

# 5

## A NOTE ON ETERNITY, TIME, AND THE CONCEPT

Complete Text of the Sixth through Eighth Lectures  
of the Academic Year 1398-1939

### SIXTH LECTURE

To speak of the appearance of Science in the concrete reality of the historical World makes it necessary to speak of a before and an after—that is, of a becoming, and consequently of *Time*. In asking the question of the relation between Science and objective Reality, therefore, one must ask the question of the relation between Science and Time. And this is what Hegel does in the Second Stage of the Second Section of the Second Part of Chapter VIII.

The problem that we are tackling here is far from new. One can even say that it has been asked as long as philosophy has existed. Indeed, all philosophies have sought, and generally claim to have found, the truth, or at least some truths. Now, truth in the strict sense of the term is supposed to be a thing that cannot be either modified or denied: it is, as we say, “universally and necessarily” valid—i.e., it is not subject to changes; it is, as we also say, *eternal* or nontemporal. On the other hand, there is no doubt that it is *found* at a certain moment of time and that it exists *in* time, because it exists through and for Man who lives in the World. Therefore, to pose the problem of truth, even partial truth, is necessarily to pose the problem of time, or more particularly, the problem of the relation between time and the eternal or between time and the intemporal. And this is the problem that Hegel poses and resolves in the “Second Stage” in question.

To use Hegel’s terms, we can call the coherent whole of con-

ceptual understanding that lays claim to the truth—*Begriff*, Concept. And, indeed, the truth is always a “concept” in the broad sense, that is to say, a coherent whole of *words* having a meaning. Then we can pose the problem by asking what the relations are between the Concept and Time.

Hegel answers this question in the very first words of the Second Stage; and one must say that he answers it in quite an unexpected manner. This is what he says (page 558, lines 10-11): “*Die Zeit ist der Begriff selbst, der da ist*” (“*Time is the Concept itself, which is there [in empirical existence]*”). And it must be underlined that in writing this strange sentence, Hegel weighed his words carefully. For he already said exactly the same thing in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, where we read (page 38, lines 33-37): “*Was die Zeit betrifft, . . . so ist sie der daseiende Begriff selbst*” (“In what concerns *Time*, [it must be said that] it is the Concept itself which exists empirically”).

It is very clear: “*Die Zeit ist der daseiende Begriff selbst.*” And at the same time, it is quite incomprehensible. In order to understand better what Hegel means, it is useful briefly to review the solutions to the problem that Plato and Aristotle, Spinoza and Kant proposed before him. This is what I am going to do in the sixth through eighth lectures.

The problem is to establish a positive or negative relation between the Concept and Time. Now, it is obvious that there is only a very limited number of possibilities here, as the following formulas show:

- $$\begin{array}{l} \text{I. } C = E \\ \text{II. } C = E' \text{ and relates to } \begin{cases} 1. E \\ 2. T \end{cases} \begin{cases} a. \text{ outside of } T \\ b. \text{ in } T \end{cases} \\ \text{III. } C = T \\ \text{[IV. } C = T'] \end{array}$$

C symbolizes the Concept. Not some determined concept or other, but *the* Concept—that is, the integration of all concepts, the complete system of concepts, the “idea of ideas,” or the *Idea* in the Hegelian (Cf. *Logik*) and Kantian sense of the word. *T* designates Time or temporal reality. *E* represents the opposite of Time—that is, Eternity, nontemporal reality in the *positive* sense.

*E'* signifies "eternal," as opposed to "Eternity." (Just as this table *is*, without being Being, the Concept can be conceived as *eternal* without being Eternity: it "participates" in Eternity, it is an eternal function of Eternity, and so on; but Eternity itself is something other than the Concept.) Finally, *T'* is the "temporal," distinguished from Time itself as the "eternal" is distinguished from Eternity.

