

PART TWO

The Fundamental Ontological Question of the Meaning of Being in General



The Basic Structures and Basic Ways of Being

The discussion of the four theses in Part One was intended in each case to make an ontological problem accessible to us. This was to be done in such a way that the four groups of problems thus arising would show themselves to be intrinsically a unit, the problems constituting the whole of the basic problems of ontology. The following emerged as *the four basic ontological problems*: first, the problem of the *ontological difference*, the distinction between being and beings; secondly, the problem of the *basic articulation of being*, the essential content of a being and its mode of being; thirdly, the problem of the *possible modifications of being* and of the *unity of the concept of being* in its ambiguity; fourthly, the problem of the *truth-character of being*.

We shall assign *the four chapters* of this *second part* each to one of these four basic problems.

Chapter One

The Problem of the Ontological Difference

It is not without reason that the problem of the distinction between being in general and beings occurs here in first place. For the purpose of the discussion of this difference is to make it possible first of all to get to see thematically and put into investigation, in a clear and methodically secure way, the like of being in distinction from beings. The possibility of ontology, of philosophy as a science, stands and falls with the possibility of a sufficiently clear accomplishment of this differentiation between being and beings and accordingly with the possibility of negotiating the passage from the ontical consideration of beings to the ontological thematization of being. The discussions in this chapter will therefore claim our preponderant interest. Being and its distinction from beings can be fixed only if we get a proper hold on the understanding of being as such. But to comprehend the understanding of being means first and foremost to understand *that* being to whose ontological constitution the understanding of being belongs, the Dasein. Exposition of the basic constitution of the Dasein, its existential constitution, is the task of the preparatory ontological analytic of the Dasein's existential constitution. We call it the existential analytic of the Dasein. It must aim at bringing to light the ground of the basic structures of the Dasein in their unity and wholeness. To be sure, in the first part we occasionally gave *individual portions* of such an existential analytic, so far as the positively critical discussions provisionally required. But we have neither run through them in their systematic order nor given an express exposition of the Dasein's basic constitution. Before we discuss the basic ontological problem, the existential analytic of the Dasein needs to be developed. This, however, is impossible within the present course, if we

wish to pose the basic ontological problem at all. Therefore, we have to choose an alternative and presuppose the essential result of the existential analytic of the Dasein as a result already established. In my treatise on *Being and Time*, I set forth what the existential analytic encompasses in its essential results. The outcome of the existential analytic, the exposition of the ontological constitution of the Dasein in its ground, is this: *the constitution of the Dasein's being is grounded in temporality [Zeitlichkeit]*. If we presuppose this result, it does not mean that we may permit ourselves to be satisfied just to hear the word "temporality." Without explicitly adducing here the proof that the Dasein's basic constitution is grounded in temporality, we must nevertheless attempt in some way to gain an understanding of what temporality means. To this end we choose the following path. We shall *take as our starting point the common concept of time* and learn to see how what is commonly known as time and was for a long time the only concept of time made into a problem in philosophy, *itself presupposes temporality*. The point is to see that and how time in its common sense belongs to and springs from temporality. By means of this reflection we shall work our way toward the phenomenon of temporality itself and its basic structure. What shall we gain by doing this? Nothing less than *insight into the original constitution of the Dasein's being*. But then, *if indeed the understanding of being belongs to the Dasein's existence, this understanding too must be based in temporality*. *The ontological condition of the possibility of the understanding of being is temporality itself*. Therefore we must be able to cull from it that by way of which we understand the like of being. Temporality takes over the enabling of the understanding of being and thus the *enabling of the thematic interpretation of being and of its articulation and manifold ways*; it thus makes ontology possible. From this arises a whole set of specific problems related to temporality. We call this entire problematic that of *Temporality [Temporalität]*. The term "Temporality" [Temporalität] does not wholly coincide with the term "temporality" [Zeitlichkeit], despite the fact that, in German, Temporalität is merely the translation of Zeitlichkeit. It means temporality insofar as temporality itself is made into a theme as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being and of ontology as such. The term "Temporality" is intended to indicate that temporality, in existential analytic, represents the horizon from which we understand being. What we are inquiring into in existential analytic, existence, proves to be temporality, which on its part constitutes the horizon for the understanding of being that belongs essentially to the Dasein.

The main point is to see being in its Temporal determination and to unveil its problematics. But if being becomes phenomenologically visible in its Temporal determination, we thereby put ourselves in a position to grasp the distinction between being and beings more clearly as well, and to fix the

ground of the ontological difference. This gives us the design for the first chapter of Part Two, which is to deal with the problem of the ontological difference:

§19. Time and temporality

§20. temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] and Temporality [*Temporalität*]

§21. Temporality [*Temporalität*] and being

§22. Being and beings

§19. Time and temporality

The aim now is to press forward through the common understanding of time toward temporality, in which the Dasein's ontological constitution is rooted and to which time as commonly understood belongs. The first step is to make certain of the common understanding of time. What do we mean by time in natural experience and understanding? Although we constantly reckon with time or take account of it without explicitly measuring it by the clock and are abandoned to it as to the most commonplace thing, whether we are lost in it or pressed by it—although time is as familiar to us as only something in our Dasein can be, nevertheless, it becomes strange and puzzling when we try to make it clear to ourselves even if only within the limits of everyday intelligibility. Augustine's remark about this fact is well known. *Quid est enim "tempus"? Quis hoc facile breviterque explicaverit? Quis hoc ad verbum de illo proferendum vel cogitatione comprehenderit? Quid autem familiarius et notius in loquendo commemoramus quam "tempus"? Et intellegimus utique, cum id loquimur, intellegimus etiam, cum alio loquente id audimus.—Quid est ergo "tempus"? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio; fidenter tamen dico scire me, quod, si nihil praeteriret, non esset praeteritum tempus, et si nihil adveniret, non esset futurum tempus, et si nihil esset, non esset praesens tempus.*¹ "What then is time; who can explain it easily and briefly? Who has comprehended it in thought so as to speak of it? But what is there that we mention in our discourse more familiar and better known than time? And we always understand it whenever we speak of it, and we understand it too when we hear someone else speak of it.—What then is time? If no one asks me about it, I know; if I am supposed to explain it to one who asks, I do not know; yet I say confidently that I know: if nothing were to pass away there would be no past time, and if nothing were coming there would be no time to come, and if nothing were to exist there would be no present time." Simplicius the Neoplatonist says: *ti de depote estin ho chronos, erotetheis*

¹ Augustine, *Confessiones*, 11.14.

mogis an ho sophotatos apokrinaito;² "as to what time may be, then, to this question hardly the wisest would be able to find an answer." Further evidence for the difficulty of apprehending and interpreting time is superfluous. Every attempt we ourselves make to elucidate what we mean by time in our natural understanding of it, every attempt to lay out unveiled and in its purity what is to be understood by time, convinces us of this. At first we are without any orientation at all. We do not know where to look, where to seek and find the like of time. But there is a way that begins to help us out of this perplexity. The common understanding of time very early reached conceptual expression in philosophy. Accordingly, in the explicit concepts of time, we have at our disposal a portrayal of the time phenomenon. This phenomenon need no longer give us the slip completely if we hold on to a conceptual characterization of it. However, even if time becomes more manageable when we comprehend these time concepts, we should not be led by this gain to surrender all methodical foresight and criticism. For, precisely if the time phenomenon is so hard to grasp, it remains doubtful whether the interpretation of time that was laid down in the traditional time concept is thoroughly in keeping with the phenomenon of time. And even if it were, still requiring discussion would be the question whether this interpretation of time, although suitable, reaches the phenomenon in its original constitution or whether the common and genuine time concept only expresses a configuring of time that is indeed peculiar to it but does not lay hold of it in its originality.

Only if we impose these reservations on ourselves is there any surety that we can draw something of use for the understanding of the time phenomenon from a critical discussion of the traditional time concept. Now to understand the fundamental-ontological considerations it is indispensable that the time phenomenon should be brought to view in its original structure. Hence it would be altogether pointless if we simply took note of one or more definitions of time in order simply to take the opportunity to offer our own definition. What we need first of all is a many-sided orientation toward the time phenomenon, following the clue of the traditional time concepts. After that it becomes pertinent to inquire in what way the interpretations of time from which these concepts have sprung themselves took sight of the time phenomenon, how far they took into view the original time phenomenon, and how we can achieve the return passage from this time phenomenon first given to the original time.

For the sake of a synoptic view we shall divide §19 into (a) historical

2. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis physicorum libros quattuor priores commentaria*, ed. Hermann Diels (Berlin: [G. Reimer], 1882), p. 695, line 17 f

orientation regarding the traditional concept of time and a delineation of the common understanding of time that lies at the basis of this concept, and (b) the common understanding of time and the return to original time.

a) Historical orientation regarding the traditional concept of time and a delineation of the common understanding of time that lies at the basis of this concept

If we look back historically and survey the various attempts to master time conceptually, it turns out that the ancients had already set forth the essentials that constitute the content of the traditional concept of time. The two ancient interpretations of time which thereafter became standard—Augustine's, which has already been mentioned, and the first great treatise on time by Aristotle—are also by far the most extensive and truly thematic investigations of the time phenomenon itself. Augustine agrees with Aristotle also on a series of essential determinations.

Aristotle's treatise on time is to be found in his *Physics*, 4.10.217^b29-4.14.224^a17. He gives essential supplementary material for his view of time in the early chapters of the *Physics*, book 8. There are also some important passages in *De Anima*, book 3. Among ancient conceptions of time, that of Plotinus also has a certain significance, *peri aionos kai chronou* (*Enneads* 3.7), "On the Aeon and on Time." Aeon is a peculiar form intermediate between eternity and time. The discussion of the aeon played a great role in the Middle Ages. Plotinus, however, gives us more of a theosophical speculation about time than an interpretation adhering strictly to the phenomenon itself and forcing the phenomenon into conceptual form. A summary particularly useful for orientation regarding the ancient concept of time is to be found in the appendix that Simplicius provides in his great commentary on Aristotelian physics. At the conclusion of the interpretation of book 4 this commentary provides an independent appendix in which Simplicius deals with time.³ Among the Scholastics, Thomas Aquinas and Suarez dealt most specifically with the time concept, in close connection with the Aristotelian conception. In modern philosophy the most important investigations of time occur in Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, and here, too, at bottom, the Aristotelian interpretation of time breaks through everywhere.

From the most recent period we may cite Bergson's investigations of the time phenomenon. They are by far the most independent. He presented the essential results of his inquiries in his *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (1888). These investigations were extended and set in a wider

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 773-800.

context in his major work, *L'évolution créatrice* (1907). As early as his first treatise, Bergson makes the attempt to overcome the Aristotelian concept of time and to show its one-sidedness. He tries to get beyond the common concept of time by distinguishing *durée*, duration, in contrast with time as commonly understood, which he calls *temps*. In a more recent work, *Durée et simultanéité* (2nd edition, 1923), Bergson provides a critical examination of Einstein's theory of relativity. Bergson's theory of duration itself grew out of a direct critique of the Aristotelian concept of time. The interpretation he gives of time in the common sense rests on a misunderstanding of Aristotle's way of understanding time. Accordingly, his counterconcept to common time, namely duration, is also in this sense untenable. He does not succeed by means of this concept in working his way through to the true phenomenon of time. Nevertheless, Bergson's investigations are valuable because they manifest a philosophical effort to surpass the traditional concept of time.

We have already stressed that the essentials of what can first of all be said about time within the common understanding of it were said in the two ancient interpretations of time by Aristotle and Augustine. Of the two, Aristotle's investigations are conceptually more rigorous and stronger while Augustine sees some dimensions of the time phenomenon more originally. No attempt to get behind the riddle of time can permit itself to dispense with coming to grips with Aristotle. For he expressed in clear conceptual form, for the first time and for a long time after, the common understanding of time, so that his view of time corresponds to the natural concept of time. Aristotle was the last of the great philosophers who had eyes to see and, what is still more decisive, the energy and tenacity to continue to force inquiry back to the phenomena and to the seen and to mistrust from the ground up all wild and windy speculations, no matter how close to the heart of common sense.

We must here deny ourselves a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's treatise as well as Augustine's. We shall select a few characteristic propositions in order to illustrate by them the traditional time concept. In supplementation we shall draw several important thoughts from Leibniz, whose discussions of time, like all of his essential ideas, are scattered about in occasional writings, treatises, and letters.

To the clarification of the Aristotelian time concept we shall preface a short account of the structure of the Aristotelian treatise on time.

α) Outline of Aristotle's treatise on time

The treatise contains five chapters (*Physics*, 4.10-14). The first chapter (chap. 10), being first, defines the inquiry, which moves in two directions.

The first question is: *poteron ton onton estin e ton me onton*?⁴ does time belong among beings or non-beings? Is it something that exists of itself or does it exist only in such a way that it is co-present in something that exists independently? *How and where* is time? The second question runs: *tis he physis autou*?⁵ what is the nature, the essence, of time? These two questions about *time's mode of being* and its *essential nature* receive proportionately unequal treatment. The first question is discussed in lesser detail; the positive answer is given only in the last chapter (14.223^a16-224^a17). The remaining portions of the treatise are devoted to the investigation and discussion of the second question, What is time? Chapter 10 not only defines both these problems but also discusses provisionally the difficulties implicit in them, and in connection with this it makes reference to previous attempts at a solution. Aristotle's custom is almost without exception to introduce his investigations in this form: historical orientation and discussion of the difficulties, the *aporiai*. *Aporia* means: not getting through, being without passage. The problems are at first set in such a way that it appears as though no further passage can be made in these inquiries. The essential content of the problem is provisionally brought closer by this historical orientation and discussion of *aporiai*.

With reference to the first question, whether time is something extant or is not rather a *me on*, the latter determination seems to suggest itself as the answer. How should time exist as a whole, an *ousia*, if the parts that go to make it up are non-existent and are so in different ways? Things past and things future belong to time. The former are *no longer*, the latter are *not yet*. Past and future have the character of a nullity. It is as though time, as Lotze once put it, has two arms which it stretches out in different directions of non-being. Past and future, by their very concepts, are exactly non-existent; at bottom it is only the present, the now, that is. But on the other hand, time also is not composed of a manifold of existent nows. For in every now there is only this now, and the others *are* now either not yet or no longer. The now also is never the same and never a single one, but another, a not-the-same and not-one, a manifold. But selfsameness and unity are determinations necessarily belonging to something that exists in itself. If these determinations themselves are lacking to perhaps the only moment of time of which it

⁴ Aristotle, *Physica* (Ross), book 4, 10.217^a31 [W. D. Ross's edition, or editions, of Aristotle's *Physics* can be traced back, at the earliest, to 1936: *Aristotle's Physics*, with introduction and commentary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936). Heidegger could not have used this text, and the data provided in the *Grundprobleme* text (note 4, page 330) are insufficient to determine which edition is intended. Heidegger could have used the editions by Immanuel Bekker (Berlin, 1843) or Charles Prantl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1879). See note 34 below.]

⁵ *Ibid.*, 217^a32.

can be said that it is, the now, then time seems to belong wholly and completely to not-being and the non-existent (me on). Aristotle provisionally lets the question of the mode of being of time rest with this aporia while he goes on to discuss several traditional views relating to the mode of being as well as the essential nature of time.

→ One view identifies time with the motion of the universe. He *tou holou kinesis*,⁶ the whole of all beings, which moves, is time itself. In a certain sense this is still conceived mythically. But all mythology has its basis in specific experiences and is anything but pure fiction or invention. It cannot be accidental and arbitrary that in this mythical view time is identified with the motion of the universe. A second view tends in the same direction but is more definite. It says that time is *he sphaira aute*.⁷ Time here is equated with the heavenly sphere which, rotating in a circle, embraces everything and contains everything within itself. To understand this we must bring to mind the ancient picture of the world, according to which the earth is a disk floating in the ocean with the whole of the heavenly sphere surrounding it. In this sphere other spheres are layered one above the other in which the stars are fastened. The outermost heavenly sphere embraces everything that really exists. It and its rotation are identified with time. According to Aristotle the basis for this interpretation is as follows: *en te to chrono panta estin kai en te tou holou sphaira*.⁸ everything that is, is in time; but everything that exists is also inside the revolving vault of heaven, which is the outermost limit of all beings. Time and the outermost heavenly sphere are identical. There is something of experience implicit in this interpretation too: time in connection with the rotation of the sky and time also as that in which all beings exist. We say indeed that what is, is in time. Even if, says Aristotle, we have to disregard these simple-minded analyses, nevertheless there is a legitimate appearance supporting the view that time is something like motion, *kinesis tis*. We speak of the flux of time and say that time elapses. For *kinesis* Aristotle also says *metabole*. This is the most general concept of motion; literally it means the same as the German *Umschlag*, a change or turn [sometimes sudden, into its opposite]. But by its nature motion is *en auto to kinoumeno*, in the moving thing itself or always there exactly where the thing in motion, the *kinoumenon* or *metaballon*, itself is. Motion is always in the moving thing; it is not something that floats as it were above the thing in motion; rather, the moving thing itself moves. Motion therefore is always where the moving thing is. But time, says

6. *Ibid.*, 218^a33.

7. *Ibid.*, 218^b1. ["The sphere itself." Trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in *The Works of Aristotle* (Ross), vol. 2. All further references to the Hardie and Gaye translation of the *Physica* are to this volume in the Ross edition.]

8. *Ibid.*, 218^a6f

Aristotle, *ho de chronos homoios kai pantachou kai para pasin*,⁹ is, on the contrary, in a like manner both everywhere and also beside everything and close to everything. In this way a distinction is fixed that contrasts time with motion. While motion is always only in the moving thing and is only where the moving thing is, time is everywhere (*pantachou*), not in one definite place, and it is not in the moving thing itself but (*para*) beside it, in some way close by it. Motion and time differ in how they belong to the moving thing and to that which is in time and which we call the intratemporal [*das Innerzeitige*]. Thus the first provisional determination that had suggested itself, that time itself might be a motion, collapses. Time itself is not motion, *hoti men toinun ouk estin kinesis*.¹⁰ On the other hand, however, time also does not exist without motion. Thus the result can now be formulated: time is *oute kinesis out' aneu kineseos*;¹¹ it is not itself indeed the motion of the moving thing but still it is *not without* motion. From this it follows that time is connected in some sense with motion; it is not *kinesis* but *kineseos ti*, *something at, close to, motion*, something in connection with the motion of the moving thing. The problem of the question about the essential nature of time concentrates on the question: *ti tes kineseos estin*,¹² *what* connected with motion is time?

In this way the course of the investigation is outlined beforehand. In chapter 11, the second chapter of the treatise on time, which is the central chapter of the whole treatise, Aristotle reaches the result, the answer to the question what time is. We shall merely record the result here because later we shall want to pursue in more detail the interpretation of the nature of time. He says: *touto gar estin ho chronos, arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron*;¹³ time is this, namely, something counted which shows itself in and for regard to the before and after in motion or, in short, something counted in connection with motion as encountered in the horizon of earlier and later. Aristotle then shows more precisely what is already present in the experience of a motion and how time is encountered there along with it. He makes clear to what extent and in what sense time is *arithmos*, a number, and how the basic phenomenon of time, *to nun*, the now, results.

This leads him, in the third chapter (chap. 12), to define in greater detail the connection between motion and time and to show that not only is

⁹ *Ibid.* 218^b:13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 218^b:18.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 11.219^a:1. ["Neither movement nor independent of movement." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

¹² *Ibid.* 219^a:3 ["What exactly it has to do with movement." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

¹³ *Ibid.* 219^a:1f. ["For time is just this—number of motion in respect of before and after." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

motion in time and measured by time but conversely, too, time is measured by motion. Thus there emerges the fundamental question What does it mean to say that something is "in time"? We normally express something's being in time by the German adjective "zeitlich," English "temporal." But for terminological purposes we use the expression "zeitlich" or "temporal" in a different sense and take as the specific designation for the "being in time" of a being the expression "Innerzeitigkeit," "intratemporality." Something is in time, it is intratemporal. Elucidation of the concept of intratemporality clarifies the characterization of time as number. Since rest is itself a limiting case of motion, the relationship between time and rest also becomes clear with the determination of the relationship of time and motion. Likewise, the relation of time to the extratemporal [*Ausserzeitigen*], usually called the timeless, is cleared up by reference to the concept of intratemporality.

The *fourth chapter* (chap. 13) inquires into the unity of time in the manifoldness of the sequence of the *nows*. Aristotle tries to show here how the now, to nun, constitutes time's real holding-itself-together, its coherence, *sunecheia*, in Latin *continuum*, German *Stetigkeit*, English *continuity*. The question is how the now holds time together within itself as a whole. All the time-determinations are related to the now. In connection with the explanation of *sunecheia* Aristotle gives an interpretation of several time determinations: *ede*, forthwith, *arti*, just now, and also *palai*, before this time or once, and *exaiphnes*, all of a sudden. Forthwith, just, once, suddenly, later on, formerly are determinations, all of which go back to the nun. Just is seen looking backward from a now; immediately is seen forward, as it were, from a now. Aristotle does not grasp these determinations in their inner connections but merely gives examples of time-determinations without recognizing their systematic order.

The *fifth chapter* (chap. 14) goes back to the determination that was drawn into the definition of time, the *proteron* and *husteron*, the *earlier* and *later*. It discusses the relation of the earlier and later to the *before* and *after*. Following these discussions the first problem is taken up again: *Where and how is time?* Aristotle defines this question more closely in book 8 of the *Physics*, in which he brings time into connection with the rotation of the heavens and with the *nous*. Time is not bound up with a single motion and a definite place. In a certain way it is everywhere. And yet, since by definition it is something counted, it can exist only where a counting exists. But counting is an activity of the soul. Time is in a certain way everywhere and yet it is in each instance only in the soul. Here we once again run up against a difficult problem. What does it mean to say that time is in the soul? This corresponds to the question discussed in connection with the fourth thesis: what it means to say that truth is in the understanding. As long as we do not

have an adequate concept of the soul or the understanding—of the Dasein—it remains difficult to say what “time is in the soul” means. Nothing is gained by saying that time is subjective; at most, it would give rise to problems put precisely the wrong way.

The question now arises, How can different entities and different moving things which are in time be in or at the *same* time if they are *different*? How is the *simultaneity* of different things possible? We know that the question about simultaneity or, more precisely, the question of the possibility of an intersubjective establishment of simultaneous events constitutes one of the basic problems of relativity theory. The philosophical treatment of the problem of simultaneity depends on two factors: (1) determination of the concept of intratemporality, the question how *something is in time* at all, and (2) clarification of the question in *what way* and *where* time is or, more precisely, whether time in general is and can be said to be.

Since time for Aristotle is something connected with motion and is measured by means of motion, the problem is to find the purest motion, which is the original measure of time. The first and pre-eminent measure of all motion is the rotation (kuklophoria) of the outermost heaven. This motion is a circular motion. Time is thus in a certain sense a circle.

From this brief survey it already appears that Aristotle broached a series of central problems relating to time, and in fact not indiscriminately but in their essential concatenation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that many problems are just touched on by him and also that those with which he deals more circumstantially are by no means without need of further inquiry and new radical formulation as problems. Seen in their entirety, however, all the central problems of time which were thereafter discussed in the course of the further development of philosophy are already marked out. It can be said that subsequent times did not get essentially beyond the stage of Aristotle's treatment of the problem—apart from a few exceptions in Augustine and Kant, who nevertheless retain in principle the Aristotelian concept of time.

β) Interpretative exposition of Aristotle's concept of time

Following this survey of Aristotle's essay on time we shall try to gain a more thorough understanding of it. In doing so, we shall not keep strictly to the text but, by a free discussion and occasionally by carrying the interpretation somewhat further, we shall try to focus more clearly on the phenomenon as Aristotle sees it. We start here from the definition of time already adduced: *touto gar estin ho chronos, arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron*;¹⁴ for time is just this, something counted in connection with

14. *Ibid*

motion that is encountered in the horizon of the earlier and later (motion encountered with regard to the before and after). At first it might be said that this definition of time makes the phenomenon inquired into more opaque than accessible. The first point in the definition implies that time is something we find before us in connection with motion, as pertaining to something that moves as a moving thing, *oute kinesis out' aneu kineseos*.¹³ Let us take a simple example. A vertical rod moves on the blackboard from left to right. We can also let it move in the manner of a rotation with the lower end as pivot. Time is something about the motion, showing itself to us in connection with a moving thing. If we imagine this rod to move or to rotate then we can ask, Where is time here, if it is supposed to pertain to the motion? It is certainly not a property of this rod, not anything corporeal, not heavy, not colored, not hard, not anything that belongs to its extension and continuity (*suneches*) as such; it is not something, not a piece of the rod's manifold of points, if we think of the rod as a line. Also, however, Aristotle does not in fact say that time is something connected with the moving thing as such but rather with its *motion*. But what is the motion of the rod? We say "its change of place, the transition from one place to another—whether in the sense of simple forward motion or continued motion from one point to the other." Time is supposed to be something relating to the motion and not to the moving thing. If we follow the continued movement of the rod, whether in the sense of rotation or the other motion, will we then find time belonging to this continued movement itself? Does it adhere to the motion as such? If we stop the motion, we say that time continues. Time goes on while the motion ceases. Thus time is not motion, and the rod's motion is not itself time. Aristotle also does not say that time is kinesis, but *kineseos ti*, something close to, connected with motion. But how? The motion here is the transition of the rod from one place to the other. The moving thing, as moving, is always present at some one place. Is time at these places or is it even these places themselves? Obviously not, for if the moving thing has run through the places in its movement, these places are, as such, still existent as definite locations. But the time at which the rod was at this or that place has passed. The place remains, time goes by. Where and how, then, is time *at, with*, the motion? We say that during its motion the moving thing is always *at a place at a time*. The motion is *in time, intratemporal*. Is time then something like a container, into which motion is put? And if time is always to be met with in connection with motion, is this container then something that carries motion as such along with it like a snail its shell? But when the rod is resting we again ask where time is. Do we find nothing of time in the thing *qua* resting? Or something? We say "The rod was at rest

13. *Ibid.*, 219^a1. ["Neither movement nor independent." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

for a certain length of *time* or *temporarily*." Nevertheless, although we may look all around the moving thing and the motion itself as change of place, we shall never find time if we hold to what Aristotle says.

We must ourselves retort, naturally we shall not find it. Aristotle does not just remark indefinitely that time is something connected with motion; instead, he says more precisely: *arithmos kineseos*—a *number* connected with motion or, as he formulates it in one place, *ouk ara kinesis ho chronos all' he arithmon echei he kinesis*;¹⁶ time is not itself motion but exists so far as motion has a number. Time is a number. This again is astonishing, for numbers are just exactly that of which we say that they are timeless, extratemporal. How then is time supposed to be a number? But here, as Aristotle expressly stresses, the expression "number" (*arithmos*) must be understood in the sense of *arithmoumenon*. Time is number not in the sense of the number that numbers as such but of the number that is *numbered, counted*. Time as number of motion is what is counted in connection with motion. Let us try an experiment. What can I count about the motion of the rod? Obviously, since the motion is a change of place, I can count the individual locations occupied by the rod in transition from one to the other. But, if I add up these locations, the sum of them to all eternity will never give me time but only the whole stretch run through, a piece of space but not time. Now we are able to count and to determine by counting the speed of the rod in its transition from one place to the other. What is speed? If we take the physical concept of speed, $s = d/t$, then speed is the path traversed divided by the elapsed time. From this formula it can be seen externally that time is involved in speed, because motion requires time. But this does not yet explain what time itself is. We have not come a single step closer to time. What does it mean, then, to say that the rod has a certain speed? Patently, among other things, it means that the rod is moving in time. Its motion runs its course in time. How puzzling it is that all motions *take—use up—time* and yet time doesn't diminish at all. Let us think of 1000 particular motions in the time between ten and eleven o'clock. Think also, as a second instance, of 100,000 motions in the same time. All of them take this same time. In the second instance, when many more of them are taking this time, does the time itself diminish or does it remain quantitatively equal to itself? Is the time that is taken by the motions thereby all used up? If not, then it manifestly does not depend on the motions. Nevertheless, it is supposed to be what is counted in connection with motion. It seems to be pure assertion on Aristotle's part that time is what is counted in connection with motion. Even if we go so far as to mark the rod's change of place by numbers, so that we provide each place with a number

16. *Ibid.*, 219·3f.

and thus find something counted or enumerated directly at each place in the transition of the moving thing, we do not uncover time with this device. Or do we? I take my watch out of my pocket and follow the change of place of the second hand, and I read off one, two, three, four seconds or minutes. This little rod, hurrying on, shows me time, points to time for me, for which reason we call it a pointer, a hand. I read off time from the motion of a rod. Where then is this time? Somewhere inside the works, perhaps, so that if I put the watch into my pocket again I have time in my vest pocket? Naturally not, the answer will be. Yet we ask in return, Where then is time, since it is certainly undeniable that we read it from the watch? The watch, the clock, tells me what time it is, so that I find time in some way present there.

We see that in the end Aristotle is not so wrong when he says that time is what is counted in connection with motion. As evidence we do not need for it something as refined as a modern pocket watch. When a human being in natural, everyday existence follows the course of the sun and says "It is noon," "It is evening," he is telling the time. Time now, suddenly, is in the sun or in the sky and no longer in my vest pocket. But really, then, where is this prodigy at home? How does it happen that we should find time wherever we follow a motion, that we find time somehow attached to the motion and yet do not find it present right at the place where the moving object is? What are we attending to, toward which horizon are we looking, when—to keep to a simple example—we say at sunset that evening is coming on and thus determine a *time* of day? Are we looking only toward the particular local horizon, toward the west, or does our encounter with the moving object, the sun here in its apparent motion, look toward a different horizon?

The definition of time given by Aristotle is so ingenious that it also fixes this horizon, within which we are supposed to find, along with what is counted in connection with the motion, none other than time. Aristotle says: *arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron*. We translate this as: time is something counted in connection with encountered motion with a view to the before and after, in the horizon of the earlier and later. Time is not only what is counted about the motion, but it is counted there so far as that motion stands in the prospect of the before and after when we follow it as motion. The horizon sought for is that of the earlier and later. *Proteron* and *husteron* are translated as earlier and later, but also as before and after. The first determination, the *proteron* and *husteron* taken as earlier and later, seems to be impossible. "Earlier" and "later" are time-determinations. Aristotle says, time is what is counted about the motion we encounter in the horizon of time (of earlier and later). But this simply means that time is something met within the horizon of time. Time is counted time. If I say that time is that pertaining to motion which shows itself when I follow it as

motion in the horizon of its earlier and later, the definition of time seems to be a trivial tautology: time is the earlier and later, thus *time* is *time*. Is it worthwhile to busy ourselves with a definition that bears on its brow, as it were, the crudest sort of logical error? Nevertheless, we should not cling to the words. Certainly earlier and later are time phenomena. But the question remains whether what they mean coincides with what is meant in the subject of the definitory statement "time is time." Perhaps the second term "time" means something different and more original than what Aristotle means in the definition itself. Perhaps Aristotle's definition of time is not a tautology but merely betrays the inner coherence of the Aristotelian time phenomenon, that is, of time as commonly understood, with the original time which we are calling temporality. As Aristotle says in his interpretation, time can be interpreted only if it is itself understood again by way of time, that is, by way of *original* time. Therefore, it is not necessary to translate the proteron and husteron in Aristotle's definition of time by the indifferent before and after—even though that has its own specific and proper validity—so that their time character comes out less obviously, in order to avoid the appearance that Aristotle is defining time by going back to time. If the nature of time is in some measure understood, then Aristotle's interpretation and definition of time must be so interpreted, in conformity with its initial approach, that in it what he takes to be time must be construed by way of time.

