Civilizationalists would reply that Turkey is an exception in the Muslim world with its secular state. A general survey of the Muslim world, however, also challenges their claims. Ira Lapidus stresses that there have existed separate religious and political authorities in the Muslim world since the eighth century. At that time, independent Sunni schools of law, Shia sects, and Sufi tariqas, in addition to secular military and administrative rulers, challenged and replaced the institution of the caliphate, which claimed to represent both political and religious authorities.[37] Recently, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued a report on the constitutions of forty-four Muslim-majority countries. The commission, referring also to countries where Muslims are minority, concludes that "More than half of the world's Muslim population (estimated at over 1.3 billion) lives in countries … that either proclaim the state to be secular, or that make no pronouncements concerning Islam to be the official state religion."[38] My state-religion regimes index includes data very similar to this textual analysis as summarized in Table 4.[39] This disproves the alleged political unity in the Muslim world.[40]

[37] Lapidus 1975.

[38] Stahnke and Blitt 2005a, 2; Stahnke and Blitt 2005b, 951.

[39] As explained in Appendices A and C, my index is based on the U.S. Department of State's "Reports on International Religious Freedom."

[40] Fox indicates that states with majority Muslim population, in general, have fewer separationist policies toward religion than "Western" states. Beyond this generalization,

Critics of civilizationalism also stress that this approach has difficulty explaining not only the Muslim world but also Christian societies. The civilizational argument about the inherent church-state separation in Christianity overly romanticizes Christian societies by ignoring their (1) historical religious wars and church-state struggles, (2) substantially diverse state-religion regimes at present, and (3) current experience of religiously driven debates on political and legal issues, such as divorce, abortion, gay rights, and evolutionism, which cannot be simply explained by rendering these things onto Caesar.[41]

A more refined version of civilizationalism admits the diversity among Christian societies but argues an essential difference between the Catholics and Protestants.[42] According to this perspective, Protestantism is compatible with secularism, while Catholicism is not. As Casanova emphasizes, this approach is unable to explain the complex relations between the Catholic Church and the states, changing Catholic views toward democracy, and persistent established churches in Protestant countries.[43] Gill points out the strategic flexibility of the Catholic Church. It seeks state intervention in order to restrict Protestant proselytism in Latin America where Catholicism is a dominant religion, while it asks for more church-state separation and religious freedom in post-Soviet Russia where Catholicism remains in the minority.[44] He shows elsewhere that the Catholic Church implemented various political strategies even in different Latin American countries with regard to diverse political and religious competitions.[45] The civilizational approach, in short, ignores the contextual conditions that shape political attitudes of Catholics and Protestants. In the words of Stathis Kalyvas, "The dissimilar political behavior of Catholics and Protestants does not appear to be culturally driven: when challenged by anticlerical legislation, Protestants in the Netherlands reacted the same way Catholics did,

his dataset shows the variation of state-religion relations in both groups. Fox 2008; Fox 2006.

41 Arslan 1999, 120–31.

42 Madeley 2003b; Debray 1992, 23.

43 Casanova 2001.

44 Gill 2005, 13–15.

45 Gill 1998.

whereas when no anticlerical attack took place, Irish Catholics did not organize politically on the basis of religion."[46]

Civilizationalism generally underestimates human agency,[47] while rightly stressing that religion has an impact on politics. This impact, however, depends on diverse human interpretations of religion. Some Christians may defend church-state separation referring to the previously mentioned verse of the Bible. Others may interpret Christianity as a total blueprint for life by referring to another verse: "No one can serve two masters.… You cannot serve both God and money."[48] Likewise, Muslims interpret Islamic principles in terms of their political context. Mumtaz Ahmad stresses the diverse strategies of an Islamic movement, Jamaat-i Islami, on secularism. It defends an Islamic state in Pakistan where Muslims are majority, while supporting the secular state in India where they are minority.[49] Some Muslims embrace the idea of an Islamic state, while others, such as Abdullahi An-Naim, defend the necessity of a secular state to fully live Islam as a free individual.[50] For these reasons, I do not take religion per se as a determining factor. Instead, I focus on interpretations of religions linked with various political ideologies.