The formulas, then, can be read as follows. *First possibility*: the Concept is Eternity. Hence it is *related* to nothing: it is obviously not related to *Time*; and it is not *related* to Eternity either, since it *is* Eternity. This is Parmenides' position. (But since the fully developed and truly understood Parmenidean point of view is known to us only through Spinoza, it is of him that I shall speak in discussing this possibility). *Third possibility*: the Concept is *Time*, and hence is *related* neither to Eternity nor to *Time*; this is Hegel's position. Possibilities I and III, being identifications, cannot be subdivided. On the other hand, *possibility II* is subdivided into two possibilities, the first of which has in turn two variants; thus three possible types of philosophy are obtained, and all philosophies other than those of Parmenides-Spinoza and Hegel can actually be divided up among these three types.<sup>1</sup>

There is still *possibility IV*: the Concept is temporal. But this is no longer a *philosophical* possibility. For this (skeptical) type of thought makes all philosophy impossible by denying the very idea of truth: being *temporal*, the concept *essentially* changes; that is to say that there is no *definitive* knowledge, hence no *true* knowledge in the proper sense of the word. *Possibility III*, on the other hand, is compatible with the idea of truth; for if everything that is *in Time* (i.e., everything that is *temporal*) always *changes*, *Time* itself does not change.

Once again, then, the *second possibility* divides into two. Since it is *eternal*, and not *Eternity*, the Concept is *related* to something

<sup>1</sup> At least with regard to the problem that interests us. This problem, moreover, expresses the *essential* content of every philosophy, so that it can be said that in general there are only five *irreducible*—i.e., *essentially* different—philosophical types: an impossible type (possibility I: Parmenides-Spinoza); three relatively possible, but insufficient types (possibility II: Plato, Aristotle, Kant); and a true type, which, by the way, needs to be *developed*, to be *realized*; for I personally believe that this has not yet been done (Hegel and Heidegger represent this third possibility).

other than itself. Whence two variants: (1) the ancient or pagan variant, according to which the *eternal* Concept is related to *Eternity*; a variant clearly formulated by Plato and Aristotle (who agree on this point); and (2) the modern or Judaeo-Christian variant, clearly formulated by Kant: the *eternal* Concept is related to *Time*. The first variant in turn implies two possible types: (1) the eternal Concept related to Eternity which is *outside* of *Time* (Plato); and (2) the eternal Concept related to Eternity *in Time* (Aristotle).<sup>2</sup>

The universe of ideas, the idea of ideas—this in Plato is what in Hegel is called *Begriff*, Concept (or in the *Logik*, Idea). The World of phenomena is what Hegel calls *Dasein*, empirical Existence. To simplify, then, let us speak of "Concept" and of "Existence." Existence is essentially *change*—that is, a *temporal* entity. On the other hand, there is change *only* in Existence—that is, Existence is not only *temporal*, but *Time* itself. The Concept, on the other hand, does not—*essentially*—change. Therefore it is essentially something *other* than temporal, and other than *Time*. Hence it would be tempting to say with Parmenides (and Spinoza) that it *is Eternity*. But Plato does not say so; for he believes he has discovered that the Concept (i.e., the Logos, the *word*—or discourse endowed with a *meaning*) is *related* to something that is *other* than the Concept (or the word) itself. (Here is the point where Plato, and Platonizing philosophers from Plato to Kant, must be attacked, if one wants to avoid the disagreeable anthropological consequences implied by their philosophies). Therefore the Concept is not *Eternity*. It is merely *eternal*. Consequently one must pose the problem of the *relations* between the eternal Concept on the one hand, and *Time* and *Eternity* on the other.

Let us first state a fact of which Plato is not ignorant: real, empirically existing man utters discourses that have a meaning. Therefore: *concepts*, and consequently *the integral* Concept, sub-

<sup>2</sup> It is obvious that the second (the modern) variant cannot be subdivided in the same way as the first (the ancient), because there can be no *Time in Eternity*. However, there have been Christian philosophers who—explicitly or implicitly—made this assertion; but either they made meaningless plays on words, or else—unawares—they realized the Hegelian (or atheistic) type of philosophy.

sist in *time*, while being by definition *eternal*—i.e., something essentially other than time. (They exist *in* change; but, since they do not change, they are necessarily something other than change). If we symbolize temporal existence (Man in the World) by a line, we must represent the Concept by a *singular* point on this line: this point is essentially *other* than the other points of the line (see Figure 1). Now for Plato, the Concept is *related* to something *other* than itself. (It is on this point that Plato criticized Parmenides-Spinoza; it is on this point that Hegel criticizes Plato and all other philosophers: for him, as for Parmenides-Spinoza, the Concept is *related* to nothing, except to itself). Now, being eternal, the Concept must be related to *Eternity*, says Plato. (Aristotle follows him in this; but Kant opposes it and says that the eternal Concept is related to Time). But, Plato says, Eternity can only be *outside* of Time (which is denied by Aristotle, who discovers Eternity *in* Time). Therefore, we must complete our schema in the manner indicated by Figure 2.

