

# Fundamentalism

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## INTRODUCTION

The preponderance of scholarly opinion in the West suggests that fundamentalism is a set of dogmatic beliefs, a creed, or a literal adherence to a sacred text considered infallible (scripturalism).<sup>1</sup> This chapter presents an alternative view: fundamentalism is an orientation to the world. The intellectual aspect of that orientation is termed “worldview,” and the emotional/attitudinal aspect of that orientation is termed “ethos.” This definition is far removed from other contrasting definitions of fundamentalism by authors writing from both within and without the varied fundamentalist traditions. Within the Christian tradition the “fundamentals” have been defined as belief in the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, and human nature’s corruption by original sin.<sup>2</sup> From without the tradition as “movements that seek to return to orthodox, feudal value systems”; “repression of individuals and social groups” and “exertion of violence as an expression of power”; “a puritanical attitude...and the assertion of patriarchal authority”; and “a discernible pattern of religious militance by which self-styled ‘true believers’ attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify borders of religious community, and create alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors.”<sup>3</sup> This lack of intellectual agreement about what constitutes fundamentalism is both endearing and disturbing. The variety of definitions indicated is free-wheeling and provocative. But when anything and everything can stand for a concept, here fundamentalism, then the concept is no longer useful for purposes of description and analysis.

This is, then, an interpretive chapter. The definition and description of fundamentalism goes against the grain of much academic writing on the subject which is particularistic in scope, dichotomous in classification, and pejorative in evaluation. This account treats fundamentalism as a cross-cultural phenomenon as well as an ideal type and a genuine (though not incorruptible) form of religion. It contextualizes fundamentalism within the broad social, economic, and political currents that began at the end of the eighteenth century. The attitude taken toward fundamental-

ism is neither condemnatory nor praiseful, but rather empathetic (though not sympathetic which suggests support). That is, the aim is to understand the phenomenon rather than to boost or denigrate it. References to contrasting points of view appear in passing in the chapter, and in the list of works for further reading at the end.

This description of fundamentalism is confined to the monotheistic religions. The religious traditions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism are intimately related not only historically but also theologically. Muslims recognize the Hebrew prophets and even include Jesus as one of them! Moreover, all three religions accept Abraham as a significant seminal figure in their religious tradition and recognize that they share a common legacy. A review of Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist fundamentalism would be valuable and make this study more widely cross-cultural, but such a review is beyond my expertise.<sup>4</sup> Fundamentalism, then, is an orientation to the modern world, both cognitive and emotional, that focuses on protest and change and on certain consuming themes: the quest for purity; the struggle between good and evil; the search for authenticity; totalism and activism; the necessity of certainty (scripturalism); selective modernization and controlled acculturation, millennialism, and the centering of the mythic past on the present (traditioning). Totalism is the orientation that views religion as relevant to all important domains of culture and society including politics, the family, the marketplace, education, and law. Activism is confronting the establishment, political or religious, by multiple forms of protest: legal, political, economic, and coercive. Scripturalism is the justification and reference of all important beliefs and actions to a sacred scripture and a proof-text claimed to be inerrant. That scripture, above all, has a powerful emotional appeal for the believer. Selective modernization is the process of selective acceptance of technological and social organizational innovations introduced by the modern world. Controlled acculturation is the process by which an individual accepts a practice or belief from another culture or the secular world on terms that integrate it into their value system. Traditioning is the process of making scriptural accounts, events, and images relevant to present-day activities. Millennialism is the Christian doctrine that the prophecy in the book of Revelation will be fulfilled with an earthly rule of a thousand years of universal peace and the triumph of righteousness. More generally for a number of religious traditions it is the belief that history will come to an apocalyptic end with the return of a divine redeemer, the reign of the righteous, and a judgment day for the Al Qaedaick and the dead.<sup>5</sup>

### WHO ARE THE FUNDAMENTALISTS?

The social identity of fundamentalists has been a debatable question whose answer has often varied in terms of the fundamentalist movement discussed, the pertinent period in modern history, and the perspective taken. Five views are covered briefly below. Each view highlights certain aspects of fundamentalist recruitment that deserve attention.<sup>6</sup> Henry Munson, an anthropologist, has described fundamentalists in terms of a worldview that sees them choosing God's side in the ongoing and pervasive struggle of good against evil (Satan).<sup>7</sup> Fundamentalists differ among themselves in whether they regard this struggle as moral (with imperial rule as a

punishment for an immoral people) and as necessitating a strict return to scripture (Qur'an) or whether they see the struggle political as well as moral and as necessitating not only moral reformation and a struggle against the oppressor but also the establishment of an Islamic state. In his application of this view to Morocco in the 1970s and 1980s, Munson distinguishes three fundamentalist types, ranging from most moral to most political. Implicit in these categorizations is the distinction between "religious" and "religious-minded" people.<sup>8</sup> These terms distinguish between people who spontaneously experience religion and those who are self-conscious in defense of their beliefs (and who feel most threatened by outsiders). Two of the three fundamentalist leaders of the movements Munson discusses were former inspectors in the Ministry of Education. And the supporters of the more political of the movements were students and members of the educated middle class with very few supporters from such categories as peasants, workers or rural migrants.

Bruce Lawrence, a historian of religion, has emphasized that in its leadership and core following, fundamentalism is a movement of secondary-level male elites.<sup>9</sup> These males are dominantly laymen, not clergy.<sup>10</sup> He notes that two prominent Muslim fundamentalist leaders in Pakistan, Abul-'Ala Mawdudi and Asrar Ahmed, were a journalist and a medical doctor, respectively, before turning their attention to religious reform; two other prominent Egyptian Muslim fundamentalists, Hassan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb were, respectively a teacher and a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Education. And Juhayman ibn Sayf al-'Utayba, who led the violent military takeover of the sacred mosque enclosure in Mecca in 1979, an audacious challenge to the Saudi state, was a soldier in the Saudi National Guard before he became a self-taught Muslim theologian. In the United States Pat Robertson is by training a lawyer, and James Dobson is a developmental psychologist, and although Jerry Falwell was trained in the ministry, he made his living as a talk-show host. Fundamentalists are very much men of the world in the world. In Egypt in the 1980s Lawrence records that Muslim fundamentalists came from upwardly mobile educated middle class backgrounds and not from the dispossessed and downtrodden. In Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Iran in the late 1970s they came from the petite bourgeoisie, that is, from "marginalized out-of-power groups and estranged urban dwellers who continue to have rural roots and premodern values."<sup>11</sup> The male elite fundamentalist leaders in this period and the following decade were professionally and scientifically oriented. Quite often, they were unemployed or underemployed "frustrated engineers, disaffected doctors, or unpaid bureaucrats in meaningless public jobs."<sup>12</sup> Lawrence's description affirms the diversified social base of fundamentalist Muslim movements.