The third and final theory is rational choice, which differs from modernization and civilizationalism by not maintaining a deterministic explanation. It attaches importance to individual preferences, rational calculation, and structural constraints,[51] and provides significant insights for the analysis of actors' strategies in political struggles. This theory is also valuable for examining contextual human interpretations of religion. I agree with rational-choice theorists' critique of civilizationalism cited in the preceding text. I still have major reservations about this theory's explanation of state-religion relations.

[46] Kalyvas 1996, 3n6.

[47] Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori use the term *Muslim Politics*, instead of *Islamic Politics*, to emphasize that politics in Muslim societies is based on complex practices of Muslim agents, rather than so-called Islamic essentials. Eickelman and Piscatori 1996.

[48] Matthew 6:24.

[49] "While the Jamaat in Pakistan denounces secularism and the secular state as 'an evil force,' the Jamaat in India is equally vigorous in defending secularism as a 'blessing' and a 'guarantee for a safe future for Islam.'" Ahmad 1991, 505. See also El Fadl 2003; Messick 1988; Yılmaz 2005.

[50] An-Na'im 2008.

[51] Olson 1984; Hirschman 1972; Bates 1981; Gill 1998; Waldner 1999.

Gill is one of the few rational-choice theorists who examine the causes of state policies toward religion.[52] He argues that these policies differ due to the political rulers' varying calculations of opportunity costs based on their preferences for (1) sustaining political survival, (2) minimizing the cost of ruling, and (3) succeeding in economic growth, in addition to maximizing government revenue and minimizing civil unrest.[53] Gill would argue that in France and Turkey, state rulers pursue more restrictive policies toward religion than do rulers in the United States because these policies help them minimize the opportunity costs.

The strength of Gill's argument is its capacity to explain political rulers' strategic flexibility. However, it is unable to explicate the decisions of an important set of actors, the members of supreme/constitutional courts, who do not primarily care about political survival, the cost of ruling, or economic development, while deciding cases on state-religion relations.[54] Moreover, Gill's approach sounds state-centric because it focuses on rulers at the expense of societal actors in the formation of state policies. It also disregards the ideological divisions between rulers arguing standard preferences for them. This approach would have problems regarding my cases. The ban on students' headscarves in Turkey and France has been politically risky (in the former) and has created huge ruling costs, while not helping economic development at all.

The main weakness of rational-choice theory (or, at least, its "thin" version) is that it largely takes individual preferences as given.[55] For this theory, a ruler and a farmer have distinct preferences shaped by their socioeconomic status regardless of their ideology. This book tries to go beyond rational choice by unpacking individuals' preferences through the analysis of their ideologies. It shows that a ruler and a farmer may have shared preferences if they embrace the same ideology.[56] A related

[52] See also Finke 1990; Gill and Keshavarzian 1999.

[53] Gill 2007, esp. 232.

[54] As elaborated in the empirical chapters, I explain judges' decisions on secularism through their ideological positions.

[55] See Opp 1999; Green and Shapiro 1996. Ira Katznelson and Barry Weingast's volume includes essays that try to fix this problem of rational choice by combining it with historical institutionalism. Katznelson and Weingast 2005.