Let us go further. The appearance of concepts, and even of the Concept, in existence is not a unique phenomenon. In any case, the Concept can appear at any moment of time whatsoever. Hence the line that symbolizes existence implies *several* eternal singular points (Figure 3). Now by definition, *Eternity*—i.e., the entity to which the Concept is related—is always the *same*; and the *relation* of the Concept to this entity is also always the *same*. Therefore: at *every* instant of time (of the existence of Man in the World) the *same* relation to one and the *same* extratemporal entity is possible. If we want to symbolize Plato's conception, we must therefore modify our schema in the manner indicated by Figure 4.

Thus we find the schema of the metaphysics of the *Timaeus*: a circular time, the circularity of which (and the circularity of what, being temporal, is *in* time) is determined by the *relation* of what is *in* Time to what is *outside* of Time. And at the same time we find the famous "central point" that a Christian theology (i.e., in my view, a variant of Platonism) must necessarily introduce into the Hegelian circle that symbolizes absolute or circular knowledge. The circle thus drawn can obviously symbolize the *totality* of *Knowledge*: both of Knowledge relating to Man in the (temporal) World; and of Knowledge relating to what is outside of




Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4




Figure 5



Figure 6



Figure 7



Figure 8



Figure 9




Figure 10




Figure 11

"Theology"  
(Plato)

"Pessimistic Skepticism"  
or "Relativism"

"Silence"  
"Mysticism"

"Optimistic Skepticism"  
or "Criticism"  
(Kant)

"Absolute Knowledge"  
(Hegel)

this Knowledge—that is, outside of *Man* who exists in the World and outside of the World that implies existing (i.e., temporal) Man. This “central point” (which necessarily appears once the Concept is interpreted as a *relationship* with something *other* than the Concept—that is, once the element of *transcendence* is introduced into Knowledge) has been called God. Furthermore, we have seen that this theistic schema has no specifically Christian aspect, since we derived it from the Platonic conception.<sup>3</sup>

Let us say, then, that the “central point” is God. We can do so since for Plato the *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, symbolized by this point, is also *θεός*.

But the name makes no difference. Let us rather see what the thing means. And to this end, let us transform the drawing, that is to say, make it more precise.

First, let us simplify. The Concept *can* be repeated in time. But its repetition does not change it, nor does it change its relation to Eternity; in a word, it changes nothing. Hence we can do away with all the radii of the circle, except for one (Figure 5). (Except for one, for the fact of the Concept's presence in Time is of capital importance; now, the point on the circumference symbolizes *human* knowledge which is accomplished in Time). And now let us see what is symbolized by this radius.

The radius symbolizes the *relation* between the eternal Concept and Eternity or the eternal Entity. Therefore this relation too is nontemporal or eternal. Nevertheless, it is clearly a *relation* in the strict sense—i.e., a relation between two *different* things. Therefore the radius has, if you will, *extension* (in Space, since there is no Time in it). Therefore we did well to symbolize it by a line (a dotted line, to distinguish it from the solid temporal line). However, the relation in question is undeniably *double* (Figure 6). Indeed, on the one hand the (eternal) Concept situated in Time—i.e., the Word—*rises* up through its *meaning* to the entity revealed by this meaning; and on the other hand, this entity *descends* through the *meaning* toward the Word, which it thus *creates* as *Word* out of its phonetic, sound-giving, changing reality. Without

<sup>3</sup> Generally speaking, it is the schema of all *mono-theistic* knowledge—that is, of all Knowledge that recognizes a *transcendence*, and only one transcendent entity. And one can say that every philosophy recognizes a transcendence: except the *acosmism* of Parmenides-Spinoza (possibility I), and the *atheism* of Hegel (possibility III).