Anyone who has once seen these interconnections must plainly demand, that in the definition of time the origin of time in the common sense, of time as we encounter it immediately, should come to light from temporality. For its origin belongs to its essential nature and thus demands expression in the definition of this nature.

If we permit the earlier and later to remain in the definition of time, this does not yet show how accurate the Aristotelian definition of time is, how far what is counted in connection with motion is time. What is the meaning of "that which is counted in connection with motion encountered in the horizon of the earlier and later"? Time is supposed to be what is encountered in a specifically directed counting of motion. The specific direction of vision in counting is indicated by the kata to proteron kai husteron. What this means will be unveiled for us if we first of all take proteron and husteron as before and after and show by means of our interpretation what Aristotle means by this, so that the translation of proteron and husteron by earlier and later is justified.

Time is supposed to be something counted about motion, and in fact something counted that shows itself to us with respect to the proteron and husteron. We must now clarify what this means and in what way we experience something like time with respect to the before and after. Time is

kineseos ti, something we encounter in connection with motion. To motion in general, kinesis or metabole, there belongs kinoumenon kineitai: a moving thing is moving, is in motion. The most general character of motion is metabole, a turn or change or better a transition from something to something.¹⁷ The simplest form of motion, and the one most frequently used by Aristotle in his analysis of motion, of transition, is *phōra*, transition from one place (topos) to another, shift, change of place. This is the motion we are familiar with also as physical motion. In such motion the kinoumenon is the phenomenon, being carried forward from one place to the other. Another form of motion is, for example, *alloiosis*, becoming different in the sense that one quality changes to another, one particular color to another, and here too there is an advance ek tinos eis ti, *away from something toward something*. But this "away from something toward something" does not have the sense of transition from one place to another. Change of color can occur at the same place. It already becomes clear from this that this remarkable structure of the ek tinos eis ti, "away from something toward something" belongs to motion. The comparison with alloiosis shows that this "away from something toward something" need not necessarily be taken spatially. We shall call this structure of motion its *dimension*, taking the concept of dimension in a completely formal sense, in which spatial character is not essential. Dimension expresses a general notion of stretch; extension in the sense of spatial dimension then represents a particular modification of stretch. In the case of the determination of ek tinos eis ti we should rid ourselves completely of the spatial idea, something that Aristotle did, too. A completely formal sense of stretching out is intended in "from something to something." It is important to see this, because it was with reference to this determination that the Aristotelian concept of time was misunderstood in the modern period, especially by Bergson; from the outset he took this dimensional character of time in the sense of spatial extension in its reference to motion.

The determination of the *suneches*, *being-held-together-within-itself*, continuum, continuity, also belongs to stretch. Aristotle calls the dimensional character *megethos*. This determination *megethos*, extension or magnitude, also does not have a primarily spatial character, but that of stretch. There is no break implied in the concept and essential nature of "from something to something;" it is, instead, a stretching out that is closed within itself. When we experience motion in a moving thing, we necessarily

17. Cf. *Physica*, 3.1-3 and 5. [In book 5, see particularly 224^a21-224^b9 and 224^b35ff. The latter begins: "And since every change is from something to something—as the word itself (metabole) indicates, implying something 'after' (meta) something else, that is to say something earlier and something later—that which changes must change in one of four ways." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

experience along with it *suneches*, continuity, and in this continuity itself *ek tinos eis ti*, dimension in the original sense, stretching out (extension). In the case of change of place the extension is locally-spatial. Aristotle expresses this set of circumstances in reverse order when he says that *akolouthei to megethei he kinesis*,¹⁸ motion follows (comes in the wake of) dimension (extension). This proposition should be understood not ontically but ontologically. It does not mean that a motion proceeds ontically from stretch or continuity, that dimension has motion consequent to it. To say that motion follows continuity or follows dimension means that by the very nature of motion as such dimensionality, and thus continuity, precedes it. Extension and continuity are already implicit in motion. They are earlier than motion in the sense of being *a priori* conditions of motion itself. Where there is motion, there *megethos* and *suneches* (*sunecheia*) are already thought along with it *a priori*. But this does not signify that motion is identical with extension (space) and continuity, which is clear already from the fact that not every motion is a change of place, a spatial motion, but nevertheless is determined by the *ek tinos eis ti*. Extension here has a broader sense than specifically spatial dimension. Motion follows continuity, and continuity follows extendedness. *Akolouthei* expresses the *foundational a priori connection* of motion with continuity and extendedness. Aristotle employs *akolouthein* in other investigations, too, in this ontological signification. So far as time is *kineseos ti*, something connected with motion, this means that in thinking time, motion or rest is always thought along with it. In Aristotelian language, time follows, is in succession to, motion. Aristotle says directly: *ho chronos akolouthei te kinesei*.¹⁹ For change of place the sequence is as follows: place-manifold—(space) extension—continuity—motion—time. Viewed backward from time this

18. *Ibid.*, 219^a11. ["But what is moved is moved from something to something, and all magnitude is continuous. Therefore the movement goes with the magnitude. Because the magnitude is continuous, the movement too must be continuous, and if the movement, then the time, for the time that has passed is always thought to be in proportion to the movement." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

19. *Ibid.*, 219^a23. [A sense of the difficulty of reading this passage may be derived from noting how two translations deal with it. "But the 'now' corresponds to the body that is carried along, as time corresponds to the motion. For it is by means of the body that is carried along that we become aware of the 'before and after' in the motion, and if we regard these as countable we get the now." Trans. Hardie and Gaye. "And as time follows the analogy of movement, so does the 'now' of time follow the analogy of the moving body, since it is by the moving body that we come to know the before-and-after in movement, and it is in virtue of the countableness of its before-and-afters that the 'now' exists." A note gives an alternative translation of the last two words: "the 'now' is the before and after, *qua* countable." In Aristotle, *The Physics*, trans. Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford. 2 vols (London: William Heinemann; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929), vol. 1, pp. 389-391. All further references to the Wicksteed and Cornford translation of the *Physica* are to this edition, vol. 1.]

means: if time is something connected with motion, then the genuine connection is thought along with time. And this plainly does not say that time is identical with any of the phenomena thus thought in connection with it.

Unless the ontological sense of *akolouthēin* has been comprehended, the Aristotelian definition of time remains unintelligible. Or else defective interpretations occur, for example that of Bergson, who said that time as Aristotle understands it is space. He was misled into adopting this inadequate interpretation because he took continuity in the narrower sense of the extensional magnitude of space. Aristotle does not reduce time to space nor does he define it merely with the aid of space, as though some spatial determination entered into the definition of time. He only wants to show that and how time is something connected with motion. To this end, however, it becomes necessary to recognize what is already experienced in and with the experience of motion and how time becomes visible in what is thus experienced.

To see more precisely the sense in which time follows upon motion or motion's stretching out, we have to clarify even further for ourselves the experience of motion. The thoughts of motion, continuity, extension—and in the case of change of place, place—are interwoven with the experience of time. When we follow a motion, we encounter time in the process without expressly apprehending it or explicitly intending it. In the concrete experience of motions we keep primarily to the moving thing, the phenomenon; *ho ten kinesis gnorizomen*;²⁰ we see the motion in connection with the moving thing. To see motion purely as such is not easy: *tode gar ti to pheromenon, he de kinesis ou*;²¹ the moving thing is always a *this-here*, a definite entity, while the motion itself does not have a specifically individualized character that would give it its own special stamp. The moving thing is given for us in its individuation and thisness, but motion as such is not given in that way. In experiencing motion we keep to the moving thing, and we thus see the motion *with* the moving thing but do not see it as such.

Corresponding to the way we bring motion closer to ourselves by focusing on the moving thing is the way we experience continuity in the elements constituting something continuous, a continuum, points in the point manifold of a line. When we experience motion we focus on the moving thing and the particular place from which it makes its transition to another place. In following a motion we experience it in the horizon of a conjointly encountered series of locations on a continuous path. We experience the motion when we see the particular moving thing in its transition from one

20. *Ibid.*, 219^a:17

21. *Ibid.*, 219^a:30.

place to another. We see how it goes from there to here, from a from-there to a to-here. This calls for more precise determination.

It could be said that change of place is a traversing of a continuous series of places, so that I can obtain the motion by taking together all the places traversed, one there and another there, and so on. But if we merely re-count the individual places, reckoning up together all the individual theres and heres, we do not experience any motion. Only when we see the moving thing in its changing over from there to here do we experience motion, transition. We must not take the places as a pure juxtaposition of there and here. Instead we must take this there as "away from there" and this here as "toward here," hence not simply a there and then again another there, but "away from there" and "toward here." We must see the presented contexture of places, the point manifold, in the horizon of an "away from there—toward here." This is primarily what Aristotle's condition *kata to proteron kai husteron* means. The there is not arbitrary; the from-there is *prior, antecedent*. And the to-here or hither is likewise not an arbitrary here, but for the present, as hither, it is *posterior, subsequent*. If we thus see the place manifold in the horizon of the "away from there—toward here" and traverse the individual places in this horizon in seeing the motion, the transition, then we *retain* the first traversed place as the *away-from-there* and *expect* the next place as the *toward-here*. Retaining the prior and expecting the posterior, we see the transition as such. If, thus retentive of the prior and expectant of the posterior, we follow the transition as such, the individual places within the whole transition, which can stretch arbitrarily far, we no longer fix the individual places as individual points or as individual theres and heres arbitrarily paired. In order to grasp and formulate the peculiar retention of the prior and expectation of the posterior to come, we say: now here, formerly there, afterward there. Each there in the nexus of "away from there—toward here" is *now-there, now-there, now-there*. So far as we see the point manifold in the horizon of the *proteron* and *husteron*, when following the moving object we say at each time *now-here, now-there*. Only if we tacitly add this can we read off the time when we look at a watch or clock. We say "now" quite naturally and spontaneously when we look at the timepiece. It is not just a matter of course that we say "now," but in saying it we have already assigned time to the clock. It is not in the clock itself, but in saying "now" we assign it to the clock and the clock gives us the how-many of the *nows*.²² What is counted when we count as we follow a transition in the horizon of the *ek tinos eis ti*, whether aloud or silently, is the *nows*. We count a sequence of *nows* or of *thens* and *at-the-times*. The *then* is the not-

22. Assignment [Vorgabe] is at bottom the threefold ecstatically horizontal structure of temporality. Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] assigns the now to itself.

yet-now or the now-not-yet; the at-the-time is the now-no-longer or the no-longer-now. The then and the at-the-time both have a now-character, a now-reference. In one place Aristotle says quite concisely, without carrying out the analysis in this detailed way—but without which his whole interpretation of time is unintelligible—to pheromeno akolouthei to nun,²³ the now follows the moving thing, the object making the transition from one place to another; that is to say, the now is seen concomitantly in experiencing the motion. And to say that it is concomitantly seen means for Aristotle, in the broader sense, that it is concomitantly counted. What is thus concomitantly counted in following a motion, what is thus said, the nows—this is time. He d' arithmeton to proteron kai husteron, to nun estin.²⁴ As counted, the nows themselves count—they count the places, so far as these are traversed as places of the motion. Time as arithmos phoras is the counted that counts. Aristotle's interpretation of time matches the phenomenon extremely well when he says that time is something counted connected with motion so far as I see this motion in the horizon ek tinos eis ti, "from something to something."

In one place Aristotle says about proteron and husteron: to de proteron kai husteron en topo proton estin;²⁵ it is first of all in place, in the change and sequence of places. He is thinking of before and after here as still wholly without any time-determinateness. The Aristotelian definition of time can also be formulated at first in this way: time is what is counted in connection with motion which is experienced with respect to before and after. But what is thus counted is unveiled as the nows. The nows themselves, however, can be expressed and understood only in the horizon of earlier and later. The "with respect to the before and after" and the "in the horizon of the earlier and later" do not coincide; the second is the interpretation of the first.²⁶ If we take the proteron and husteron provisionally as before and after, previous and subsequent, the genesis of Aristotle's definition of time becomes clearer. If we take it straight away as earlier and later, then the definition seems absurd at first, but this only indicates that a central problem is still present in it: the question about the origin of the now itself. The first translation gives the literal conception, but the second already includes a large element of interpretation.

We intentionally translated the Aristotelian definition of time as something counted in connection with motion so far as this motion is seen in the horizon of earlier and later. We have already taken the proteron-husteron in

23. Ibid., 219^a22; see also 220^a6

24. Ibid. 219^a25.

25. Ibid., 219^a 14f.

26. Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 420 ff.

a narrower sense, which comes out clearly only when the before and after receive further interpretation. Primarily, proteron-husteron means for Aristotle before and after in the sequence of places. It has a non-temporal sense. But the experience of before and after intrinsically presupposes, in a certain way, the experience of time, the earlier and later. Aristotle dealt with the proteron and husteron in detail in book Delta of the *Metaphysics* (11.1018^b9ff). In the treatise on time he wavers in his conception of the proteron-husteron. Most often he takes it directly as earlier and later and not so much in the sense of before and after. He says of them that they have an *apostasis pros to nun*,²⁷ a distance from the now; in the then a now is concomitantly thought each time as not-yet-now, and similarly in the at-the-time the now concomitantly thought appears as the no-longer-now. The now is the limit for what has gone by and what comes after.

The nows which we count are themselves in time: they constitute time. The now has a peculiar double visage, which Aristotle expresses in this way: *kai suneches te de ho chronos to nun, kai dieretai kata to nun*.²⁸ Time is held together within itself by the now; time's specific continuity is rooted in the now. But conjointly, with respect to the now, time is divided, articulated into the no-longer-now, the earlier, and the not-yet-now, the later. It is only with respect to the now that we can conceive of the then and at-the-time, the later and the earlier. The now that we count in following a motion is in each instance a different now. *To de nun dia to kineisthai to pheromenon aiei heteron*,²⁹ on account of the transition of the moving thing the now is always another, an advance from one place to the other. In each now the now is a different one, but still each different now is, as now, always now. The ever different nows are, as different, nevertheless always exactly the same, namely, now. Aristotle summarizes the peculiar nature of the now and thus of time—when he interprets time purely by way of the now—in a manner so pregnant that it is possible only in Greek but hardly in German or English: *to gar nun to auto ho pot' en, to d' einai auto heteron*;³⁰ the now is the same with respect to what it always already was—that is, in each now

27. *Physica*, book 4, 14.223^a5f. [*Proteron gar kai husteron legomen kata ten pros to nun apostasin*; "for we say 'before' and 'after' with reference to the distance from the 'now.'" Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

28. *Physica*, book 4, 11.220^a5. ["Time, then, also is both made continuous by the 'now' and divided at it." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

29. *Ibid.* 220^a14

30. *Ibid.* 219^b10f. ["But every simultaneous time is self-identical; for the 'now' as a subject is an identity, but it accepts different attributes." The translators note: "E.g., if you come in when I go out, the time of your coming in is in fact the time of my going out, though for it to be the one and to be the other are different things." Trans. Hardie and Gaye. Compare the Wicksteed and Cornford translation: "But at any given moment time is the same everywhere, for the 'now' itself is identical in its essence, but the relations into which it enters differ in different connexions."]

it is now; its *essentia*, its what, is always *the same* (tauto)—and nevertheless every now is, by its nature, different in each now, to d' einai auto heteron: nowness, being-now, is always *otherness*, *being-other* (being-how or howness—*existentia*—heteron). To de nun esti men hos to auto, esti d' hos ou to auto;³¹ the now is in a certain way always the same and in a certain way never the same. The now articulates and bounds time with respect to its earlier and later. On the one hand it is indeed always the same, but then it is never the same. So far as it is always at an other and is other (we may think of the sequence of places), it is always something else. This constitutes its always being-now, its otherhood. But what it always already was as that which it is, namely, now—that is the same.

We shall not next enter any further into the problem of the structure of time itself starting from the now-manifold. Instead we ask: What is implied by Aristotle's interpreting time as something counted or as number? What in particular is he trying to make visible in stressing the numerical character of time? What does the characterization of time as number entail for the determination of the essential nature of what we call intratemporality? What does "in time" mean? How can the *being* of time be determined by way of the characterization of time as number?

What is implied by Aristotle's assigning a numerical character to time? What does he see in time? Time is number as that which is counted in following the places traversed by the moving thing, that is, so far as we follow in the motion the transition as such and in doing so say "now."

But also it is not enough that we correlate the nows in juxtaposition to a point-manifold, so as to think of them as being at a standstill in a line. This talk of time as a sequence of nows should not be misunderstood and transferred to the *spatial*, thus leading us to speak of time as a line, a series of points. The now is something counted, but not in the counting of one and the same point. Time is not a manifold of nows thrust together, because at each now every other now already no longer is and because, as we saw earlier, a curious stretching out on both sides into non-being belongs to time. The now is not correlated as a point to a fixed point and it cannot belong to it in that way, because by its essential nature it is both beginning and end. In the now as such there is already present a reference to the no-longer and the not-yet. It has dimension within itself; it stretches out toward a not-yet and a no-longer. The not-yet and no-longer are not patched on to the now as foreign but belong to its very content. Because of this *dimensional content* the *now* has within itself the *character of a transition*. The now as such is already in transit. It is not one point alongside another point so that

31. Ibid., 219^a12f.

some mediation would be needed for the two. It is intrinsically transition. Because it has this peculiar stretching out within itself, we can conceive of the stretch as being greater or less. The scope of the dimension of a now varies; now in this hour, now in this second. This diversity of scope of dimension is possible only because the now is intrinsically dimensional. Time is not thrust together and summed up out of nows, but the reverse: with reference to the now we can articulate the stretching out of time always only in specific ways. Correlation of the manifold of the nows—where the now is taken as transition—with a point-manifold (line) has only a certain validity, if we take the points of the line themselves as forming beginning and end, as constituting the transition of the continuum, and not as pieces present alongside one another each for itself. A consequence of the impossibility of correlating the nows with isolated point-pieces is that the *now*, on its part, is a *continuum of the flux of time*—not a piece. That is why the nows in the following of motion cannot ever fragment the motion into a collection of immobile parts; instead, what becomes accessible and the object of thought in the now is the transitional in its transition and the resting in its rest. And, conversely, this entails that the now is itself neither in motion nor at rest: it is not "in time."

The *now*—and that means time—is, says Aristotle, *by its essential nature not a limit*, because as transition and dimension it is open on the sides of the not-yet and the no-longer. The now is a limit, in the sense of a closing, of the finished, of the no-further, *only incidentally* with reference to something that ceases in a now and at a definite point of time. It is not the now that ceases as now; rather, the now as now is, by its essential nature, already the not-yet, already related as dimension to what is to come, whereas it can well be that a motion determined by the said now can cease in this now. With the aid of the now I can mark a limit, but the now as such does not have the character of a limit so far as it is taken within the continuum of time itself. *The now is not limit, but number*, not *peras* but *arithmos*. Aristotle explicitly contrasts time as *arithmos* with *peras*. The limits of something, he says, are what they are only in one with the being they limit. The limit of something belongs to the mode of being of the limited. This does not hold true for number. Number is not bound to what it numbers. Number can determine something without itself being dependent, for its part, on the intrinsic content and mode of being of what is counted. I can say "ten horses." Here the ten indeed determines the horses, but ten has nothing of the character of horses and their mode of being. Ten is not a limit of horses as horses; for in counting with it I can just as well determine ships, triangles, or trees. What is characteristic about number lies in the fact that it determines—in the Greek sense also de-limits—something in such a way that it itself remains

independent of what it delimits. Time as number, as that which was portrayed by us as the counted-counting, does not itself belong to the entity that it counts. When Aristotle says that time is what is *counted* in connection with motion, what he wishes to stress is that, to be sure, we count and determine motion as transition in terms of the now, but that for this reason this counting counted, time, is bound neither to the *intrinsic content* nor the *mode of being* of the moving thing nor to the motion as such. Nevertheless, in our counting as we follow a motion we encounter time as something counted. With this a peculiar character of time is revealed, a character that was interpreted later by Kant in a special sense as form of intuition.

Time is number and not limit, but as number it is at the same time able to measure that with reference to which it is number. Not only is time counted, but as counted it can itself be something that counts in the sense of a measure. Only because time is number in the sense of the counted now can it become a *mensural* number, so that it itself can count in the sense of measuring. This distinction between the now as number in general or what is counted and as the counting counted, along with the delimitation of time as number in contrast with limit, is the essential content of the difficult place in Aristotle's essay on time, into which we shall enter only briefly. Aristotle says: to de nun dia to kineisthai to pheromenon aiei heteron;³² because the now is what is counted in a transition, it always differs with that which is undergoing the transition. Hosth' ho chronos arithmos ouch hos tes autes stigmes;³³ therefore, time is not number with reference to the same point as a point, that is, the now is not a point-element of continuous time, but as a transition, insofar as it is correlated with a point, with a place in the movement, it is already always beyond the point. As transition it looks backward and forward. It cannot be correlated with an isolated point as selfsame because it is beginning and end: hoti arche kai teleute, all' hos ta eschata tes grammes mallon.³⁴ Time is number in a manner of speaking—

32. Ibid. 220^a14. [The single passage, 220^a14-20, to which notes 32-35 refer, is reproduced here as a whole. See also the remark and translation added to note 34, below.

"The 'now' on the other hand, since the body carried is moving, is always different.

"Hence time is not number in the sense in which there is 'number' of the same point because it is beginning and end, but rather as the extremities of a line form a number, and not as the parts of the line do so, both for the reason given (for we can use the middle point as two, so that on that analogy time might stand still), and further because obviously the 'now' is no part of time nor the section any part of the movement, any more than the points are parts of the line—for it is two lines that are parts of one line." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

33. Ibid., 220^a14f.

34. Ibid. 220^a15f. [The *Grundprobleme's* reference to the Ross edition of the *Physics*, which was published in 1936, runs into a specific problem here. The Ross text has the word "grammes" in this place, whereas other texts, such as that by Bekker, read "autes." Thus the Ross edition's translation (Hardie and Gaye) refers to the extremities of a line (gramme).

it determines as transition the point's extremes outward on both sides of the stretching. This transition belongs to the point and is itself, as now, not a part of time, in the sense that this time would be composed of now-parts; instead, each part has transitional character, that is, it is not strictly speaking a part. Therefore Aristotle says directly: *ouden morion to nun tou chronou, oud' he diairesis tes kineseos*;³⁵ the now is consequently not a part of time but is always time itself, and, because it is not a part, motion itself—since motion is measured by means of time—also is not cut into parts. Because the now is transition, it is capable of making motion accessible as *motion*, in its unbroken character of transition. That time is a limit in the sense that I say that motion ceases, stands still, in a now—this is a *sumbebekos*: it is only an attribute of the now, but it does not reach its essential nature.

The now is what it is, *he d' arithmei*, so far as it counts, hence number. Time as now is not limit but transition, and as transition it is possible number, possible mensural number of motion. It measures a motion or a rest in such a way that a specific motion, a specific change and advance is fixed, for example, the advance *from* one stroke of a second *to* the next, with which mensural number then the entire movement is measured. Because the now is transition it always measures a from-to, it measures a how-long, a duration. Time as number fixes the limits of a specific movement. This delimited movement is intended for measuring the whole of the movement to be measured: *metrei d' houtos ten kinesin to horisai tina kinesin he katametresei ten holen*.³⁶

Because time is *arithmos*, it is *metron*. The being measured of a moving thing with respect to its motion, this *metreisthai*, is nothing but to *en chronoinai*,³⁷ the motion's "being in time." According to Aristotle, "things are in time" means nothing but that they are measured by time on the basis of their transitional character. The *intratemporality* of things and events must be distinguished from the way the *nows*, the earlier and later, are in

whereas Heidegger speaks of the point's extremes—i.e., the translation Heidegger offers is contrary to the text quoted from Aristotle. But the question arises, further, as to the meaning of "autes" in "ta eschata tes autes." Wicksteed and Cornford (Cornford consulted Bekker, Prantl, and other sources and commentaries; see vol. 1, pp. x–xi) read it as referring to a line, not a point: "but rather as the two extremities of the same line." See also their explanatory note regarding the meaning of the entire passage, p. 392, note a. Perhaps Heidegger's expression, "on both sides of the stretching," captures this linear implication.]

35. *Ibid.* 220^b19.

36. *Ibid.* 12.221^a1f. ["Time is a measure of motion and of being moved, and it measures the motion by determining a motion which will measure exactly the whole motion, as the cubit does the length by determining an amount which will measure out the whole." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

37. *Ibid.* 221^a4.

time. Epei d' arithmos ho chronos, to men nun kai to proteron kai hosa toiauta houtos en chrono hos en arithmo monas kai to peritton kai artion (ta men gar tou arithmou ti, ta de tou chronou ti estin) · ta de pragmata hos en arithmo to chrono estin. Ei de touto, periechetai hupo chronou hosper (kai ta en arithmo hup' arithmou) kai ta en topo hupo topou.³⁸ The *nows* are indeed in a certain sense themselves in time, so far as they constitute time. But motion and the moving thing are in time, not in the sense that they belong to time itself, but in the way in which what is counted is in number. The even and odd are in the numbers themselves, but what is counted is also, in a certain way, in the numbers that do the counting. As the counted is in number, so motion is in time. That which is in time, the moving thing, periechetai hup' arithmou,³⁹ is embraced by the counting number. Time does not itself belong to motion but *embraces* it. The intratemporality of a being means its *being embraced* by time (now) as number (counted). The factor of the periechesthai, being embraced, stresses that time does not itself belong among the beings which are in time. So far as we measure a being, either in motion or at rest, by time, we come back from the time that embraces and measures the moving thing to that which is to be measured. If we remain with the image of embrace, time is that which is *further outside*, as compared with movements and with all beings that move or are at rest. It embraces or *holds around* the moving and resting things. We may designate it by an expression whose beauty may be contested: time has the character of a *holder-around*, since it holds beings—moving and resting—around. In a suitable sense we can call time, as this holder-around, a "container," provided we do not take "container" in the literal sense of a receptacle like a glass or a box but retain simply the formal element of holding-around.

Given that time embraces beings, it is required that it should somehow be *before* beings, *before* things moving and at rest, encompassing them. Kant calls time the "wherein of an order." It is an embracing horizon within which things given can be ordered with respect to their succession.

Due to its transitionary character, says Aristotle, time always measures only the moving thing or else the moving thing in its limiting case, the thing at rest. Metresei d' ho chronos to kinoumenon kai to eremoun, he to men

38. Ibid., 221^a13-18. [Cf.: "Now taking time as a number scale (a) the 'now' and the 'before' and suchlike exist in time as the monad and the odd and even exist in number (for these latter pertain to number just in the same way in which the former pertain to time); but (b) events have their places in time in a sense analogous to that in which any numbered group of things exist in number (i.e., in such and such a definite number), and such things as these are embraced in number (i.e., in time) as things that have locality are embraced in their places." Wicksteed and Cornford, pp. 401-403.]

39. Ibid.

kinoumenon to de eremoun.⁴⁰ Time measures the moving and the resting, so far as the one is in motion and the other at rest. Time measures motion at the thing moving: *pose tis*,⁴¹ *how great* the transition is, that is, *how many* *nows* there are in a particular transition from something to something. Time measures the moving thing *ouch haplos estai metreton hupo chronou*, he *poson ti estin*, all' he *he kinesis autou pose*;⁴² it measures it not simply as the moving being that it is; if a stone is in motion, time does not measure the stone as such with respect to its specific extension, but the stone insofar as it is moving. Motion is measured, and only motion is measurable, by time, because time, in virtue of its transitional character, always already means something in transition, changing or resting. So far as motion or rest can be measured by time, and to be measured by time means "to be in time," the moving or resting thing, and only it, is in time. For this reason we say that geometrical relationships and their contents are extratemporal, because they are not in motion and consequently also are not at rest. A triangle is not at rest because it does not move. It is beyond rest and motion, and therefore, in Aristotle's view, it is neither embraced nor embraceable by time.

The interpretation of intratemporality also tells us *what* can be intratemporal as well as, on the other hand, what is extratemporal. Thus it becomes ever more clear how time is something counted in connection with motion. *Hama gar kineseos aisthanometha kai chronou*;⁴³ in respect of the moving thing we perceive time together with movement. Where motion is experienced time is unveiled. *Kai gar ean e skotos kai meden dia tou somatos paschomen, kinesis de tis en te psuche ene, euthus hama dokei tis gegonenai kai chronos*.⁴⁴ It is not necessary that we should experience motion in things presently at hand. Even when it is dark, when what is at hand is concealed from us but when we are experiencing our own self, our own mental activities, time is also always already given directly together with the experience, *euthus hama*. For mental actions also come under the determination of motion—motion taken broadly in the Aristotelian sense and

40. *Ibid.*, 221^b16-18. ["But time will measure what is moved and what is at rest, the one *qua* moved, the other *qua* at rest." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

41. *Ibid.*, 221^b19.

42. *Ibid.*, 221^b19f. ["Hence what is moved will not be measurable by the time simply in so far as it has quantity, but in so far as its motion has quantity." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

43. *Physica*, book 4, 11.219^a3f. [The entire passage to which notes 43-44 refer is the following: "Now we perceive movement and time together, for even when it is dark and we are not being affected through the body, if any movement takes place in the mind we at once suppose that some time also has elapsed; and not only that but also, when some time is thought to have passed, some movement also along with it seems to have taken place. Hence time is either movement or something that belongs to movement. Since then it is not movement, it must be the other." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

44. *Ibid.*, 219^a4-6

not necessarily as local motion. The actions are not intrinsically spatial but they pass over into one another, one changes into the other. In such a mental action we can stop and dwell on something. We may recall the passage in *De interpretatione*: *hitesi he dianoa*,⁴⁵ thinking stands still with something. The mind, too, has the character of a moving thing. Even when we are not experiencing something moving in the sense of some entity presently at hand, nevertheless motion taken in the broadest sense, hence time, is unveiled for us in experiencing our own self.

However, this gives rise to a difficult problem. *Poteron de me ouses psuches eie an ho chronos e ou*,⁴⁶ whether, if there is no soul, time does or does not exist. Aristotle gives a more specific interpretation to this: *Adunatou gar ontos einai tou arithmesontos adunaton kai arithmeton ti einai, hoste delon hoti oud' arithmos. Arithmos gar e to erithmemenon e to arithmeton. Ei de meden allo pephuken arithmein e psuche kai psuches nous, adunaton einai chronon psuches me ouses, all' e touto ho pote on estin ho chronos, hoion ei endechetai kinesin einai aneu psuches. To de proteron kai husteron en kinesei estin chronos de taut' estin he arithmeta estin.*⁴⁷ Time is what is counted. If there is no soul then there is no counting, nothing that counts, and if there is nothing that counts then there is nothing countable and nothing counted. If there is no soul then there is no time. Aristotle poses this as a question and at the same time stresses the other possibility, whether time perhaps is in itself in what it is, just as a motion can also exist without a soul. But likewise he emphasizes that the before and after, which is a constitutive determination of time, is in motion, and time itself is *tauta*, the before and after *as counted*. To be counted obviously belongs to the nature of time, so that if there is no counting there is no time, or the converse. Aristotle doesn't pursue this question any further; he merely touches on it, which leads to the question *how* time itself exists.

We see by the interpretation of "being in time" that time, as the embracing, as that in which natural events occur, is, as it were, more objective than all objects. On the other hand, we see also that it exists only if the soul exists, It is more objective than all objects and simultaneously it is subjective, existing only if subjects exist. What then is time and *how* does it

45. Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, 16^b20.

46. *Physica*, book 4, 14.223^a21f. [The entire passage to which notes 46-47 refer is the following: "Whether if soul did not exist time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly be asked; for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be counted, so that evidently there cannot be number; for number is either what has been, or what can be, counted. But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, there would not be time unless there were soul, but only that of which time is an attribute, i.e., if movement can exist without soul, and the before and after are attributes of movement, and time is these *qua* numerable." Trans. Hardie and Gaye.]