[56] Rational-choice theorists generally claim to be methodologically individualist. Yet because they take preferences as given and underestimate ideas, they explain change

problem is that rational-choice analyses generally undermine ideas as either justifications for already decided behaviors or as instruments for material interests. I take ideas as genuinely important factors in the construction of preferences and interests. In the words of Max Weber: "Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest."[57]

To conclude, neither economic determinism of modernization theory, nor religious determinism of civilizationalism, nor standard preferences of rational-choice theory are able to successfully explain state policies toward religion. This book claims to explain them through the analysis of ideological struggles. It keeps a balance between civilizationalism (which overemphasizes the role of ideas at the expense of human agency) and rational choice (which undermines the role of ideas in actors' preference formations and behaviors). On the one hand, it takes ideologies and religions seriously. On the other, it stresses that neither secularism, nor Islam, nor Christianity is monolithic. Instead, all three are open to interpretations. Even if one accepts the book's argument about the importance of ideologies, there is still a question to be answered: why is passive secularism dominant in the United States, whereas assertive secularism is dominant in France and Turkey? To answer that requires an historical analysis.

HISTORICAL FORMATION AND DOMINANCE OF ASSERTIVE AND PASSIVE SECULARISM

The emergence and dominance of ideologies on state-religion relations is a complex process that requires a qualitative analysis of historical trajectory for each case. It is hard to provide a deterministic causal explanation about them. My general argument is that political relations of and perceptions about religions cause particular formations of ideologies and state-religion regimes. A religion's close

primarily through structural transformations. One rational-choice theorist stresses, "Behavioral changes (over time) are the consequences of changed constraints; behavioral differences (across individuals) are the consequences of differing constraints." Iannacconne 1996, 28.

[57] Weber 1946, 280. See also Hall 2005, esp. 152–4; Bleich 2002.

relations with political authority create certain negative perceptions against it among the authority's discontents. In the words of Alexis de Tocqueville: "There have been religions intimately linked to earthly governments, … but when a religion makes such an alliance … it sacrifices the future for the present.… Hence religion cannot share the material strength of the rulers without being burdened with some of the animosity roused against them."[58]

I specify this broad point by examining religions' political relations during the state-building period, which is generally the critical juncture that creates a path dependence concerning state-religion interactions. In certain cases, modern state building defines an *ancien régime* based on the marriage between the old monarchy and religious hegemony, which is perceived by the progressive elite as a barrier against the new republican regime. The main product of an *ancien régime* is the anticlerical (or antireligious) movement against it. The anticlericals perceive the hegemonic religion as the source of justification for the declining monarchy and the potential supporter of its reestablishment. Religious conservatives oppose the disestablishment of their religion because they want to keep the hegemony. In short, the *ancien régime* becomes the basis of the polarization between the anticlericals and conservatives.

In addition to their different levels of hostility against religion, anticlerical movements also have various results, contingent on their organization, popular support, and timing. They may create either an antireligious state, or a secular state where assertive secularism is dominant. These results are also changeable as seen in the previously discussed transformations from antireligious Soviet Union to secular Russia. The following examples of Spain and Portugal indicate change from assertive secularism to passive secularism as dominant ideology.

The Soviet Union was an example of the first result (the antireligious state). The Orthodox Church in Russia faced an antagonism from the antireligious Bolsheviks mainly due to its fusion with the Russian monarchy.[59] In the *ancien régime*, "the Russian Orthodox Church was

[58] Tocqueville 2000 [1835], 297. Such a close state-religion relation is more likely to make "secularity as a symbol of opposition." Chaves 1992, 276.

[59] Krindatch 2006, 271.

the established church of the Russian Empire, and the Tsar was its head."[60] That was one of the main reasons why Lenin and other leaders of the 1917 Revolution were hostile to the church. Their atheism was much more antagonistic toward religion than Marx's philosophical atheism.[61] As a result of Soviet antireligious policies, the number of the Russian Orthodox Church's parishes, which was around fifty thousand in 1917, decreased to two hundred to three hundred in 1939.[62]