the Word, Eternity would not be *represented* in Time, and consequently it would not be accessible to Man. And without Eternity, the Word would have no meaning and would not raise Man above Time and change; there would be no *truth* for Man. (Or, taking a concept as an example of the Concept: the word “Dog” reveals the *essence* of the dog, and without this word this essence would not be revealed to man; but the *essence* of the *dog* is what realizes the meaning of the word; the *dog* is what allows man to develop the word “Dog” into a *judgment*, saying: “the dog is an animal with four feet, covered with hair, etc.”) Generally speaking, there is a movement from the word to the thing, and a return from the thing to the word. And it is only this *double* relation that constitutes the *truth* or the revelation of reality, that is to say, the *Concept* in the proper sense. And on the other hand, this double relation *exhausts* the truth or the Concept: the (eternal) Concept is related only to Eternity, and Eternity reveals itself exclusively through the Concept. Hence, even though they are in Time, they nonetheless have no relations with Time and the temporal. Therefore the double, or better, *circular*, relation of the (eternal) Concept and Eternity *cuts through* the temporal circle. Change as change remains inaccessible to the Concept. In other words, there is no truth in the temporal, either before or after the Concept. Through the Concept, one can rise from the temporal to Eternity; and then one can fall back to the temporal. But after the fall one is exactly what one was before. In order to live in the Concept—that is, in the truth—it is necessary to live *outside* of Time in the *eternal* circle. In other words: the eternal circle of *absolute* knowledge, even though it is in Time, has no relation to Time; and the *entirety* of Knowledge is *absolute* only to the extent that it implies an *eternal* circle which is related *only* to Eternity. And that is why we must represent the Platonic conception of absolute Knowledge in the manner indicated by Figure 7. In other words, again we find the schema of theo-logical Knowledge. (The circle with a point in the center was but a simple graphical variant of this schema.)

Thus we see that the difference between the theological System and the atheistic Hegelian System is to be traced back to the very beginning point. Speaking in metaphysical terms, we can say that a theistic System properly so-called—that is, a frankly transcen-

dentalist and mono-theistic System—results as soon as the Concept (i.e., absolute Knowledge) is defined as an *eternal* entity that is *related* to Eternity, Eternity being *outside* of Time.

Let us see what this means for the temporal World of phenomena. Understanding of this World (and of Man who lives in it) is symbolized by the large circle. So, let us take away the small circle of the eternal Concept (Figure 8). Then, two interpretations are possible. FIRST, one can say that the arc has fixed, definitive, impassable limits (Figure 9). Thus we find the schema of the Knowledge that I have called “mystical” in the broad sense of the word. Taking God away from a given theological System, then, can lead in the end to a mystical System, in which one can speak of everything except God, who is essentially ineffable. And if one is radical, one will say that it cannot even be said of God that he is God; the most that can be said is that he is ineffable. And the ineffable Being can reveal itself through whatever you like: through “ecstasy,” through music, and so on; but not through Speech.<sup>4</sup>

But with regard to the other things—i.e., the temporal entities—*everything* can be said. In other words, the Knowledge that relates to them can, in principle, be *total*, definitive; since Time is *limited*, it and its content can be *exhausted* by Discourse. However, in saying *everything* that can be said about the temporal (worldly and human) reality, one attains its *limit*—that is, the limit of what is beyond. But the establishment of the *presence* of the beyond proves that one cannot be content with *Discourse*, even total. One sees that one is obliged to go beyond Discourse through a *silence*—“mystical,” “ecstatic,” “algorithmic,” “sonorous,” or otherwise.

SECOND, one can say that after the small circle that symbolizes the eternal Concept has been taken away, the arc of the large circle is without limits (its two “farthest” points being on the small circle that has been removed): Figure 8. In this case, we have the schema of skeptical or relative Knowledge—i.e., the schema of the absence of true Knowledge in the strict sense of the term. Knowledge is related to Time—that is, to change. But since

<sup>4</sup>In Plato the “mystical” tendency is very clear: the *ἔν ἀγαθόν* is “revealed” in and by a *silent* contemplation.