47. *Ibid.*, 223^a22-29.

exist? Is it only subjective, or is it only objective, or is it neither the one nor the other? From our earlier discussions we already know that the concepts "subject" and "object" as they are nowadays employed are ontologically indefinite and hence are inadequate, especially for defining the being that we ourselves are, the being that is meant by soul or subject. We point the question about the being of time in the wrong direction from the beginning if we base it on the alternative as to whether time belongs to the subject or object. An unending dialectic can be developed here without saying the least thing about the matter, just as long as it is not settled *how* the Dasein's being itself is, whether perhaps it is such that the Dasein, inasmuch as it exists, is further outside than any object and at the same time further inside, more inward (more subjective), than any subject or soul (because temporality as transcendence is openness). We indicated earlier that the phenomenon of the world manifests something of the sort. Given that the Dasein exists, is in a world, everything extant that the Dasein encounters is necessarily intraworldly, held-around [con-tained] by the world. We shall see that in fact the *phenomenon of time*, taken in a more original sense, is *interconnected with the concept of the world and thus with the structure of the Dasein itself*. But for the while we must leave untouched the difficulty as Aristotle records it. Time is the before and after insofar as they are counted. As counted it is not antecedently extant in itself. Time does not exist without soul. If time thus becomes dependent on the counting of numbers, it does not follow that it is something mental in the soul. Simultaneously it is *en panti*, everywhere, *en ge*, on the earth, *en thalatte*, in the ocean, *en ourano*, in the heaven.⁴⁸ Time is everywhere and yet nowhere and, still, it is only in the soul.

What is essential for understanding the foregoing interpretation of Aristotle's concept of time lies in correctly understanding the concept of *akolouthēin*, to follow. It means an ontological connection of founding which subsists among time, motion, continuity, and dimension. From this concept of founding, of following in the sense of *akolouthēin*, it cannot be inferred that Aristotle identifies time with space. But it surely does become clear that, in bringing time into immediate connection with motion in the sense of local motion, he approaches the mode of measuring time in just the way it is prescribed in the natural understanding of time and in the natural experience of time itself. Of this Aristotle gives only one explicit interpretation. From the mode of interconnection of the now-sequence with motion we saw that the now itself has transitional character: as now it is always the not-yet-now and the no-longer-now. Due to this transitional character, it gets the peculiarity of measuring motion as such, as *metabole*. Since each

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* . 223-17f.

now is not a pure point but is intrinsically transition, the now, by its essential nature, is not a limit but a number. The numerical character of the now and of time in general is essential for the fundamental understanding of time because only from this does what we call intratemporality become intelligible. This means that every being is in time. Aristotle interprets "being in time" as being measured by time. Time itself can be measured only because on its part it is something counted and, as this counted thing, it can itself count again, count in the sense of measuring, of the gathering together of a specific so-many.

At the same time the numerical character of time entails the peculiarity that it embraces or contains the beings that are in it, that with reference to objects it is in a certain way more objective than they are themselves. From this there arose the question about the being of time and its connection with the soul. The assignment of time to the soul, which occurs in Aristotle and then in a much more emphatic sense in Augustine, so as always thereafter to make itself conspicuous over and over again in the discussion of the traditional concept of time, led to the problem how far time is objective and how far subjective. We have seen that the question not only cannot be decided but cannot even be put in that way, since both these concepts "object" and "subject" are questionable. We shall see why it can be said neither that time is something objective in the sense that it belongs among objects nor that it is something subjective, existent in the subject. It will turn out that this manner of putting the question is impossible but that both answers—time is objective and time is subjective—get their own right in a certain way from the original concept of temporality. We shall try now to determine this original concept of temporality more particularly by going back to it from time as understood in the common way.

b) The common understanding of time and the return to original time

Our interpretation of Aristotle's concept of time showed that Aristotle characterizes time primarily as a *sequence of nows*, where it should be noted that the nows are not parts from which time is pieced together into a whole. The very way in which we translated Aristotle's definition of time—hence the way we interpreted it—was intended to indicate that, when he defines it with reference to the earlier and later, he is defining it in terms of time as that which is counted in connection with motion. We also stressed that the Aristotelian definition of time does not contain a tautology within itself, but instead Aristotle speaks from the very constraint of the matter itself. Aristotle's definition of time is not in any respect a definition in the academic sense. It characterizes time by defining how what we call time

becomes accessible. It is an *access definition* or *access characterization*. The type of definiendum is determined by the manner of the sole possible access to it: the counting perception of motion as motion is at the same time the perception of what is counted as time.

What Aristotle presents as time *corresponds to the common prescientific understanding of time*. By its own *phenomenological content* common time points back to an original time, *temporality*. This implies, however, that Aristotle's definition of time is only the *initial approach* to the interpretation of time. The characteristic traits of time as commonly understood must themselves become intelligible by way of original time. If we set this task for ourselves it means that we have to make clear how the *now qua now has transitional character*; how time as *now, then, and at-the-time embraces beings* and as such an embrace of extant things is still more objective and more extant than everything else (intratemporality); how time is *essentially counted* and how it is pertinent to time that it is *always unveiled*.

The common understanding of time manifests itself explicitly and primarily in the use of the clock, it being a matter of indifference here what perfection the clock has. We saw how we had to convince ourselves in looking at the employment of clocks that we encounter time as we count in following a movement. What this means more specifically, how it is possible, and what it implies for the concept of time—we did not ask about all this. Also, neither Aristotle nor subsequent interpreters of time posed this question. What does it mean to speak of using a clock? We have made clear the Aristotelian interpretation of time in regard to the employment of clocks but without ourselves offering a yet more exact interpretation of that employment. For his part Aristotle does not interpret the use of clocks, doesn't even mention it, but presupposes this natural mode of access to time by way of the clock. The common understanding of time comprehends only the time that reveals itself in counting as a succession of *nows*. From this understanding of time there arises the concept of time as a sequence of *nows*, which has been more particularly defined as a unidirectional irreversible sequence of *nows* one after the other. We shall retain this initial approach to time in terms of clock usage and, by a more precise interpretation of this comportment toward time and of the time thus experienced, advance toward what makes this time itself possible.

- α) The mode of being of clock usage. Now, then, and at-the-time as self-expositions of the comportments of enpresenting, expecting, and retaining

What does it mean to read time from a clock? To "look at the clock"? In using a clock, in reading time from it, we do indeed look at the clock but the clock itself is not the object of our regard. We do not occupy ourselves, for

example, with our watch as such, as this particular instrument, so as to distinguish it, say, from a coin. But also a clock is not our object as it is for its maker. He doesn't use it specifically as the equipment that it is. In using a clock we do of course perceive the clock, but only and solely in order to allow ourselves to be brought by it to something that the clock itself is not but that it shows as a clock—time. But here too caution is advisable. The point is to grasp the *use of the clock in its original mode of being*. When I use a clock to read the time, I am also *not directed toward time as the proper object of my vision*. I make neither clock nor time the theme of my regard. When I look at my watch I ask, for instance, how much time still remains for me until the scheduled end of the lecture. I am not searching for time as such in order to occupy myself with it; on the contrary, I am occupied in giving a phenomenological exposition. I am concerned to bring it to a close. In noting the time, I am trying to determine what time it is, how much time there is till nine o'clock, so as to finish this or that subject. In ascertaining the time, I am trying to find out how much time there is *till this or that point* so that I may see that I have enough time, so much time, *in order to finish the subject*. I make inquiry of the clock with the aim of determining how much time I still have *to do this or that*. The time I am trying to determine is always "time to," time *in order to do this or that*, time that I need *for*, time that I can permit myself *in order to* accomplish this or that, time that I must take *for* carrying through this or that. Looking at the clock roots in and springs out of a "taking time." If I am to *take* time then I must have it somewhere or other. In a certain sense we always have time. If often or for the most part we have no time, that is merely a privative mode of our *original having of time*. Time reading in clock usage is founded in a taking-time-for-oneself or, as we also say, taking time into account. The "count" in the accounting here must be understood not in the sense of mere counting but as "reckoning with time," "taking our reckoning in accordance with it," "making allowance for it." Reckoning with time in the form of measuring time arises as a modification from the primary comportment toward time as *guiding oneself according to it*. It is on the basis of this original comportment toward time that we arrive at the measuring of time, that we invent clocks in order to shape our reckoning with time more economically with reference to time. We are always already reckoning with time, taking it into account, before we look at a clock to measure the time. If we observe that each time we use a clock, in looking at it, there is present already a reckoning with time, then this means that time is already given to us before we use the clock. Somehow it has already been unveiled for us; and it is for this reason alone that we can return to time explicitly with the clock. The position of the clock's hand only determines the how much. But the how much and the so much of time understands time originally as that with which I reckon, as

time in order to . . . The time that is always already *given* to us so far as we take time and take account of time has the character of "time in order to. . ."

When without reflecting we look at a clock in everyday behavior, we always say "now," explicitly or not. But this now is not a naked, pure now but has the character of the "now it is time to . . .," "now there is still time until . . ." "now I still have enough time until. . ." When we look at the clock and say "now" we are not directed toward the now as such but toward that *wherefore* and *whereto* there is still time now; we are directed toward what occupies us, what presses hard upon us, what it is time for, what we want to have time for. When we say "now" we are never directed toward the now as toward a merely extant thing. The *Dasein* says "now" also when it is not expressly measuring time by the clock. When we simply feel that it is cold here it implies "now it is cold." It should be stressed once again that when we mean and express "now" we are not talking about some extant thing or other. Saying "now" has a different character from saying "this window." In the latter expression I intend thematically that window over there, the object itself. If in saying "now" we are not addressing ourselves to anything extant, then are we addressing ourselves to the being that we ourselves are? But surely I am not the now? Perhaps I am, though, in a certain way. Saying "now" is not a speaking about something as an object, but it is surely a declaration about something. The *Dasein*, which always exists so that it takes time for itself, *expresses itself*. Taking time for itself, it utters itself in such a way that it is *always saying time*. When I say "now" I do not mean the now as such, but in my now-saying I am transient. I am in *motion* in the understanding of now and, in a strict sense, I am really with that *whereto* the time is and *wherefore* I determine the time. However, we say not only "now" but also "then" and "before." Time is constantly there in such a way that in all our planning and precaution, in all our comportments and all the measures we take, we move in a silent discourse: now, not until, in former times, finally, at the time, before that, and so forth.

We now have to determine more precisely *whence* we actually *take* what we mean by the now without our making it into an object. When I say "then" this means that in this form of discourse I *am expecting* a particular thing which will come or happen on its own or I am expecting something I myself intend to do. I can only say "then" when I am expecting something, only so far as the *Dasein* as existent is expectant. Such a being-expectant, an *expecting*, expresses itself by means of the then. It utters itself in such a way that it does not expressly mean itself but nevertheless displays its own self in this expression of the then. When I say "at the time" I am able to say it with understanding only if I *retain* something bygone. It is not necessary that I should explicitly recollect it but only that I should somehow retain it as something bygone. The at-the-time is the self-expression of the *retention* of

something former, something erstwhile. A specific mode of retention is *forgetting*. This is not nothing; a very definite type of comportment of the self toward the bygone is exhibited in it—a mode in which I close myself off from the bygone, in which it is veiled over for me. And finally, whenever I say "now" I am comporting myself toward something extant or, more precisely, toward something present which is in my present. This comportment toward something present, this having-there of something present, a having which expresses itself in the now, we call the *enprésenting* [*Gegenwärtigen*] of something.

These three determinations, already familiar to Aristotle, the *now* and the modifications of the *at-the-time* as no-longer-now and the *then* as not-yet-now, are the *self-exposition of comportments* which we characterize as expecting, retaining, and enprésenting. Inasmuch as each then is a not-yet-now and each at-the-time a no-longer-now, there is an enprésenting implicit in every expecting and retaining. If I am expecting something, I always see it into a present. Similarly, if I am retaining something, I retain it for a present, so that all expecting and retaining are enprésenting. This shows the *inner coherence* not only of time as expressed but also of these *comportments* in which time expresses itself. If time utters itself with these determinations—now, at-the-time, then—and if further these determinations themselves express an expecting, retaining, and enprésenting, then obviously what is brought out here is *time in a more original sense*. We shall have to ask how what confronts us in the unity of expecting, retaining, and enprésenting can be validly asserted to be original time. This will be the case above all if all the essential moments belonging to the now—its embracing character, its making possible of intratemporality, its transitional character and that of time's being counted or unveiled—can be made intelligible in their possibility and necessity by way of more original phenomena whose unity we shall come to know as temporality. And temporality in its turn provides the horizon for the understanding of being in general.

Time as Aristotle expounds it and as it is familiar to ordinary consciousness is a sequence of nows from the not-yet-now to the no-longer-now, a sequence of nows which is not arbitrary but whose intrinsic direction is from the future to the past. We also say that time passes, elapses. The sequence of nows is directed uniformly in accordance with this succession from future to past and is not reversible. This sequence of nows is designated as infinite. It is taken to be a universal law that time is infinite.

The common understanding of time first manifests itself explicitly in the use of the clock, in the measurement of time. However, we measure time because we need and use time, because we take time or let it pass, and explicitly regulate and make secure the way we use time by specific time measurement. When we look at a clock, since time itself does not lie in the

clock, we assign time to the clock. In looking at the clock we say "now." We have thus given explicit expression to time, which we determine in a merely numerical way from the clock. This saying "now" and the uttering of a then or an at-the-time must have a specific origin. Where do we get the now from when we say "now"? Plainly we do not intend an object, an extant thing; instead, what we call the enpresenting of something, the present, expresses itself in the now. In the at-the-time a retaining pronounces itself, and in the then an expecting. Since each at-the-time is a "no-longer-now" and each then a "not-yet-now," there is always already an enpresenting, a concomitant understanding of the now, incorporated in the uttering of a then that arises from an expecting. Each one of these time-determinations—now, then, at-the-time—is spoken from out of the unity of an enpresenting-expecting-retaining (or forgetting). What I expect to come next is spoken of in the "*at once, forthwith*." What I still retain or even have already forgotten is spoken of as the most recent in the "*just now*." The just now stands with its modification in the horizon of the "*earlier*," which belongs to retaining and forgetting. The forthwith and the then stand in the horizon of the "*later-on*," which belongs to expecting. All nows stand in the horizon of the "*today*," the "*present*," that is the horizon of enpresenting. The time intended by means of the now, then, and at-the-time is the time with which the Dasein that takes time reckons. But where does it get the time it reckons with and which it expresses in the now, then, and at-the-time? We shall still defer answering this question. But it is already clear that this answer is nothing but the elucidation by way of original time of the origin of the now, then (not-yet-now), and at-the-time (no-longer-now), of time as sequence of nows (succession).

β) The structural moments of expressed time: significance, datability, spannedness, publicness

The question is, How must we define more precisely this enpresenting, expecting, and retaining which express themselves in the now, then, and at-the-time? We can do this only if we are certain that we already see in its full structure what the Aristotelian interpretation of time knows as the now-sequence. However, this is not the case in the way Aristotle and the whole of the subsequent tradition characterize time. It is first of all necessary, then, to delineate more precisely the structure of expressed time, the now, then, and at-the-time.

We have already touched on one essential moment of the time read from the clock and thus in general of the time that we generally take or leave for ourselves, but without assigning it to the now as a structure. All time we read from the clock is time to "time to do this or that," *appropriate* or *inappropriate* time. The time we read from the clock is always the time

which has as its opposite the wrong time, as when we say that someone comes at the wrong time or is on time. We have already had this peculiar character of time in view in another context when we characterized the concept of the world and saw that in it there is intended a whole of relations having the character of the in-order-to. We designated by the term "significance" this totality of relations of the in-order-to, for-the-sake-of, for-that-purpose, to-that-end. Time as right and wrong time has the *character of significance*, the character that characterizes the world as world in general. It is for this reason that we call the time with which we reckon, which we leave for ourselves, *world-time*. This does not mean that the time we read from the clock is something extant like intraworldly things. We know, of course, that the world is not an extant entity, not nature, but that which first makes possible the uncoveredness of nature. It is therefore also inappropriate, as frequently happens, to call this time nature-time or natural time. There is no nature-time, since all time belongs essentially to the Dasein. But there is indeed a world-time. We give time the name of world-time because it has the character of *significance*, which is overlooked in the Aristotelian definition of time and everywhere in the traditional determination of time.

A second factor along with the significance of time is its *datability*. Each now is expressed in an enpresenting of something in unity with an expecting and retaining. When I say "now" I am always tacitly adding "*now, when such and such.*" When I say "then" I always mean "*then, when.*" When I say "at the time" I mean "*at the time when.*" To every now there belongs a "when"—now, when such and such. By the term "datability" we denote this relational structure of the now as now-when, of the at-the-time as at-the-time-when, and of the then as then-when. Every now dates itself as "now, when such and such is occurring, happening, or in existence." Even if I can no longer determine exactly and unequivocally the when of an at-the-time-when, the at-the-time has this relation. Only because the relation of dating belongs essentially to the at-the-time, now, and then, can the date be indefinite, hazy, and uncertain. The date itself does not need to be calendrical in the narrower sense. The calendar date is only one particular mode of everyday dating. The indefiniteness of the date does not imply a shortcoming in datability as essential structure of the now, at-the-time, and then. These must belong to it in order for it to be able to be indefinite as a date. We say, for example, "at the time when the French were in Germany," and we speak of the "French time." The dating can be calendrically indeterminate but it is nevertheless determined by a particular historical happening or some other event. No matter how broad, certain, and unequivocal the dating may be of a "now when," an "at-the-time when," and a "then when," the structural moment of datability belongs to the essential constitution of

the now, at-the-time, and then. The "now when," "at-the-time when," and "then when" are related essentially to an entity that gives a date to the datable. The time that is commonly conceived as a sequence of nows must be taken as this dating relation. This relation should not be overlooked and suppressed. Nevertheless, the common conception of time as a sequence of nows is just as little aware of the moment of pre-calendrical datability as of that of significance. The common conception thinks of the nows as free-floating, relationless, intrinsically patched on to one another and intrinsically successive. In contrast to this we have to see that every now, every at-the-time, and every then is datable by its very structure, always already related to something, and in its expression is more or less definitely dated from something. The fact that the essential dating relation of the now, the no-longer-now, and the not-yet-now was overlooked in the traditional theories of time is further evidence of how far precisely what is taken for granted as self-evident lies from the concept. For what is more a matter of course than that by the now we mean "now, when this or that exists or is happening"? Why could time-structures as elemental as those of significance and datability remain hidden from the traditional time concept? Why did it overlook them and why did it have to overlook them? We shall learn how to understand this from the structure of temporality itself.

In expecting, the Dasein says "then," in enpresenting "now," in retaining "at-the-time." Each then is uttered as a not-yet in the understanding of a now, in an enpresenting. In the expectant expression of the then a "till then" is always understood from the standpoint of a now. In each then the understanding of a now-till-then is tacitly but conjointly involved. The stretch from now till then is articulated by means of the then itself. The relation "from now till then" is not first established as supplementary between a now and a then but is already present in the expectant enpresenting expressed in the then. It lies just as much in the now as in the not-yet and then, which is related to a now. When I say "then" as starting from a "now," I always already mean a definite *meanwhile* until then. What we call *duration*, the *during*, the *enduring* of time, lies in this meanwhile. Once again the structure of datability that has just been exhibited belongs to this determination as to a time character: meanwhile, that is, "while this or that is happening." This meanwhile can itself be more exactly determined and divided again by particular "from then to thens" which articulate the meanwhile. Lasting or enduring is especially accessible in the articulated meanwhile or during. What becomes accessible is that what is meant by the "from now till then," time, stretches out. We call what is thus articulated in these characters of the meanwhile, the during, and the till-then, the *spannedness* of time. By the meanwhile and the during we mean a span of time.

This is the feature that Aristotle rightly assigns to the now when he says that it has a certain transitionary character. Time is intrinsically spanned and stretched. Every now, then, and at-the-time not only has, each, a date but is spanned and stretched within itself: "now, during the lecture," "now, during the recess." No now and no time-moment can be punctualized. Every time-moment is spanned intrinsically, the span's breadth being variable. It varies, among other things, with what in each case dates the now.

But significance, datability, and spannedness (stretchedness) do not comprise the full structure of the now, at-the-time, and then. The final character of time in the sense of calculated and expressed time we call the *publicness* of time. Whether publicly announced or not, the now is expressed. When we say "now" we mean "now, when this thing or event is happening." The dated now has a certain stretchedness. As we express the dated and spanned now *in our being with one another* each one of us understands the others. When any one of us says "now," we all understand this now, even though each of us perhaps dates this now by starting from a different thing or event: "now, when the professor is speaking," "now, when the students are writing," or "now, in the morning," "now, toward the end of the semester." To understand the expressed now as a now we do not at all have to agree in our dating of it. The expressed now is intelligible to everyone in our being with one another. Although each one of us utters his own now, it is nevertheless the now for everyone. The accessibility of the now for everyone, without prejudice to the diverse datings, characterizes time as public. The now is accessible to everyone and thus belongs to no one. On account of this character of time a peculiar objectivity is assigned to it. The now belongs neither to me nor to anyone else, but it is somehow there. There is time, time is given, it is extant, without our being able to say how and where it is.

We also lose time, just as immediately as we constantly take time for ourselves. We leave time for ourselves with something, and in fact in such a way that while we do so the time is not there. As we lose time, we give it away. But losing time is a particularly carefree leaving time for oneself, one way in which we have time in the oblivious passing of our lives.

We have pointed to a series of characters of the time that Aristotle has in view when he defines it as counted. The time that we take for ourselves and that we express in the now, then, and at-the-time has the structural moments of significance, datability, stretchedness, and publicness. The time with which we reckon, in the broader sense of reckoning, is datable, spanned, public, and has the character of significance, belonging to the world itself. But how do these structural moments belong essentially to time? How are these structures themselves possible?

γ) Expressed time and its origination in existential temporality. The ecstatic and horizontal character of temporality

It is only if we keep in view the full structure of the now-sequence in these aspects that we can inquire concretely: Where does that time originate which we know first of all and which we know solely? Can these structural moments of time, and thus time itself just as it expresses itself, be understood by means of what is expressed in the now, then, and at-the-time, by means of enpresenting, expecting, and retaining? When we are expecting any particular happening, we comport ourselves in our Dasein always in some particular way toward our own most peculiar ability to be. Even if what we are expecting may be some event, some occurrence, still our own Dasein is always conjointly expected in the expecting of the occurrence itself. The Dasein understands itself by way of its own most peculiar capacity to be, of which it is expectant. In thus comporting toward its own most peculiar capacity to be, it is ahead of itself. Expecting a possibility, I come from this possibility toward that which I myself am. The Dasein, expecting its ability to be, comes toward itself. In this coming-toward-itself, expectant of a possibility, the Dasein is *futural* in an original sense. This coming-toward-oneself from one's most peculiar possibility, a coming-toward which is implicit in the Dasein's existence and of which all expecting is a specific mode, is the *primary concept of the future*. This existential concept of the future is the presupposition for the common concept of the future in the sense of the not-yet-now.

Retaining or forgetting something, the Dasein always comports itself somehow toward what it itself already has been. It is only—as it always factually is—in such a way that it *has in each instance already been* the being that it is. In comporting ourselves toward an entity as bygone, we retain it in a certain way or we forget it. In retaining and forgetting, the Dasein is itself concomitantly retained. It concomitantly retains its own self in *what it already has been*. That which the Dasein has already been in each instance, its [past as] *having-been-ness* [*Gewesenheit*] belongs concomitantly to its future. This having-been-ness, understood primarily, precisely does not mean that the Dasein no longer in fact is; just the contrary, the Dasein is precisely in fact what it *was*. That which we *are* as having been has not gone by, passed away, in the sense in which we say that we could shuffle off our past like a garment. The Dasein can as little get rid of its [past as] bygoneness as escape its death. In every sense and in every case everything we have been is an essential determination of our existence. Even if in some way, by some manipulations, I may be able to keep my bygoneness far from myself, nevertheless, forgetting, repressing, suppressing are modes in

which I myself am my own having-been-ness. The Dasein, in being necessarily always has been. It can be as having been only as long as it exists. And it is precisely when the Dasein no longer is, that it also no longer has been. It has been only so long as it is. This entails that [pastness in the sense of] having-been-ness belongs to the Dasein's existence. From the viewpoint of the moment of the future, as previously characterized, this means that since the Dasein always comports itself more or less explicitly toward a specific capacity-to-be of its own self, since the Dasein always comes-toward-itself from out of a possibility of itself, it therewith also always comes-back-to what it has been. Having-been-ness, the past in the existential sense, belongs with equal originality to the future in the original (existential) sense. In one with the future and the present, [the past as] having-been-ness first makes existence possible.

The present in the existential sense is not the same as presence or as extantness. The Dasein, in existing, is always dwelling with extant beings, beings that are at hand. It has such beings in its present. Only as enpresenting is the Dasein futural and past [as having-been] in the particular sense. As expecting a possibility the Dasein is always in such a way that it comports itself enpresentingly toward something at hand and keeps this extant entity as something present in its, the Dasein's, own present. Attendant upon this is the fact that we are most frequently lost in this present and it appears as though future and past as bygoneness or, more precisely, the past as having-been-ness, were blacked out, as though the Dasein were at every moment always leaping into the present. This is an illusion that in its turn has its own causes and requires an explanation which, however, we shall forgo in this context. What alone is important here is to see more or less that we are talking about future, past [having-been-ness] and present in a more original (existential) sense and are employing these three determinations in a signification that lies in advance of common time. The original unity of the future, past, and present which we have portrayed is the phenomenon of original time, which we call temporality. Temporality temporalizes itself in the ever current unity of future, past [having-been-ness], and present. What we denominate in this way must be distinguished from then, at-the-time, and now. The latter time-determinations are what they are only by originating in temporality, as temporality expresses itself. Expecting, the future, retaining, the past, and enpresenting, the present—all of these express themselves by means of the now, then, and at-the-time. In expressing itself, temporality temporalizes the only time that the common understanding of time is aware of.

The essence of the future lies in coming-toward-oneself; that of the past [having-been-ness] lies in going-back-to; and that of the present in staying-with, dwelling-with, that is, being-with. These characters of the toward, back-

to, with reveal the basic constitution of temporality. As determined by this toward, back-to, and with, temporality is *outside itself*. Time is carried away within itself as future, past, and present. As future, the Dasein is *carried away* to its past [has-been] capacity-to-be; as past [having-been], it is *carried away* to its having-been-ness; and as enpresenting, it is *carried away* to some other being or beings. Temporality as unity of future, past, and present does not carry the Dasein away just at times and occasionally; instead, as temporality, it is itself *the original outside-itself*, the *ekstatikon*. For this character of carrying-away we employ the expression the *ecstatic character* of time. Time is not carried away merely on occasion in a supplementary and accidental way; rather, future is carried away intrinsically as toward—it is *ecstatic*. The same holds for past and present. We therefore call future, past, and present the three *ecstases* of temporality; they belong together intrinsically with co-equal originality.

It is important to see this ecstatic character of time in more precise detail. This interconnection can be brought to view in the concrete conscious realization of all sorts of phenomena, but only if the guiding clue is available. The term "ecstatic" has nothing to do with ecstatic states of mind and the like. The common Greek expression *ekstatikon* means stepping-outside-self. It is affiliated with the term "existence." It is with this ecstatic character that we interpret existence, which, viewed ontologically, is the original unity of being-outside-self that comes-toward-self, comes-back-to-self, and enpresents. In its ecstatic character, temporality is the condition of the constitution of the Dasein's being.

Within itself, original time is outside itself; that is the nature of its temporalizing. It is this outside-itself itself. That is to say, it is not something that might first be extant as a thing and thereafter outside itself, so that it would be leaving itself behind itself. Instead, within its own self, intrinsically, it is nothing but the outside-itself pure and simple. As this ecstatic character is distinctive of temporality, each *ecstasis*, which temporalizes only in temporalizing unity with the others, contains within its own nature a *carrying-away toward something* in a formal sense. Every such remotion is intrinsically *open*. A peculiar *openness*, which is given with the outside-itself, belongs to *ecstasis*. That toward which each *ecstasis* is intrinsically open in a specific way we call the *horizon of the ecstasy*. The horizon is the *open expanse* toward which remotion as such is outside itself. *The carrying-off opens up this horizon and keeps it open*. As ecstatic unity of future, past, and present, temporality has a horizon determined by the *ecstases*. Temporality, as the original unity of future, past, and present, is *ecstatically-horizonal* intrinsically. "Horizonal" means "characterized by a horizon given with the *ecstasis* itself." Ecstatic-horizonal temporality makes ontologically possible not only the constitution of the Dasein's being, but also the

temporalizing of the only time of which the common understanding of time is aware and which we designate generally as the irreversible sequence of nows.

We shall not now enter into further detail regarding the connection between the phenomenon of *intentionality* and that of *ecstatic-horizonal temporality*. Intentionality—being directed toward something and the intimate connection of *intentio* and *intentum* present in it—which is commonly spoken of in phenomenology as the ultimate primal phenomenon, has the condition of its possibility in temporality and temporality's *ecstatic horizonal character*. The *Dasein* is intentional only because it is determined essentially by temporality. The *Dasein*'s essential determination by which it intrinsically *transcends* is likewise connected with the *ecstatic-horizonal character*. How these two characters, intentionality and transcendence, are interconnected with temporality will become apparent to us. At the same time we shall understand how ontology, by making being its theme, is a transcendental science. But first, since we did not expressly interpret temporality by way of the *Dasein*, we must make the phenomenon more familiar to ourselves.

δ) The derivation of the structural moments of now-time from ecstatic-horizonal temporality. The mode of being of falling as the reason for the covering up of original time

The conception of time as a now-sequence is not aware of the derivation of this time from original time and overlooks all the essential features belonging to the now-sequence as such. As commonly understood, time is intrinsically a free-floating sequence of nows. It is simply there; its givenness must be acknowledged. Now that we have characterized temporality in a rough way, the question arises whether we can let the now-sequence arise out of original temporality, with explicit reference to the essential structures—significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness. If time temporalizes itself as a now-sequence from out of the original temporality, then *these structures must become ontologically intelligible by way of the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality*. What is more, if the temporality in which time temporalizes itself as now-sequence constitutes the *Dasein*'s ontological constitution, and if the factual *Dasein* experiences and knows time first and primarily only as it is commonly understood, then we should also be able to explain by recourse to the *Dasein*'s temporality *why* factual *Dasein* knows time primarily only as now-sequence and, further, *why* the common understanding of time either overlooks or does not suitably understand time's essential structural moments of significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness. If it is possible—if indeed it is even necessary—to show that what is commonly known as time springs from what we have characterized as temporality, then this justifies calling that from which

common time derives by the name of original time. For the question could then be asked why we still designate the unity of future, past, and present in this original sense as time. Is it not something different? This question is answered in the negative as soon as it is seen that the now, the then, and the at-the-time are nothing but temporality expressing itself. It is only for this reason that the now is a *time* character and that the then and the at-the-time are temporal.

The question now is, How does time in the common sense root in temporality itself—how does time in the common sense derive from temporality or, more precisely, how does temporality itself temporalize the only time that the common understanding knows? Every now is by its nature a now-when. Because of this relation of datability, it is related to some being by reference to which it has its date. This character of being a now-when-this-or-that, the relation of datability, is possible only because the now is ecstatically open as a time-determination, having its source in temporality. The now belongs to a particular ecstasis, the present in the sense of the enpresenting of something. In the enpresenting of a being the enpresenting, intrinsically, is related ecstatically to something. In expressing itself as ecstatically related, saying "now" in this self-expression and meaning by the now the present, this ecstatic-horizonal—and thus intrinsically ecstatic—now is *related to . . .*; each now, qua now, is "now, when this or that." The enpresenting of a being lets that being be encountered in such a way that when, expressing itself, the enpresenting says "now," this now, because of the ecstatic character of enpresenting, must have the present-character "now, when this or that." Correspondingly, every at-the-time is an at-the-time-when and every then is a then-when. If I say "now" and express it in an enpresenting and as this enpresenting, then, because of the enpresenting of something, I encounter some being as that by reference to which the expressed now dates itself. Because we enunciate the now in each case in and from an enpresenting of some being, the now that is thus voiced is itself structurally enpresenting. It has the relation of datability, the factual dating always differing in point of content. The now and every other time-determination has its dating relation from the ecstatic character of temporality itself. The fact that the now is always a "now when this or that," every at-the-time an "at-the-time when," and every then a "then when" merely shows that time as temporality—as enpresenting, retaining, and expecting—already lets beings be encountered as uncovered. In other words, time in the common sense, the now as seen via this dating relation, is only the index of original temporality.