Martin Riesebrodt, a sociologist, compares the social composition of Protestant fundamentalists in the United States in the period from 1910 to 1928 with Shi'a Muslim fundamentalists in Iran from 1961 to 1979 and finds remarkable similarities. He argues that fundamentalists are neither a class nor a dislocated amorphous mass. Rather, they are segments of different classes sharing the same experience and reacting to it through the same set of religious symbols or, alternatively, segments of society having different experiences that are expressed through the same set of religious symbols.<sup>13</sup> A social movement whose members share a number of attributes such as religion, regional tradition, and economic position organize through a

voluntary religious association to promote a certain worldview. They are brought together symbolically and socially by common images and ideas. Riesebrodt argues that fundamentalism is an urban protest movement recruited from all classes but featuring urban migrants, the traditional middle class, the clergy, and "border-crossers." Border-crossers include youth and white-collar bureaucrats of rural origins who come to the city, have received a secular education, are alienated from many aspects of rural culture, but are not modern in their worldview or ethos (e.g., they have conservative views of women and their dress, demeanor and participation in public life including education and work).<sup>14</sup> In Iran patron-client ties between particular local and regional religious leaders and their followers martialed economic support for schools, mosques, and hospitals, and for the revolution (of 1979).<sup>15</sup>

In the United States fundamentalism was also an urban phenomenon, arising and flourishing in the large northern cities of New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and Minneapolis as well as in Los Angeles. The leaders of fundamentalist activity as well as the followership "came from confessions in which the conflict between modernism and orthodoxy was strongest, the Baptists and Presbyterians of the North."<sup>16</sup> Riesebrodt's demographic point is significant not only because it challenges the stereotype of American fundamentalism as a rural and small-town phenomenon, but also because it focuses on rapid urbanization, industrialization, and mass migration. These were the processes that were transforming the United States from a personalistic and patriarchal society to an impersonal and bureaucratic one, both in the communities and in the churches.<sup>17</sup> It is not accidental that the invective of the Protestant fundamentalists at the beginning of the twentieth century was xenophobic, citing "Rum and Romanism," and focusing on Roman Catholics and Jews. These were precisely the immigrant groups that were pouring into the northern cities where fundamentalism arose. It was they, the fundamentalists argued, that were eroding the moral values of the nation. The American south did not experience such mass migration, industrialization, and urbanization until much later.

Ian Lustick, a political scientist, has in one way broadened and in another way narrowed the application of the term fundamentalism by linking it with militant political activism. He defines fundamentalism as "a style of political participation characterized by unusually close and direct links between one's fundamental beliefs and political behavior designed to effect radical change."<sup>18</sup> Fundamentalists are identified by three attributes: uncompromisable injunctions, belief that their behavior is "guided by direct contact with the source of transcendental authority," and "political attempts to bring about rapid and comprehensive change."<sup>19</sup> By defining fundamentalism in this way Lustick was able to rule out other Jewish religious groups in Israel such as the *haredim* (ultra-orthodox Jews) as fitting the category. The latter regarded the Torah and other Jewish sacred scriptures as literally true and inerrant, and they were extremely pious as judged by their devotion to worship and their style-of-life (dress, diet, and demeanor). But the *haredim* "opted out of key political struggles over the course that Israeli society will take."<sup>20</sup> By definition, for Lustick, fundamentalists must not only be political activists, they must be militant political activists. Members of *Gush Emunim* (Bloc of the Faithful) are com-

mitted to claiming and settling the West Bank of the Jordan river – land already settled by Palestinians – by force if necessary under the slogan, “The Land of Israel for the People of Israel, according to the Torah of Israel.”<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, Lustick’s definition of fundamentalists would include nonreligious political movements characterized by dogmatism, militancy, and justification by some ultimate cause (e.g., the classless society). The core of *Gush Emunim* (around 20,000 in the 1980s) was supported by a much larger number of followers and sympathizers (estimated at 150,000 in elections) connected in a social network with nodes in religious schools, cooperative and collective settlements, parties, and political lobbies in much the same way that Iranian fundamentalists are connected in a far-flung social network whose nodes are mosques, prayer halls (*busayniyyahs*), and bazaars where pious businessmen organize activities. Fundamentalists, then, are not always, perhaps not usually, organized in formal corporate groups but rather in informal networks within which, nevertheless, communication can be rapid and efficient.

A fifth perspective is provided by Daniel Levine and David Stoll who discuss the attraction of new Protestant religious movements among Roman Catholics in Latin America. In explaining the attraction of such movements, Levine and Stoll have emphasized five attributes: social change and mobility, the allure of modernity, the small size of churches located on the urban periphery, the intense informal social networks, and the evangelical component in the message.<sup>22</sup> The authors emphasize the new clientele that have developed for Protestant missionary activity as a result of urbanization, population shift, and expanded transport and communication, beginning in the 1960s. The “new affiliations to Protestant churches are overwhelmingly drawn from men and women with an intense experience of change and mobility with hopes for improving personal and family life.”<sup>23</sup> Fundamentalist churches appeal to “the newly educated, including groups with technical training.”<sup>24</sup> The newly educated sense that the fundamentalist churches represent a “modern way of living,” with their emphasis on personal responsibility, literacy, the necessity to read an “unmediated ... text,” and a focus on intense spirituality and health and healing.<sup>25</sup> Levine and Stoll also indicate that Protestant fundamentalist churches are better able to adapt to changes occurring in Latin America because they are located on the urban periphery where migrants land, and because they are small and unburdened with the large bureaucracy the Roman Catholic Church must support. The authors argue that there is a built-in dynamism of small, poor fundamentalist or evangelical churches related to their “low thresholds.”<sup>26</sup> These churches feature intense social and religious life with small meetings, overlapping groups, and frequent home visits. These low thresholds mean that “it is simple to organize a church and not very difficult to gain recognition as a religious leader.” The poorer the church, the more it depends on expansion (in membership) to survive.<sup>27</sup> Finally, Levine and Stoll argue that the essential component of the attraction of new Protestant movements in Latin America is their evangelical character which they define in terms of three beliefs: the reliability on the Bible as a final authority; the necessity of being “born again” (i.e., of being “saved” as an adult through a personal relationship with Jesus Christ); and “the importance of spreading this message of salvation to every nation and person.”<sup>28</sup>

## THE GREAT WESTERN TRANSMUTATION AND THE PROTEST AGAINST MODERNISM

Fundamentalist movements are defined, ideologically, by their opposition to and reaction against the ideology that suits the permissive secular society, the ideology of modernism.<sup>29</sup> Lawrence has characterized the ideology of modernism as one that values change over continuity, quantity over quality, and commercial efficiency (production and profit) over human sympathy for traditional values. The ethos of fundamentalism, its affective orientation, is one of protest and outrage at the secularization of society; that is, at the process by which religion and its spirit has been steadily removed from public life – from schools, offices, workshops, universities, courts, and markets, and even from religious institutions themselves – churches, mosques, and synagogues.

The elevation of change over continuity in our lives is evidenced by the constant upgrading of computer hardware and software, and, recently, by the energy crisis with its demand for constriction of budgets, consumer conservation, and producer proliferation of new sources of energy. The necessity of corporate businessmen to uproot themselves and their families and to adjust in the new suburbs where they relocated was described after World War Two by William H. Whyte in his best seller, *Organization Man* (1956). So common a part of life in corporate Europe and the United States is this phenomenon it has been termed *spiralism* by sociologists: one has to move spatially to climb hierarchically. Although human beings in peasant societies traveled occasionally to regional markets, they worked daily within walking distance of their homes, enabling cultivators to go out to their fields and return by nightfall. The urban revolution did not disrupt the unity of home and work; it was quite common for urban dwellers in the Chinese, Indian, and Middle Eastern civilizations to live in the same neighborhood where they worked; often, they lived and worked in the same building, working on the first floor, living on the second. The industrial revolution changed all that. The introduction of the factory required leaving one's home to go to work. During the last hundred years, particularly in the last twenty-five, the industrial revolution and the high-tech era have encouraged the rapid spread of transportation and communication networks, triggering mobility because of the proliferation of job opportunities provided by the complex, global capitalist system. Transnational migration has become a powerful force for change in Europe, Asia and North America.<sup>30</sup> In my own community, a small town in upstate New York, I am no longer able to get a newspaper, pick up prescription drugs, shop at a small supermarket, or repair my shoes at the nearby shopping plaza, as I was forty years ago when I moved to the community. All these small enterprises have been displaced by the proliferation of large shopping malls on the other side of town. The small city adjoining my town is now the locus of transnational migrants from Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Europe including Kurds, Somalis, Iraqi Arabs, Bosnians, Vietnamese, Laotians, Haitians, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Chinese, Russians, Brazilians, and Ukrainians. Only the latter were present in any numbers forty years ago.