Time is now without limits, change never stops. Hence there is no eternal or definitive Knowledge: there is no *epistēmē*, there is only *doxa*. But in another way, even in this case, one can say that the circle is closed. Then the ideal of Hegelian absolute Knowledge—that is, circular Knowledge—is set up (cf. Figure 11). But this ideal forever remains an ideal: the circle of real Knowledge is never actually closed (Figure 10). It is the optimistic form of skepticism. It is the skepticism of the eternal “why,” of humanity “that always learns,” that ceaselessly marches on like an individual man toward an end that it will never attain. And the *truth* remains “blank”—according to the definition of the Devil in “*Le Puits de Sainte Claire*.” It is also the “eternal task” (*ewige Aufgabe*) of Kantian Criticism. In the two variants of skeptical knowledge, then, philosophy as a road that actually leads to Wisdom is obviously impossible.

Inversely, through the introduction of the *eternal* Concept—i.e., discursive *truth*—into a given “mystical” or “skeptical” System, a *theo*-logical System is always obtained, even if the term God does not explicitly enter into it. For in this case the truth would necessarily reveal a Being situated *outside* of Time—that is, outside of the World and Man.

Well then, once more, what does the *theological* (not the mystical or skeptical) System mean for understanding of the temporal World?

In principle, *everything* can be said about the World and Man. Knowledge that relates to them is *total*. However, in itself, Knowledge relating to Time and the temporal remains relative: it is a *doxa*. Only by relating it in its entirety to *eternal* Knowledge related to Eternity can one say something *definitive* about the temporal.

LET US CONSIDER THE WORLD. In theological language (in the narrow sense of the term) one must say that events in the World, as well as the World itself, are contingent: hence there is no absolute *Knowledge* relating to them. But if, *per impossible*, *God's* designs and *His* creative will were known, there could be a true *Science* of the World. Speaking in symbolic theological terms, one can say that there is *Science* relating to the World only to the extent that this World implies *geometrical* elements. Indeed, Kant

showed us that if algorithm is to be transformed into *Discourse*, it must be related either to Time or to Space. Here, since its being related to Time is excluded by definition, it can be related only to Space (which, in this conception, is a Space *outside* of Time). And indeed, one can *speak* of geometry: "the circle" is also a *word* that has a meaning (and one can *say* what it is), as opposed to a nonspatialized integral, for example, which can be *expressed* only by an algorithm. Therefore, the theological System can fabricate a real *geometry*, that is to say, a *geometrical* physics, and nothing else. Now, this physics can tell us that the earth is *round*, but it cannot tell us why it attracts heavy objects (because the force of attraction, like every force, is not only a spatial, but also an essentially temporal phenomenon); and consequently, it cannot say what the earth is as *Earth*—a planet on which trees grow and man lives.

AS FOR MAN himself, the case is the same for him. There is true *Science* concerning him only to the extent that he is related to *Eternity*. I can *prove* the existence of *God*: it is an eternal truth. But I cannot prove *my* existence on the same grounds, unless I conceive of myself as an *eternal* idea in God. As for me in my temporal or worldly existence, I can know nothing. Moreover, absolute Knowledge related to *Eternity* is precisely what makes an *absolute* Knowledge relating to the temporal *impossible*. Let us take Christian theology as an example. What truly matters for the Christian is to know whether he is saved or damned in consequence of his worldly or temporal existence. Now, the analysis of the eternal concept that reveals God shows that this cannot be known, that this can never be known. If the Christian does not want to be "mystical," that is, to renounce Discourse completely, he must necessarily be *skeptical* with respect to his temporal existence. Do what he will, he will not be *certain* that he is acting well.<sup>5</sup>

In short, in the theological System there is an *absolute* Knowledge in and through *Bewusstsein*, but there is no absolute Knowledge through and in *Selbst-bewusstsein*.

Finally, we can present the theological System in its anthropological aspect by explaining the significance in it of the idea of

<sup>5</sup> But the Christian admits that God's decision is in conformity with human reason.

human *freedom* (that is to say, the idea of Man himself, since man without freedom is but an animal).