Every now and every time-determination is *spanned* within itself, has a range that varies and does not first grow by means of a summation of individual nows as dimensionless points. The now does not acquire a breadth and range by my collecting together a number of nows, but just the

reverse: each now already has this spannedness within itself in a primary way. Even if I were to reduce the now to a millionth of a second it would still have a breadth, because it already has it by its very nature and neither gains it by a summation nor loses it by a diminution. The now and every time-determination has a spannedness intrinsically. And this, too, has its basis in the fact that the now is nothing but the "expression," the "speaking out," of original temporality itself in its ecstatic character. Spannedness is spoken concomitantly in every spoken now, because by means of the now and the other time-determinations an enpresenting expresses itself which temporalizes itself in ecstatic unity with expecting and retaining. A stretchedness which enters into expressed time is already originally present in the ecstatic character of temporality. Since every expecting has the character of coming-toward-self and every retaining the character of back-to, even if in the mode of forgetting, and every coming-toward-self is intrinsically a back-to, temporality qua ecstatic is *stretched out within its own self*. As the primary outside-itself, temporality is stretch itself. Stretch does not first result from the fact that I shove the moments of time together but just the reverse: the character of the continuity and spannedness of time in the common sense has its origin in the original stretch of temporality itself as ecstatic.

The now and every other expressed time-determination is *publicly accessible* to the understanding of each Dasein in the Daseins' being-with-one-another. This factor of the publicness of time is also rooted in the ecstatic-horizonal character of temporality. Because temporality is intrinsically the outside-itself, it is as such already intrinsically disclosed and open for itself along the directions of its three ecstases. Therefore each uttered, each expressed, now is immediately known as such to everyone. The now is not the sort of thing that only one or another of us could somehow find out; it is not something about which one of us might perhaps know but another might not; rather, in the Daseins' being-with-one-another itself, in their communal being-in-the-world, there is already present the unity of temporality itself as open for itself.

Because of its character of significance, we called the time of everyday time-understanding *world-time*. We had already indicated earlier that the Dasein's basic constitution is being-in-the-world and in fact being there in such a way that the existent Dasein is occupied in its existence with this being, which means at the same time that it is occupied with its ability-to-be-in-the-world. The Dasein is occupied with its own most peculiar ability to be or, as we also say, the Dasein in each instance uses itself primarily for its own self. If it expresses itself as enpresenting in the now, expecting in the then, and retaining in the at-the-time—if temporality expresses itself in these time-determinations, then expressed time here is simultaneously that for which the Dasein uses itself, for the sake of which the Dasein itself is. In

temporality's self-expression the expressed time is to be understood in the character of the for-the-sake-of and the in-order-to. Expressed time has in itself the character of world—which can also be confirmed by means of still other, more difficult connections into which we shall not at present enter. If the Dasein uses itself for itself, and the Dasein's temporality expresses itself in the now, then expressed time is always something with which the Dasein is itself occupied. Time is always time as the right time or the wrong time.

We can see from the elucidation of the structural moments of significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness that and how the basic determinations of time in the common sense arise from the ecstatic-horizonal unity of expecting, retaining, and enpresenting. What we are commonly familiar with as time originates with respect to its time character from ecstatic-horizonal temporality; therefore, that from which the derivative time stems must be called time in a primary sense: the time that temporalizes itself and, as such, temporalizes world-time. If original time qua temporality makes possible the Dasein's ontological constitution, and this being, the Dasein, is in such a way that it temporalizes itself, then this being with the mode of being of existent Dasein must be called originally and fitly the *temporal entity simply as such*. It now becomes clear why we do not call a being like a stone temporal, even though it moves or is at rest in time. Its being is not determined by temporality. The Dasein, however, is not merely and not primarily intratemporal, occurring and extant in a world, but is intrinsically temporal in an original, fundamental way. Nevertheless, the Dasein is also in a certain way in time, for we can view it in a certain respect as an extant entity.

Now that we have derived the characters of common time from original temporality and have thus demonstrated why we designate the origin as time with a greater legitimacy than that which originates from it, we must ask the following questions. How does it happen that the common understanding of time knows time only as an irreversible sequence of nows; that the essential characters of that sequence—significance and datability—remain concealed from it; and that the structural moments of spannedness and publicness remain ultimately unintelligible to it; so that it conceives of time as a manifold of naked nows which have no further structure but are always merely nows, one following the other from future into past in an infinite succession? The covering up of the specific structural moments of world-time, the covering up of their origination in temporality, and the covering up of temporality itself—all have their ground in that mode of being of the Dasein which we call *falling*. Without going into further detail regarding this phenomenon, we may portray it in terms of what we have already touched on several times. We have seen that the Dasein is always primarily oriented toward beings as extant things, so that it also determines

its own being by means of the mode of being of the extant. It also calls the ego, the subject, a res, a substantia, a subjectum. What appears here in a theoretical field of developed ontology is a general determination of the Dasein itself, namely, that it has the tendency to understand itself primarily by way of things and to derive the concept of being from the extant. For common experience what happens is that beings are encountered in time. Aristotle says that time is *kineseos ti*, something *connected with motion*. But this means that time is in a certain way. If the common understanding of time is aware of being only in the sense of extant being, being at hand, then time, being publicly accessible *along with motion*, must necessarily be something extant. As the Dasein encounters time, time gets interpreted also as something somehow extant, particularly if it reveals itself as being in a certain connection precisely with extant nature. In some way or other time is *concomitantly extant*, whether in the objects or in the subject or everywhere. The time that is known as the now and as a manifold and succession of nows is an *extant sequence*. The nows appear to be intratemporal. They come and go like beings; like extant entities they perish, becoming no longer extant. The common experience of beings has at its disposal no other horizon for understanding being than that of extantness, being at hand. Matters like significance and datability remain a closed book for this way of understanding being. Time becomes the intrinsically free-floating runoff of a sequence of nows. For the common conception of time this process is extant, just as space is. Starting from this view, it arrives at the opinion that time is infinite, endless, whereas by its very nature temporality is finite. Since the common vision of time is directed solely toward the extant and the non-extant in the sense of the not-yet-extant and the no-longer-extant, the nows in their succession remain the sole thing that is relevant for it. Implicit in the Dasein's own mode of being is that it knows the sequence of nows only in this naked form of the nows of sequential juxtaposition. Only on this presupposition, too, is Aristotle's manner of inquiry possible when he asks whether time is something that is or whether it is a nonexistent and discusses this question with reference to past and future in the common sense of being-no-longer and being-not-yet. In this question about the being of time, Aristotle understands being in the sense of extantness. If you take being in this sense, then you have to say that the now which is no longer extant in the sense of the bygone now and the now which is not yet extant in the sense of the now yet to come, are not—that is, are not extant. Seen in this way, what is in time is only the now that is extant in each now. Aristotle's aporia with reference to the being of time—which is still the principal difficulty today—derives from the concept of being as equal to being extant.

It is from the same direction of thought in the common understanding of time that the universally familiar thesis that time is infinite originates. Each now has a transitional character; each now is by its essential nature not-yet and no-longer. In whatever now I may wish to stop, I stand in a not-yet or a no-longer. Each now at which I wished to posit an end, purely in thought, would be misunderstood as now if I wished to cut it off either on the side of the past or on that of the future, because it points beyond itself. If the nature of time is understood in this way, it follows that time must then be conceived as an endless sequence of nows. This endlessness is inferred purely deductively from the isolated concept of the now. And also, the inference to the endlessness of time, which has a legitimate sense within certain limits, is possible only if the now is taken in the sense of the clipped sequence of nows. It can be made clear—as was shown in *Being and Time*—that the endlessness of common time can enter the Dasein's mind only because temporality itself, intrinsically, forgets its own essential finitude. Only because temporality in the authentic sense is finite is inauthentic time in the sense of common time infinite. The infinity of time is not a positive feature of time but a privation which characterizes a negative character of temporality. It is not possible to go into further detail here on the finitude of time, because it is connected with the difficult problem of death, and this is not the place to analyze death in that connection.

We have stressed that the common understanding of time is not expressly aware of the characters of the now, significance, datability, spannedness, and publicness. We must however qualify this statement at least to some degree, since the Aristotelian interpretation of time already shows that, even if time is taken merely as the time we reckon with, certain characters of time come to view. But they cannot be made an explicit problem as long as the common conception of time represents the sole guide to the interpretation of time. Aristotle assigns transitional character to the now; he defines the time in which we encounter beings as a number that embraces (holds-around) beings; time as counted is referred to a reckoning with it, in which it is unveiled. The determinations of transition, holding-around, and unveiledness are the nearest characters in which time manifests itself as a sequence of nows. Looked at more closely, they point back to the moments we have come to know in a different connection.

The transitional character belongs to each now because temporality, as ecstatic unity, is stretched out within itself. The ecstatic connection of coming-toward-itself (expecting), in which the Dasein at the same time comes back to itself (retains itself), for the first time provides, in unity with an enpresenting, the condition of the possibility that expressed time, the now, is dimensionally future and past, that each now stretches itself out as

such, within itself, with respect to the not-yet and the no-longer. The transitional character of each now is nothing but what we described as the spannedness of time.

That time should hold-around beings, contain them, in such a way that we recognize what it holds as intratemporal, is possible and necessary because of the character of time as world-time. Due to its ecstatic character temporality is, as it were, further outside than any possible object which the Dasein can encounter as temporal. Because of this, any being that the Dasein encounters is already embraced by time from the very outset.

Similarly, the essential countedness of time is rooted in the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality. Time's character as container and as world-time, as well as its essential unveiledness, will emerge still more clearly in what follows.

It should suffice that we now have an approximate view of time as sequence of nows with respect to its derivation from temporality; we can thus recognize that the essential structure of temporality is the self-enclosed ecstatic-horizonal unity of future, past, and present in the sense explained. *Temporality [Zeitlichkeit]* is the condition of the possibility of the constitution of the Dasein's being. However, to this constitution there belongs understanding of being, for the Dasein, as existent, comports itself toward beings which are not Daseins and beings which are. Accordingly, *temporality must also be the condition of possibility of the understanding of being that belongs to the Dasein.* How does temporality make such understanding of being possible? How is time as temporality the horizon for the explicit understanding of being as such, if being is supposed to be the theme of the science of ontology, or scientific philosophy? In its role as condition of possibility of the understanding of being, both pre-ontological and ontological, we shall call temporality *Temporality [Temporalität]*.

§20. *temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and Temporality [Temporalität]*

What has to be shown is this: temporality is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of being; *being is understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time.* When temporality functions as such a condition we call it Temporality. The understanding of being, the development of this understanding in ontology, and scientific philosophy are to be exhibited in their Temporal possibility. What exactly is the meaning of this "understanding of being" into whose Temporal possibility we are inquiring? By the discussion of the four theses we have shown in different ways that and how something like an understanding of being belongs to the existent Dasein. We now stand before or, better, in the fact that we understand being but nevertheless do not conceptually comprehend it.

a) Understanding as a basic determination of
being-in-the-world

What is the difference between understanding and conceptual comprehension? What do "to understand" and "understanding" mean at all [as act and as achievement]? It might be said that understanding [as achievement, *Verständnis*] is a type of cognition and, correspondingly, understanding [as act, *Verstehen*] is a specific type of cognitive comportment. Following Dilthey's precedent, the tendency today is to contrast understanding as a specific kind of knowing with a different kind of knowing, namely, explaining. We shall not enter into this discussion of the relationship between explanation and understanding, avoiding it above all because these discussions suffer from a fundamental defect that makes them unfruitful. The defect is that there is lacking an adequate interpretation of what we understand in general by cognition, of which explanation and understanding are supposed to be "kinds." A whole typology of kinds of cognition can be enumerated and ordinary common sense can be impressed by this, but philosophically it is meaningless as long as it remains unclear what sort of knowing this understanding is supposed to be in distinction from the type of cognition represented by explanation. In whatever way we conceive of knowing, it is, qua that which embraces knowing and understanding in the ordinary conception of it, a *comportment toward beings*—if for the while we can disregard philosophical cognition as a relationship to being. But all practical-technical commerce with beings is also a comportment toward beings. And an understanding of being is also present in practical-technical comportment toward beings so far as we have at all to do with beings as beings. In all comportment toward beings—whether it is specifically cognitive, which is most frequently called theoretical, or whether it is practical-technical—an understanding of being is already involved. For a being can be encountered by us as a being only in the light of the understanding of being. If, however, an understanding of being always already lies at the basis of all comportment of the *Dasein* toward beings, whether nature or history, whether theoretical, or practical, then plainly I cannot adequately define the concept of understanding if, in trying to make the definition, I look solely to specific types of cognitive comportment toward beings. Thus what is required is to find a sufficiently original concept of understanding from which alone not only all modes of cognition but every type of comportment that relates to beings by inspection and circumspection can be conceived in a fundamental way.

If there is present an [act of] *understanding* in the [achieved] *understanding* of being and this understanding of being is constitutive for the ontological constitution of the *Dasein*, it follows that the [act of] *understanding* is an

original *determination of the Dasein's existence*, regardless of whether the Dasein pursues science in the manner of explanation or of understanding. And what is more, in the end understanding is not at all primarily a cognition but—since existence is indeed more than mere cognition in the usual spectator sense of knowledge and such knowledge presupposes existence—a basic determination of existence itself. This, in fact, is how we have to take the concept of understanding.

Let us try to delineate this concept without as yet making explicit reference to the understanding involved in the understanding of being. How does understanding belong to the Dasein's existence as such, apart from whether the Dasein does or does not practise psychology or history as understanding? To exist is essentially, even if not only, to understand. We made some remarks earlier about the essential structure of existence. To the Dasein's existence there belongs being-in-the-world, and in fact in such a way that this being-in-the-world is occupied *with this being itself*. It is occupied *with this being*; this entity, the Dasein, has its own being in a certain way under control, as it comports itself in this or that way toward its capacity to be, as it has already decided in this or that way for or against it. "The Dasein is occupied with its own being" means more precisely: it is occupied with its own *ability to be*. As existent, the Dasein is free for specific possibilities of its own self. It is its own most peculiar able-to-be. These possibilities of itself are not empty logical possibilities lying outside itself, in which it can engage or from which it could keep aloof; instead they are, as such, determinations of existence. If the Dasein is free for definite possibilities of itself, for its ability to be, then the Dasein is in this *being-free-for*; it is these possibilities themselves. They are only as possibilities of the existent Dasein in whatever way the Dasein may comport toward them. The possibility is in every instance that of one's own most peculiar being. It is the possibility it is only if the Dasein becomes existent in it. To be one's own most peculiar ability to be, to take it over and keep oneself in the possibility, to understand oneself in one's own factual freedom, that is, *to understand oneself in the being of one's own most peculiar ability-to-be, is the original existential concept of understanding*. In German we say that someone can *vorstehen* something—literally, stand in front of or ahead of it, that is, stand at its head, administer, manage, preside over it. This is equivalent to saying that he *verstehet sich darauf*, understands in the sense of being skilled or expert at it [has the know-how of it]. The meaning of the term "understanding" [Verstehen] as defined above is intended to go back to this usage in ordinary language. If understanding is a basic determination of existence, it is as such the condition of possibility for all of the Dasein's particular possible manners of comportment. It is the condition of possibility for all kinds of comportment, not only practical but also cognitive. The explanatory and understanding sciences—if this classification is admitted as being

at all legitimate—are possible only because the Dasein, as existent, is itself an intrinsically understanding entity.

We shall now attempt to clarify the structure of the understanding that is constitutive of existence. To understand means, more precisely, *to project oneself upon a possibility*, in this *projection* to keep oneself at all times in a possibility. A can-be, a possibility as possibility, is *there* only in projection, in projecting oneself upon that can-be. If in contrast I merely reflect on some empty possibility into which I could enter and, as it were, just gab about it, then this possibility is not there, precisely as possibility; instead for me it is, as we might say, actual. The character of possibility *becomes* manifest and is manifest only in projection, so long as the possibility is held fast in the projection. The phenomenon of projection contains two things. First, that *upon which* the Dasein projects itself is a can-be of its own self. The can-be is unveiled primarily in and through the projection, but in such a way that the possibility upon which the Dasein projects itself is not itself apprehended objectively. Secondly, this projection *upon* something is always a projecting of. . . . If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility, it is projecting itself in the sense that it is unveiling itself as this can-be, in this specific being. If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility and understands itself in that possibility, this understanding, this becoming manifest of the self, is not a self-contemplation in the sense that the ego would become the object of some cognition or other; rather, the projection is the way in which I *am* the possibility; it is the way in which I exist freely. The essential core of understanding as projection is the Dasein's understanding itself existentially in it.* Since projection unveils without making what is unveiled as such into an object of contemplation, there is present in all understanding an *insight* of the Dasein into itself. However, this insight is not a free-floating knowledge about itself. The knowledge of insight has genuine truth-character, adequately unveiling the existence of the Dasein which is supposed to be unveiled by it, only if it has the primary character of self-understanding. Understanding as the Dasein's self-projection is the Dasein's fundamental mode of *happening*. As we may also say, it is the authentic meaning of action. It is by understanding that the Dasein's happening is characterized—its *historicality*. Understanding is not a mode of cognition but the

*The term "existentiell"—the standard translation in *Being and Time* for existenziell—is defined by Heidegger in the following way: "Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call 'existentiell.'" Trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, *Being and Time*, "The Ontical Priority of the Question of Being," p. 33 (*Sein und Zeit*, p. 12). In short, the existentiell is what happens or is given in and by existing. It is to the existential as the ontical is to the ontological.

basic determination of existing. We also call it existentiell understanding because in it existence, as the Dasein's happening in its history, temporalizes itself. The Dasein becomes what it is in and through this understanding; and it is always only that which it has chosen itself to be, that which it understands itself to be in the projection of its own most peculiar ability-to-be.

This must suffice as a sketch of the concept of understanding in its constitutive character for the Dasein's existence. The following task now arises: (1) *by starting from temporality, to elucidate this understanding, in its possibility, so far as it constitutes existence, and at the same time (2) to set it off from the understanding which we describe in the narrower sense as the understanding-of-being in general.* The Dasein projects upon its possibilities the understanding belonging to existence. Because the Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world, projection unveils in every instance a possibility of being-in-the-world. In its function of unveiling, understanding is not related to an isolated punctual ego but to factually existent being-able-to-be-in-the-world. This entails that along with understanding there is always already projected a *particular possible being with the others* and a *particular possible being toward intraworldly beings*. Because being-in-the-world belongs to the basic constitution of the Dasein, the existent Dasein is essentially *being-with others as being-among intraworldly beings*. As being-in-the-world it is never first merely being among things extant within the world, then subsequently to uncover other human beings as also being among them. Instead, as being-in-the-world it is being-with others, apart from whether and how others are factually there with it themselves. On the other hand, however, the Dasein is also not first merely being-with others, only then later to run up against intraworldly things in its being-with others; instead, being-with others means being-with other being-in-the-world—being-with-in-the-world. It is wrong to oppose to objects an isolated ego-subject, without seeing in the Dasein the basic constitution of being-in-the-world; but it is equally wrong to suppose that the problem is seen in principle and progress made toward answering it if the solipsism of the isolated ego is replaced by a solipsism en deux in the I-thou relationship. As a relationship between Dasein and Dasein this has its possibility only on the basis of being-in-the-world. Put otherwise, being-in-the-world is with equal originality both being-with and being-among. Quite different from this is the problem as to how at each time the correlative Dasein of the thou is relevant for each of the individual, factually ontical-existentiell possibilities of the individual Dasein. But these are questions of concrete anthropology.¹

1. As to what the a priori of this presupposition is, cf. *Sein und Zeit*, div. 1, chap. 4. ["Being-in-the-world as being-with and being-one's-self. The 'They.'"]

In self-understanding there is understood the being-in-the-world with which specific possibilities of being-with others and of dealing with intraworldly beings are traced out. In self-understanding as being-able-to-be-in-the-world, *world* is understood with equal originality. Because by its concept understanding is free self-understanding by way of an apprehended possibility of one's own factual being-in-the-world, it has the intrinsic possibility of shifting in various directions. This means that the factual Dasein can understand itself primarily via intraworldly beings which it encounters. It can let its existence be determined primarily not by itself but by things and circumstances and by the others. It is the understanding that we call *inauthentic understanding*, which we described earlier and which now becomes clarified by the fundamental concept of understanding. "Inauthentic" does not mean here that it is not an actual understanding; it denotes an understanding in which the existent Dasein does not understand itself primarily by that apprehended possibility of itself which is most peculiarly its own. Or again, projection can be accomplished primarily from the freedom of our own most peculiar Dasein and back into it, as authentic understanding. These free possibilities involved in understanding itself are not to be pursued here any further.

b) Existentiell understanding, understanding of being, projection of being

We may keep in mind, then, that understanding, as the projection which has been portrayed, is a basic determination of the Dasein's existence. It relates to the Dasein itself, hence to a being, and is therefore an ontical understanding. Because it is related to existence, we call it existentiell understanding. But since in this existentiell understanding the Dasein, as a being, is projected upon its ability-to-be, being in the sense of existence is understood in it. An understanding of the being of existence in general is enclosed in every existentiell understanding. Now the Dasein is being-in-the-world and, in equal originality with its facticity, a *world is disclosed and other Daseins are disclosed with it and intraworldly beings are encountered*; consequently, *the Dasein understands, in equal originality with its understanding of existence, the existence of other Daseins and the being of intraworldly beings*. At first, however, the understanding of the being of the Dasein and of things extant is not divided and articulated into specific modes of being and it is not comprehended as such. *Existence, being extant or at hand, being handy, being the fellow-Dasein of others*—these are not conceptually comprehended each in its own sense of being, but instead they are understood indifferently in an understanding of being that makes possible and guides both the experience of nature and the self-apprehension of the history of being-

with-one-another. In existentiell understanding, in which factual being-in-the-world becomes visible and transparent, there is always already present an understanding of being which relates not only to the Dasein itself but also to all beings which are unveiled fundamentally with being-in-the-world. *In it there is present an understanding which, as projection, not only understands beings by way of being but, since being itself is understood, has also in some way projected being as such.*

In our analysis of the structure of ontical understanding we came across a stratification of projections present in it itself and making it possible. The projections are, as it were, inserted in front of one another. "Stratification" is admittedly a tricky image. We shall see that there can be no talk of unilinear interlacing stratification of projections in which one determines the others. In *existentiell understanding* one's own Dasein is first experienced as something that is, a being, and in that process being is understood. If we say that being is understood in the existentiell understanding of the Dasein and if we note that understanding is a projecting, then in the *understanding of being* there is present a further projection: being is understood only as, on its own part, it is *projected upon something*. What it is projected upon remains at first obscure. It can then be said that this projection, the *understanding of being* in experiencing beings, is on its own part, as understanding, projected upon something which at first is still in question. We understand a being only as we project it upon being. In the process, being itself must be understood in a certain way; being must in its turn be projected upon something. We shall not now touch on the question that arises here, whether this recursion from one projection to the next does not open up a progressus in infinitum. At present we are in search only of the *connection between the experiencing of a being, the understanding of being, and the projection upon . . . which in its turn is present in the understanding of being*. It is enough that we see the distinction between the existentiell understanding of Dasein as a being and the understanding of being, which qua understanding of being must itself, in conformity with its character as projection, project being upon something. At first we can understand only indirectly that upon which being, if and when it is understood, must be disclosed. But we may not flinch from it, so long as we take seriously the facticity of our own existence and our being-with other Dasein and see that and how we understand world, the intraworldly, existence, and co-existent Dasein in its being. If Dasein harbors the understanding of being within itself, and if temporality makes possible the Dasein in its ontological constitution, then *temporality* must also be the *condition of the possibility of the understanding of being* and hence of the *projection of being upon time*. The question is whether time is indeed that upon which being is itself projected—whether time is that by way of which we understand the like of being.

In order to ward off a fatal misunderstanding, we need a brief digression. Our aim is to give a fundamental clarification of the possibility of the understanding of being in general. With regard to the Dasein's comportment toward beings, our interpretation of the understanding of being in general has presented only a necessary but not a sufficient condition. For I can comport toward beings only if those beings can themselves be encountered in the brightness of the understanding of being. This is the necessary condition. In terms of fundamental ontology it can also be expressed by saying that all understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs to understanding itself.² To be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings, although they do not by themselves alone make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which gives its light to each mood, each passion, each affect. Being itself, if indeed we understand it, must somehow or other be projected upon something. This does not mean that in this projection being must be objectively apprehended or interpreted and defined, conceptually comprehended, as something objectively apprehended. Being is projected upon something from which it becomes understandable, but in an *unobjective* way. It is understood as yet pre-conceptually, without a logos; we therefore call it *the pre-ontological understanding of being*. Pre-ontological understanding of being is a kind of understanding of being. It coincides so little with the ontical experience of beings that ontical experience necessarily presupposes a pre-ontological understanding of being as an essential condition. The experience of beings does not have any explicit ontology as a constituent, but, on the other hand, the understanding of being in general in the pre-conceptual sense is certainly the condition of possibility that being should be objectified, thematized at all. It is in the objectification of being as such that the basic act constitutive of ontology as a science is performed. The essential feature in every science, philosophy included, is that it constitutes itself in the objectification of something already in some way unveiled, antecedently given. What is given can be a being that lies present before us, but it can also be being itself in the pre-ontological understanding of being. The way in which being is given is fundamentally different from the way beings are given, but both can certainly become objects. They can become objects, however, only if they are unveiled in some way *before* the objectification and *for* it. On the other hand, if something becomes an object, and in fact just as it offers itself in its own self, this objectification does not signify a subjective apprehension and re-interpretation of what is laid hold of as object. The basic act of objec-

2. Cf. *Sein und Zeit*, §29 ff.

tification, whether of being or of beings—and regardless of the fundamental diversity in the two cases—has the function of *explicitly* projecting what is antecedently given upon that on which it has *already* been projected in pre-scientific experience or understanding. If being is to become objectified—if the understanding of being is to be possible as a science in the sense of ontology—if there is to be philosophy at all, then that upon which the understanding of being, qua understanding, has already pre-conceptually projected being must become unveiled in an explicit projection.

We confront the task not only of going forth and back from a being to its being but, if we are inquiring into the condition of possibility of the understanding of being as such, of *inquiring even beyond being as to that upon which being itself, as being, is projected*. This seems to be a curious enterprise, to inquire beyond being; perhaps it has arisen from the fatal embarrassment that the problems have emanated from philosophy; it is apparently merely the despairing attempt of philosophy to assert itself as over against the so-called facts.

At the beginning of this course we stressed that the more fundamentally the simplest problems of philosophy are posed, without any of the vanities of the allegedly more advanced moderns and without the host of secondary questions arbitrarily snatched up by the mania for criticism, the more immediately will we stand by ourselves in direct communication with actual philosophizing. We have seen from various angles that the question about being in general is indeed no longer explicitly raised but that it everywhere demands to be raised. If we pose the question again, then we understand at the same time that philosophy has not made any further progress with its cardinal question than it had already in Plato and that in the end its innermost longing is not so much to get on further with it, which would be to move further away from itself, as rather *to come to itself*. In Hegel, philosophy—that is, ancient philosophy—is in a certain sense thought through to its end. He was completely in the right when he himself expressed this consciousness. But there exists just as much the legitimate demand to start anew, to understand the finiteness of the Hegelian system and to see that Hegel himself has come to an end with philosophy because he moves in the circle of philosophical problems. This circling in the circle forbids him to move back to the center of the circle and to revise it from the ground up. It is not necessary to seek another circle beyond the circle. Hegel saw everything that is possible. But the question is whether he saw it from the radical center of philosophy, whether he exhausted all the possibilities of the beginning so as to say that he is at the end. No extensive demonstration is needed to make clear how immediately, in our attempt to get beyond being to the light from which and in which it itself comes into the brightness of an understanding, we are moving within one of Plato's fundamental

problems. There is no occasion here to delineate the Platonic order of inquiry in further detail. But a rough reference to it is necessary so that the view may be progressively dispelled that our fundamental-ontological problem, the question about the possibility of the understanding of being in general, is simply an accidental, eccentric, and trivial rumination.

At the end of the sixth book of the *Republic*, in a context that cannot occupy us in further detail here, Plato gives a division of the different realms of beings, with particular regard to the possible modes of access to them. He distinguishes the two realms of the *horaton* and the *noeton*, things visible to the eyes and things thinkable. The visible is that which is unveiled by sense, the thinkable that which understanding or reason perceives. For seeing with the eyes there is required not only eyes and not only the being that is seen but a third, *phos*, light, or, more precisely, the sun, *helios*. The eye can unveil only in the light. All unveiling requires an antecedent illumining. The eye must be *helioeides*. Goethe translates this by "sonnenhaft" [like, of the type of, the sun]. The eye sees only in the light of something. Correspondingly, all non-sensible cognition—all the sciences and in particular all philosophical knowledge—can unveil being only if it has being's *specific illumination*—if the *noeisthai* also gains its own specific *phos*, its light. What sunlight is for sensuous vision the *idea tou agathou*, the idea of the good, is for scientific thinking, and in particular for philosophical knowledge. At first this sounds obscure and unintelligible; how should the idea of the good have a function for knowledge corresponding to that which the light of the sun has for sense perception? As sensible cognition is *helioeides*, so correspondingly all *gignoskein*, all cognition, is *agathoeides*, determined by the idea of the *agathon*. We have no expression for "determined by the good" which would correspond to the expression "sunlike." But the correspondence goes even further: *Ton helion tois horomenois ou monon oimaiten tou horasthai dunamin parechein pheseis, alla kai ten genesin kai auxen kai trophen, ou genesin auton onta.*³ "You will, I believe, also say, the sun furnishes to the seen not only the possibility of being seen, but gives to the seen, as beings, also becoming, growth, and nurture, without itself [the sun] being a becoming." This extended determination is correspondingly applied to knowledge. Plato says: *Kai tois gignoskomenois toinun me monon to gignoskesthai phanai hupo tou agathou pareinai, alla kai to einai te kai ten ousian hup' ekeinou autois proseinai, ouk ousias ontos tou agathou, all' eti epekeina tes ousias presbeia kai dunamei huperechontos.*⁴ "So then you must also say that the known not only receives its being known from a good,

³ Plato (Burnet), *Republic*, 6.509^b2-^b4. [*Politeia*, in *Platonis opera*, ed. John Burnet, vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899).]

⁴ *Ibid.*, 509^b6-^b10.

but also it has from thence *that* it is and *what* it is, in such a way indeed that the good is not itself the being-how and being-what, but even outstrips being in dignity and power." That which illuminates the knowledge of beings (positive science) and the knowledge of being (philosophical knowledge) as unveiling lies even beyond being. Only if we stand in this light do we cognize beings and understand being. The understanding of being is rooted in the projection of an *epekeina tes ousias*. Plato thus comes upon something that he describes as "outstripping being." This has the function of light, of illumination, for all unveiling of beings or, in this case, illumination for the understanding of being itself.