Mexico is a clear example of the second result (the dominance of assertive secularist ideology). During the nineteenth century, the liberal republicans regarded the Catholic Church as the ally of conservative authoritarian rulers. Whenever they got power, the liberals pursued anticlerical policies, such as confiscating church properties and making legal marriage a civil, not religious, act. The conservatives succeeded in establishing a monarchy in 1864, but it lasted only three years. Having an ambivalent *ancien régime* in their minds, the liberals led the state (re)building in 1910 and adopted the Constitution of 1917, which established the ideological dominance of assertive secularism, in general, and secular, compulsory, and free education, in particular (Art. 3). In response, conservative forces staged the Cristero Rebellion from 1926 to 1929.[63] The failure of the rebellion led the liberals to implement assertive secularist policies, and some policies sounded antireligious. Although the "Catholic Church did not *legally* exist in Mexico" following the Constitution of 1917, governments de facto accommodated the Catholic Church by allowing it to use church buildings. The constitutional amendment in 1992 maintained basic religious freedoms and provided legality to the Catholic Church.[64]

Spain and Portugal are examples where the second result temporarily existed. In both countries anticlericalism emerged as the republicans' reaction to the Catholic Church's cooperation with monarchies. In the words of Paul Manuel: "Absolute political power and legitimacy in Portugal and Spain until … the modern era were in the hands of the monarch.… The Roman Catholic Church legitimized the monarch's claim to divine authority, and, in turn, typically

[60] Berman 1996, 287.
[61] Ibid., 289.
[62] Ramet 1999, 231.
[63] Bailey 1974.
[64] Gill 2007, 116 (emphasis in original).

received royal grants of land, among other goods."[65] In the nineteenth century, the republican elite challenged this "Iberian *ancien régime*." As a result of the Catholic Church's continuing support to the crown and aristocracy, "the Republicans became staunchly anticlerical."[66] In both countries, the anticlericals founded assertive secularist republics with oppressive policies against the church in the early twentieth century. Yet the conservatives fought back and established "pro-clerical fascist and corporatist regimes in the 1930s."[67] Finally, both Spain and Portugal became democracies in the 1970s and 1980s, where the Catholic Church is disestablished but keeps certain privileges through concordats.

In countries where there is no *ancien régime*, the anticlerical movement does not exist or is marginal. The existence or absence of an *ancien régime* has four components as seen in the preceding cases: (1) monarchy, (2) hegemonic religion, (3) an alliance between the two, and (4) a successful republican movement. In cases where *ancien régimes* exist, such as Russia, Mexico, Spain, and Portugal, all four components are historically present. In countries where there is no *ancien régime*, some components are missing. That may lead to a religious state, a state with established religion, or a secular state with the dominance of passive secularism. Iran today is an example of the first result. During the Revolution of 1979, the first, second, and fourth components existed. Yet the hegemonic religion did not ally with the monarchy. On the contrary, the Shia clergy gained popularity by challenging the Shah and led the revolution. Another religious state, Saudi Arabia, has not experienced a republican transformation since its independence in 1926; therefore, it does not have an *ancien régime*. If a republican movement emerges and succeeds, then the current regime, which is based on the alliance between the Saudi monarchy and Wahhabi leaders, will become an *ancien régime*.

In certain European countries that have established churches, there is no *ancien régime* due to an absence of a republican transformation. Although it is symbolic, the monarchy-church alliance still persists; it is therefore a modern, at least contemporary, not ancient, regime.

[65] Manuel 2002, 74.
[66] Ibid., 76.
[67] Ibid., 77. See also Casanova 1994, 75–81.

Britain is relatively different from Scandinavian monarchies because the Anglican dominance was weaker than the Lutheran hegemony. The Anglican establishment was contested by several alternative religions, from Catholicism to various Protestant denominations. Similarly, it "had much less social or political power than the Catholic Church in some countries. Hence there was no reason for a radical attack."[68] In Britain, there "was no need to overthrow religion itself, because there was no pope … , no monopolistic priesthood."[69] As a result, a clash did not take place between religious and secularist forces: "there was no 'conflict of two Great Britains' resembling the 'conflict of two Frances.'"[70] Greece is unique in Europe: it had a republican transformation but has kept the established religion. There is no such thing as a "Greek *ancien régime*," because the Greek Orthodox Church was not a strong supporter of monarchy against the republicans. The church generally obeyed any political authority as a result of its Caesaropapist tradition, which accepted the superiority of the state power.[71] Therefore, the church "as an institution has been used by conservative, reformist fascist and socialist regimes alike."[72]