Modernity's elevation of commercial efficiency over human sympathy is reflected in the increasing focus on the clock. Two political scientists, Lloyd and Susanne

Rudolph compared Gandhi's daily schedule to Benjamin Franklin's. In their diaries both men segmented the day's activities according to clock time, stipulating beginning and ending times for meals, bath, exercise, rest, study, sleep and worship. Gandhi was the more "modern" of the two, the more efficient and specialized in dividing activities by the clock, stipulating fourteen activities beginning at 4 a.m. and ending at 9 p.m., whereas Franklin stipulated eleven, beginning at 5 a.m. and ending at 10 p.m. Modern life is clock-conscious life and rules the day. However, the modern way of life submerges the important interpersonal ties that have bound societies together for thousands of years. Among these are ties of friendship. I recall many years ago being a visiting professor at the American University of Beirut, where a Lebanese colleague and I became good friends, eating meals together, visiting one another in off-work hours, and going on trips together in the Lebanese countryside. Late one morning he came to me as I was in the midst of preparing a class lecture I was to give in an hour's time, saying, "Let's go out for a cup of coffee and a smoke of the hubble-bubble pipe." I replied, "I'm sorry, I have to finish preparing my lecture." Although I noted he was disappointed, I thought little about the matter. A few weeks later he was busy preparing a lecture for a class he was to give in an hour's time, when his friend, a Lebanese professor, came in and said to him, "Come, let's go out for a cup of coffee and hubble-bubble smoke." He replied, "Okay, let's go." This incident demonstrated that I was tied to the clock and my obligation to produce a lecture. My friend and colleague was a good teacher and an excellent scholar, but he placed human sympathy and friendship first.

Also among these human ties are patron-client ties.<sup>31</sup> These ties are often discussed in a political or economic context, but such a discussion misses their human texture. During this same time (when I was a visiting professor in Beirut) I often had my shoes shined because of the dusty thoroughfares of a bustling *entrepôt* and because it was appropriate to my status in the university milieu. Outside the university gate there were six or seven men lined up next to one another who shined shoes. Fortuitously, I chose one on the occasion of my first shoe shine; thereafter, the same man would always preempt the others and shine my shoes. Soon, he and I took it for granted that we were linked in a patron-client relationship. He always said he would give me a better shine than the others would, and I think he did because, over time, we developed a less instrumental and more personal relationship. Customarily, when I finished my shoe shine and went into the Lebanese restaurant opposite the gate, I experienced a similar relationship; the same waiter always came to serve me at the table, and every other patron at the restaurant had his or her own special waiter who offered superior service and jocular company. These interpersonal ties that informed the ethos of a premodern society are being diminished, even in the rural areas of Jordan. Before the 1970s the prevailing custom of the villages of the district where I did my research was that villagers who returned to the community after a long absence (six months or a year) always brought gifts to their close kinsmen. In this society this could mean a fairly large number of cousins, uncles and aunts as well as immediate family members. Close kinsmen reciprocated by inviting the returned villagers to their homes for a sumptuous meal, sometimes involving the slaughter of an animal. In the 1970s transnational migration from the village where I conducted my research to seventeen different countries for purposes of work, higher education, and military training became common.

Many villagers were coming and going with a frequency never before known. Now they could not afford to bring gifts every time they returned; they wished to save their money for their education, for the education of their children, or for commercial enterprises they might start in the village and its environs with their savings from working abroad. Yet these returned villagers still expected their close kinsmen to invite them for meals or at least invite them to their homes. On their side, kinsmen who remained in the village still expected their relatives to bring them gifts from abroad. Expectations were disappointed on both sides. A new ethos began to replace the old one, which was composed of hospitality, cordiality, and mutual affection. Villagers characterized the new ethos by the term *mujamala*, meaning politeness, but false politeness motivated by self-interest. That is, your kinsmen only visited you now because they wanted something from you, not because they had affection for you. What does this discussion have to do with fundamentalism? It is simply this: fundamentalism is a reaction, both ideological and affective, to the changes in basic social relationships that have occurred on a worldwide basis as a result of the social organizational, technological, and economic changes introduced by the modern world.

The changes in interpersonal relations described above are part of a historical shift in worldview and power relations that Bruce Lawrence, following Fernand Braudel, Marshall Hodgson, and Barrington Moore, has described as the "Great Western Transmutation" (GWT).<sup>32</sup> The GWT began at the end of the eighteenth century in Western Europe and changed the outlook of human beings toward the material world. As a result of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the commercialization and industrialization of life, and the scientific revolution, a worldview that had been preoccupied with moral and ultimate questions (such as the quest for salvation) now became involved with (commercial) puzzle solving in a world of expanding markets and opportunities. God's world was this new world and not the next world, and the work of the world was God's work, whereas before, the work of the world was to prepare for the hereafter. The GWT undermined the organic worldview that placed each class in its proper place and taught each man/woman to aspire only to their parent's role/status and led instead to the revolution of rising expectations. This new worldview also led eventually to the pluralization of private beliefs (in the United States regarding birth control, equal rights for women, prayer in the schools, affirmative action) and the relativization of public value (by which the government assumes dissent on issues of public interest and a "live and let live attitude" on the part of the populace). The GWT is tied to a shift in power relations in turn related to the bureaucratization and technicalization of violence. I remember as a high schooler going on the class trip to Washington DC and being taken into the Pentagon. I looked down one of the hallways and could not see the end of it! The Pentagon is the culmination of the bureaucratization and the technicalization of violence. Before the French Revolution (1789) there were ten world powers (measured by their ability to wage war successfully); after World War One (1919) there were six; after World War Two they had been reduced to two; and after the Gulf War (1991) by that standard only one, the United States. Over the course of two hundred years with respect to military, political and economic power there has been a reduction of winners and a proliferation of losers. This changing power ratio has had a direct impact on fundamentalism. Fundamentalism in its many manifesta-

tions worldwide is a movement of those who are or see themselves as losers in the struggle for power and recognition.

### THE QUEST FOR PURITY

It remains to discuss some of the prominent attributes of fundamentalism.<sup>33</sup> Perhaps the most important is the quest for purity. Why so important? Because fundamentalists regard the world as impure and corrupt. Therefore, they must devise strategies to avoid that world, or alternatively, to confront and defeat it. Avoidance through flight is a fundamentalist reaction at one extreme; separation – physical, social or symbolic – is a second reaction to an impure world; and militant struggle to overcome and capture that world is a third reaction. The quite different reactions of fundamentalists to a common problem again illustrates that fundamentalists are not so much tied by a particular cultural content (Christian fundamentalists are driven by antipathy to evolution and positivist science, Muslim fundamentalists by outrage at Western colonialism, and Jewish fundamentalists by outrage at virulent anti-Semitism), but rather by their common orientation to the modern world: an orientation of outrage, protest and fear.