We do not need to define freedom here.<sup>6</sup>

We all have "an idea of what it is," as we say; even if we do not know how to *define* freedom. And the "idea" that we have of it is sufficient to enable us to say this:

The free act is situated, so to speak, *outside* of the line of temporal evolution. The *hic et nunc*, represented by a point on this line, is *determined, fixed, defined* by the past which, through it, determines the future as well. The *hic et nunc* of the free act, on the other hand, is *unexplainable*, on the basis of its past; it is not fixed or determined by it. Even while existing in space-time, the being endowed with freedom must be able to *detach* itself from the *hic et nunc*, to rise *above* it, to take up a *position* in relation to it. But the free act is related to the *hic et nunc*: it is effected in given determined conditions. That is to say: the *content* of the *hic et nunc* must be preserved, while being *detached* from the *hic et nunc*. Now, that which preserves the content of a perception while detaching it from the *hic et nunc* of sensation is precisely the Concept or the Word that has a meaning. (This *table* is bound to the *hic et nunc*; but the *meaning* of the words "this table" exists everywhere and always). And that is why everyone agrees that only a *speaking* being can be free.<sup>7</sup>

As for Plato, who believes that virtue can be taught, and taught through dialectic—i.e., through Discourse—obviously the free act, for him, has the same nature as the act of conceptual understanding: for him, they are but two complementary aspects of one and the same thing.

Now, for Plato the Concept is (1) *eternal*, and (2) it is *related* to Eternity, which (3) is *outside* of Time. The application of this definition of the Concept to the free act leads to the following results:

Just as the Concept is not related to the temporal reality in which *doxa* reigns, so the free act, too, is impossible in *this* reality. In and

<sup>6</sup> In point of fact, either this word has no meaning, or else it is the *Negativity* of which Hegel speaks, and which a Descartes and a Kant had in view without speaking of it explicitly. But no matter.

<sup>7</sup> Hegel, it is true, reverses this assertion and says that only a free being can speak; but he too maintains the close connection between language and freedom.

by the free act, man relates himself to something that is situated *outside* of Time. That is, as Plato says in his well-known myth: the soul *chooses* its destiny *before* its birth. There is *choice*, hence *freedom*. But this choice is made *outside* of temporal existence, which existence is absolutely *determined* in its evolution. In his myth Plato adopts the idea of metempsychosis: the choice can be repeated, and the choices differ among themselves. But in truth, this hypothesis does not fit in well with the entirety of the Platonic system, in which the nontemporal admits of no variations. Accordingly, fairly soon one comes to the (gnostic and Christian) conception of a unique choice, fixed by the relation between the extra-temporal Eternity (or God) and the free agent. It is the idea of the Angel who decides once and for all, and outside of time properly so-called, for or against God, and becomes a "virtuous" Angel or a forever "fallen" Angel or Devil.<sup>8</sup>

Generally speaking, this whole conception does not manage to explain *temporal* existence as *such*, that is, as History. History here is always a comedy, and not a tragedy: the tragic is before or after, and in any case outside of, temporal life; this life itself realizes a program fixed beforehand and therefore, taken in itself, has neither any meaning nor any value.

In conclusion, then, this can be said: every system of *theological* absolute Knowledge sees in the Concept an *eternal* entity, which is *related* to Eternity. And inversely, *this* conception of the Concept necessarily leads in the end, once developed, to a *theological* Knowledge. If, as in Plato, Eternity is situated *outside* of Time, the System is rigorously *mono-theistic* and radically *transcendentalist*: the being of God is *essentially* different from the being of him who speaks of God; and this divine Being is absolutely one and unique, that is to say, it is eternally identical to itself or it excludes all change.

In relation to the natural World, this System gives a purely

<sup>8</sup> This conception also comes to light in the dogma of original sin: in Adam, man, in his entirety, freely decides once and for all. Here the act is in time; but it is not *related* to time; it is related to the *eternal* commandment of God, this God being *outside* of time. As for the freedom of man properly so-called—it is the stumbling block of all theology, and particularly of Christian theology. Even if divine election is a cooperation with man (which in itself is quite "heretical"), human acts are judged all at once by God, so that freedom remains a unique act, situated outside of time and related to Eternity.