Among the secular states, those that lack an *ancien régime* experience the dominance of passive secularism. Ireland and Poland historically had a hegemonic religion but not a monarchy versus republic division. Therefore, the Catholic hegemony was not perceived as an antirepublican force. Instead, the Catholic Church historically was a symbol of resistance against "English colonization" in Ireland[73] and foreign "invasions, partitions, and occupations" in Poland.[74] Germany had a monarchy and republican transformation but not a religious hegemony. During the *Kulturkampf*, the conflict was not between religion and secularism; it was mainly between the Protestant state authority and Catholicism.[75] The Netherlands has had a monarchy but has not had a hegemonic religion. The "formation of the Dutch state

[68] Modood and Kastoryano 2006, 163.
[69] Himmelfarb 2003, 51.
[70] Baubérot and Mathieu 2002, 33.
[71] Mavrogordatos 2003.
[72] Kokosalakis 1987, 231.
[73] Dillon 2002, 48.
[74] Byrnes 2002, 27.
[75] Henkel 2006, 309; Fetzer and Soper 2005, 106; Gould 1999, 83.

and the building of the Dutch nation have been dominated by the religious cleavage of Calvinists and Roman Catholics."[76] Its church-state disputes included multiple actors, rather than two opposite (religious and secular) forces. That led to a passive secularist regime, the Dutch "pillarization system."[77]

Colonized India historically lacked both a local monarchy and hegemonic religion. The founders of modern India adopted passive secularism to maintain both the political autonomy of the state and the peaceful coexistence of majority Hindus with a large Muslim minority.[78] Canada and Australia also experienced the absence of monarchy (as two other former British colonies) and religious diversity (of several Protestant denominations and Catholics). That explains the absence of an *ancien régime* and dominance of passive secularism in these cases.[79]

The existence or absence of an *ancien régime* is a crucial factor in my three cases. Passive and assertive secularism, which had largely been formulated in the minds and writings of intellectuals for decades, became dominant ideologies during the periods of secular state building in the United States (1776–1791: from the Declaration of Independence to the First Amendment); in France (1875–1905: from the Constitutional Laws of 1875 to the 1905 law separating church and state); and in Turkey (1923–1937: from the foundation of the republic to the constitutional amendment enshrining secularism as a constitutional principle).

These periods are critical junctures when the secular state replaced the old types of state-religion regimes and left an ideological and institutional legacy that has persisted ever since. A critical juncture, in general, is a moment when both agency and structural conditions are available for a systematic change. It is a period when "choices close off alternative options and lead to the establishment of institutions that generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes."[80] In my three cases, the critical junctures followed structural crises caused by wars: the American War of Independence (1775–1783), the Franco-Prussian

[76] Knippenberg 2006, 328.
[77] Dekker and Ester 1996.
[78] Bhargava 2007; Jacobsohn 2003.
[79] Lyon and Die 2000; Monsma and Soper 1997, 87–120.
[80] Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 341.

War (1870–1871), and the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922). Moreover, in all cases, there existed powerful agents, ideological groups, that were willing and able to form the new order during the structural crisis. When the new system becomes consolidated, it creates a path dependence. In the aftermath of this transformation, a new change becomes difficult and requires a new critical juncture.[81] The length of critical junctures may vary, as long as it is shorter than the "duration of the path-dependent process it initiates."[82] In the words of Ruth Collier and David Collier, it "may range from relatively quick transitions – for example, '*moments* of significant structural change' – to an extended period that might correspond to one or more presidential administrations, a long 'policy period,' or a prolonged 'regime period.'" In their work, critical junctures range from nine to twenty-three years.[83] In my analysis they range from one and a half decades in the United States and Turkey to three decades in France.