Flight has long been a strategy pursued by minoritarian religious groups who suffer oppression, discrimination or both. The Boers of South Africa (representing the Dutch Reform Church tradition) trekked 1,000 miles from Cape Province to the Transvaal in 1836 to escape the pervasive secular influence brought by English settlers and administrators representing the British Empire. The Egyptian fundamentalist group, “Excommunication and Flight” (*takfir wa hijra*), so named by the Egyptian press and public in the 1970s because they declared excommunicated the majority of Egyptian Muslims who, they argued, engaged in idolatrous behavior such as usury, fornication, prostitution, the mixing of sexes in public, and the drinking of alcohol (Stella, a national beer, was very popular in Cairo). Their own purified version of Islam followed the Prophet’s tradition: they shaved their heads, cultivated trimmed beards, and wore black cloaks after his example. The movement split into two parts, one of which pursued the strategy of militant confrontation with the government, resorting to kidnapping government ministers and assassination. But the other branch abandoned their urban residences for caves in Upper Egypt near the desert to escape the reach of the government and the pressure for conformity.<sup>34</sup> Flight is a demonstration of protest and sometimes defiance. It allowed this group of Egyptian fundamentalists to avoid common national obligations such as military conscription and payment of taxes.

A second strategy is separation. One mode of separation is radical social and spatial separation (but not flight). Another branch of Excommunication and Flight remained within urban centers but formed their own “families” within these centers, living with like-minded fundamentalists of both sexes in crowded apartment buildings. They prayed separately in these buildings, refusing to attend mosques led by government-appointed (and therefore contaminated) preachers. They taught their children in their own homes rather than send them to public schools whose curriculum they regarded as corrupting; in their view all teachers in public schools were appointed by the corrupt central government. They refused intermarriage with those

who were not members of their own religious movement. When they did marry they refused to be married by mainline religious officials; that is, the usual religious specialists who served the majority population. Another example of radical separation (but not flight) from an impure world is the case of the Reb Arelach *haredim* who live in the gated quarter of Mea Shearim in Jerusalem.<sup>35</sup> Israelis use this term to designate those Jews who defend the faith and keep the law without making the kind of compromises to the secular world common to the majority in Israel. The *haredim* designate themselves *erlicher Yidn*, virtuous Jews, not a sect of Judaism, but the true Jews. Like Excommunication and Flight they regard the central government of Israel with distrust and often hostility because they see that government as supporting a “permissive society” in which Judaism threatens to be overwhelmed by nightclubs, cinemas, television, immodesty of women (particularly their dress), hedonistic cross-sex relations, violations of kosher rules, and the secularization of education. To ward off the powerful flow of impure culture that emanates from the government, secular Jews, and foreign countries, the *haredim* have gathered in their own quarter of Jerusalem where they conduct their own way of life according to their own strict rules. They do not allow strangers to enter their quarter and strut their profane style-of-life with impunity. Immodestly dressed men and women who enter their quarter are heckled and sometimes stoned. Just before the Sabbath they close the gate to their quarter and permit no one in or out until the Sabbath ends twenty-four hours later. When they appear outside their quarter, the *haredim* are immediately set off by their dress and appearance. They are always in black and white, with men distinguished by beards and ear locks and women with hair covered.

A third mode of separative strategy is institutional and symbolic rather than physical and spatial, illustrated by the Bethany Baptist Academy (BBA), a Christian academy in a city of 50,000 in Illinois. The leader of the school told the anthropologist studying it, “The Bible says that we are in the world, but not to be of the world.”<sup>36</sup> The academy urged students not to form close ties with non-Christians; not to date non-Christians; not to marry non-Christians; to prefer Christian candidates in the voting booth; and to carry back and apply their Christian ethics and Christian ethos in their homes. But there was no Christian yellow-page listing in the telephone book with names of preferred merchants and physicians, and BBA families had no restrictions placed on where they could live. Although certain occupations were preferred (minister, missionary) with a few exceptions (bartender, gambler, rock musician) occupations were open. It is important to note that “non-Christians” designated all those who were not “saved” (received Jesus in the form of the Holy spirit in adult life). Therefore, the world of the impure was far larger than might first appear. Because the BBA applied the principle of separation differently in different domains of culture, and because it did not constrain daily contact with nonbelievers in the workaday world, special devices were necessary to provide protection to core believers. These devices were symbolic and ethical. On the symbolic side, a dress code sets Bethany students apart from others: short hair for boys, nice dresses and stockings for girls, and the absence of blue jeans for both. More important on the symbolic side is a whole vocabulary of salvation that defines the quest for divine grace as well as the degree of its achievement: “being saved,” “grown in the Lord,” “testifying,” “witnessing,” “full-time Christian,” “born-

again,"the fallen faithful," "get in the word," "get right with the Lord," "the place the Lord wants you to be," and "we put the Lord first." Separation is defined in spiritual terms. All these symbolic statuses or processes have ethical correlates. In other words, one must be one's brother's as well as one's own keeper. Because the BBA did not segregate its students from the world at large, it had to develop other devices to ensure effective inculcation of its message. Besides its elaborate vocabulary of degrees of salvation and their ethical correlates, and along with constant monitoring, it developed "total teaching" and strived for a "total atmosphere." All classes including math and English were introduced by biblical lessons and religious messages. All school activities began with prayer, e.g., the bus driver or the coach prayed before the bus left on athletic trips. Parents were urged to support the teachings of BBA at home to produce the "total atmosphere" of a Christian home and "the full-time-Christian." Such were the dimensions of totalism.

### SCRIPTURALISM AND TRADITIONING

The focus on a divine scripture is a key attribute of fundamentalism, but not for the reasons usually given – the literal belief in an inerrant scripture as the word of God.<sup>37</sup> The scripture is so powerful, above all, for its numinous character, an unseen and majestic presence that inspires both dread and fascination. Every major mosque of every major Muslim city is adorned with the calligraphy of the Qur'an. This Qur'anic calligraphy is the closest presence of God on earth for the believing Muslim. The emotional impact of the scripture is manifested in Muslim daily prayers which are filled with Qur'anic verses. The emotional impact of the Protestant Bible was and still is reflected in the intimate notes written in the margins of verses that had/have particular meaning for the meditating Christian. Charles Hirschkind has provided new insights into how recitation of scripture impacts the believer. In his book, *The Ethical Soundscape* (2006) he has analyzed how Islamic sermon cassettes have communicated a powerful emotional but also ethical message that has driven the Islamic revival in Egypt in such a way as to overcome the power of the state to indoctrinate its own citizens with a basically nationalist ideology.<sup>38</sup> These cassette sermons are filled with verses of the Qur'an that are chanted by Muslim preachers and heard by taxi drivers and their passengers as they wend their way through the cacaphony of Cairo traffic. Hirschkind has argued that these Qur'anic verses register through the sensorium (the heart, the mind, the ears, the muscles, the entire body inside and outside) until the listener develops "an active belief" (to take action in the world rather than wait for the hereafter) and an "attitude of ... acceptance and responsibility infused with the emotions of fear, sadness and humility."<sup>39</sup> Moreover, he argues that the discussions triggered by these sermons lead to a process of collective rethinking involving argument, criticism and debate rather than simple indoctrination. In addition, scripture assuages that yearning for certainty felt by human beings in an increasingly uncertain world. This yearning was reflected in an early twentieth century public debate on the inerrancy of scripture before 10,000 people in New York City by a fundamentalist minister named Straton:

"Shall the highest interests of our natures be left to caprice and chance? Are we forever to grope in darkness and uncertainty? Are there no fixed standards? No

solid and enduring ground on which we can build our society and found our hopes of Heaven? Is each one of us to be left to believe one thing one day – and that thing perhaps different from everything our neighbors are believing – and another thing tomorrow, and another thing the next day, and so on and on.”<sup>40</sup>

Finally, the scripture is a guide to everyday behavior and an explanation of repetitive and occasional events. When I was conducting anthropological field work in a peasant village in Jordan during the winter months I would sometimes look up at the partly cloudy sky in the morning and ask a villager if he thought it was going to rain. He would often reply by reciting a verse from the Qur’an such as, “Hast thou not seen that God knows whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth” (58: 7), i.e., Why are you asking me such a foolish question?

Traditioning is the process of collapsing the primordial, the ancient, the heritage of the golden age with the present time, making them one and the same. By identifying with the good past and melding that past with the good present, a guide and an explanation is provided for present situations and circumstances.<sup>41</sup> Samuel Heilman’s account of an ultra-orthodox (*haredi*) community in Jerusalem illustrates this process.<sup>42</sup> He sat in on a sixth grade *haredi* class. He was interested in the class’s knowledge of modern geography, and the teacher asked the students to draw a map of (modern) Israel and its neighbors. No one could list the names of the countries surrounding Israel nor name the main bodies of water, the Dead Sea and the Sea of Galilee. They had never heard of Saudi Arabia. But they did have a map of the world, a globe hanging from the vestibule of the yeshiva (Jewish religious school). It was a map of eastern Europe that spread-eagled the globe. However, it was a very particular eastern Europe, the eastern Europe of the rebbes (Jewish scholar-mystics) who had founded the religious order in Russia and Poland more than a century before. The central focus of the map was the town of Zvil (the rebbe of the Israeli order to which the school was affiliated traced his descent to Zvil), and the surrounding cities were all well-known centers of authentic Jewish life in eastern Europe a hundred years previously. The past was made present in the geography taught as well as the language (of the golden east European age), Yiddish. Of course, the students had an excellent knowledge of scriptural geography, the geography of the Torah. For these yeshiva students, the Israel of their imagination, biblical Israel – including all its heroes and heroines – was far superior to modern (secularized) Israel.

The past was made present in many other aspects of *haredi* life. For instance, Heilman attended the Friday night Sabbath religious observances at the Belz (another east European town) yeshiva in Jerusalem, which culminated in a meal at the rebbe’s *tish* (the Yiddish world for table). He described it as a “classic east European meal” that became ritualized. After each set of songs, all Belz tunes, the rebbe ate another course, beginning with the breaking of the coiled challah bread and followed in turn by gefilte fish, grape juice, chicken soup, farfel (little bits of noodles), honey-sweetened carrots, chicken, and finally fruit compote. The *haredi* way of dealing with the tragedy of the Holocaust was to intensify both worship and what they regarded as the pure Jewish tradition (of eastern Europe) and to nurture a counterculture through social separation. Traditioning in the Christian tradition was illustrated above in the habit of avidly tracing and strictly applying biblical proof texts regarding various domains of culture and society (such as intermarriage and obedience to parents).

The most interesting and politically problematic aspect of traditioning is its view of time and history. What is relevant is only today and the previous golden age(s). What happened in between (and the peoples involved) is/are irrelevant. Susan Harding has given the best explanation of the fundamentalist notion of time/history in *The Book of Jerry Falwell*.<sup>43</sup> She conducted field work in and around Lynchburg, Virginia, the center of Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority movement as well as Liberty University, founded by him in 1984. She listened carefully to the language that preachers and followers affiliated with his movement used. Three terms were continuously repeated relating to time/history and human destinies: prefiguring/foreshadowing (used as synonyms) and fulfillment. The meaning of these concepts was illustrated by Falwell himself when discussing the mountain-top location of Liberty Baptist College (later Liberty University) in 1972. He gave a proliferation of scriptural references that prefigured the location of Liberty University: Noah's ark rested on a mountain; Abraham prepared to sacrifice Isaac on a mountain; Moses and Joshua viewed the Holy Land from a mountain; Jesus gave the Sermon on the Mount.<sup>44</sup> By implication Falwell became metaphorically Noah, Abraham, Jesus, Joshua, and Moses. Even bad events (in the present) are prefigured and lead to fulfillment unforeseen by the individual. In 1973 when the Securities and Exchange Commission sued Falwell's Thomas Road Baptist Church for fraud and deceit in the sale of church bonds and declared it insolvent, it forced Falwell to modernize and expand his church: hire professional accountants, cut overhead costs, hire public relations experts, and an agency to coordinate fund-raising.<sup>45</sup> Fundamentalists constantly see their lives personally fulfilled in terms of prefigured events. This notion of time, history, and personal destiny is alien to the notion of the chain of cause and effect held by most historians and lay persons.

### SELECTIVE MODERNIZATION AND CONTROLLED ACCULTURATION

Because fundamentalism is often regarded by majoritarian, secularized groups as an ideology that resists change, most surprising are the attributes of selective modernization and controlled acculturation. Christian radio broadcasting and televangelism are dramatic examples of selective modernization.<sup>46</sup> The same year Jerry Falwell became an accredited preacher (1956) he became a televangelist and businessman (a primary function of televangelism is raising money for religious congregations). Pat Robertson founded his all-day Christian Broadcasting Network in 1961. The network evolved into 5,500 cable systems across the country. He developed the "700 club" while experimenting with the variety show, talk show, and country formats to find the most effective format for televangelism. James Dobson (with a PhD in child development and not religion) founded his radio program, "Focus on the Family," a weekday, half-hour program that combined religious wisdom with psychological discussion in the 1970s. By the 1980s his program received 200,000 letters a month and 1,200 telephone calls a day. For the 10,000 letters regarded as life-threatening, the program referred the writers to one of 19 family counselors, nationwide, who made therapist referrals. Every year Focus on the Family sent out 52 million pieces of mail and one million cassettes.<sup>47</sup> It's obvious that such massive

communications involve the development of a complex social organization and bureaucracy as well as technological expertise and business acumen. The televangelists and Christian radio broadcasters martialed this sophisticated technological expertise, however, to communicate a specific and highly selective message: the immorality of the world, the cataclysm to come, the necessity for individual spiritual reform, and economic libertarianism and social traditionalism. Economic libertarianism assumes that economic interaction between rationally self-interested individuals in the market will lead to prosperity and social harmony; this policy has been labeled, *laissez-faire*. Social traditionalism is concerned with the breakdown of the family, community, religion, and traditional morality in American life due to the government's supporting abortion, affirmative action, busing, sexual permissiveness, the Equal Rights Amendment, and the prohibition of school prayer.<sup>48</sup>