The basic condition for the knowledge of beings as well as for the understanding of being is: standing in an illuminating light. Or, to express it without an image: something upon which, in understanding, we have projected that which is to be understood. Understanding must itself *somehow see, as unveiled, that upon which it projects*. The basic facts of the antecedent illumination for all unveiling are so fundamental that it is always only with the possibility of being able to see into the light, to see in the light, that the corresponding possibility of knowing something as actual is assured. We must not only understand actuality in order to be able to experience something actual, but the understanding of actuality must on its side already have its illuminating beforehand. The understanding of being already moves in a *horizon* that is everywhere illuminated, giving luminous brightness. It is not an accident that Plato, or Socrates in the dialogue, explains the context to Glaucon by a simile. The fact that Plato reaches for a simile when he comes to the extreme boundary of philosophical inquiry, the beginning and end of philosophy, is no accident. And the content of the simile especially, is not accidental. It is the simile of the cave, which Plato interprets at the beginning of the seventh book of the *Republic*. Man's existence, living on the disk of earth arched over by the sky, is like a life in the cave. All vision needs light, although the light is not itself seen. The Dasein's coming into the light means its attainment of the understanding of truth in general. The understanding of truth is the condition of possibility for scope and access to the actual. We must here relinquish the idea of interpreting in all its dimensions this inexhaustible simile.

Plato describes a cave in which humans have their hands, feet, and heads fettered, with their eyes turned to the cave's wall. Behind them there is a small exit from the cave, through which light falls into the cave in back of its inhabitants, so that their own shadows necessarily fall on the wall lying opposite them. Fettered and bound firmly so that they can only look ahead of them, they see only their own shadows on the wall. Behind them, between them and the light, there is a path with a partition, like the partitions puppeteers have. On this path other humans, behind the pri-

oners, carry past all sorts of implements such as are used in everyday life. These objects throw their own shadows and are visible as moving objects on the opposite wall. The prisoners discuss among themselves what they see on the wall. What they see there is for them the world, actual beings. Suppose one of the prisoners is released, so that he can turn around and look into the light, and even move out of the cave and walk toward the light itself; he will first be dazzled and will only slowly become accustomed to the light and see the things that stand outside the cave in the light. Let us now assume that, with the sun in his eyes, he returns to the cave and converses once again with those who are sitting in the cave. The cave dwellers will take him to be mad; they would like to kill him because he wants to persuade them that the objects they see and have deemed to be real throughout their lives are only shadows. Plato wants to show by this that the condition for the possibility of recognizing something as a shadow in distinction from the real does not consist in my seeing an enormous quantity of given things. If the cave dwellers were to see more clearly for all eternity only what they now see on the wall, they would never gain the insight that it is only shadows. The basic condition for the possibility of understanding the actual as actual is to look into the sun, so that the eye of knowledge should become sunlike. Ordinary common sense, in the cave of its know-it-all, wiseacre pretensions, is narrow-minded; it has to be extricated from this cave. For it, what it is released to is, as Hegel says, *die verkehrte Welt*—the inverted, topsy-turvy world. We, too, with this apparently quite abstract question about the conditions of the possibility of the understanding of being, want to do nothing but bring ourselves out of the cave into the light, but in all sobriety and in the complete disenchantment of purely objective inquiry.

What we are in search of is the *epekeina tes ousias*. For Plato this *epekeina* is the condition of possibility for all knowledge. Plato says, first, that the *agathon* or the *idea agathou* is *en to gnosto teleutaia he tou agathou idea kai mogis horasthai*;⁵ in knowledge or in the knowable and intelligible, and in general in the whole sphere of that which is in any way accessible to us, the *idea* of the good is that which lies at the end, toward which all cognition runs back or, conversely, from which it begins. The *agathon* is *mogis horasthai*, hardly to be seen. Secondly, Plato says of the *agathon*: *en te noeto aute kuria aletheian kai noun paraschomene*.⁶ It is that which has dominion in the knowable and renders knowledge and truth possible. It thus becomes clear how the *epekeina tes ousias* is that which has to be inquired after, if indeed being is to be the object for knowledge. How the *epekeina* must be defined, what the "beyond" means, what the *idea* of the

5. Ibid. 7.517^a-8 f.

6. Ibid., 517^a 3 f.

good signifies in Plato and in what way the idea of the good is that which is supposed to render knowledge and truth possible—all this is in many respects obscure. We shall not enter here into the difficulties of Platonic interpretation nor into the demonstration of the connection of the idea of the good with what we discussed earlier regarding the ancient understanding of being, its derivation from production. It appears as though our thesis that ancient philosophy interprets being in the horizon of production in the broadest sense would have no connection at all with what Plato notes as condition of possibility of the understanding of being. Our interpretation of ancient ontology and its guiding clue seems to be arbitrary. What could the idea of the good have to do with production? Without entering further into this matter, we offer only the hint that the idea *agathou* is nothing but the *demiourgos*, the producer pure and simple. This lets us see already how the idea *agathou* is connected with *poiein*, *praxis*, *techne* in the broadest sense.

c) The temporal interpretation of existentiell understanding, both authentic and inauthentic

The question about the possibility of the understanding of being runs into something that transcends being, a "beyond." As to what makes understanding of being possible, we shall find it without an image only if we first ask: *What makes understanding possible as such?* One essential moment of understanding is projection: understanding itself belongs to the basic constitution of the *Dasein*. We shall inquire further into this phenomenon and its possibility, and to this end we may also recall something noted earlier. Understanding belongs to the basic constitution of the *Dasein*; but the *Dasein* is rooted in temporality. How is temporality the condition of possibility for understanding in general? How is *projection grounded in temporality?* In what way is temporality the condition of possibility for the understanding of being? Do we in fact understand the being of beings by means of time? We shall attempt, first of all, a temporal interpretation of understanding, taking understanding as ontical, existentiell understanding and not yet as understanding of being. We shall then inquire further how our existent comportment toward beings, toward the extant in the wider sense, is grounded as understanding in temporality, and how, further back beyond that, the understanding of being that belongs to this existent comportment toward beings is conditioned on its part by time. Is the possibility and structure of the distinction between being and beings grounded in temporality? Must the ontological difference be interpreted Temporally?

How is existentiell understanding determined by temporality? We heard earlier that temporality is the equally original ecstatic-horizonal unity of

future, past, and present. Understanding is a basic determination of existence. And *resoluteness* is our name for authentic existence, the existence of the Dasein in which the Dasein is itself in and from its own most peculiar possibility, a possibility that has been seized on and chosen by the Dasein itself. Resoluteness has its own peculiar temporality. Let us try to demonstrate it briefly now, though only in a specific respect, which however is certainly very essential. If authentic existence, resoluteness, is grounded in a specific mode of temporality, then a specific present belongs to resoluteness. Present, as ecstatic-horizonal phenomenon, implies enpresenting of. . . . In resoluteness the Dasein understands itself from its own most peculiar can-be. Understanding is primarily futural, for it comes toward itself from its chosen possibility of itself. In coming-toward-itself the Dasein has already taken itself over as the being that it in each case already has been. In resoluteness, that is, in self-understanding via its own most peculiar can-be—in this coming-toward-itself from its own most peculiar possibility, the Dasein comes back to that which it is and takes itself over as the being that it is. In coming back to itself, it *brings* itself with everything that it is *back again* into its own most peculiar chosen can-be. The temporal mode in which it is as and what it *was* we call [bringing-back-again, that is.] *repetition*. Repetition is a peculiar mode in which the Dasein *was, has been*. Resoluteness temporalizes itself as repetitive coming-back-toward-itself from a chosen possibility to which the Dasein, coming-toward-itself, *has run out in front of itself* [preceded itself]. In the ecstatic unity of *repetitive self-precedence*, in this past and future, there lies a specific present. Whereas the enpresenting of something for the most part and chiefly dwells with things, gets entangled in its own self, lets itself be drawn along by things so as to be merged with what it is enpresenting—whereas enpresenting for the most part runs away from itself, loses itself within itself, so that the past becomes a forgetting and the future an expecting of what is just coming on—the present that belongs to resoluteness is *held* in the specific future (self-precedence) and past (repetition) of resoluteness. The present that is held in resoluteness and springs from it we call the *instant*. Since we intend by this name a mode of the present—the phenomenon indicated by it has ecstatic-horizonal character—this means that the instant is an *enpresenting* of something present which, as belonging to resolve, discloses the situation upon which resoluteness has resolved. In the instant as an ecstasis the existent Dasein is carried away, as resolved, into the current factually determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of the situation of its action. The instant [the *Augenblick*, the twinkling of an eye] is that which, arising from resoluteness, has an eye first of all and solely for what constitutes the situation of action. It is the mode of resolute existence in which the Dasein, as being-in-the-world, holds and keeps its world in view. But

because the Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is at the same time being-with other Daseins, authentically existent being-with-one-another must also determine itself primarily by way of the individual's resoluteness. Only and in its resolute individuation is the Dasein authentically free and open for the thou. Being-with-one-another is not a tenacious intrusion of the I upon the thou, derived from their common concealed helplessness; instead, existence as together and with one another is founded on the genuine individuation of the individual, determined by enpresenting in the sense of the instant. Individuation does not mean clinging obstinately to one's own private wishes but being free for the factual possibilities of current existence.

From what has been said one thing should become clear, that the instant belongs to the Dasein's original and authentic temporality and represents the primary and authentic mode of the present as enpresenting. We heard earlier that enpresenting expresses itself in the now, that the now as time in which beings are encountered arises from original temporality. Since the now always arises from the present, this means that the now originates from, comes from, the instant. It is for this reason that the phenomenon of the instant cannot be understood from the now, as Kierkegaard tries to do. To be sure, he understands the instant quite well in its real contents, but he does not succeed in expounding the specific temporality of the instant. Instead, he identifies the instant with the now of time in the common sense. Starting from here he constructs the paradoxical relationships of the now to eternity. But the phenomenon of the instant cannot be understood from the now even if we take the now in its full structure. The only thing that can be shown is that the now most expeditiously manifests its full structure precisely where the Dasein as resolute enpresenting expresses itself by means of the now. The instant is a primal phenomenon of original temporality, whereas the now is merely a phenomenon of derivative time. Aristotle already saw the phenomenon of the instant, the *kairos*, and he defined it in the sixth book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*; but, again, he did it in such a way that he failed to bring the specific time character of the *kairos* into connection with what he otherwise knows as time (*nun*).

The present pertinent to the Dasein's temporality does not constantly have the character of the instant. The Dasein does not constantly exist as resolute but is usually irresolute, closed off to itself in its own most peculiar ability to be, and not determined primarily from its most peculiar ability to be in the way it projects its possibilities. The Dasein's temporality does not constantly temporalize itself from that temporality's authentic future. Nevertheless, this inconstancy of existence, its being generally irresolute, does not mean that in its existence the irresolute Dasein at times lacks a future. It only means that temporality itself, with respect to its different ecstases,

especially the future, is changeable. Irresolute existence is so little a non-existence that it is precisely this irresoluteness which characterizes the everyday actuality of the Dasein.

Because we are trying to expound existent comportment in the everyday sense toward the beings most proximately given, we must turn our view upon everyday, inauthentic, irresolute existence and ask what the character is of the *temporality of inauthentic self-understanding*, of the Dasein's irresolute projection of itself upon possibilities. We know that the Dasein is being-in-the-world; factually existing as such, it is being-among intra-worldly beings and being-with-other Daseins. The Dasein understands itself at first and usually from things. The others, the fellow humans, are also there with the Dasein even when they are not to be found there in immediately tangible proximity. In the way they are there with the Dasein they are also jointly understood with it via things. Let us recall Rilke's description in which he shows how the inhabitants of the demolished house, those fellow humans, are encountered with its wall. The fellow humans with whom we have to do daily are also there, even without any explicit existentiell relation of one Dasein to others. Keeping all of this in mind, we may now turn our exploratory regard solely to *understanding comportment toward things handy and things extant*.

We understand ourselves by way of things, in the sense of the self-understanding of everyday Dasein. To understand ourselves from the things with which we are occupied means to project our own ability to be upon such features of the business of our everyday occupation as the feasible, urgent, indispensable, expedient. The Dasein understands itself from the ability to be that is determined by the success and failure, the feasibility and unfeasibility, of its commerce with things. The Dasein thus comes toward itself from out of the things. It expects its own can-be as the can-be of a being which relies on what things give or what they refuse. It is as though the Dasein's can-be were projected by the things, by the Dasein's commerce with them, and not primarily by the Dasein itself from its own most peculiar self, which nevertheless exists, just as it is, always as dealing with things. This inauthentic self-understanding by way of things has, indeed, the character of coming-toward-itself, of the future, but this is *inauthentic future*; we characterize it as *expecting [Gewärtigen]*. Only because the Dasein is expectant of its can-be in the sense described, as coming from the things it attends to and cares for—only because of this expecting can it anticipate, *await* something from the things or wait for the way they run off. Expecting must *already beforehand have unveiled a sphere* from which something can be awaited. Expecting is thus not a subspecies of waiting for or anticipating but just the reverse: waiting for, anticipating, is grounded in an expecting, a looking-forward-to. When in our commerce with things we

lose ourselves in and with them, we are expectant of our can-be in the way it is determined via the feasibility and unfeasibility of the things with which we are concerned. We do not expressly come back to ourselves in an authentic projection upon our own most peculiar can-be. This implies at the same time that we do not repeat the being we have been, we do not take ourselves over in our facticity. What we are—and what we have been is always contained in this—lies in some way behind us, *forgotten*. Expecting our own can-be to come from things, we have forgotten the factual Dasein in its having-been. This forgetting is not the absence and failure to appear of a recollection, so that in the place of a recollection there would be nothing. It is, rather, a peculiar positively ecstatic mode of temporality. The ecstasis of forgetting something has the character of disengagement from one's most peculiar having-been-ness, and indeed in such a way that the disengaging-from closes off that from which it disengages. Forgetting, in closing off the past—and this is the peculiar feature of that ecstasis—closes itself off for itself. The characteristic of forgetting is that it forgets itself. It is implicit in the ecstatic nature of forgetting that it not only forgets the forgotten but forgets the forgetting itself. This is why to the common pre-phenomenological understanding it appears as though forgetting is nothing at all. Forgottenness is an elementary mode of temporality in which we are primarily and for the most part our own having-been. But this shows that the past, in the sense of having-been-ness, must not be defined in terms of the common concept of the bygone. The bygone is that of which we say that it no longer is. Having-been-ness, however, is a mode of being, the determination of the way in which the Dasein is as existent. A thing that is not temporal, whose being is not determined by means of temporality, but merely occurs within time, can never have-been, because it does not exist. Only what is intrinsically futural can have-been; things, at best, are over and done with. Understanding oneself by way of feasible and directly encountered things involves a *self-forgetting*. The possibility of retaining something which one was just now expecting rests only on the basis of the original forgottenness that belongs to the factual Dasein. To this *retaining* related to things there corresponds again a non-retaining, a *forgetting in the derivative sense*. It becomes clear from this that *recollection* is possible only on the basis of and because of the original forgottenness that belongs to the Dasein and not conversely. Because the Dasein is expectant of itself by way of the feasible, that with which it is dealing at the moment is in its present. Self-understanding, in equal originality with future and past, is an *enpresenting*. The enpresenting of the inauthentic understanding that predominates in the Dasein will occupy us more particularly in the sequel. Negatively, it must be said that the present of inauthentic understanding does not have the character of the instant, because the temporalizing of this mode of the

present is determined by way of the inauthentic future. Accordingly, inauthentic understanding has the character of *forgetful-enpresenting-expectance*.

d) The temporality of the understanding of functionality and its totality (world)

This temporal characterization of inauthentic understanding has clarified only one possibility of the Dasein's existentiell (ontical) understanding as the existent being. We require, however, a clarification of the understanding of being which is always already implicit in the existentiell understanding of beings. But we do not wish to explain the understanding of being in regard to existentiell understanding, whether authentic or inauthentic, but rather with a view to the Dasein's existent comportment toward the things it encounters in its immediate neighborhood. We shall try to *clarify the understanding of being* which relates to *beings which are not of the nature of Dasein*. It is the understanding of the being of those beings we encounter nearest to us with which we deal irresolutely, beings which are also there when we are not occupied with them. We are taking this direction of interpretation not because it is easier but because we shall thus gain an original understanding of the problems we discussed earlier, all of which are ontologically oriented toward beings as extant.

Let us once more take note of the whole context of the problem and the direction of our inquiry. What we are seeking is the *condition of the possibility of that understanding-of-being which understands beings of the type of the handy and the at-hand*. Beings of these kinds are encountered as we deal with them in our everyday concerns. This commerce with the beings we most immediately encounter is, as existent comportment of the Dasein toward beings, founded in the basic constitution of existence, in being-in-the-world. The beings with which we are occupied are therefore encountered as intraworldly beings. Since the Dasein is being-in-the-world and the basic constitution of the Dasein lies in temporality, *commerce with intraworldly beings is grounded in a specific temporality of being-in-the-world*. The structure of being-in-the-world is unitary but it is also organized. Our object here must be to understand via temporality the organized totality of this structure, which means, however, that we must interpret the phenomenon of being-in-as such and the phenomenon of the world in their temporal constitution. This will lead us to the connection between temporality and transcendence, since being-in-the-world is the phenomenon in which it becomes originally manifest how the Dasein by its very nature is "beyond itself." Starting from this transcendence, we comprehend the possibility of the understanding of being that is implicit in and illuminates our commerce with intraworldly beings. This then leads to the question of the interrelations of the under-

standing of being, transcendence, and temporality. And from that point we shall attempt to portray temporality as horizon of the understanding of being. That is, we shall attempt the definition of the concept of Temporality.

In returning now to inquire about the condition of the possibility of understanding being—an understanding that belongs to our commerce with the beings we encounter—we shall ask first about the *condition of possibility of being-in-the-world in general*, which is based on *temporality*. It is only from the temporality of being-in-the-world that we shall understand how being-in-the-world is already, as such, understanding of being. The being most nearly encountered, that with which we have to do, has the ontological constitution of *equipment*. This entity is not merely extant but, in conformity with its equipmental character, belongs to an *equipmental contexture* within which it has its specific equipmental function, which primarily constitutes its being. Equipment, taken in this ontological sense, is not only equipment for writing or sewing; it includes everything we make use of domestically or in public life. In this broad ontological sense bridges, streets, street lamps are also items of equipment. We call the whole of all these beings the *handy* [*das Zuhandene*]. What is essential in this connection is not whether or not the handy is in nearest proximity, whether it is closer by than purely extant, at-hand things, but only that it is handy in and for daily use or that, looked at conversely, in its factual being-in-the-world the Dasein is well practiced in a specific way in handling this being, in such a way that it understands this being as something of its own making. In the use of equipment the Dasein is also always already well practiced in being-with others, and here it is completely indifferent whether another Dasein is or is not factually present.

Equipment is encountered always within an equipmental contexture. Each single piece of equipment carries this contexture along with it, and it is *this equipment only* with regard to that contexture. The specific *thisness* of a piece of equipment, its *individuation*, if we take the word in a completely formal sense, is not determined primarily by space and time in the sense that it appears in a determinate space- and time-position. Instead, what determines a piece of equipment as an individual is in each instance its equipmental character and equipmental contexture. What then is it that constitutes the specific equipmental character of a piece of equipment? Equipmental character is constituted by what we call *Bewandtnis, functionality*. The being of something we use, for instance, a hammer or a door, is characterized by a specific way of being put to use, of functioning. This entity is "in order to hammer," "in order to make leaving, entering, and closing possible." Equipment is "in order to." This proposition has an ontological and not merely an ontical meaning; a being is not what and how

it is, for example, a hammer, and then in addition something "with which to hammer. Rather, what and how it is as this entity, its *whatness* and *howness*, is constituted by this in-order-to as such, by its functionality. A being of the nature of equipment is thus encountered as the being that it is in itself if and when we understand beforehand the following: functionality, functionality relations, functionality totality. In dealing with equipment we can use it as equipment only if we have already beforehand *projected this entity upon functionality relation*. This antecedent understanding of functionality, this projecting of equipment onto its functionality character, we call *letting-function*. This expression, too, has its ontological sense suited to the present context of discourse. In hammering we let the hammer *function with something*. The *wherein* of our letting-function is that *for which* the equipment is destined as such; the *for-which* characterizes this specific equipment as what and how it is. We are *expectant of the for-which* in using the equipment. "To let function in something" means expectance of a *for-which*. Letting-function, as *letting-function-in*, is always at the same time a "letting-function *with something*." That with which there is functionality is in each case determined via the *for-which*. *Expecting* the *for-which*, we *retain the with-which* in our view; keeping it in view, we first understand the equipment as equipment in its specific functionality relation. Letting-function, that is, the understanding of the functionality which makes possible an equipmental use at all, is a retentive expectance, in which the equipment is *enpresented* as this specific equipment. In expectant-retentive *enpresenting*, the equipment comes into play, becomes present, enters into a present [*Gegen-wart*]. The expecting of the *for-which* is not a contemplation of an end and much less the awaiting of a result. Expectance does not at all have the character of an optical apprehension; nor is retention of the *wherewith* a contemplative dwelling with something. This becomes clear if we bring to conscious realization unconstructively an immediate employment of equipment. When I am completely engrossed in dealing with something and make use of some equipment in this activity, I am just not directed toward the equipment as such, say, toward the tool. And I am just as little directed toward the work itself. Instead, in my occupation I move in the functionality relations as such. In understanding them I dwell with the equipmental contexture that is handy. I stand neither with the one nor with the other but move in the in-order-to. It is for this reason that we proceed in *order* in dealing with things—we do not merely approach them as they lie before us but have commerce with them as they exhibit themselves as equipment in an equipmental contexture. Letting-function, as understanding of functionality, is that projection which first of all gives to the *Dasein* the light in whose luminosity things of the nature of equipment are encountered.

Letting-function, as *understanding of functionality*, has a *temporal constitution*. But it itself *points back to a still more original temporality*. Only when we have apprehended the more original temporalizing are we able to survey in what way the *understanding of the being of beings*—here either of the equipmental character and *handiness* of handy equipment or of the thinghood of extant things and the *at-handness* of the at-hand—is *made possible by time* and thus becomes transparent.

We shall not yet presently pursue this temporality but instead ask more precisely what the basic condition is for our apprehending an equipmental contexture as equipmental *contexture*. First of all, we have seen only in general what the presupposition is for an instrumental usage: *understanding of functionality*. But all equipment is as equipment within an equipmental contexture. This contexture is not a supplementary product of some extant equipment; rather, an individual piece of equipment, as *individual*, is handy and extant only within an equipmental contexture. The *understanding of equipmental contexture as contexture* precedes every individual use of equipment. With the analysis of the *understanding of an equipmental contexture in the totality of its functionality*, we come across the *analysis of the phenomenon that we pointed to earlier, the concept and phenomenon of the world*. Since the world is a structural moment of *being-in-the-world* and *being-in-the-world* is the ontological constitution of the *Dasein*, the analysis of the world brings us at the same time to an *understanding of being-in-the-world itself and of its possibility by way of time*. Interpretation of the possibility of *being-in-the-world on the basis of temporality* is already intrinsically interpretation of the possibility of an *understanding of being in which, with equal originality, we understand the being of the Dasein, the being of fellow-Daseins or of the others, and the being of the extant and handy entities always encountered in a disclosed world*. This kind of *understanding of being* is, nevertheless, indifferent, unarticulated at first. It is for the most part—for reasons lying in the *Dasein* itself—oriented toward those beings in which the *Dasein* has first and for the most part lost itself, extant beings, for which reason also the ontological interpretation of being at the beginning of philosophy, in antiquity, develops in orientation toward the extant. This interpretation of being becomes philosophically inadequate as soon as it widens out universally and attempts to understand existence also along the lines of this concept of being, whereas the procedure should be exactly the reverse.

e) *Being-in-the-world, transcendence, and temporality. The horizonal schemata of ecstatic temporality*

We must now formulate in a more fundamental way what we described in reference to existentiell understanding, authentic as well as inauthentic.

We must focus more closely on the concept of the *Dasein's* transcendence in order to see the connection of the *Dasein's* transcendence with the understanding of being, from which alone we can then carry our inquiry back to the temporality of the understanding of being as such.

Functionality is understood in commerce with the beings we encounter in closest proximity—equipment. Everything for which and in which there is a letting-function with something, is what it is within an in-order-to. The relations of the in-order-to, but also those of the purpose-free and purposeless, root either ultimately or initially in the *for-the-sake-of-which*. They are understood only if the *Dasein* understands something of the nature of the *for-the-sake-of-itself*. As existent, the *Dasein* understands something of the nature of a "for-the-sake-of-itself," because its own being is determined by this: that, as existent, the *Dasein* is occupied in its own being with its ability to be. Only so far as the *for-the-sake-of* a can-be is understood can something like an in-order-to (a relation of functionality) be unveiled. That all functional relations are grounded ontologically in a *for-the-sake-of* in no way decides whether, ontically, all beings are as beings for the sake of the human *Dasein*. The ontological rooting of the ontological structures of beings and of their possible intelligibility in the *for-the-sake-of-which* is still extraneous to the ontical assertion that nature was created or exists for the purpose of the human *Dasein*. The ontical assertion about the purposiveness of the actual world is not posited in the ontological rooting just mentioned. In fact, the latter is presented primarily precisely in order to make evident how the understanding of the being of an entity which is and can be in itself, even without the *Dasein* existing, is possible only on the basis of the ontological rooting of functionality relations in the *for-the-sake-of-which*. Only on the basis of the clarified ontological interconnections of the possible ways of understanding being, and thus also of functionality relations, with the *for-the-sake-of* is it at all decidable whether the question of an ontical teleology of the universe of beings has a legitimate philosophical sense or whether it doesn't rather represent an invasion by common sense into the problems of philosophy. That the ontological structure of in-order-to relations is grounded in a *for-the-sake-of-which* implies nothing about whether the ontical relations between beings, between nature and the *Dasein*, exhibit a purposive contexture.

Since the *Dasein* exists as a being which is occupied in its being with its can-be, it has already understood the like of the "for the sake of itself." Only on the basis of this understanding is existence possible. The *Dasein* must give its own can-be to itself to be understood. It gives itself the task of signifying how things stand with its can-be. The whole of these relations, everything that belongs to the structure of the totality with which the *Dasein* can in any way give itself something to be understood, to signify to

itself its ability to be, we call *significance* [*Bedeutsamkeit*]. This is the structure of what we call *world in the strictly ontological sense*.

We saw earlier that the Dasein understands itself first and for the most part via things; in unity with that, the co-existence of other Daseins is understood. Understanding of the can-be of the Dasein as being-with others is already implicit in functionality relations. The Dasein is, as such, essentially open for the co-existence of other Daseins. Factual Dasein is, explicitly or not, for-the-sake-of being-able-to-be-with-one-another. This is possible, however, only because the Dasein is determined as such from the very outset by being-with others. When we say that the Dasein exists for the sake of itself, this is an ontological determination of existence. This existential proposition doesn't as yet prejudge anything about existentiell possibilities. The proposition "The Dasein exists essentially for the sake of itself" does not assert ontically that the factual purpose of the factual Dasein is to care exclusively and primarily for itself and to use others as instruments toward this end. Such a factual-ontical interpretation is possible only on the basis of the ontological constitution of the Dasein, that it is in general for-the-sake-of its own self. Only because it is this can it be with other Daseins and only on the same condition can another Dasein, which in turn is occupied with its own being, enter into an essential existentiell relation to one that is other than itself.

The basic constitution of the Dasein is being-in-the-world. This now means more precisely that in its existence the Dasein is occupied with, about, being-able-to-be-in-the-world. It has in every instance already projected itself upon that. Thus in the Dasein's existence there is implicit something like an *antecedent understanding of world, significance*. Earlier we gave a provisional definition of the concept of world and showed there that the world is not the sum of all extant beings, not the universe of natural things—that the world is not at all anything extant or handy. The concept of world is not a determination of the intraworldly being as a being which is extant in itself. World is a determination of the Dasein's being. This is expressed from the outset when we say that Dasein exists as being-in-the-world. The world belongs to the Dasein's existential constitution. World is not extant but world exists. Only so long as Dasein is, is existent, is world given. Since in *understanding world* the relations of the in-order-to, of functionality and being-for-the-sake-of are understood, it is essentially *self-understanding*, and self-understanding is Dasein-understanding. Contained in this, again, there is the understanding of being-with-others and the understanding of being able to be-among and dwell-among extant entities. The Dasein is not at first merely a being-with others so as thereupon to emerge from this being-with-one-another into an objective world, to come out to things. This approach would be just as unsuccessful as subjective

idealism, which starts first with a subject, which then in some manner supplies an object for itself. To start with an I-thou relationship as a relationship of two subjects would entail that at first there are two subjects, taken simply as two, which then provide a relation to others. Rather, just as the Dasein is originally being with others, so it is originally being with the handy and the extant. Similarly, the Dasein is just as little at first merely a dwelling among things so as then occasionally to discover among these things beings with its own kind of being; instead, as the being which is occupied with itself, the Dasein is with equal originality being-with others and being-among intraworldly beings. The world, within which these latter beings are encountered, is—because every Dasein is of its own self existent being-with others—always already world which the one shares with the others. Only because the Dasein is antecedently constituted as being-in-the-world can one Dasein existentially communicate something factually to another; but this factual existentiell communication does not first constitute the possibility that one Dasein has a single world with another Dasein. The different modes of factual being-with-one-another constitute in each case only the factual possibilities of the range and genuineness of disclosure of the world and the different factual possibilities of intersubjective confirmation of what is uncovered and of intersubjective foundation of the unanimity of world-understanding and the factual possibilities of the provision and guidance of existentiell possibilities of the individual. But it is again not an accident that we elucidate for ourselves what world means in an ontological sense chiefly in terms of intraworldly beings, to which there belong not only the handy and the extant but also, for a naive understanding, the Dasein of others. Fellow humans are certainly also extant; they join in constituting the world. For this common concept of the world it is sufficient to point to the concept of the cosmos, for instance, in Paul. Cosmos here means not only the whole of plants, animals, and earth, but primarily the Dasein of the human being in the sense of God-forsaken man in his association with earth, stars, animals, and plants.

World exists—that is, it is—only if Dasein exists, only if there is Dasein. Only if world is there, if Dasein exists as being-in-the-world, is there understanding of being, and only if this understanding exists are intraworldly beings unveiled as extant and handy. World-understanding as Dasein-understanding is self-understanding. Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world. Only because the "subject" is determined by being-in-the-world can it become, as this self, a thou for another. Only because I am an existent self am I a possible thou for another as self. The basic condition for the

possibility of the self's being a possible thou in being-with others is based on the circumstance that the Dasein as the self that it is, is such that it exists as being-in-the-world. For "thou" means "you who are with me in a world." If the I-thou relationship represents a distinctive existence relationship, this cannot be recognized existentially, hence philosophically, as long as it is not asked what existence in general means. But being-in-the-world belongs to existence. That the being which exists in this way is occupied in its being with its ability to be—this selfhood is the ontological presupposition for the selflessness in which every Dasein comports itself toward the other in the existent I-thou relationship. Self and world belong together in the unity of the basic constitution of the Dasein, the unity of being-in-the-world. This is the condition of possibility for understanding the other Dasein and intraworldly beings in particular. The possibility of understanding the being of intraworldly beings, as well as the possibility of understanding the Dasein itself, is possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world.

We now ask, How is *the whole of this structure, of being-in-the-world, founded in temporality?* Being-in-the-world belongs to the basic constitution of the being that is in each case mine, that at each time I *myself* am. Self and world belong together; they belong to the unity of the constitution of the Dasein and, with equal originality, they determine the "subject." In other words, the being that we ourselves in each case are, the Dasein, is the *transcendent*.