In France and Turkey, the *ancien régime* deeply affected the ideological backgrounds of secular and religious movements, as well as their relations. In both countries, religion was an important pillar of the monarchy, which made the republican elite anticlerical; in a sense they opposed religion's influence over society and polity. Moreover, Catholicism in France and Islam in Turkey were hegemonic religions. Therefore, conservative Catholics and Islamists sought to preserve religious establishments. It was difficult to find a religious justification of state-religion separation, and there was almost no ideational bridge between secular and religious movements. Severe conflict between the two was foreseeable. The dominance of assertive secularism, in a nutshell, meant the victory of the secular movement over its religious rival.

America, however, was a relatively new country of immigrants. It had neither a local monarchy nor a hegemonic religion. Hence, the

[81] According to James Mahoney, critical junctures "are moments of relative structural indeterminism when willful actors shape outcomes in a more voluntary fashion than normal circumstances permit.... Before a critical juncture, a broad range of outcomes is possible; after a critical juncture, enduring institutions and structures are created, and the range of possible outcomes is narrowed considerably." Mahoney 2001, 7.

[82] Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 350.

[83] Collier and Collier 1991, 32.

TABLE 5. *Historical Conditions and Relations during Secular State Building*

	I→	II→	III→	IV
United States	The absence of an *ancien régime* (no local monarchy and diversity of Protestant denominations)	Secular groups were not against religion's public role; religious groups were open to church-state separation	Overlapping consensus between secular and religious groups	Dominance of *passive secularism*
France and Turkey	The presence of an *ancien régime* based on monarchy and hegemony of Catholicism and Islam	Secular groups were against religion's public role; religious groups were seeking to preserve the establishment of Catholicism and Islam	Severe conflict between secular and religious groups	Dominance of *assertive secularism*

republican elite did not perceive religion as an ally of an old monarchy. Instead, there was a diversity of competing Protestant denominations, none of which could claim a bare majority. Because of the intense religious diversity, many religious groups saw the church-state separation as a second-best choice and a guarantee to their religious freedom. Secular and religious elites had an ideational common ground based on John Locke's liberalism. The dominance of passive secularism depended on an "overlapping consensus" – an agreement that secular and religious movements reached for different purposes. Table 5 summarizes this historical argument.

The facts that secularism chronologically and world-historically took place in France before it did in Turkey, and that the Turkish framers were inspired by the French model, did not weaken the argument based on the *ancien régime*. First, Turkish framers preferred the French model to other alternatives because the historical conditions in both countries were relatively similar. Second, the Turkish model is not a simple imitation of the French one; the two had several

differences. Finally, Turkey took initiative earlier than France on several issues, such as putting secularism into the constitution (1937 in Turkey and 1948 in France), banning students' headscarves, and creating an umbrella organization to control Islam (Turkish Diyanet in 1924 and the French Council of the Muslim Faith in 2003).[84]

Since the secular state building, passive and assertive secularism have preserved their dominance in the three cases through ideological indoctrination, institutional socialization, and public education, despite certain challenging forces and conceptual transformations. This path dependence is a crucial dimension of ideological struggles in the public-policy formation process in these three cases. These complex relations and processes require nuanced conceptual tools.

CONCEPT FORMATION, TYPOLOGY, AND CONTINUUM

Typologies and continua, which help us understand abstract phenomena and evaluate concrete cases, are complementary, not mutually exclusive, conceptual tools. The choice of one or the other is based on the depth of the analysis. Regarding religion's institutional control over legislature and judiciary, there are only two types – religious states (e.g., Iran) and nonreligious states (e.g., the United States). To increase the conceptual precision, one needs to descend in the "ladder of abstraction," in the words of Giovanni Sartori.[85] A simple way of descending is to add another criterion, such as state neutrality toward religions. That increases the number of types to four: religious states (e.g., Iran), states with established religion (e.g., England), secular states (e.g., the United States), and antireligious states (e.g., China). Obviously these are Weberian "ideal types."[86] Some cases may perfectly fit these types, although many exist through a continuum