Controlled acculturation is the process by which an individual of one culture accepts a practice or belief from another, but integrates that belief or practice within his/her own value system. When I initiated my research in Kufr al-Ma in rural Jordan in the 1960s I noted that women were restricted in their spatial and occupational mobility. Women never left the village unchaperoned by men and did not work outside the village. Both Islamic and tribal norms stipulated that the honor of women would be jeopardized by allowing them to mix socially with unrelated men.<sup>49</sup> When I returned to the village in the 1980s I discovered that substantial transnational migration for education and work had taken place, and that a number of village women were now working as teachers in villages up to twenty miles away; a few had gone to work on five-year contracts as teachers in Saudi Arabia. It was difficult for me to reconcile this development with both the practice and the norms I had observed in the 1960s. After further inquiry I discovered that there was a carefully elaborated pattern of controlled acculturation that allowed both spatial and occupational mobility. The key to this pattern was the kinship system and the bus driver! Teachers went to school and returned every day on the bus. The locations where they taught seemed haphazard with a number teaching in villages relatively far away, whereas few taught in villages relatively close. Tibne was the mother village from which the people of Kufr al-Ma (and many other villages) had originally come a hundred years before. The teachers only taught in villages that were the daughter villages of Tibne, i.e., where they had relations of kinship and former propinquity. Absent that opportunity, they only taught in villages in which the bus driver was of the "peoples of Tibne." Thus, the village could be quite far away. At the point where the bus driver of "the peoples of Tibne" was replaced by another (i.e., stranger), the people of Kufr al-Ma refused to allow their daughters/sisters to travel. The bus driver became the substitute chaperone. He was trusted to monitor and protect the teachers, and be sure they went and returned safely and unmolested by word or deed. The value of women's modesty and honor had been accommodated to occupational mobility. This is controlled acculturation.

## FUNDAMENTALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL RELIGION AFTER 9/11

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001 raises the question of the connections between terrorism and fundamental-

ism and more broadly between religion and violence. It also poses anew the question of the organization of terrorist movements and their relation to the organization of religious movements. Fundamentalism is one response to a broader religious process that Hervieu-Leger has described as the “cultural disqualification of all traditions bearing a unified code of meaning in a world committed to rapid change and extreme pluralization.”<sup>50</sup> Global changes in communication, transportation, marketing systems, and social relations, along with the mass movement of peoples and information, have undermined the unified messages of all the world religions and their focus on a national and local hub of religious activity. One reaction is a shift away from the pursuit of salvation in local religious congregations and attendance to, “private religiosity oriented toward this-worldly realities and psychological fulfillment of the individual.”<sup>51</sup> This can be termed a “do-it-yourself” approach to religion. Another reaction is the multiplication of transnational socioreligious networks. A debate has swirled around the composition and shape of such networks, in particular around the organization of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The case of the Taliban in Afghanistan is interesting in this regard. The Taliban are a quite different fundamentalist movement than Al Qaeda in inspiration, organization, and composition. Shahrani has argued that the Taliban continue a long tradition of “internal colonialism” in Afghanistan by which the Pushtun-speaking tribes of the south and southeast have dominated the Uzbek and Tajik ethnic groups of the north.<sup>52</sup> An alternative view regards the Taliban as a transnational movement with a critical niche in a particular political economy: the trading of military arms for drugs (opium) through Afghanistan between Central Asia and Pakistan.<sup>53</sup> A third view regards the Taliban as an aberrant fundamentalist movement, drawing much of its power from the aura of purity and charisma of a holy man, Mullah Omar, who as its leader, because of his status, had the appearance of a neutral who could effectively mediate between the tribes, factions and ethnic groups.<sup>54</sup> A fourth view stresses the Taliban’s application of the strategies of selective modernization and controlled acculturation to gain and maintain power through radio, mass street and brutal stadium spectacles, tanks corps, and machine guns mounted on Toyotas.<sup>55</sup> Canfield, Crews, and Tarzi have stressed the variegated composition of the Taliban. The movement has been embraced by different core and support elements affording different financial and material resources as well as different political perspectives: *madrasa* students and orphans from Pakistan; former anti-Soviet mujahidin commanders; defectors from the militias that fought the Russians and then one another in the civil war; former Pashtun officers working with the Communists; Pakistani military and technical advisors; dispersed Pashtuns from northern Afghanistan; the government of Saudi Arabia; and not least Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

Whereas the Taliban is a religious movement spanning two countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al Qaeda is a transnational movement spanning several continents and many countries, e.g., North Africa, Indonesia, the Philippines, Iraq, and the northwest territory of Pakistan. A debate has also swirled around its composition and the shape of its network with views oscillating between those who argue that it is centrally led and trained by a cadre focused on Pakistan and Afghanistan to those who argue that it is a loosely knit world-wide network that conducts its activities in different regions in an autonomous fashion, looking for inspiration only to its charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden.<sup>56</sup> Although Al Qaeda has undergone

many transformations, if one accepts the first view stated above, there are generally three levels to its social structure: a trusted inner circle (many with blood ties to Bin Laden), the “soldiers” who carry out the missions; and a wide range of supporters/sympathizers who aid the movement financially, logistically by providing a room or recommending for a job or ideologically by transmitting its message through multimedia or word of mouth. Although bin Laden’s vocabulary is political and anti-colonial, his struggle is religious against “global unbelief.”<sup>57</sup> In his “Letter to the Americans,” posted on the internet on October 14, 2002, Bin Laden raises and answers two questions, “Why are we fighting and opposing you?” and “What do we want from you?” and answers both. With respect to the latter question he demands that Americans accept Islam and stop both their oppression of other peoples and the debauchery within their own society.<sup>58</sup> Sayyid Qutb, perhaps the most influential fundamentalist writer of the twentieth century, enabled Al Qaeda as a militant movement justifying *takfir* (excommunication) and killing of “defeatist ulema” (Muslim scholars) and Sunni Muslims who cooperated with the government. Followers of Qutb in Iraq extended his militant message to Shi’a Muslims and Kurds because all were said to be unbelievers living a life of the *jahiliyya* (the time of ignorance before the prophecy of Muhammad) who repudiated their prayer and fasting by engaging in fornication, adultery, gambling, the drinking of alcohol, and the witnessing of pornography (in night-clubs).<sup>59</sup>

## RELIGION AND VIOLENCE

What are the links between religion and violence and more specifically between fundamentalism and terrorism? By terrorism I mean public acts of destruction committed without a clear-cut military objective, usually against civilians, that arouse an overpowering sense of fear.<sup>60</sup> Although writers on the subject seldom do so, it is necessary to distinguish between different types of terrorism (state, criminal, religious, political, and pathological) if only because of their quite different motivations and implications.<sup>61</sup> Are fundamentalists violent people? I know of no reliable statistical study on this subject. My own judgment based on reading about various fundamentalist movements over a period of twenty-five years is that only a tiny minority of fundamentalists resort to violence, not to speak of terrorism. Fundamentalists pursue strategies of flight, radical separation, spatial separation, and institutional separation – none of which are violent – as well as confrontation. The great majority of confrontational acts are nonviolent: contesting elections, staging demonstrations, boycotting products, services and entertainments, propagandizing over radio and television, acting as pressure groups, and pursuing legal action in the courts. The great majority of fundamentalists are law-abiding people, like the general population of all nations.<sup>62</sup>

What is the justification for violence within the Islamic tradition, a tradition about which misinformation abounds.<sup>63</sup> To simplify a complex set of opinions over a long historical period, the justification for using violence by Muslim scholars has a minority and a majority tradition. For most Muslim scholars *jihad* is not holy war, but rather struggle, striving, persevering towards a fixed goal, fighting to

defend one's life or against an oppressive ruler, or against the evil in oneself, e.g. miserliness and jealousy.