What has so far been said will become clearer by means of the exposition of the concept of *transcendence*. Transcendere signifies literally to step over, pass over, go through, and occasionally also to surpass. We define the philosophical concept of transcendence following the pattern of the original meaning of the word and not so much with regard to traditional philosophical usage, which besides is quite ambiguous and indefinite. It is from the ontological concept of transcendence properly understood that an understanding can first of all be gained of what Kant was seeking, at bottom, when transcendence moved for him into the center of philosophical inquiry, so much so that he called his philosophy transcendental philosophy. In delineating the transcendence concept, we have to keep in view the basic structures already exhibited of the constitution of the Dasein's being. In order to avoid making the first fundamental considerations too heavy, we have purposely disregarded the full development of the basic structure of care. Consequently, the following exposition of the transcendence concept is not adequate, but it suffices for what we chiefly need here.

In the popular philosophical sense of the word, the transcendent is the being that lies beyond, the otherworldly being. Frequently the term is used to designate God. In theory of knowledge the transcendent is understood as what lies beyond the subject's sphere, things in themselves, objects. In this

sense the transcendent is that which lies outside the subject. It is, then, that which steps beyond or has already stepped beyond the boundaries of the subject—as if it had ever been inside them—as if the Dasein steps beyond itself only when it comports itself toward a thing. The thing doesn't at all transcend and is not at all the transcendent in the sense of that which has stepped beyond. Even less is it the transcendent in the genuine sense of the word. The overstepping as such, or that whose mode of being must be defined precisely by this overstepping, properly understood, is the Dasein. We have more than once seen that in its experience of beings and particularly in dealing with handy equipment the Dasein always already understands functionality—that the Dasein returns to beings of that sort only from its antecedent understanding of functionality contexture, significance, world. Beings must stand in the light of understood functionality if we are to encounter handy equipment. Equipment and the handy confront us in the horizon of an understood world; they are encountered always as intra-worldly beings. World is understood beforehand when objects encounter us. It was for this reason we said that the world is in a certain sense further outside than all objects, that it is more objective than all objects but, nevertheless, does not have the mode of being of objects. The mode of being of the world is not the extantness of objects; instead, the world exists. The world—still in the orientation of the common transcendence concept—is the truly transcendent, that which is still further beyond than objects, and at the same time this beyond is, as an existent, a basic determination of being-in-the-world, of the Dasein. If the world is the transcendent, then what is *truly transcendent* is the *Dasein*. With this we first arrive at the *genuine ontological sense of transcendence*, which also ties in with the basic sense of the term from the common standpoint. Transcendere means to step over; the transcendens, the transcendent, is *that which oversteps as such* and not that toward which I step over. The world is transcendent because, belonging to the structure of being-in-the-world, it constitutes stepping-over-to as such. The Dasein itself oversteps in its being and thus is exactly *not the immanent*. The transcending beings are not the objects—things can never transcend or be transcendent; rather, it is the "subjects"—in the proper ontological sense of the Dasein—which transcend, step through and step over themselves. Only a being with the mode of being of the Dasein transcends, in such a way in fact that transcendence is precisely what essentially characterizes its being. Exactly that which is called immanence in theory of knowledge in a complete inversion of the phenomenal facts, the sphere of the subject, is intrinsically and primarily and alone the transcendent. Because the Dasein is constituted by being-in-the-world, it is a being which in its being is out *beyond* itself. The *epekeina* belongs to the Dasein's own most peculiar structure of being. This transcen-

ding does not only and not primarily mean a self-relating of a subject to an object; rather, transcendence means *to understand oneself from a world*. The Dasein is as such out beyond itself. Only a being to whose ontological constitution transcendence belongs has the possibility of being anything like a self. Transcendence is even the presupposition for the Dasein's having the character of a self. The *selfhood* of the Dasein is *founded on its transcendence*, and the Dasein is not first an ego-self which then oversteps something or other. The "toward-itself" and the "out-from-itself" are implicit in the concept of selfhood. What exists as a self can do so only as a transcendent being. This selfhood, founded on transcendence, the possible toward-itself and out-from-itself, is the presupposition for the way the Dasein factually has various possibilities of being its own and of losing itself. But it is also the presupposition for the Dasein's being-with others in the sense of the I-self with the thou-self. The Dasein does not exist at first in some mysterious way so as then to accomplish the step beyond itself to others or to extant things. Existence, instead, always already means to step beyond or, better, having stepped beyond.

The Dasein is the transcendent being. Objects and things are never transcendent. *The original nature of transcendence makes itself manifest in the basic constitution of being-in-the-world*. The transcendence, the over-and-out-beyond of the Dasein makes it possible for the Dasein to comport itself to beings, whether to extant things, to others, or to itself, as beings. Transcendence is unveiled to the Dasein itself, even if not qua transcendence. It makes possible coming back to beings, so that the antecedent understanding of being is founded on transcendence. The being we call the Dasein is as such open for. Openness belongs to its being. The Dasein is its Da, its here-there, in which it is here for itself and in which others are there with it; and it is at this Da that the handy and the extant are met with.

Leibniz called mental-psychical substances monads, or, more precisely, he interpreted all substances in general as monads (unities). With reference to the monads he pronounced the well-known proposition that the monads have no windows, do not look outside themselves, do not look out from inside their own capsules. The monads have no windows because they need none. They need none, have no need to look outside the interior of the capsule, because that which they have within themselves as their possession suffices for them. Each monad is representational, as such, in diverse degrees of wakefulness. In each monad, in conformity with its possibility, there is represented the universe of all the other monads, the totality of all beings. Each monad already represents in its interior the whole of the world. The individual monads differ according to the level of their wakefulness in regard to the clarity in which the whole of the world, the universe of the remaining monads, is accessible to it as purely drawn from its own self.

Each monad, each substance, is intrinsically representation: it represents to itself the universe of all beings.

What the Leibnizian proposition about the monads being without windows basically means can truly be made clear only by way of the basic constitution of the Dasein which we have developed—being-in-the-world, or transcendence. As a monad, the Dasein needs no window in order first of all to look out toward something outside itself, not because, as Leibniz thinks, all beings are already accessible within its capsule, so that the monad can quite well be closed off and encapsulated within itself, but because the monad, the Dasein, in its own being (transcendence) is already outside, among other beings, and this implies always with its own self. The Dasein is not at all in a capsule. Due to the original transcendence, a window would be superfluous for the Dasein. In his monadological interpretation of substance, Leibniz doubtless had a genuine phenomenon in view in the windowlessness of the monads. It was only his orientation to the traditional concept of substance that prevented him from conceiving of the original ground of the windowlessness and thus from truly interpreting the phenomenon he saw. He was not able to see that the monad, because it is essentially representational, mirroring a world, is transcendence and not a substantival extant entity, a windowless capsule. Transcendence is not instituted by an object coming together with a subject, or a thou with an I, but the Dasein itself, as "being-a-subject," transcends. The Dasein as such is being-toward-itself, being-with others, and being-among entities handy and extant. In the structural moments of *toward-itself*, *with-others*, and *among-the-extant* there is implicit throughout the character of *overstepping*, of transcendence. We call the unity of these relations the Dasein's being-in, with the sense that the Dasein possesses an original familiarity with itself, with others, and with entities handy and extant. This familiarity is as such *familiarity in a world*.

Being-in is essentially being-in-the-world. This becomes clear from what has already been said. As selfhood, the Dasein is *for the sake of itself*. This is the original mode in which it is toward-itself. However, it is itself, the Dasein, only as being among handy entities, entities which it understands by way of an in-order-to contexture. The in-order-to relations are rooted in the for-the-sake-of. The unity of this whole of relations belonging to the Dasein's being-in is the world. Being-in is being-in-the-world.

How is this being-in-the-world itself possible as a whole? More precisely, why does transcendence ground the primary structure of being-in-the-world as such? In what is the Dasein's transcendence itself grounded? We shall give the answer with regard to the two structural moments which have just been considered separately but intrinsically belong together. "being-in" and "world. *Being-in as toward-itself*, as *for-the-sake-of* itself, is possible

only on the basis of *the future*, because this structural moment of time is intrinsically ecstatic. The *ecstatic character of time makes possible the Dasein's specific overstepping character, transcendence*, and thus also the world. Then—and with this we come to the most central determination of the world and of temporality—the ecstases of temporality (future, past, and present) are not simply removals to . . . not removals as it were to the nothing. Rather, as removals to . . . and thus because of the ecstatic character of each of them, they each have a *horizon* which is prescribed by the mode of the removal, the carrying-away, the mode of the future, past, and present, and *which belongs to the ecstasis itself*. Each ecstasis, as removal to . . . has at the same time within itself and belonging to it a pre-delineation of the formal structure of the *whereto of the removal*. We call this *whither of the ecstasis* the horizon or, more precisely, the *horizontal schema of the ecstasis*. Each ecstasis has within itself a completely determinate schema which modifies itself in coordination with the manner in which temporality temporalizes itself, the manner in which the ecstases modify themselves. just as the ecstases intrinsically constitute the unity of temporality, so in each case there corresponds to the ecstatic unity of temporality such a unity of its horizontal schemata. The *transcendence of being-in-the-world is founded in its specific wholeness on the original ecstatic-horizontal unity of temporality*. If transcendence makes possible the understanding of being and if transcendence is founded on the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality, then temporality is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being.

§21. Temporality [Temporalität] and being

The task now is to comprehend how, on the basis of the *temporality that grounds the Dasein's transcendence*, the Dasein's *Temporality makes possible the understanding of being*. The most original temporalizing of temporality as such is Temporality. In connection with it we have always already oriented our considerations toward the question of the possibility of a specific understanding of being, namely, the *understanding of being in the sense of extantness in its broadest signification*. We have shown further how commerce with beings is grounded, as commerce, in temporality. But from this we have only partly inferred that this commerce is also understanding of being and is possible, precisely as such, on the basis of temporality. It must now be shown explicitly *how the understanding of the handiness of handy equipment is as such a world-understanding, and how this world-understanding, as the Dasein's transcendence, is rooted in the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of the Dasein's temporality*. Understanding of the handiness of

the handy *has already projected such being upon time*. Roughly speaking, use of time is made in the understanding of being, without pre-philosophical and non-philosophical Dasein knowing about it explicitly. Nevertheless, this interconnection between being and time is not totally hidden from the Dasein but is familiar to it in an interpretation which, to be sure, is very much misunderstood and very misleading. In a certain way, the Dasein understands that the interpretation of being is connected in some form or other with time. Pre-philosophical as well as philosophical knowledge customarily distinguishes beings in respect of their mode of being with regard to time. Ancient philosophy defines as the being that is in the most primary and truest sense, the *aei on*, the *ever-being*, and distinguishes it from the changeable, which only sometimes is, sometimes is not. In ordinary discourse, a being of this latter kind is called a temporal being. "Temporal" means here "running its course in time." From this delineation of everlasting and temporal beings, the characterization then goes on to define the timeless and the supratemporal. "Timeless" refers to the mode of being of numbers, of pure space determinations, whereas the supratemporal is the eternal in the sense of *aeternitas* as distinguished from *sempiternitas*. In these distinctions of the various types of being with regard to time, time is taken in the common sense as intratemporality. It cannot be an accident that, when they characterize being, both pre-philosophical and philosophical understanding are already oriented toward time. On the other hand, we saw that when Kant tries to conceive being as such and defines it as position, he manifestly makes no use of time in the common sense. But it does not follow from this that he made no use of temporality in the original sense of Temporality, without an understanding of being, without himself being in the clear about the condition of possibility of his ontological propositions.

We shall attempt a *Temporal interpretation of the being of those extant entities in our nearest neighborhood, handiness*; and we shall show in an exemplary way with regard to transcendence how the understanding of being is possible Temporally. By this means it is proved that the function of time is to make possible the understanding of being. In connection with this we shall return to the first *thesis*, that of *Kant*, and will try to establish on the basis of our results so far the degree to which our critique of Kant was valid and in what way it must be fundamentally supplemented in its positive part.

a) The Temporal interpretation of being as being handy.

Praesens as horizontal schema of the ecstasy of enpresenting

Let us recall the temporality of our dealings with equipment which was described earlier. This commerce as such makes an equipmental contexture

primarily and suitably accessible. A trivial example. If we observe a shoemaker's shop, we can indeed identify all sorts of extant things on hand. But which entities are there and how these entities are handy, in line with their inherent character, is unveiled for us only in dealing appropriately with equipment such as tools, leather, and shoes. Only one who understands is able to uncover by himself this environing world of the shoemaker's. We can of course receive instruction about the use of the equipment and the procedures involved; and on the basis of the understanding thus gained we are put in a position, as we say, to reproduce in thought the factual commerce with these things. But it is only in the tiniest spheres of the beings with which we are acquainted that we are so well versed as to have at our command the specific way of dealing with equipment which uncovers this equipment as such. The entire range of intraworldly beings accessible to us at any time is not suitably accessible to us in an equally original way. There are many things we merely know something about but do not know how to manage with them. They confront us as beings, to be sure, but as unfamiliar beings. Many beings, including even those already uncovered, have the character of unfamiliarity. This character is positively distinctive of beings as they first confront us. We cannot go into this in more detail, especially since this privative mode of uncoveredness of the extant can be comprehended ontologically only from the structure of primary familiarity. Basically, therefore, we must keep in mind the point that the usual approach in theory of knowledge, according to which a manifold of arbitrarily occurring things or objects is supposed to be homogeneously given to us, does not do justice to the primary facts and consequently makes the investigative approach of theory of knowledge artificial from the very start. Original familiarity with beings lies in *dealing with them* appropriately. This commerce constitutes itself with respect to its temporality in a *retentive-expectant enpresenting of the equipmental contexture* as such. It is first of all letting-function, as the antecedent understanding of functionality, which lets a being be understood as the being that it is, so that it is understood by looking to its being. To the being of this being there belong its inherent content, the specific whatness, and a way of being. The *whatness* of the beings confronting us every day is defined by their equipmental character. The *way* a being with this essential character, equipment, is, we call *being-handy* or handiness, which we distinguish from being extant, at hand. If a particular piece of equipment is not handy in the immediately environing world, not near enough to be handled, then this "not-handy" is in no way equivalent to mere non-being. Perhaps the equipment in question has been carried off or mislaid; we say that we cannot lay our hands on it, it is unavailable. The *unavailable* is only a mode of the handy. When we say that something has become unavailable, we do not normally mean that it has

simply been annihilated. Of course, something can be unavailable in such a way that it no longer is at all, that it has been annihilated. But the question then arises as to what this annihilation means, whether it can be equated with not-being and nothing. In any event, we see again that even in a rough analysis a multiplicity of intrinsically founded levels of being are manifested within the being of things and of equipment alone. How the understanding of equipment traces back to the understanding of functionality, significance, and world, and hence to the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of the Dasein, has already been roughly shown. We are now interested solely in the mode of being of equipment, its *handiness*, with regard to its *Temporal possibility*, that is, with regard to how we understand handiness as such in temporal terms.

From the reference to the possible modification of the being of the handy in becoming unavailable, we can infer that *handiness* and *unavailability* are specific variations of a single basic phenomenon, which we may characterize formally as *presence* and *absence* and in general as *praesens*. If handiness or the being of this being has a *praesensial meaning*, then this would signify that this mode of being is understood Temporally, that is to say, understood from the temporalizing of temporality in the sense of the ecstatic-horizonal unity described earlier. Here, in the dimension of the interpretation of being via time, we are purposely making use of Latinate expressions for all the determinations of time, in order to keep them distinct in the terminology itself from the time-determinations of temporality in the previously described sense. *What does praesens mean with regard to time and temporality in general?* If we were to answer that it is the moment of the present, that would be saying very little. The question remains why we do not say "the present" instead of "praesens." If nevertheless we employ this term, this new usage must correspond to a new meaning. If the difference in names is to be justified the two phenomena, the present and praesens, should not mean the same thing. But is praesens perhaps identical with the phenomenon of the present which we came to know as the now, the nun, toward which the common interpretation of time is oriented when it says that time is an irreversible sequence of nows? But praesens and now, too, are not identical. For the now is a character of intratemporality, of the handy and the extant, whereas praesens is supposed to constitute the condition of possibility of understanding handiness as such. Everything handy is, to be sure, "in time," intratemporal; we can say of it that the handy "is now," "was at the time," or "will then be" available. When we describe the handy as being intratemporal, we are already presupposing that we understand the handy as handy, understanding this being in the mode of being of handiness. This antecedent understanding of the handiness of the handy should become possible precisely through praesens. The now as a determination of

time qua intratemporality cannot therefore take over the Temporal interpretation of the being of beings, here of handiness. In all now-determination, in all common time-determination of the handy, if indeed the handy is already understood, time is employed in a more original sense. This means that the common characterization of the being of beings in regard to time—temporal, timeless, supratemporal—is untenable for us. It is not an ontological but an ontical interpretation, in which time itself is taken as a being.

Praesens is a more original phenomenon than the now. The instant is more original than the now for the reason that the instant is a mode of the pre-sent, of the enpresenting of something, which can express itself with the saying of "now." We thus come back again to the present and the question arises anew. Is praesens after all identical with present? In no way. We distinguished the *present*, the *enpresenting of . . .*, as one of the *ecstases of temporality*. The name "*praesens*" itself already indicates that we do not mean by it *an ecstatic phenomenon* as we do with present and future, at any rate not the ecstatic phenomenon of temporality with regard to its ecstatic structure. Nevertheless, there exists a *connection between present and praesens* which is not accidental. We have pointed to the fact that the *ecstases of temporality* are not simply removals to . . . in which the direction of the removal goes as it were to the nothing or is as yet indeterminate. Instead, each ecstasis as such has a horizon that is determined by it and that first of all completes that ecstasis' own structure. *Enpresenting*, whether authentic in the sense of the instant or inauthentic, *projects that which it enpresents*, that which can possibly confront us in and for a present, *upon something like praesens*. The ecstasis of the present is as such the condition of possibility of a specific "beyond itself," of transcendence, the *projection upon praesens*. As the condition of possibility of the "beyond itself," the *ecstasis of the present* has within itself a *schematic pre-designation* of the *where out there* this "beyond itself" is. That which lies beyond the ecstasis as such, due to the character of removal and as determined by that character, or, more precisely, that which determines the *whither of the "beyond itself"* as such in general, is *praesens as horizon*. The present projects itself within itself ecstatically upon praesens. Praesens is not identical with present, but, as *basic determination of the horizontal schema of this ecstasis*, it joins in constituting the complete time-structure of the present. Corresponding remarks apply to the other two ecstases, future and past (repetition, forgetting, retaining).

In order not to confuse unduly our vision of the phenomena of temporality, which moreover are themselves so hard to grasp, we shall restrict ourselves to the explication of the present and its ecstatic horizon, *praesens*. *Enpresenting* is the ecstasis in the temporalizing of temporality which understands itself as such upon praesens. As removal to . . . , the present is a

being-open for entities confronting us, which are thus understood antecedently upon praesens. Everything that is encountered in the enpresenting is understood as a presencing entity (*Anwesendes*)—that is, it is understood upon presence—on the basis of the horizon, praesens, already removed in the ecstasis. If handiness and unavailability signify something like presence and absence—praesens modified and modifiable thus and so—the being of the beings encountered within the world is projected praesentially, which means, fundamentally, Temporally. Accordingly, we understand being from the original horizontal schema of the ecstases of temporality. The schemata of the ecstases cannot be structurally detached from them, but the orientation of understanding can certainly be turned primarily toward the schema as such. The temporality which is thus primarily carried away to the horizontal schemata of temporality as conditions of the possibility of the understanding of being, constitutes the content of the general concept of Temporality. [Temporality is temporality with regard to the unity of the horizontal schemata belonging to it, in our case the present with regard to praesens. In each instance the inner Temporal interconnections of the horizontal schemata of time vary also according to the mode of temporalizing of temporality, which always temporalizes itself in the unity of its ecstases in such a way that the precedence of one ecstasis always modifies the others along with it.

In its ecstatic-horizontal unity temporality is the basic condition of the possibility of the *epekeina*, the transcendence constitutive of the *Dasein* itself. Temporality is itself the basic condition of the possibility of all understanding that is founded on transcendence and whose essential structure lies in projection. Looking backward, we can say that temporality is, intrinsically, original self-projection simply as such, so that wherever and whenever understanding exists—we are here disregarding the other moments of the *Dasein*—this understanding is possible only in temporality's self-projection. Temporality exists—*ist da*—as unveiled, because it makes possible the "Da" and its unveiledness in general.

If temporality is self-projection simply as such, as the condition of the possibility of all projecting, then this implies that temporality is in some sense already concomitantly unveiled in all factual projection—that somewhere and somehow time breaks through, even if only in the common understanding or misunderstanding of it. Wherever a *Da*, a here-there, is intrinsically unveiled, temporality manifests itself. However hidden temporality may be, and above all with regard to its Temporality, and however little the *Dasein* explicitly knows about it, however distant it has hitherto lain from all thematic apprehension, its temporalizing holds sway throughout the *Dasein* in a way even more elemental than the light of day as the basic condition of everyday circumspective seeing with our eyes, toward which we do not turn when engaged in everyday commerce with things. Because the ecstatic-horizontal unity of temporality is intrinsically self-

projection pure and simple, because as ecstatic it makes possible all projecting upon . . . and represents, together with the horizon belonging to the ecstasis, the condition of possibility of an upon-which, an out-toward-which in general, it can no longer be asked upon what the schemata can on their part be projected, and so on in infinitum. The series, mentioned earlier, of projections as it were inserted one before the other—understanding of beings, projection upon being, understanding of being, projection upon time—has its end at the horizon of the ecstatic unity of temporality. We cannot establish this here in a more primordial way; to do that we would have to go into the problem of the finiteness of time. At this horizon each ecstasis of time, hence temporality itself, has its end. But this end is nothing but the beginning and starting point for the possibility of all projecting. If anyone wished to protest that the description of that to which the ecstasis as such is carried away, the description of this as horizon, is after all only an interpretation once more of the whither in general to which an ecstasis points, then the answer would be as follows. The concept "horizon" in the common sense presupposes exactly what we are calling the ecstatic horizon. There would be nothing like a horizon for us if there were not ecstatic openness for . . . and a schematic determination of that openness, say, in the sense of *praesens*. The same holds for the concept of the schema.

Fundamentally it must be noted that if we define temporality as the original constitution of the *Dasein* and thus as the origin of the possibility of the understanding of being, then Temporality as origin is necessarily richer and more pregnant than anything that may arise from it. This makes manifest a peculiar circumstance, which is relevant throughout the whole dimension of philosophy, namely, that within the ontological sphere the possible is higher than everything actual. All origination and all genesis in the field of the ontological is not growth and unfolding but degeneration, since everything arising arises, that is, in a certain way runs away, removes itself from the superior force of the source. A being can be uncovered as a being of the ontological type of the handy, it can be encountered in our commerce with it as the being *which* it is and *how* it is in itself, only if and when this uncovering and commerce with it are illuminated by a *praesens* somehow understood. This *praesens* is the horizontal schema of the ecstasis which determines primarily the temporalizing of the temporality of all dealings with the handy. We did indeed show that the temporality of dealing with equipment is a retentive-expectant enpresenting. The ecstasis of the present is the controlling ecstasis in the temporality of commerce with the handy. It is for this reason that the being of the handy—namely, handiness—is understood primarily by way of *praesens*.

The result of our considerations thus far, which were intended to serve to exhibit the Temporality of being, can be summarized in a single sentence.

The handiness of the handy, the being of this kind of beings, is understood as praesens, a praesens which, as non-conceptually understandable, is already unveiled in the self-projection of temporality, by means of whose temporalizing anything like existent commerce with entities handy and extant [at hand] becomes possible.

Handiness formally implies praesens, presence [Anwesenheit], but a praesens of a peculiar sort. The primarily praesensial schema belonging to handiness as to a specific mode of being requires a more particular determination with regard to its praesensial content. Since, without complete mastery of the phenomenological method and above all without security of procedure in this problem area, the understanding of the Temporal interpretation continually runs into difficulties, let us try to procure indirectly at least an idea of how a wealth of complex structures is implicit in the content of the praesens belonging to handiness.

Everything positive becomes particularly clear when seen from the side of the privative. We cannot now pursue the reasons why that is so. Incidentally speaking, they lie equally in the nature of temporality and in that of the negation rooted in it. If the positive becomes particularly clarified by way of the privative, then for our problem this means that the Temporal interpretation of handiness in its sense of being must be more clearly attainable in orientation toward non-handiness. To understand this characterization of handiness from the direction of non-handiness, we must take note that the beings we encounter in everyday commerce have in a preeminent way the character of *unobtrusiveness*. We do not always and continually have explicit perception of the things surrounding us in a familiar environment, certainly not in such a way that we would be aware of them expressly as handy. It is precisely because an explicit awareness and assurance of their being at hand does not occur that we have them around us in a peculiar way, just as they are in themselves. In the indifferent imperturbability of our customary commerce with them, they become accessible precisely with regard to their unobtrusive presence. The presupposition for the possible equanimity of our dealing with things is, among others, the *uninterrupted quality* of that commerce. It must not be held up in its progress. At the basis of this undisturbed imperturbability of our commerce with things, there lies a peculiar temporality which makes it possible to take a handy equipmental contexture in such a way that we lose ourselves in it. The temporality of dealing with equipment is primarily an enpresenting. But, according to what was previously said, there belongs to it a specific praesensial constitution of the horizon of the present, on the basis of which the specific presence of the handy, in distinction, say, from what is merely at hand, extant, becomes antecedently intelligible. The undisturbed character of imperturbable commerce with the handy becomes visible as such if we contrast it with

the disturbed quality of the commerce, and indeed a disturbance that proceeds from the being itself with which we are dealing.

Equipmental contexture has the characteristic that the individual pieces of equipment are correlated among themselves with each other, not only in general with reference to the inherent character of each but also in such a way that each piece of equipment has the place belonging to it. *The place of a piece of equipment* within an equipmental contexture is always determined with regard to the handy quality of the handy thing prescribed and required by the functionality totality. If a habitual procedure gets interrupted by that with which it is occupied, then the activity halts, and in fact in such a way that the procedure does not simply break off but, as held up, merely dwells explicitly upon that with which it has to do. The most severe case in which a habitual occupation of any sort can be interrupted and brought to a halt occurs when some equipment pertinent to the equipmental contexture is missing. Being missing means the unavailability of something otherwise handy, its un-handiness. The question is, How can something missing fall upon our attention? How can we become aware of something unavailable? How is the uncovering of a missing thing possible? Is there any sort of access to the unavailable and non-handy? Is there a mode of exhibition of what is not handy? Obviously, for we also say "I see some that are not here." What is the mode of access to the unavailable? The peculiar way in which the unavailable is uncovered in a specific mode is *missing it*. How is this kind of comportment ontologically possible? What is the temporality of missing something? Taken formally, missing is the counter-comportment to *finding*. The finding of something, however, is a species of enpresenting something, and consequently not-finding is a not-enpresenting. Is missing then a not-enpresenting, a not-letting something be encountered, an absence and omission of an enpresenting? Is that how the matter really stands? Can missing be a *not-letting-encounter*, although we have already said that it is the *access to the unavailable* as such? Missing is so little a not-enpresenting that its nature lies precisely in a specific mode of enpresenting. Missing is not a not-finding of something. If we do not meet with something, this not-meeting doesn't always have to be a missing it. This is expressed by the circumstance that in such cases we can subsequently say "The thing not met with—I can also miss it." Missing is the not-finding of something we have been expecting as needed. In reference to our dealing with equipment this is the same as saying: what we need in use of the equipment itself. Only in a circumspective letting-function, in which we understand the encountered entity by way of its functionality, its in-order-to relations—in which we expect a for-what and enpresent what is useful in bringing it about—only there can we find that something is missing. Missing is a not-enpresenting, not in the sense of a remaining away of the present, but rather an *100-*

enpresenting as a specific mode of the present in unity with an expecting and retaining of something available. Consequently, to missing, as a specific enpresenting, there corresponds not no horizon at all, but a *specially modified horizon of the present, of praesens*. To the ecstasis of the unenpresenting that makes missing possible there belongs the horizational schema of *absens*. This modification of praesens to absens, in which praesens preserves itself as modified, cannot be interpreted more precisely without entering upon a characterization of this modification in general, that is, upon modification of praesens as not, as negative, and clarifying it in its interconnectedness with time. If circumspective letting-function were not from the very outset an expectance, and if this expectance did not temporalize itself, as an ecstasis, in ecstatic unity with an enpresenting, hence if a pertinent horizational schema were not antecedently unveiled in this ecstatic unity, if the Dasein were not a temporal Dasein in the original sense of time, then the Dasein could never find that something is missing. In other words, there would be lacking the possibility of an essential factor of commerce with and orientation within the intraworldly.

Conversely, the possibility of being surprised by a newly emerging thing which does not appear beforehand in the customary context is grounded in this, that the expectant enpresenting of the handy is unexpectant of something else which stands in a possible functionality connection with what is at first handy. Missing, however, is also not just the uncovering of the non-handly but an explicit enpresenting of what is precisely already and at least still handy. The absential modification, precisely, of the praesens belonging to the enpresenting of commerce [with the handy], the praesens being given with the missing, is what makes the handy become conspicuous. With this a fundamental but difficult problem lays claim to our attention. When we formally call the ab-sensial a negation of the praesensial, may it not be, exactly, that a negative moment is constituting itself in the structure of the being of the handy, that is, primarily in handiness? In fundamental terms, to what extent is a negative, a not, involved in Temporality in general and, conjointly, in temporality? We may even inquire to what extent time itself is the condition of possibility of nullity in general. Because the modification of praesens into absens, of presence into absence—a modification belonging to temporality (to the ecstasis of the present as well as to the other ecstases)—has the character of negativity, of the not, of not-presencing, the question arises as to where in general the root of this not lies. Closer consideration shows that the not and also the essential nature of the not, nullity, likewise can be interpreted only by way of the nature of time and that it is only by starting from this that the possibility of modification—for example, the modification of presence into absence—can be explained. In the end, Hegel is on the track of a fundamental truth when he says that

being and nothing are identical, that is, belong together. Of course, the more radical question is, What makes such a most original belonging-together at all possible?

We are not well enough prepared to penetrate into this obscure region. It will suffice if it becomes clear how only by going back to temporality as Temporality, to the horizon of the ecstases, can light be shed on the interpretation of being—and in the first place the specific mode of being, handiness and extantness.

We may summarize by unfolding backward the foregoing exposition of Temporality. The handiness of the handy is determined by way of a praesens. Praesens belongs as horizontal schema to a present, which temporalizes itself as an ecstasis in the unity of a temporality which, in the case before us, makes possible commerce with the handy. To this comportment to beings there belongs an understanding of being, because the temporalizing of the ecstases—here that of the present—has intrinsically projected itself upon their [the ecstases'] horizon (praesens). The possibility of the understanding of being lies in the circumstance that in making commerce with beings possible as the present, as ecstasis, the present has the horizon of praesens. Temporality in general is ecstatic-horizontal self-projection simply as such, on the basis of which the Dasein's transcendence is possible. Rooted in this transcendence is the Dasein's basic constitution, being-in-the-world, or care, which in turn makes intentionality possible.