[84] According to Pierre-Jean Luizard, the model for French and Turkish state policies toward Islam is the French colonial rule in Algeria, which implemented the principle of state control over Islam, rather than state-Islam separation. Luizard's interview with Ali İhsan Aydın, "Türkiye'de Sömürge Modeli Laiklik Uygulanıyor," *Zaman*, March 14, 2008. See also Luizard 2006.

[85] Sartori 1970. See also Goertz 2006; Collier and Mahon 1993; Collier and Levitsky 1997.

[86] In the words of Max Weber, "An ideal type is … a unified *analytical* construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a *utopia*. Historical research faces the task of determining in each



FIGURE 2. Continuum of State-Religion Regimes and Secularism

between them. Germany, for example, is a secular state regarding the typology, but the fact that the German state is collecting church tax (mainly for Catholic and certain Protestant churches) puts it in a continuum between the secular state and the state with established religion.[87] Spain, Portugal, and Poland are also cases that deviate from ideal types. On the one hand, they do not have constitutionally established religions; on the other hand, they provide privileges to the Catholic Church through concordats. Israel and Egypt are states with established religions with regard to the general typology. Yet, as Yüksel Sezgin convincingly points out, religious laws and courts are ruling on the issues of personal status (e.g., marriage, divorce, maintenance, and inheritance) in both cases.[88] Based on that, one may put them in a continuum between states with established religions and religious states.

This book continues descending in the ladder of abstraction by examining the diversity of secular states. Therefore, it adds another variable – whether a secular state pursues exclusionary or inclusionary policies toward religion in the public sphere. That leads the development of the two types (assertive and passive) of secularism. Figure 2 locates the typologies of state-religion regimes and secularism in a continuum.

Assertive and passive secularist ideologies can be defined as *dichotomous types*. State policies, however, are more complex and less consistent than ideologies. The two types of secularism imply ideal types, while the real state policies exist through the continuum between them. States are neither completely assertive secularist (excluding religion

individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality." Weber 1949, 90 (emphasis in original).

[87] Monsma and Soper 1997.

[88] Sezgin 2007. For ideological struggles between proreligious and prosecular groups to shape Israeli state policies toward religion, see Wald 2002; Sezgin 2003.

FIGURE 3. Continuum of Passive and Assertive Secularism

entirely from the public sphere) nor purely passive secularist (allowing any sort of public visibility of religion). Even the dominance of assertive or passive secularism in a country is a *matter of degree*. France and Turkey, despite their ideological similarity, still differ from each other with regard to the levels of the exclusion of religion from the public sphere. Certain policies, such as the ban on private religious education and the prohibition on wearing headscarves at universities and in private schools, indicates that the Turkish state has a more exclusionary attitude toward religion than does the French state, as Figure 3 demonstrates.

I explain the differences between the French and Turkish cases with diverse impacts of democracy and authoritarianism.[89] From the secular state building in the late nineteenth century to the present, assertive secularism in France has coexisted with a multiparty democracy and has gained substantial popular support. It was challenged by Catholic movements that supported the reestablishment of monarchy and the authoritarian rules, such as the Vichy regime (1940–1944). Due to the French democracy, the opponents of assertive secularism have had the political means to criticize certain policies, and the assertive secularists have made compromises from their utopian ideological views (see Chapters 4 and 5). In Turkey, by contrast, assertive secularism was established by an authoritarian single-party rule in the early twentieth century and has been defended since 1960 by several military *coup d'états* against democratically elected governments. In the Turkish elections, assertive secularist politicians have always received fewer votes than the conservatives. That reflects the tension between assertive secularism and democracy in

[89] Zana Çıtak argues that state policies toward religion have been more exclusionary in Turkey than in France because the historical formation of nationalism in Turkey was independent of, if not against, Islam, whereas that of France had both anti-Catholic and pro-Catholic trajectories. Çıtak 2004. This argument ignores the historical and contemporary existence of pro-Islamic nationalism in Turkey. Chapter 7 explains that a founder of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gökalp, was pro-Islamic, at least not anti-Islamic.