However, the minority scholarly tradition regards *jihad* as "the neglected duty." This is the title of an essay written by Abd al-Salam Faraj (doubtless inspired by Sayyid Qutb), the spokesman of Islamic Jihad, the movement responsible for assassinating Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt, in 1981.<sup>64</sup> In this tradition the establishment of an Islamic state is necessary for the establishment of an Islamic society and the living of a Muslim life. Three criteria indicate the disappearance of an Islamic society: when Muslims become ruled by non-Muslim laws; when unbelief prevails in society; and when Muslims recite the profession of faith, pray and fast but undermine their worship by drinking alcohol, gambling, immodest dress, and indulging in fornication and adultery. According to this tradition, the Islamic state cannot be established by education and proselytization because the evil state controls mass communication and because good people are usually a minority. These scholars justify holy war with Qur'anic proof-texts such as "Fight them (unbelievers) until there is no dissension and the religion is entirely God's" (Qur'an 7:39) and "Fighting is prescribed for you, though it is distasteful to you. Possibly you dislike a thing, though it is good for you and possibly you may love a thing though it is bad for you" (Qur'an 2: 216).

The majority scholarly interpretation of the religious justification for violence is quite different. Followers of this view cite the Qur'anic verse, "Let there be no compulsion in religion" (2:256). And they cite the practice of the Prophet, Muhammad, based on the biography of the Prophet written within one hundred years of his death by Ibn Ishaq.<sup>65</sup> During the first thirteen years of his prophecy Muhammad was neither a militant nor a political advisor. When his followers were oppressed he recommended flight, first to Ethiopia and later (622 CE) to the oasis of Medina, 200 miles to the north. He was called by the people of Medina to be neither a prophet nor a ruler, but rather an arbitrator (*hakam*) between competing tribes, a role for which he had been known in Mecca. Between 622 and 629 he waged a war of attrition against the Meccans involving raids with few casualties. In 629 Muhammad appeared before the gates of Mecca with a large army that could easily have taken the city.<sup>66</sup> The Meccans told him they would not allow him to enter the city, but if he came back the following year they would allow him peaceful entry. The Prophet led his army back to Medina, and the following year he returned, entering the city peacefully and performing the first Muslim pilgrimage at the Kaaba.

Several significant facts about these events should be noted for our discussion of the connection between religion and violence in the Islamic tradition. First, Muhammad did not destroy the Kaaba, the previous center of polytheistic tribal worship which he had denounced. Rather, he emptied it of its idols and made it the center of Muslim pilgrimage, the Hajj. Second, he did not allow his army to take revenge against the Meccan leaders who had derided his message, hounded him, and oppressed his followers. Rather, he declared a general amnesty for the Meccan population including those who led the opposition against him. And third, although Muhammad's entrance into Mecca in 629 was recorded as "the conquest of Mecca," it was achieved by negotiation and compromise and not force of arms. This culminating event of Muhammad's political career marks him as a man of peace, recon-

ciliation, and compassion rather than a militant seeking revenge. The majority view, then, is that jihad is just war and striving to do good deeds in the familial (e.g., serving one's parents), political (e.g., opposing oppressive rulers), and religious spheres (e.g., performing pilgrimage) and not holy war against unbelievers.

What can we say, then, about the strength of fundamentalism as a socioreligious movement after 9/11? Fundamentalism remains a powerful transnational movement, though not the dominant force, demographically, in hardly any nation-state in the world today.<sup>67</sup> It remains a powerful force because change and uncertainty have become even more rapid and intense, and the secular state still holds powerful sway in most of the world.<sup>68</sup>

### Notes

- 1 For a discussion of various views on the importance of scripturalism (and other attributes) to a definition of fundamentalism consult the following academic authors: Akenson 1992; Ammerman in Marty and Appleby 1991; Armstrong 2000; Beale 1986; Carpenter 1988; Euben 1999; Harding 2000; Heilman 1992; Lawrence 1989; Lustick 1988; Marty and Appleby 1991; Moussalli 1999; Shepard 1987; and Silberstein in Silberstein 1993. One should also consult what leaders of fundamentalist movements themselves have to say including the following fundamentalists: Dobson 1970; Falwell 1980; Jones 1985; Kahane 1972; Khomeini 1981; Mawdudi 1985; Mutahhari 1988; Qutb n.d.; Robertson and Slosser 1982; and Rowland on Begin 1985.
- 2 See Gardiner in Pessó-Miquel and Stierstorfer 2007.
- 3 These contrasting views/definitions of fundamentalism were gathered from within the covers of a single volume. See *Fundamentalism and Literature*, pp. 109, 125, 126, 147, and 169.
- 4 South Asians have pursued a wide variety of orientations and strategies to cope with change in the modern world including fundamentalism. In fact, India's Bharatiya Janata Party is the largest movement of religious nationalism in the world. Its victory in the Indian elections of 1999 allowed it to form the governing coalition at the national level. Sikh fundamentalism has been active for many years as a movement fighting both secular nationalism and Hindu nationalism. The selective bibliography at the end of the chapter includes a few titles on fundamentalism in South and Southeast Asia.
- 5 Millennialism will not be dealt with in this chapter. For those interested in this attribute of fundamentalism see the Left Behind series novels of Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins, e.g., 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2007. See also Cook 2005.
- 6 The question of who fundamentalists are, socially, is different from the question of how fundamentalism is defined/described as a phenomenon in the modern world. The latter question is addressed in the following sections.
- 7 See Munson 1984: 20–1.
- 8 A distinction made by Clifford Geertz as quoted in Munson 1993.
- 9 See Lawrence 1989: 100.
- 10 Ayatollah Khomeini is the exception. Munson's ministry of education inspectors are more the rule.
- 11 Lawrence 1989: 196.
- 12 Lawrence 1989: 197.
- 13 See Riesebrodt 1990.

- 14 Riesebrodt 1990: 185–9.
- 15 For details of this kind of patron-client relationship in a revolutionary and prerevolutionary context see Fischer, 1980. For a more general view of clergy-state relations in Iran see Akhavi, 1980.
- 16 Riesebrodt 1990: 73.
- 17 See Riesebrodt 1990: ch. 2.
- 18 See Lustick 1988: 5.
- 19 Lustick 1988: 6.
- 20 Lustick 1988: 7.
- 21 Lustick 1988: 83.
- 22 See Levine and Stoll, in Rudolph and Piscastori 1997 for details of the argument.
- 23 Levine and Stoll 1997: 72.
- 24 Levine and Stoll 1997: 72.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Levine and Stoll 1997: 73.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 “Fundamentalist” and “evangelical” are overlapping categories. However, Many Christians identify themselves as either one or the other. The split between evangelicals and fundamentalists in the United States took institutional form in the early 1940s, with the evangelicals seeking greater accommodation with the modern world by accepting cultural and structural pluralism and functional rationality. In this chapter fundamentalists are defined by the presence of certain attributes (e.g., protest against the modern world, concern for purity, activism and totalism, traditioning, etc.) whereas evangelicals are distinguished by their view that Christians must be “born again.” Not all fundamentalists are evangelicals in this sense, and not all evangelicals share all the attributes of fundamentalism. For divergent views on this distinction see Ammerman 1987 and Harding 2000.
- 29 Ideology refers here to “an action-oriented system of beliefs capable of explaining the world ... justifying decision(s), identifying alternatives, and ... creating the most all-embracing and intensive social solidarity possible.” This is Paul Sigmund’s definition as quoted in Lawrence 1989: 76. In short, an ideology is an action-related system of ideas focused on this (and not the next) world.
- 30 For the structure and culture of the pre-industrial city see Sjoberg, 1960; for the recent impact of transnational migration on the migrants and on the home community in one Jordanian village see Antoun 2005.
- 31 For a discussion of how patron–client ties operate in the Mediterranean and the Middle East see Gellner and Waterbury 1977.
- 32 For details see Moore 1966 and 1972; Hodgson, 3 vols., 1974; Braudel, 3 vols., 1981–4 and 1980; and Lawrence 1989.
- 33 A full description and analysis of the attributes of fundamentalism is to be found in Antoun 2001 and 2008. For a discussion of how fundamentalism relates to the state and to bureaucracies, particularly when the bureaucrat is also a fundamentalist, see Antoun, August 2006.
- 34 See Kepel 1984 for a detailed description of this movement in the 1970s and 1980s.
- 35 See Heilman 1992 for details.
- 36 See Peshkin 1996 for details.
- 37 For various versions of the literalist scriptural interpretation see Ammerman 1987; Beale 1986; Bendroth 1993; Kepel 1994; Lustick 1988; Marty and Appleby 1991 and 1992; Munson 1984 and 1983; and Peshkin 1996.