The Dasein, however—as we have said over and over—is the being to whose existence the understanding of being belongs. A sufficiently original interpretation of the Dasein's basic constitution in general, the exposition of temporality as such, must furnish the basis for clearing up by means of temporality—or more precisely by means of the horizontal schema of temporality, Temporality—the possibility of understanding being. If, then, philosophical investigation from the beginning of antiquity—we may think, for example, of Parmenides: *to gar auto noein estin te kai einai*, being and thinking are the same; or of Heraclitus: being is the logos—oriented itself toward reason, soul, mind, spirit, consciousness, self-consciousness, subjectivity, this is not an accident and has so little to do with world-view that, instead, the admittedly still hidden basic content of the problems of ontology as such pressed and directed scientific inquiry. The trend toward the "subject"—not always uniformly unequivocal and clear—is based on the fact that philosophical inquiry somehow understood that the basis for every substantial philosophical problem could and had to be procured from an adequate elucidation of the "subject." For our part we have seen positively that an adequate elucidation of the Dasein, achieved by going back to temporality, can alone prepare the ground for meaningfully putting

the question about the possible understanding of being in general. Consequently, in the first part of our critical discussion of the basic ontological problems we pointed positively to the way the trend of inquiry aims at the "subject," how it unconsciously demands a preparatory ontological interpretation of the Dasein.

b) The Kantian interpretation of being and the problematic of Temporality [Temporalität]

Following this exposition of the being of the extant in general in the broadest sense with regard to praesens, we may now return briefly to the *Kantian thesis* and our critique of it, so as to give this critique a more original foundation by the results achieved in the meantime. There will thus emerge an explicit confrontation between the *Kantian interpretation of being* and the *Temporal problematic* which has been developed. Kant's thesis asserts something negative and something positive. Negatively, being is not a real predicate; positively, being equals position, existence (extantness) equals absolute position. Our criticism had to do with the positive content of the thesis. We did not criticize it by opposing to it a so-called different standpoint from which then to play off objections to it. Our aim in reverse was to go along with his thesis and his attempt at the interpretation of being and to inquire, in this attendant examination, what further clarification the thesis, its content, in itself requires if it is to remain tenable as substantiated by the phenomenon itself. Being is position; extantness or, as Kant says, existence [Dasein] is absolute position or perception. We first ran into a characteristic ambiguity in the expression "perception," according to which it means perceiving, perceived, and perceivedness. This ambiguity is not accidental but gives expression to a phenomenal fact. What we call perception has an intrinsic structure that is so multiform-uniform that it makes possible this ambiguity of designation in different respects. What is designated by perception is a phenomenon whose structure is determined by intentionality. Intentionality, self-relation to something, seemed at first sight to be something trivial. However, the phenomenon proved to be puzzling as soon as we recognized clearly that a correct understanding of this structure has to be on its guard against two common errors which are not yet overcome even in phenomenology (erroneous objectivizing, erroneous subjectivizing). Intentionality is not an extant relation between an extant subject and an extant object but is constitutive for the relational character of the subject's comportment as such. As the structure of subject-comportment, it is not something immanent to the subject which would then need supplementation by a transcendence; instead, transcendence, and

hence intentionality, belongs to the nature of the entity that comports itself intentionally. Intentionality is neither something objective nor something subjective in the traditional sense.

In addition, we gained further essential insight regarding a factor belonging essentially to intentionality. Not only do *intentio* and *intentum* belong to it but also each *intentio* has a directional sense, which must be interpreted with reference to perception as follows. Extantness must be antecedently understood if an extant entity is to be uncoverable as such; in the perceivedness of the perceived there is already present an understanding of the extantness of the extant.

And with regard to perceivedness, too, there was the puzzle which recurred in the fourth thesis: perceivedness is a mode of uncoveredness and unveiledness, hence of truth. The perceivedness of the perceived is a determination of the perceived extant entity and yet it has the mode of being not of that entity but rather of the percipient *Dasein*. Perceivedness is in a certain way objective, in a certain way subjective, and yet neither of the two. In our first consideration of intentionality we stressed that the question how directive sense, the understanding of being, belongs to *intentio*, and how *intentio* itself is possible as this necessary reference, is not only unanswered in phenomenology but not even asked. This question will occupy us later.

We have thus found the answers for the positive completion of our earlier critique. When Kant says that being equals perception, then in view of the ambiguity of perception this cannot mean that being equals perceiving; nor can it mean that being equals the perceived, the entity itself. But also it cannot mean that being equals perceivedness, equals positedness. For perceivedness already presupposes an understanding of the being of the perceived entities.

We can now say that *the unveiledness of an entity presupposes an illumination, an understanding of the being of the entity*. The unveiledness of something is intrinsically related to what is unveiled; in the perceivedness of the perceived entity its being is already concomitantly understood. The being of a being cannot be identified with the perceivedness of the perceived. We saw with reference to the perceivedness of the perceived that on the one hand it is a determination of the perceived entity but on the other hand it belongs to the perceiving—it is in a certain way objective and in a certain way subjective. But the separation of subject and object is inadequate; it does not make possible any access to the unity of the phenomenon.

We know, however, that this self-direction toward something, *intentionality*, is possible only if the *Dasein* as such is intrinsically *transcendent*. It can be transcendent only if the *Dasein*'s basic constitution is grounded originally in *ecstatic-horizonal temporality*. The whole of perception's intentional

structure of perceiving, perceived, and perceivedness—and that of every other mode of intentionality—is grounded in the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality. In perceiving, the Dasein, in accordance with its own comportmental sense, lets that toward which it is directed, the [intended] entity, be encountered in such a way that it understands this entity in its incarnate character as an in-itself. This understanding is also present when perception takes the form of illusion. In hallucination, too, the hallucinated [object] is understood in conformity with the directional sense of the hallucination as an illusory perception, as something incarnately present. Perception, as intentional comportment having the directional sense mentioned, is a distinctive mode of the enpresenting of something. *The ecstasis of the present is the foundation for the specifically intentional transcendence of the perception of extant entities.* To an ecstasis as such, to the carrying away, there belongs a horizonal schema—as, for instance, praesens is the horizonal schema for the present. An understanding of being can already be present in intentional perception because the temporalizing of the ecstasis as such, enpresenting as such, understands in its own horizon, thus by way of praesens, that which it enpresents, understanding it as something present [Anwesendes]. Put otherwise, a directional sense can be present in the intentionality of perception only if perception's direction understands itself by way of the horizon of the temporal mode that makes possible perceiving as such: the horizon of praesens. When Kant says, therefore, that existence—that is, for us, extantness, being on or at hand—is perception, this thesis is extremely rough and misleading; all the same it points to the correct direction of the problem. On our interpretation, "being is perception" now means: being is an intentional comportment of a peculiar sort, namely, enpresenting; it is an ecstasis in the unity of temporality with a schema of its own, praesens. "Being equals perception," when interpreted in original phenomenological terms, means: being equals presence, praesens. At the same time, it thus turns out that Kant interprets being and being-existent exactly as ancient philosophy does, for which that which is is the *hupokeimenon*, which has the character of *ousia*. In Aristotle's time *ousia* in its everyday, pre-philosophical sense is still equivalent to property, estate, but as a philosophical term it signifies presence. Of course, like Kant, the Greeks had hardly the least knowledge that they were interpreting being in the sense of the extant in its extantness, its mere being at hand, by way of time, or from what original context they had drawn this interpretation of being. Instead, they followed the immediate propensity of the existent Dasein, which, in its everyday mode of being, understands beings first of all in the sense of the extant and understands the being of beings in an inchoate Temporal manner. Reference to the fact that the Greeks understood being by way of the present, by means of praesens, is a confirmation not to be

overestimated for our interpretation of the possibility of understanding being by time; but it nevertheless does not establish it basically. Still, it is testimony that in our own interpretation of being we are attempting nothing other than the repetition of the problems of ancient philosophy in order to radicalize them in this repetition by their own selves.

We can continue to clarify *the Temporal content of Kant's thesis* that being equals perception by a brief explication of its negative content, according to which being is not a real predicate, does not belong to the *res* or real thing-content of the being. Being, existence, is for Kant, rather, a *logical predicate*. He says once in a posthumously published manuscript on metaphysics: "Accordingly, all concepts are predicates; however, they signify either things or their position: the former is a real predicate, the latter merely a logical predicate."¹ In Temporal language, this means that a being can no doubt be found as extant in an enpresenting, but this enpresenting itself does not let the *being* of the extant entity be encountered as such. And yet, what is meant by "the being of that which an enpresenting lets be encountered" becomes intelligible, precisely, only in one with the enpresenting of something extant and is already antecedently intelligible in that enpresenting. What Kant calls a "logical predicate" can only be understood in an enpresenting if praesens belongs to the enpresenting's ecstatic projection; and only from this as its source can that predicate be drawn for a predication. Kant says: "Anyone who denies existence [the extantness of a being] removes the thing with all its predicates. Existence [extantness] can indeed be a logical predicate but never a real predicate of a thing."² To deny the existence, extantness, of a being, to assert non-existence, means to say "A is not extant." Kant calls this denial of extantness removing the being with all its predicates. Conversely then—it could be said in supplementation—the assertion "A exists" is not a removing, not a *removere* but an *admovere*. *Admovere*, however, means "to draw near," "to bring or place near," "to let encounter," an enpresenting of a being as such. The addition "as such" means: the entity taken in its own self, not with regard to any relation to another and not with regard to relations subsisting within its essential content, but the entity in itself, not relatively but absolutely in its own self. Kant therefore defines existence as absolute position. Position is to be interpreted here again as we interpreted perception: not the positing and not the posited and also not positedness; instead, being is that which is already understood in positing as the letting-stand of something on its own self; it is what is already understood in positing as a specific intentional

1. Academy edition, vol. 17 (vol. 4 of div. 3), No. 4017, p. 387 [Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1902)]

2. *Ibid.*

comportment according to its directional sense: the thing's being-stood-upon-its-own-self with all its predicates, the self-determined presence of a thing. Only through Temporal interpretation does Kant's assertion that being equals position, so striking at first, acquire a realizable sense, which the Neo-Kantians have fundamentally misunderstood. Kant obviously did not intend his proposition that being equals position to mean that the subject would first create the thing and bring it into being out of its own self; instead, he surely understood the equivalence of being and position in the way we have interpreted him, without having the possibility of bringing this understanding into explicit conceptual form, because he lacked the means for an original interpretation. Being as a so-called logical predicate already lies latently at the basis of everything real. It is precisely because Kant bases the problem of being on the proposition, in a genuinely Greek way (*logos*), that he must of necessity fail to recognize the essential differences and therefore [the essential] interrelations. Real and logical predication differ not only by the content of the predicates but primarily by the understanding that receives expression through the corresponding assertion as the interpretation of what is understood. In Kant the phenomenologically decisive thing remains obscure, namely, that in asserting existence, extantness, some being is indeed always intended, but the understanding does not look to that entity as such in order to derive being from it as an existent predicate. The glance of understanding in the assertion of being looks toward something else, which, however, is already understood precisely in commerce with beings and in access to them. Expressed in Temporal language, the enpresenting of something has, as such, a reference to beings; but this means that as ecstasis it lets that for which it is open be encountered in the light of its own—the enpresenting's—horizon, which thus is itself assertible in the enpresenting of something. If we stay within the assertion of the being of an existent entity, "A is," but existence [in the sense of extantness] is not a real determination of the existent, there remains to us the possibility of turning back from the real reference to the subject. However, this is not the case, because being means *praesens* and *praesens* constitutes precisely the ecstatic horizon which the *Dasein*, as temporal already understands, and in fact understands in the ecstasis, in the removal, and therefore not at all in reflection on the subject. In reference to the Kantian interpretation of being as logical predicate, it therefore becomes doubtful whether the term "logical" is valid here. But the reason why Kant calls being a logical predicate is connected with his ontological, that is, transcendental, mode of inquiry, and it leads us to a fundamental confrontation with this type of inquiry, which we shall discuss in the context of the interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* next semester. With reference to the Temporal interpretation of the being of the extant by means of *praesens*, in comparison with the Kantian

interpretation of being as position, it should have become clear how only a phenomenological interpretation affords the possibility of opening up a positive understanding of the Kantian problems and his solutions of them, which means putting the Kantian problem on a phenomenal basis. We have not yet discussed the question of how far the manner of conducting our investigations hitherto has been *phenomenological* and what “phenomenological” means here. This will be dealt with in connection with the expositions of the following paragraph.

**§22. Being and beings.
The ontological difference**

a) temporality [Zeitlichkeit], Temporality [Temporalität], and ontological difference

As ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporalizing, temporality is the condition of possibility of transcendence and thus also the condition of possibility of the intentionality that is founded in transcendence. Because of its ecstatic character, temporality makes possible the being of a being which as a self deals existentially with others and, as thus existent, deals with beings as handy or as extant. Temporality makes possible the Dasein's comportment as a comportment toward beings, whether toward itself, toward others, or toward the handy or the extant. Because of the unity of the horizonal schemata that belongs to its ecstatic unity, temporality makes possible the understanding of being, so that it is only in the light of this understanding of being that the Dasein can comport itself toward its own self, toward others as beings, and toward the extant as beings. Because temporality constitutes the basic constitution of the being we call the Dasein, to which entity the understanding of being belongs as determination of its existence, and because time constitutes the original self-projection pure and simple, being is already always unveiled—hence beings are either disclosed or uncovered—in every factual Dasein, since it exists. The pertinent horizonal schemata are projected with and in the temporalizing of the ecstases—this is intrinsically involved in the nature of removal to . . .—and in such a way, in fact, that the ecstatically, hence intentionally, structured comportments toward something always understand this something as a being, hence in its being. But it is not necessary that comportment toward a being, even though it understands the being of that being, must explicitly distinguish this understood being of the being from the being toward which it comports itself, and it is still less necessary that this distinction between being and a being should be comprehended conceptually at all. On the contrary, being

itself is even treated at first like a being and explained by means of determinations of beings, as at the beginning of ancient philosophy. When Thales answers the question What is that which is? by saying "Water," he is here explaining beings by means of a being, something that is, although at bottom he is seeking to determine what that which is, is as a being. In the question he therefore understands something like being, but in the answer he interprets being as a being. This type of interpretation of being then remains customary in ancient philosophy for a long time afterward, even after the essential advances made by Plato and Aristotle in formulating the problems, and at bottom this interpretation has remained the usual one in philosophy right down to the present day.

In the question as to what that which is, is as something that is—what a being is as a being—being is treated like a being. Nevertheless, although unsuitably interpreted, it is still made a problem. Somehow the Dasein knows about something like being. Since it exists, the Dasein understands being and comports itself toward beings. The distinction between being and beings is *there [ist da]*, latent in the Dasein and its existence, even if not in explicit awareness. The distinction is *there, ist da* [i.e. exists]; that is to say, it has the mode of being of the Dasein: it belongs to existence. Existence means, as it were, "to be in the performance of this distinction." Only a soul that can make this distinction has the aptitude, going beyond the animal's soul, to become the soul of a human being. The distinction between being and beings is temporalized in the temporalizing of temporality. Only because this distinction is always already temporalizing itself on the basis of temporality and conjointly with temporality and is thus somehow projected, and thus unveiled, can it be known expressly and explicitly and, as known, be interrogated and, as interrogated, investigated and, as investigated, conceptually comprehended. The distinction between being and beings is *pre-ontologically* there, without an explicit concept of being, *latent in the Dasein's existence*. As such it can become *an explicitly understood difference*. On the basis of temporality there belongs to the Dasein's existence the immediate unity of the understanding of being and comportment toward beings. Only because this distinction belongs to existence can the distinction become explicit in different ways. Because when this distinction between being and beings becomes explicit the terms distinguished contrast with each other, being thereby becomes a possible theme for conceptual comprehension (*logos*). For this reason we call the distinction between being and beings, when it is carried out explicitly, the *ontological difference* [*die ontologische Differenz*]. This explicit accomplishment and the development of the ontological difference is therefore also, since it is founded on the Dasein's existence, not arbitrary and incidental but a basic comportment of the Dasein in which ontology, that is, philosophy, constitutes itself as a science.

To comprehend the possibility and character of this constituting of philosophy as science in the Dasein's existence, a few prefatory remarks are necessary about the concept of science in general. In connection with this we shall try to show that philosophy as a science is no arbitrary whim of the Dasein's but that its free possibility, its existentiell necessity, is founded on the Dasein's essential nature.

b) temporality [Zeitlichkeit] and the objectification of beings (positive science) and of being (philosophy)

The *concept of philosophy*, as well as that of the *non-philosophical sciences*, can be expounded only by way of a properly understood concept of the Dasein. It is only by this exposition that a clear foundation can be given for what we asserted dogmatically at the beginning of these lectures when we differentiated philosophy as a science from the formation of a *world-view* on the one hand and from the positive sciences on the other. Science is a kind of cognition. Cognition has the basic character of *unveiling*. We characterized the unveiledness of something as truth. Science is a kind of cognizing for the sake of unveiledness as such. Truth is a *determination* (a warranty or responsibility) of the Dasein, that is, a free and freely seized possibility of its existence. Science, as a specific type of cognition for the sake of unveiledness, is a possibility of existing in the sense of a *task* that can be freely taken up and freely worked out. Science is cognizing for the sake of unveiledness as such. What is to be unveiled should become *manifest*, solely in view of its own self, in whatever its pure essential character and specific mode of being may be. What is to be unveiled is the sole court of appeal of its determinability, of the concepts that are suitable for interpreting it. As a specific type of cognition thus described, science constitutes itself essentially on the basis of what is in each instance already in some way given. What is already unveiled pre-scientifically can become an *object* of scientific investigation. A *scientific investigation* constitutes itself in the *objectification* of what has somehow already been unveiled beforehand.

What does this mean? The objectification will differ depending on *what* and *how* something is given. Now we see that with the factual existence of the Dasein *beings* are always already unveiled or given; and in the understanding of being that goes with them, *being* is also already unveiled or given. Beings and being are unveiled, though still without differentiation, nevertheless with equal originality. Moreover, with the factual existence of the Dasein two essential fundamental possibilities of objectification are posited, both of which—since being is always the being of a being, and a being as a being always is—are intrinsically related to each other regardless of their fundamental diversity. Because the carrying out of the distinction

between being and beings is always already proceeding in the Dasein's temporality. *temporality is the root and the ground for both the possibility and, properly understood, the factual necessity of the objectification of the given beings and the given being.* The given beings are to be met with directly in the factual Dasein in the direction in which its existentiell comportment tends. Beings are given in the distinctive sense that it is exactly they which lie in view in a primary way for the Dasein and its existence. Beings are just simply present there: that which is is the *positum* [what is laid down there], and indeed it is present not only as nature in the broadest sense but also as Dasein itself. The positive sciences constitute themselves in the objectification of beings where the objectification holds itself in the direction of the tendency of everyday direct apprehension.

Being is indeed also already unveiled in the understanding of being; nevertheless, the Dasein as existent does not comport itself toward being as such directly, not even to its own being as such in the sense that it might perhaps understand its being ontologically; but since the Dasein is occupied with its own ability-to-be, this can-be is understood primarily as the can-be of the being that in each case I myself am. Being is, to be sure, also familiar and consequently in some manner given, but it is not to be met with in the direction of tendency of everyday-factual existence as comportment toward beings. The objectification of that which is, in which the positive sciences variously constitute themselves in conformity with the intrinsic content and mode of being of the specific region of being, has its center in the projection, in each case, of the ontological constitution of the beings which are to become objects. This projection of the ontological constitution of a region of beings, which is the essential nature of the objectification that is foundational for the positive sciences, is nevertheless not an ontological investigation of the being of the beings in question, but still has the character of pre-ontological awareness, into which, to be sure, an already available knowledge of ontological determinations of the relevant beings can enter and factually always does enter. It was thus that modern natural science constituted itself in the objectification of nature by way of a mathematical projection of nature. In this projection the basic determinations were exhibited which belong to nature in general, although their ontological character was not realized. Galileo, who accomplished this primary step, developed this projection from and in a knowledge about basic ontological concepts of nature like motion, space, time, matter, which he took over from ancient philosophy or from Scholasticism, without *merely* taking them over in this specific form. We cannot here enter further into the problems of the objectification that is constitutive for the positive sciences in the sense of the projection of the constitution of being. We need only keep in mind that the positive sciences of beings, too, precisely in what first of all gives them

their validity, *relate necessarily if only pre-ontologically to the being of beings*. This, however, does not mean that they already explicitly encroach upon the domain of ontology.

Our question aims at the objectification of being as such, at the second essential possibility of objectification, in which philosophy is supposed to constitute itself as science.

Being is familiar in the Dasein's factual existence—whether scientific or pre-scientific—but the factual Dasein is disoriented with reference to it. Beings are not only familiar but present, right on hand. The Dasein comports itself directly only to beings, for which the understanding of being is controlling. Fundamentally the objectification of being is always possible, since being is in some way unveiled. But the direction of the possible projection of being as such is too doubtful, indefinite, and insecure to gather it as an object expressly from this projection. After our earlier discussions, no further allusions are needed to make clear that at first and for a long time original temporality, not to say Temporality, and hence that upon which we have projected being in order to make being the object of Temporal interpretation, remains hidden. But it is not only temporality that is concealed although something like time always announces itself; even more well-known phenomena, like that of transcendence, the phenomena of world and being-in-the-world, are covered over. Nevertheless, they are not completely hidden, for the Dasein knows about something like ego and other. The concealment of transcendence is not a total unawareness but, what is much more fateful, a misunderstanding, a faulty interpretation. Faulty interpretations, misunderstandings, put much more stubborn obstacles in the way of authentic cognition than a total ignorance. However, these faulty interpretations of transcendence, of the basic relationship of the Dasein to beings and to itself, are no mere defects of thought or acumen. They have their reason and their necessity in the Dasein's own historical existence. In the end, these faulty interpretations *must be made, so that the Dasein may reach the path to the true phenomena by correcting them*. Without our knowing where the faulty interpretation lies, we can be quietly persuaded that there is also a faulty interpretation concealed within the Temporal interpretation of being as such, and again no arbitrary one. It would run counter to the sense of philosophizing and of every science if we were not willing to understand that a fundamental untruth dwells with what is actually seen and genuinely interpreted. The history of philosophy bears witness how, with regard to the horizon essentially necessary for them and to the assurance of that horizon, all ontological interpretations are more like a groping about than an inquiry clear in its method. Even the basic act of the constitution of ontology, of philosophy, the objectification of being, *the projection of being upon the horizon of its understandability, and precisely this*

basic act, is delivered up to uncertainty and stands continually in danger of being reversed, because this objectification of being must necessarily move in a projective direction that runs counter to everyday comportment toward beings. For this reason the projection of being itself necessarily becomes an ontical projection, or else it takes the direction toward thought, comprehension, soul, mind, spirit, subject, without understanding the necessity of an originally preparatory ontological disposition of precisely these areas, in other words, the necessity of being serious about its work. For it is said that subject and consciousness must not be reified, must not be treated as a purely extant thing; this has been heard for a long time at every philosophical street-corner; but now even this is no longer heard.

Our account of the ontological interpretation of the handy in its handiness showed that we project being upon praesens, hence upon Temporality. Because Temporal projection makes possible an objectification of being and assures conceptualizability, and thereby constitutes ontology in general as a science, we call this science in distinction from the positive sciences the *Temporal science*. All of its interpretations are developed by following the guidance of an adequately presented temporality in the sense of Temporality. All the propositions of ontology are *Temporal propositions*. Their truths unveil structures and possibilities of being in the light of Temporality. All ontological propositions have the character of *Temporal truth, veritas temporalis*.

By our analysis of being-in-the-world, we showed that transcendence belongs to the Dasein's ontological constitution. The Dasein is itself the transcendent. It oversteps itself—it surpasses itself in transcendence. Transcendence first of all makes possible existence in the sense of comporting oneself to oneself as a being, to others as beings, and to beings in the sense of either the handy or the extant. Thus transcendence as such, in the sense of our interpretation, is the first condition of possibility of the understanding of being, the first and nearest upon which an ontology has to project being. The objectification of being can first be accomplished in regard to transcendence. The science of being thus constituted we call the science that inquires and interprets in the light of transcendence properly understood: *transcendental science*. To be sure, this concept of transcendental science does not coincide directly with the Kantian; but we are certainly in a position to explicate by means of the *more original concept of transcendence* the Kantian idea of the transcendental and of philosophy as transcendental philosophy in their basic tendencies.

We showed, however, that transcendence, on its part, is rooted in temporality and thus in Temporality. Hence *time is the primary horizon of transcendental science, of ontology, or, in short, it is the transcendental horizon*. It is for this reason that the title of the first part of the investigation of *Being*

and Time reads "The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question about being." Ontology is at bottom Temporal science; therefore philosophy, understood in the proper sense and not taken straightway in a Kantian sense, is transcendental philosophy—but not conversely.

c) Temporality [Temporalität] and a priori of being.
The phenomenological method of ontology

Because they are assertions about being in the light of time properly understood, all ontological propositions are Temporal propositions. It is only because ontological propositions are Temporal propositions that they can and must be *a priori propositions*. It is only because ontology is a Temporal science that something like the a priori appears in it. A priori means "from the earlier" or "the earlier." "Earlier" is patently a *time-determination*. If we have been observant, it must have occurred to us that in our explications we employed no word more frequently than the expression "already." It "already antecedently" lies at the ground; "it must always already be understood beforehand"; where beings are encountered, being has "already beforehand" been projected. In using all of these temporal, really Temporal, terms we have in mind something that the tradition since Plato calls the a priori, even if it may not use the very term itself. In the preface to his *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* [Metaphysical principles of natural science], Kant says: "Now to cognize something a priori means to cognize it from its mere possibility."¹ Consequently, a priori means that which makes beings as beings possible in *what and how* they are. But why is this possibility or, more precisely, this determinant of possibility labeled by the term "earlier"? Obviously not because we recognize it earlier than beings. For what we experience first and foremost is beings, that which is; we recognize being only later or maybe even not at all. This time-determination "earlier" cannot refer to the temporal order given by the common concept of time in the sense of intratemporality. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that a time-determination is present in the concept of the a priori, the earlier. But, because it is not seen how the interpretation of being necessarily occurs in the horizon of time, the effort has to be made to explain away the time-determination by means of the a priori. Some go so far as to say that the a priori—the essentialities, the determination of beings in their being—is extratemporal, supratemporal, timeless. That which does the enabling, the possibilities are characterized

1. Kant, *Werke* (Cassirer), vol. 4, p. 372.

by a time-determination, the earlier, because in this a priori nothing of time is supposed to be present, hence *lucus a non lucendo*? Believe it if you wish.

On the other hand, it is also characteristic of the state of philosophical inquiry today and has been for a long time that, while there has been extensive controversy about whether or not the a priori can be known, it has never occurred to the protagonists to ask first what could really have been meant by the fact that a time-determination turns up here and why it must turn up at all. To be sure, as long as we orient ourselves toward the common concept of time we are at an impasse, and negatively it is no less than consistent to deny dogmatically that the a priori has anything to do with time. However, time in the sense commonly understood, which is our topic here, is indeed only one derivative, even if legitimate, of the original time, on which the Dasein's ontological constitution is based. *It is only by means of the Temporality of the understanding of being that it can be explained why the ontological determinations of being have the character of apriority.* We shall attempt to sketch this briefly, so far as it permits of being done along general lines.

We have seen that all comportment toward beings already understands being, and not just incidentally: being must necessarily be understood precursively (pre-cedently). The possibility of comportment toward beings demands a precursory understanding of being, and the possibility of the understanding of being demands in its turn a precursory projection upon time. But where is the final stage of this demand for ever further precursory conditions? It is temporality itself as the basic constitution of the Dasein. Temporality, due to its horizontal-ecstatic nature, makes possible *at once* the understanding of being and comportment toward beings; therefore, that which does the enabling as well as the enablings themselves, that is, the possibilities in the Kantian sense, are "temporal," that is to say, Temporal, in their specific interconnection. Because the original determinant of possibility, the origin of possibility itself, is time, time temporalizes itself as the absolutely earliest. *Time is earlier than any possible earlier* of whatever sort, because it is the basic condition for an earlier as such. And because time as the source of all enablings (possibilities) is the earliest, all possibilities as such in their possibility-making function have the character of the earlier. That is to say, they are a priori. But, from the fact that time is the earliest in the sense of being the possibility of every earlier and of every a priori foundational ordering, it does not follow that time is ontically the first being; nor does it follow that time is forever and eternal, quite apart from the impropriety of calling time a being at all.

We have heard that the Dasein dwells daily and first and for the most part solely with beings, even though it must already have understood being in that very process and in order to accomplish it. However, because the

Dasein spends itself on and loses itself in that which is, in beings, both in itself, the Dasein, and in the sort of beings that it itself is not, the Dasein knows nothing about its having already understood being. Factually the existent Dasein has forgotten this prius. Accordingly, if being, which has already always been understood "earlier," is to become an express object, then the objectification of this prius, which was forgotten, must have the character of a coming back to what was already once and already earlier understood. Plato, the discoverer of the a priori, also saw this character of the objectification of being when he characterized it as anamnesis, recollection. We shall furnish only some brief evidence for this from one of the main dialogues for these contexts, the *Phaedrus*.

Ou gar he ge mepote idousa ten aletheian eis tode hexei to schema. Dei gar anthron sunienai kat' eidos legomenon, ek pollon ion aistheseon eis hen logismo sunairoumenon · touto d'estin anamnesis ekeinon ha pot' eiden hemon he psuche sumporeutheisa theo kai huperidoussa ha nun einai phamen, kai anakupsasa eis to on ontos. Dio de dikaios mone pteroutai he tou philosophou dianoiā · pros gar ekeinois aei estin mneme kata dunamin, pros hoisper theos on theios estin.²

For a soul which has never seen the truth, which does not understand the truth in general as such, can never take on the human form; for man, in conformity with his mode of being, must understand by addressing that which is in regard to its essence, its being, in such a way that starting from the multiplicity of perceived [beings] he draws it back to a single concept. This conceptual cognition of beings in their being is a recollection of what our soul saw previously, that is, precursively—what it saw when following God and thus taking no notice of what we now, in everyday existence, call that which is, and in this disregard raising up its head above beings toward the true being, toward being itself. Therefore, it is just that the thinking of the philosopher alone is truly fitted with wings, for this thinking, as far as possible, always stays with the things in which God, abiding, is for that very reason divine. Plato points above all to the *Phaedo* for the corresponding interpretation of learning and knowing in general and the foundation of learning in recollection: hoti hemin he mathesis ouk allo ti e anamnesis tugchanei ousa;³ learning itself is nothing but recollection. The ascent to being from the depths of beings, by means of conceptual thought of the essence, has the character of the recollection of something already previously seen. Expressed without the myth of the soul, this means that being has the character of the prius which the human being, who is familiar first and foremost merely with beings, has forgotten. The liberation of the

2. Plato (Burnet), *Phaedrus*, 249^a:5-6. [In *Platonis opera*, ed. John Burnet, vol. 2.]

3. Plato (Burnet), *Phaedo*, 72^c:5 f. [In *Platonis opera*, ed. John Burnet, vol. 1.]

fettered cave dwellers from the cave and their turning around to the light is nothing but a drawing oneself back from this oblivion to the recollection of the prius, in which there lies enclosed the enabling of understanding being itself.

By means of this reference we have made known the connection of apriority with Temporality merely in its basic features. All a priori Temporal—all philosophical—concept formation is fundamentally opposed to that of the positive sciences. To recognize this adequately, further penetration is required into the mystery of apriority and the method of cognition of the a priori. The center of development of ontological inquiry in general lies in the exposition of the Dasein's temporality, specifically in regard to its Temporal function. Here we must in all sobriety understand clearly that temporality is in no way something that is to be beheld in some superabundant and enigmatic intuition; it discloses itself only in conceptual labor of a specific sort. But also it is not merely hypothetically supposed at the beginning without our having some vision of it itself. We can follow it quite well in the basic features of its constitution, unveil the possibilities of its temporalization and its modifications, but only in going back from the factually concrete nature of the Dasein's existence, and this means in and from orientation to that being [Seienden] which is unveiled along with the Dasein itself and is encountered for the Dasein.