Turkey. Under the shadow of the authoritarian military and judiciary, it has been much more difficult to oppose assertive secularist policies. The assertive secularists, therefore, have rarely accepted policy compromises. Yet democratization has also caused relative moderation of assertive secularist policies in Turkey (see Chapters 6 and 7).[90]

Diverse characteristics of French and Turkish *ancien régimes* contributed to the different impulses of democracy and authoritarianism in the two cases. In France, the Catholic Church represented a hierarchical organization relatively isolated from the French society, due to its certain features, such as the pope's supranational authority and the clergy's celibacy. There was a tension between several segments of the French society and the church regarding issues, such as the church's large properties, since the time of feudalism.

In Turkey, however, the role of religion in the *ancien régime* was relatively different. Islamic institutions, from the ulema in Istanbul to Sufi tariqas in local areas, were very diverse. These institutions were comparatively more deeply embedded to the society because there was not an extraterritorial pope or isolated clergy with celibacy. In this regard, there was no monolithic polarization between the "mosque" and certain segments of the "people." The pious foundations, for example, were seen as a shared value of the society, not the property of the ulema. The tension happened between the Westernist elite and Islamic leaders in the late Ottoman and the early Republican period. Moreover, the Islamists in Turkey, unlike the Catholic Church in France, did not try to reestablish the monarchy. Yet the Turkish republican elite still saw the Islamists as the representative of the *ancien régime*, in terms of the hegemony of Islamic way of life.

As a result, assertive secularism was largely imposed as a top-down elite project in Turkey, while it has been established through a relatively more bottom-up process in France. Assertive secularism in Turkey was the pillar of the Westernization project, which alienated the traditional culture of the masses by importing a new European way of life. In France, assertive secularism was more indigenous. That is a reason why the assertive secularists became successful under multiparty democracy in France, whereas they have needed authoritarian means in Turkey. In short, despite their similar historical background

[90] See Baubérot 2000, 36–40; Burdy and Marcou 1995, 29; Massignon 2000, 362.

TABLE 6. *Groups in a Continuum between Passive and Assertive Secularism*

	Nonsecularist Groups	Passive Secularists	Assertive Secularists
United States	Christian Right	Accommodationists, Separationists	Strict separationists
France	Far-Right	Pluralistic secularists	Combative secularists
Turkey	Islamists	Conservatives	Kemalists

(*ancien régime*) and dominant ideology (assertive secularism), France and Turkey are still different with regard to certain characteristics of their *ancien régimes*, which impacted their diverse levels of democratization. That explains why Turkey has more restrictive state policies toward religion than France does.

Throughout the book, I avoid defining my cases as assertive or passive secularist states. Instead, I define them as countries where one of the two secularist ideologies has domination, which is still resisted by alternative ideologies. This book also problematizes the monolithic view of the state by stressing that state actors are divided through ideological lines.[91] Therefore, the final conceptual attempt of the book to descend in the ladder of abstraction is to unpack countries as arenas of struggle for ideological groups. I just summarize these groups in Table 6 and leave explanations to the empirical chapters.

METHODOLOGY

This study primarily analyzes three countries and enlarges the number of cases and units of observation by comparing different periods of time (e.g., historical and contemporary) and various cases (e.g., movements and parties) within countries. I chose the United States, France, and Turkey because they allow me to conduct a cross-regional and cross-cultural comparison. These cases also provide variations in dependent and explanatory variables.[92] They direct to generalizable results

[91] Migdal 2001.
[92] King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 128–32.