- 38 See Hirschkind 2006.
- 39 Hirschkind 2006: 180.
- 40 As quoted in Carpenter 1988.
- 41 See Heilman 1992 for a definition and illustrations of this concept.
- 42 Heilman: 57ff.
- 43 See Harding 2000 for details.
- 44 Harding 2000: 113–14.
- 45 Harding 2000: 116–17.
- 46 See Bruce 1990 for details.
- 47 See the article by the *New York Times* religion correspondent, Steinfels, June 5, 1990, for details.
- 48 See Himmelstein, in Liebman and Wuthnow 1983 for details.
- 49 See Antoun, August, 1968 for details.
- 50 Hervieu-Leger in Rudolph and Piscatori 1997: 106.
- 51 Hervieu-Leger: 110.
- 52 See Shahrani in Crews and Tarzi 2008.
- 53 See Crews and Tarzi, “Introduction” and Canfield in Crews and Tarzi 2008 for details.
- 54 See Canfield, Crews and Tarzi, Sinno, and Cole, in Crews and Tarzi 2008. Cole’s essay develops the Taliban’s policy towards women.
- 55 See Cole for details.
- 56 For examples of opposing views of Al Qaeda see Gerges 2005; Burgat 2008; Sageman 2008; and Hoffman, May/June, 2008.
- 57 See Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, 2005, for the best collection in English of Bin Laden’s speeches and communications.
- 58 See Lawrence 2005 for a full statement of this and other letters sent out by Bin Laden over the years. Robert A. Pape, a political scientist, has an alternative view of Al Qaeda. He stresses that Al Qaeda pursues non-religious political goals, e.g., the withdrawal of Western combat forces from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Muslim countries. He views Al Qaeda as engaged in an anti-imperial struggle that can be dealt with by Western countries through dialogue that recognizes the legitimate interests of other countries. See Pape’s (2005) book.
- 59 The most influential of Qutb’s books is *Milestones* (n.d.). On his works and his influence see Haddad in Esposito 1983 and Shepard 1996.
- 60 For an insightful discussion of the anatomy of terrorism and its ramifications in five different terrorist movements see Juergensmeyer 2000. See also the articles of Ann Speckhard (2005 and 2006) on the case of Chechen terrorism, particularly on the part of women.
- 61 See Eqbal Ahmad’s discussion of these differences recorded in a speech given in Boulder Colorado, October 12, 1998 entitled “Terrorism: Theirs and Ours” and included as a chapter in a book edited by Benbelsdorf, Cerullo, and Chandrani 2006.
- 62 For a more detailed discussion of the connections between religion and violence see Antoun in Gluck (in press); and Antoun, *Understanding Fundamentalism* 2nd edn., 2008, ch. 7.
- 63 For insightful discussions of how the Western tradition of maligning Islam developed historically see Daniel 1962 and 1966. The morbid focus on violence, martyrdom, and death attributed to Islam and its civilization by Western critics has been examined perceptively by Hirschkind 2006. He discovered in his study of Egyptian sermon cassettes that a very large number did indeed focus on death. But the theme developed is that death is the inevitable and proper end of life; and that the knowledge that one is destined to die should encourage positive and ethical behavior in life. See Hirschkind 2006: 178.

- 64 See Faraj in Jansen 1986 for the details of the argument.
- 65 Thus the saying common among knowledgeable scholars of Islam that this religion was born “in the full light of history.” See Gillaume, *The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat\_Rasul Allah*, 1955.
- 66 All these events are recorded in Ibn Ishaq’s biography.
- 67 I would argue that fundamentalism is demographically not even dominant in Iran where the fundamentalists rule. Remember, the Iranian revolution of 1979 was a grass-roots movement, fought by a coalition of forces: shopkeepers, peasants, intellectuals, industrial workers, students, and religious leaders. The latter took the leading role in the revolution because their mosques and prayer-halls were the only rallying places left open after the Shah’s repression. After the revolution the religious leaders through their militias suppressed the other coalition members and seized power. I would also argue that Saudi Arabia is not a fundamentalist state. The fundamentalist (Wahhabi) clergy dominates a religiously conservative populace, but the Saudi elite rules by tribal norms and not religious norms, although it enforces Islamic law on a selective basis.
- 68 An example of the continued power of the secular state, albeit with a strong fundamentalist challenge, in the United States was the controversy over a provision of a Pentagon bill that would allow military chaplains to offer sectarian prayers at non-denominational military events. “The long-standing custom has been to offer a non-sectarian prayer, for example citing God rather than Christ” (*The New York Times*, 9/19/06). Many ecumenical groups spoke against the provision, saying that sectarian prayers would create division among the military. Evangelical groups argued that “refusing (evangelical) chaplains the chance to pray in Jesus’ name infringes on their religious liberty” (*The New York Times*, 9/19/06). The evangelicals were not able to prevail. The Republican Party’s recent (August 2008) nomination of governor Sarah Palin of Alaska to be its candidate for vice-president of the United States dramatizes the continued relevance of a fundamentalist perspective at the highest political levels in the United States. Uncertainty and change mark her personal life (a Downs-syndrome infant and a pregnant, unmarried teenage daughter) as well as her political life (Alaska is undergoing a huge economic boom accompanied by gross governmental and corporate corruption). The ideology of fundamentalism provides governor Palin a moral compass to lead her through difficult times. Addressing the Assembly of God church in her home town of Wasilla, Alaska, “the governor encouraged a group of young church leaders to pray that ‘God’s will’ be done in bringing about the construction of a big pipeline in the state’.” She told them that “her work as governor would be hampered ‘if the people of Alaska’s heart isn’t right with God’” (*The New York Times*, 9/6/08). Religion and politics are inextricably intertwined in her world-view. Note, however, that John McCain, the presidential candidate of the Republican Party has never been associated with fundamentalists or their ideology. Although in 2008 he mended his political fences with them, in the 2000 primary campaign in South Carolina he refused to associate himself with Bob Jones University or deliver an address there.

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