Surveying the whole we note that in the Dasein's existence there is an essentially twofold possibility of objectification of the given. Factually, the possibility of two basic types of science is initially established with the Dasein's existence: objectification of beings as positive science; objectification of being as Temporal or transcendental science, ontology, philosophy. There exists no comportment to beings that would not understand being. No understanding of being is possible that would not root in a comportment toward beings. Understanding of being and comportment to beings do not come together only afterward and by chance; always already latently present in the Dasein's existence, they unfold as summoned from the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality and as made possible by it in their belonging together. As long as this original belonging together of comportment toward beings and understanding of being is not conceived by means of temporality, philosophical inquiry remains exposed to a double danger, to which it has succumbed over and over again in its history until now. Either everything ontical is dissolved into the ontological (Hegel), without insight into the ground of possibility of ontology itself; or else the ontological is denied altogether and explained away ontically, without an understanding of the ontological presuppositions which every ontical explanation already harbors as such within itself. This double uncertainty pervading the whole of the philosophical tradition until the present time, on

the side of the ontological as well as that of the ontical, this lack of a radically founded understanding of the problem, also has over and over again either impeded the assurance and development of the method of ontology, of scientific philosophy, or prematurely distorted any genuine approaches that were actually achieved.

As a method however, the *method of ontology* is nothing but the sequence of the steps involved in the approach to being as such and the elaboration of its structures. We call this method of ontology *phenomenology*. In more precise language, phenomenological investigation is explicit effort applied to the method of ontology. However, such endeavors, their success or failure, depend primarily, in accordance with our discussion, on how far phenomenology has assured for itself the object of philosophy—how far, in correspondence with its own principle, it is unbiased enough in the face of what the things themselves demand. We cannot now enter any further into the essential and fundamental constituent parts of this method. In fact, we have applied it constantly. What we would have to do would be merely to go over the course already pursued, but now with explicit reflection on it. But what is most essential is first of all to have traversed the whole path once, so as, for one thing, to learn to wonder scientifically about the mystery of things and, for another, to banish all illusions, which settle down and nest with particular stubbornness precisely in philosophy.

There is no such thing as *the one* phenomenology, and if there could be such a thing it would never become anything like a philosophical technique. For implicit in the essential nature of all genuine method as a path toward the disclosure of objects is the tendency to order itself always toward that which it itself discloses. When a method is genuine and provides access to the objects, it is precisely then that the progress made by following it and the growing originality of the disclosure will cause the very method that was used to become necessarily obsolete. The only thing that is truly new in science and in philosophy is the genuine questioning and struggle with things which is at the service of this questioning.

In this struggle, however, and even without useless polemics, the conflict is carried on with what today more than ever before threatens philosophy from all the precincts of intellectual life: the formation of world-views, magic, and the positive sciences that have forgotten their own limits. In Kant's time the forces mentioned first—the formation of world-views, magic, myth—were called philosophy of feeling, *Gefühlsphilosophie*. What Kant, the first and last scientific philosopher in the grand style since Plato and Aristotle, had to say against the philosophy of feeling may well close these lectures. If our course itself never attained it, Kant's example may nevertheless summon us to sobriety and real work. We quote from the

short essay "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (On a genteel tone recently sounded in philosophy) (1796). Kant here comes to speak of Plato and distinguishes between Plato the academic and Plato—as he says—the "letter-writer." "Plato the academic, therefore, though not of his own fault (for he employed his intellectual intuitions only backward for the purpose of *elucidating* the possibility of a synthetic cognition a priori, not forward in order to *expand* it by those Ideas which were legible in the divine understanding), became the father of all enthusiasm in philosophy. But I would not wish to confuse Plato the letterwriter (recently translated into German) with the academic."⁴ Kant quotes one passage from Plato's seventh epistle, which he adduces as evidence for Plato himself as an enthusiast.

Who does not see here the mystagogue, who gushes not merely for himself but is at the same time a clubbist and in speaking to his adepts in contrast with the people (meaning all the uninitiated) really *puts on airs* with his alleged philosophy! May I be permitted to cite a few modern examples of this elegance. In modern mystical-Platonic language we read, "All human philosophy can only depict the dawn; of the sun we can only have a presentiment." But really, no one can have a presentiment of a sun if he hasn't already seen one; for it could very well be that on our globe day regularly followed night (as in the Mosaic story of creation) without anyone ever being able to see a sun, because of the constantly overcast sky, and all our usual business could still follow its proper course according to this alternation (of days and seasons). Nevertheless, in such circumstances a true philosopher would indeed not *surmise* a sun (for that's not his thing), but perhaps he could still *deliberate* about whether this phenomenon might not be explained by assuming an hypothesis of such a celestial body, and he might thus by good luck hit on the right answer. To gaze into the sun (the suprasensible) without becoming blind may not be possible, but to see it adequately in reflection (in the reason that illuminates the soul morally) and even in a practical respect, as the older Plato did, is quite feasible: in contrast with which the Neoplatonists "certainly give us merely a stage sun," because they wish to deceive us by feeling (presentiments, surmises), that is, merely by the subjective, which gives no concept at all of the object, so as to put us off with the illusion of a knowledge of the objective, which borders on rapturous gush. The platonizing philosopher of feeling is inexhaustible in such figurative expressions, which are supposed to make this surmising intelligible: for example, "to approach so closely to the goddess Wisdom that the rustle of her robe can be heard" but also in commending the art of this sham-Plato, "although he cannot lift the veil of Isis, nevertheless to make it so thin that one can surmise

⁴ Kant, Academy edition [*Gesammelte Schriften*], vol. 8, p. 398.

the Goddess behind it." How thin we are not told; presumably, however, not so thick that you can make anything you like out of the apparition: for otherwise it would be a seeing which indeed should be avoided.⁵

Kant concludes the essay: "For the rest, 'if,' without taking this proposal as a comparison, as Fontenelle said on another occasion, 'Mr. N. still insists on believing in the oracle, no one can prevent him.'"⁶

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 398–399.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 406.

This book reproduces the text of the course of lectures given under the same title during the summer semester of 1927 at the University of Marburg/Lahn.

Mr. Fritz Heidegger provided the handwritten prototype. The typewritten copy and the manuscript were collated by the editor. The passages not yet deciphered by Mr. Fritz Heidegger—above all, the insertions and marginal notes on the right side of the manuscript pages—had to be carried over so as to fill out the text. The completed copy was then additionally compared with a transcription of the lectures by Simon Moser (Karlsruhe), a student of Heidegger's at that time. In doing so it became evident that we were dealing here with a set of shorthand notes whose accuracy was very good, which the notetaker had transcribed by typewriter. After its completion Heidegger read over this transcription several times and furnished it here and there with marginalia.

The text printed here was composed under Heidegger's direction by putting together the manuscript and the transcript following the guidelines given by him. The handwritten manuscript contains the text of the lectures, worked out, occasionally also consisting of captionlike references, and divided into parts, chapters, and paragraphs. Nevertheless, during the actual lecturing Heidegger departed from the manuscript to the extent of often giving to the thought a revised formulation or expounding more broadly and with greater differentiation a thought that had been recorded in an abbreviated form. Similarly, while and after making the written copy, he inscribed on the pages of the manuscript insertions specified on the right side and marginalia that had been formulated more fully in the oral lecture. Transformations, deviations, and expansions that arose in the course of the delivery of the lectures were recorded in the stenographic transcript and could be worked into the manuscript for publication.

Among the materials taken over from the transcript there are also the recapitulations at the beginning of each two-hour lecture. Where they were not concerned with mere repetitions but with summaries in a modified formulation and with supplementary observations, they were fitted into the lecture's course of thought.

All items taken over from the transcript were investigated for authenticity by testing their style. Occasional errors of hearing could be corrected by comparison with the handwritten copy.

Still, the relationship of the transcript to the manuscript would be inadequately characterized if it were not mentioned that numerous remarks

contained in the manuscript were omitted during the oral delivery, so that in this regard the transcript must yield to the manuscript.

In preparing the manuscript for publication, the editor endeavored to intertwine transcript and manuscript so that no thought either set down in writing or conceived during the lectures has been lost.

The text of the lectures was reviewed for publication. Expletives and repetitions peculiar to oral style were removed. Nevertheless, the aim remained to retain the lecture style. An ampler division of the often quite lengthy paragraphs seemed useful, so as to make possible a differentiated survey of the contents.

Explanations by Heidegger inside quotations and their translations are set in square brackets.

The course of lectures puts into practice the central theme of the third division of part 1 of *Being and Time*: the answer to the fundamental-ontological question governing the analytic of Dasein, namely, the question of the meaning of being in general, by reference to "time" as the horizon of all understanding of being. As the structure of the course shows, the "Temporality of being" is laid bare not by resuming immediately where the second division of *Being and Time* concluded, but by a new, historically oriented approach (Part One of the lectures). This lets us see *that and how* the treatment of the question of being and of the analytic of Dasein pertaining to it arises from a more original appropriation of the Western tradition, of the orientation of its metaphysical-ontological inquiry, and not actually from motives germane to existential philosophy or the phenomenology of consciousness. Although of the three parts originally conceived in the "Outline of the Course" the limited number of lecture hours permitted only a development of Part One and the first chapter of Part Two, the many anticipations of the later chapters provide an insight into those parts that were not developed. Anyhow, for the discussion of the theme of "Time and Being," chapter 1 of Part Two is decisive. The text here published also does not facilitate in its unfinished form an understanding of the systematic ground-plan of the question of being as it showed itself for Heidegger from the standpoint of his path of thought at that time. At the same time, the course contains the first public communication of the "ontological difference."

I owe cordial thanks to Mr. Wilhelm von Herrmann, Lic. theol., for his aid in the laborious task of collation as well as for his helpful dictation of the manuscript for publication and his aid in reading the proofs. My thanks go further to Mr. Murray Miles, Cand. Phil., and Mr. Hartmut Tietjen, Cand. Phil., for their careful and conscientious help with the proofs.

Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann

Translator's Appendix

A Note on the Da and the Dasein

The three most common German words for existence are: *das Dasein*, *das Vorhandensein* (*die Vorhandenheit*), and *die Existenz*. Most writers use them more or less interchangeably although there are semantic differences among them. As Heidegger explains in §7, Kant uses either *Dasein* or *Existenz* whether he is talking about the existence of God, of human beings, or of non-human things of nature. The Scholastics used *existentia* for similar purposes. Heidegger believes that there is a difference of fundamental significance between the mode of being of human beings and that of natural things *qua natural*—leaving aside questions of theology. He therefore co-opts both *Dasein* and *Existenz* for human beings and leaves *Vorhandensein* (and *Vorhandenheit*, its equivalent) for non-human beings.

In §7 it is too early to explain the difference between human and non-human being: the course itself has to make clear the distinction and the reasons for it. The thinking behind the distinction had already been set forth in *Being and Time*. Two paragraphs from that work are presented in this Appendix.

As indicated in §7, *Dasein* is to be the name for the being, *das Seiende*, which each human being is. It falls on the "beings" side of the ontological difference. *Existenz* (existence, in translation) is then to designate the mode or way of being, the *Seinsart* or *Seinsweise*, of this entity; hence this term falls on the "being" side, the *Sein*-side, of the ontological difference. *Existenz* is the way or mode of being of the *Dasein*; the *Dasein* is by existing. For the most part Heidegger uses the entire form "*das Dasein*" rather than the shortened quasi-generalized (and at the same time namelike) form "*Dasein*," and in the translation this usage is followed, so that we speak for the most part not, as in the original translation of *Being and Time*, of *Dasein*, but of *the Dasein*. This usage helps to keep in mind the point that the *Dasein* is not a *Sein* but a *Seiendes*, not a sort of being but a being, though of course it has its own specific mode or way of being, its own *Sein*, which is named *Existenz*.

At the same time, the German word "*Dasein*" connotes, sometimes more vividly and explicitly than at other times, the being, *Sein*, which belongs to this being, *Seienden*. Its being—that is, its *Existenz*—is, among other things, precisely *Da-sein*, literally, *to-be-da*. And this "*da*" of the *Dasein* is

extremely important for Heidegger's thinking. For it registers a fundamental ontological role of the human being as the Dasein.

The human being is, as it were, the mediator between being and beings, the one who holds open the difference between them. Of all the beings we know, Heidegger believed, the human being alone has the required *Seinsverständnis*, understanding-of-being. The understanding-of-being is a precondition for any human comportment toward beings, and all our comportment toward beings is carried out in the light of (in the clearing opened up by) our understanding of their being. Because we have understanding-of-being prior to the encountering of beings (not to say prior to any conceptualized science of being, or ontology), we are able to project being as horizon upon which beings are understood as the beings they are. (What this being-horizon is itself projected upon becomes a further question in fundamental ontology.) We are therefore able to project world; for world is the context of significance that belongs to the special mode of being labeled functionality. And within the world there can be not only functional entities—entities that are handy, having the mode of being called handiness, *Zuhandenheit*—but also beings that are released from all functionality-connections and are understood as merely there as such, extant, at-hand entities, whose mode of being is *Vorhandenheit*, *Vorhandensein*: extantness, at-handness, presence-at-hand.

Now the essential precondition for being able to project world at all, and therefore to let beings of the ontological character of the handy and the extant be and be encountered as such, is the capacity to open-up, let-be-uncovered, -disclosed, -unveiled. This is the obverse side of what, in traditional phenomenology, has gone under the name of consciousness. Unless there is an openness, a clearing in which the distinction between being and beings can appear, so that beings can come forth and be encountered in their being and their being can function as horizon for them as these beings, there can be no such phenomena at all as beings, being, and their mutual belonging together.

Heidegger does not deny the "independent being" of nature and of natural things. He is speaking about world and our being-in-the-world and what is and can be unveiled in the context of being-in-the-world. He is talking phenomenology.

The ability to open-up, let-be-unveiled as uncovered or disclosed is the ability to exist as the Da. In German, the adverb "da" can mean several things—here, there, where, when, then, at the time—in addition to special functions it has a participial form, component of compounds, and conjunction. In the constitution of the verb "dasein" and the correlative noun "Dasein" the da suggests, first of all, the here or the there, the somewhere

as a definite location; dasein is to be here or to be there; Dasein is being-here or being-there. There are also overtones of being at some more or less definite time: being-then, being-when, being-at-the-time. These temporal connotations fit into Heidegger's usage, but the aspect first stressed in *Being and Time* is the spatial one. Later, when the role of time and temporality, especially Temporality, is comprehended as constitutive for the Dasein's being, the notion of the Da takes on a temporal sense which does not appear so clearly at the beginning. (See, for instance, the connection between ecstasis and openness, p. 267.)

In this Appendix we are concentrating solely on the beginning. When time and temporality become thematic—as in the latter part of *Being and Time* and of *Basic Problems*—the temporal overtones sound more distinctly and vividly for the reader.

As Heidegger explains in the passages to be cited from *Being and Time*, here and there are possible only in an essential disclosedness which lets spatiality be. Spatiality is itself disclosed as the being of the Da. Only given such disclosed spatiality can a world and its contents be "there" for the human being (though the world is not there in the same way as any entity within the world), and only so can the human being be "here" as this "I-here" in its being-toward the beings that are "there." And the decisive point is that this Da or essential disclosedness—by which spatiality, a spatial world, and spatial interrelationships of entities within the world and of being-in-the-world (Dasein) toward such entities are all possible—is an essential aspect of the ontological constitution of the being which each human being is, and which is *therefore* called the Dasein.

The ontological role of the human being qua Dasein, then, is just that: to be the Da, to be its Da, namely, to be the essential disclosedness by which the here and the there first become possible, or by which the spatiality of the world becomes possible within which beings can be distinguished from their being and understood by way of their being and so encountered as the beings they are, so that human comportment toward them as beings becomes possible.

The German for to be the Da is Da-sein. The entity, the being whose role it is to be the (its) Da can therefore be called the Dasein. Here Heidegger uses a Sein-word, a being-word, to denominate a Seienden, to name certain beings, those whose role it is to sustain this mode of being. The Dasein's role is to sustain Da-sein, and that is why it has this special ontological name.

No English equivalent is quite possible, not being-here, nor being-there, nor being-here-there. The reason is that the Da is not just a here or a there or a here-there, but rather is the essential disclosure by which here, there,

and here-there become possible. It is their source. In the translation I have occasionally used "here-there," but it could obviously be misleading and the reading should be corrected by this note.

Because of the uniqueness of the signification to be attached to the term "Dasein," I have followed the precedent of the original translators of *Being and Time* and retained it in German. It has, anyway, already become a technical term in the philosophical language that now belongs to the Anglo-American community.

Here are the passages from *Being and Time*. They are from chapter 5, which is devoted to a thematic analysis of being-in as such. (See our *Lexicon*: being, -in.) A large part of the exposition treats of the existential constitution of the Da.

(1) The being which is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world is itself in every case its "Da." In its familiar meaning the "Da" points to "here" and "there." The "here" of an "I-here" is always understood via a handy "there" in the sense of a being-toward this "there"—a being-toward which is *deseverant-directional-concernful*. The Dasein's existential spatiality, which determines for it its "location" in such a form, is itself grounded on being-in-the-world. The there is a determination of something encountered within the world. "Here" and "there" are possible only in a "Da," that is to say, only if there is a being which has disclosed spatiality as the being of the "Da." This entity bears in its own most peculiar being the character of not being closed-up /*Unverschlossenheit*/. The expression "Da" means this essential disclosedness /*Erschlossenheit*/. By this disclosedness this entity (the Dasein) is "da" for itself in one with the being-da of world.

When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the *lumen naturale* in man, we mean nothing but the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that it is in such a way as to be its Da. To say that it is "illuminated" means that it is cleared in and of its own self as being-in-the-world, not by any other entity but instead in such a way that it itself is the clearing. It is only to an entity which is existentially cleared in this way that the extant becomes accessible in the light, hidden in the dark. The Dasein brings its Da with it from the very beginning; lacking the Da it is not only factually not the entity with this essential nature but is not this entity at all. *The Dasein is its disclosedness.*¹

(2) The leading question of this chapter has been about the being of the Da. Its theme was the ontological constitution of the disclosedness belonging essentially to the Dasein. The being of this disclosedness is constituted in affective self-finding /*Befindlichkeit*, "state-of-mind" in the Macquarrie and Robinson translation; see our *Lexicon*: affective self-finding/, understanding.

1. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 8th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1957), pp. 132—133; trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 171.

and discourse. The everyday mode of being of disclosedness is characterized by chatter, curiosity, and ambiguity. These in turn exhibit the movement of falling, whose essential characteristics are temptation, tranquilizing, estrangement, and entanglement.

But with this analysis the whole of the existential constitution of the Dasein has been laid bare in its chief features and the phenomenal basis has been gained for a "comprehensive" interpretation of the Dasein's being as care.²

Lexicon

- ability-to-be (Seinkönnen; see alternative translations: capacity-to-be; can-be), 270, 276, 278, 279, 289, 295
- absence (Abwesenheit), 305, 307, 310, 311
- absens: modification of praesens, in missing something, 311. See *Linate*
- absolute, 103
- absolutism, 222
- abstractum, 187
- access, 49, 109–110, 317; a. to the unavailable, 310
- accidens, 91
- accident, 85, 130, 143, 149
- action, 101, 127, 141–142; a. and feeling of respect, 137–138; understanding as “the authentic meaning of action,” 277; the instant and the situation of a., 287
- actual, actuality, actualization (wirklich, Wirklichkeit, Verwirklichung), actualitas, 28, 29, 34, 37, 38, 40, 43, 45ff., 50, 55, 67–68, 71ff., 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 87–88, 88–89, 91ff., 94, 95, 97ff., 101ff., 107–108, 110, 111, 112, 117ff., 120, 122, 123, 125, 128, 152, 179, 189, 277, 284–285; being-actual, 109; actuality as ontological constitution of the actual, compared with humanity and the human, equity and the equitable, 138–139; actuality of the actual, 108, 123; actualization, 97–98, 104–105, 107; actuality understood with reference to actualization and being enacted (ancient, medieval), 102ff.; understood as action inward upon subject and action of forces (modern), 104–105; traditional concept, 105
- actus, actum, agere, agens, 102–103
- additio existentiae, 90; a. entis, 91
- addition, 33ff., 39, 40–41, 45, 46–47, 97. See theses: 1st thesis, Kantian
- admovere, 316
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- aeon, in Plotinus and medieval thought, 231
- aesthetic beholding, 110
- aeternitas, 303
- affection, 144, 149
- affective self-finding, as formal structure of mood, passion, affect: its relation to understanding as necessary condition for the Dasein's comportments, 281. See in *Being and Time*: state of mind, Befindlichkeit, sich befinden
- agreement, between ideas and things, 206–207
- akolouthein, to follow, 243; its ontological meaning and Aristotle's use of it, 243–244; essential for understanding Aristotle's concept of time, its meaning, 255
- aletheia, aletheuein: aletheuein as function of logos according to Aristotle (to make manifest or reveal), 215. See truth
- Alexander of Aphrodisias, 181

- already, always already, antecedent, before, beforehand, earlier, in advance, precedent, prior—expressions used with great frequency: "If we have been observant, it must have occurred to us that in our explications we have employed no word more frequently than the expression 'already.'" 324; some characteristic instances: 11, 13, 20, 70–71, 73, 159, 162, 164, 165, 171, 208, 211, 216, 265, 287, 293, 296–297, 300, 301, 304, 305–306, 309, 311, 314, 316, 319, 321, 325, 326–327; reckoning with time, "time is already given to us before we use the clock," 258–259; encountered beings already embraced by time from the outset, 274; antecedent givenness of something already unveiled, 281; antecedent illumination for understanding of being, 284; See beforehand; a priori
- analysis: phenomenological a., 114, 115; phenomenological a. of Kant's interpretation of being, existence, 43ff.; Kant's phenomenological a. of respect, 133ff.
- analytic judgment, 203
- analytic of the Dasein, 16
- animal, animals, 165, 297, 319; animals and the given, 190, 191; animals and language, 191; animality, animalness, 129, 131, 143–144; rational animal, 96; "world" of the animals, 191
- annihilation, 305
- Anselm of Canterbury, 30–31, 37
- antecedent. See already
- anthropocentrism, 224
- anthropology, 51–52, 54–55, 130, 278
- antiquity, 22, 100ff., 106, 117, 122. See philosophy, ancient; ontology, ancient; thought, ancient; thought, traditional; tradition
- Anwesen, as meaning property, 109
- Anzeichen (mark or symptom, Husserl), 185
- apophansis, apophantic, 209; a. as primary character of assertion, 209; "All the moments of assertion are determined by its *apophantic structure*," 209; its meaning, 209; a. structure of understanding, as unveiling exhibiting of something, 216
- aporia, 233; aporiai regarding time, 233ff., 272
- appearance, 151, 207–208
- apperception, 127, 129; original synthetic unity of a., 127, 128; its meaning in Kant, 127; transcendental a., 129, 131, 145
- apprehension, 21, 49, 112–113, 118, 127, 129, 142, 165, 244; order of a., 106; theoretical a., 133; ontical a., 293; thematic a., 307; See perception
- appropriate, appropriately (adj., adv.), a. or inappropriate time (significance), 261–262; "Original familiarity with beings lies in *dealing with them appropriately*," 304
- appropriate (v.), appropriation, 219; exhibitiv appropriation of a being, 219
- a priori, 20, 24, 52ff., 70, 74, 128–129, 195; a priori comportmental character of comporting, 61; a priori conditions of motion, 243; a priori of being, 324; its meaning as relating to time, 324ff.; a priori and already, 324; Kant on its meaning, 324; a priori as contemporary problem, 325
- apriority, 20, 24; a. of ontological determinations of being: explicable only Temporally, 20, 324ff.; its connection with Temporality, 327
- Arabic philosophy, 81
- Aristotle, 14–15, 26–27, 24, 29, 52, 73, 77ff., 85, 86, 88, 96–97, 101, 102, 105, 108, 109, 118, 179, 180ff., 183ff., 194, 200, 204, 205–206, 209, 213ff., 217–218, 231ff., 260.

- 261–262, 263–264, 272, 273, 288, 315, 319, 328; his view of the being of the copula, 180ff. on the meaning of "is," 182; ambiguity of his truth thesis, 214ff.; critique of his truth thesis, 216–217; proper understanding of his truth thesis, 217; on time, 328ff.; interpretation of his concept of time, 237ff.; the primary meaning of his *kata* to *proteron kai husteron*, 245; his interpretation of time matches the phenomenon, 246; genesis of his definition of time, 246; implication of his numerical interpretation of time, 248ff. summary interpretation of his theory of time, 256–257; evaluation of his implicit concept of time, as presentation of common understanding of time, 257; his interpretation of time overlooked significance and datability, 261ff.; his interpretation of time, as under the influence of falling, 271–272. *See* time, Aristotle's definition discussed
- arithmetic, 54
- articulation, 208, 210; spoken a. and the *logos*, 207
- articulation of being, 18, 78, 119; general problem, connected with thesis 2, of the articulation of each being into a being *that* it is and the *how* of its being, 120; connection between basic a. and ontological difference, 120; a. into *essentia* and *existentia*, 120; "The articulation of being varies each time with the way of being of a being," 120
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problems, specific (In the course of the lectures the author formulated many specific problems which were dealt with as the discussion proceeded. Among them, in addition to the particular problems raised within the framework of the four basic problems above, are questions relating particularly to the Dasein and to time. The question regarding the Dasein has to do with the nature of the being (Sein) of the being (Seiendes) which each human being itself is; the human being is a certain entity which has a certain mode of being, and the question has to do with this mode of being. See Dasein (the), as the being that we ourselves are, and 140. The Dasein, as ontical (a being), has an ontological priority (a priority with respect to being and the understanding of being), which leads to the problems of a fundamental ontology, 223–224; see fundamental ontology. Pursuit of the question of the condition of possibility of the understanding of being in the Dasein leads to the entire problematic of time and temporality, through which time can be seen as the horizon of all understanding of being. The problems here fall into THREE MAIN DIVISIONS. (A) What is the nature of time as commonly understood and as specifically articulated in Aristotle's treatise on time (which gives explicit formulation to the common view of time)? (B) How is time as commonly understood derivative from original time, the original temporality of expecting, retaining, and enpresenting? (C) How can time, and especially original time, original temporality, be conceptually comprehended as the condition of possibility of all understanding of being and hence of ontology as the science of being? The following is a representative listing of appearance of these three parts of the overall problematic.) (A) TIME AS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD AND AS ARTICULATED BY ARISTOTLE: Aristotle's two chief problems concerning time, 232ff.; problem of the origin of the now, 246; if there is no soul does time exist? Aristotle's specific interpretation of this problem, 254; "What then is time and *how* does it exist? Is it only subjective, or is it only objective, or is it neither the one nor the other?" 255, and forecast of the answer, 256. (B) HOW IS TIME AS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD DERIVATIVE FROM ORIGINAL TIME? 256; problem of clock-usage, 257; to what do we address ourselves in saying "now," "then," "before /at-the-time/?" 259; whence do we take the now without making it an object? 259; "We shall have to ask how what confronts us in the unity of expecting, retaining, and enpresenting can be validly asserted to be original time," 260; where do we get the now from? from enpresenting, 261; whence does the Dasein get the time it reckons with and expresses in the now, then, and at-the-time? 261; answer to be given by showing its origin in original time, temporality, 261, 265; what makes common time possible? 257, 259, and how does it derive from original time? 269; why did the traditional time concept have to overlook significance and datability? answer will derive from the structure of temporality, 263; why does the common understanding of time ignore the structural moments and conceive of time merely as a manifold of unstructured nows? 271ff. (C) TIME, AND ESPECIALLY ORIGINAL TIME, ORIGINAL TEMPORALITY, AS CONDITION OF POSSIBILITY OF ALL UNDERSTANDING OF BEING AND HENCE OF THAT PARTICULAR UNDERSTANDING OF BEING WHICH

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- subject (The author employs this term in two general senses: (1) formal-apophantic or grammatical-logical, i.e., the subject of predicates; and (2) ontological-personal, "in the sense of subjectivity or egohood." The distinction and interconnection of these two senses is given on pp. 126–127. However there is also (3) the generic ontological sense, associated with the Greek *hupokeimenon* and in some degree with the Latin *subjectum*, of which sense (2) tends to become a specification and sense (1) an abstractly formal expression. For this third sense, see Greek expressions, *hupokeimenon*. (1) SUBJECT, FORMAL-APOPHANTIC, 36, 40, 126–127, 180, 185, 193, 200, 204, 209; s. as formal-apophantic category, 126–127 (2) SUBJECT, ONTOLOGICAL-PERSONAL, 37, 38, 47, 58, 59ff., 62ff., 69, 73 (all philosophy returns to the subject), 101, 104, 113, 114, 117, 123, 125ff., 129ff.

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- Temporal, Temporality (German temporal, Temporalität) (The author's explanation of the meaning assigned to the German words "temporal" and "Temporalität", 228, makes clear that they were chosen as the Latinate equivalents of the usual German words for temporal and temporality, namely, zeitlich and Zeitlichkeit. Since, according to his doctrine, temporality is the horizon for the understanding of being and the condition of possibility for all understanding of being and hence for solution of the basic problem of philosophy, the problem of the meaning of being in general, a special term is needed to refer to temporality

in this role as such a condition of possibility. For this purpose the Latinate equivalent of the German was used. But in English we already employ the Latinate expression for normal reference to the temporal. What then can we do? We might try an equivalent from the other classical language, Greek, as for instance, *chronal* and *chronality*. This was experimented with and found not completely satisfactory. The sense of identity with the concept of the temporal is not strong enough, the idiom is a little too strange, and unwanted associations enter, like that of the *chronometer*, which measures clock-time rather than *Temporalität*, and that of the *chronic*, as in *chronic diseases* and *chronic habits*. Another possibility is to find an English equivalent, like *timelike*, *timely*, *timeish*. However, beside being awkward, none of these gives the true intended meaning. It was decided, therefore, to employ a special device, capitalization, for the purpose. This gives us *Temporal* to correlate with German *temporal* and *Temporality* with *Temporalität*. Capitalization introduces typographical difficulties with the beginnings of printed sentences and in speaking one has to add the expression "capital-t" to refer to the terms. Another experiment was earlier made with the forms *c-temporal* and *c-temporality*, where the letter *c* stands for "condition of possibility," to remind us that here we are speaking of the temporal and temporality understood as condition of possibility. But this mode of expression is unnatural and awkward and experiments with readers were sufficient to establish their dislike for it. Consequently it was decided to accept the relatively minor infelicity of capitalization, where the capital letter functions as a *recollective index*, informing the reader about the transcendental role of temporality when that is under consideration. Indeed, the capital *t* could be taken as representative of the notion of the transcendental and the term *Temporality* may then be read as meaning temporality understood as transcendental horizon for the understanding of being and condition of possibility for all understanding of being and hence for the solution of the basic problem of ontology, namely, the problem of the meaning of being in general.), 17, 228, 274, 302, 305, 312, 313, 318, 322ff., 324ff.; T. DEFINED by the ontological problematic related to temporality: "It means temporality insofar as temporality itself is made into a theme as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being and of ontology as such. The term 'Temporality' is intended to indicate that temporality, in existential analytic, represents the horizon from which we understand being," 228; T. defined as temporality in its role as condition of possibility of the understanding of being, both pre-ontological and ontological, 274; concept of T. to be defined, 292; Temporal interpretation of the BEING OF BEINGS, 306; T. interpretation of the BEING OF THE EXTANT by means of *praesens*, 317-318; CENTRAL ROLE of T. in ontological inquiry, 327; "The fundamental subject of research in ontology is *Temporality*," 17; content of its general CONCEPT, "/T/emporality is *temporality with regard to the unity of the horizontal schemata belonging to it*," 307; T. interpretation of HANDINESS, 305, 309; T. content of KANT'S THESIS, 316; T. PROJECTION, 323; T. PROPOSITIONS, 323; T. SCIENCE (ontology), 323; T. TRUTH (*veritas temporalis*), 323, backward SUMMARY of exposition of T., 312

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