*geometrical* theory, which can at most operate with the notion of purely incorporeal "movement" (as Descartes does), but not with the notion of force: this System admits kinematics or phronomy, but excludes dynamics. Consequently, it does not explain biological phenomena, in which Time is *constituent*. And in relation to the human World, this System at best explains "angelic" existence, but deprives historical life, that is, Man's *temporal* existence, of any meaning and value.

## SEVENTH LECTURE

I have discussed at some length the Platonic conception, which corresponds to possibility II, 1, *a*.

Let us now move on to Aristotle—that is, to possibility II, 1, *b*.

Aristotle saw Plato's difficulties. And at the same time he made a great discovery. Just like Plato, Aristotle defines the Concept as eternal. That is, he defines it as a relation to something else. And this something else for him, as for Plato, is not Time but Eternity. (*Epistēmē* exists only in the cosmos in which there are ideas—i.e., eternal entities, having Eternity as their *topos*.) But Aristotle saw what Plato seems not to have seen; namely, that Eternity is not *outside* of Time, but *in* Time. At the very least, there is something eternal in Time.

In fact, Plato reasoned as follows: All real dogs change; the concept "dog," on the other hand, remains identical to itself; therefore it must be related to an Eternity situated outside of real dogs—that is, outside of Time. (This Eternity is the "idea" of dog, and consequently, in the final analysis, the Idea of ideas.) To which Aristotle answered: to be sure, the concept "dog" is related to Eternity; but Eternity subsists *in* Time; for if real *dogs* change, *the* real dog—that is, the *species* "dog"—does not change. Since the species is *eternal*, even though it is placed *in* Time, it is possible to relate the Concept to Eternity *in* Time. Therefore there is an

absolute Knowledge relating to the temporal World, to the extent that this World implies Eternity. In other words, Plato forgot that in Heracleitus' river there are permanent eddies. First of all, they are the animals and the plants. The eternal or immutable axis of the "eddies" is the *telos* or the entelechy; and this same entelechy is what appears, in relation to the Concept, as the Idea of the "eddy." But there are also planets, and finally the Cosmos. Hence Aristotle says: Time itself is *eternal*. It is circular,<sup>9</sup> but the circle is gone around again and again, eternally.<sup>10</sup> Therefore the Cosmos has the same structure as does the animal. The Aristotelian System thus gives an explanation of life and a biological conception of the World.

Theologically speaking, the conception that relates the eternal Concept to Eternity *in* Time equals *Polytheism*. To be sure, Aristotle is too far removed from the totemic mentality to assert that animals and plants are gods. But when he says that the planets are gods, he maintains a greater agreement with his system than does Plato with his. But, all things considered, the difference is not very important: *mono-* or *poly-theism*—in both cases we are dealing with a *theo-*logical knowledge. The cosmic revolution is eternally repeated; and it is solely because there is an *eternal* repetition that there is an absolute Knowledge relating to the Cosmos. Now, it is one and the same Eternity that manifests itself in and through the eternal return of Time. In other words, there is a supreme god, the God properly so-called, who maintains the Cosmos in its identity and thus makes conceptual Knowledge possible. And, while manifesting itself through the course of Time, this divine Eternity differs essentially from everything that is *in* Time. At most, man can speak of himself too, taken as species, when he speaks of God. It remains nonetheless true that the difference is *essential* between him, taken as historical individual, and the eternal God of whom he speaks. Once more, then, as in Plato, it is an absolute Knowledge of *Bewusstsein*, and not of *Selbst-Bewusstsein*. (For the species has no *Selbst-Bewusstsein*, no *Selbst* or Self; at the most, it says "we," but not "I.")

<sup>9</sup> As in Hegel.

<sup>10</sup> Whereas in Hegel the circuit is made only once.

Therefore, the Aristotelian System explains Man's biological existence but not his truly human—i.e., historical—existence. And we see this even better by turning to the anthropological level—that is, by posing the problem of *freedom*.

To be sure, Aristotle talks about freedom. But everyone talks about freedom. Even Spinoza! But if it is not to be a word-game, if the true notion of freedom (made explicit in the Hegelian conception, as it is formulated in the *Phenomenology*) is sought, it must be admitted that it is not compatible with Aristotle's System. As a matter of fact, we know that this System excludes, by definition, a *creative* God. (By definition, for Eternity in Time signifies: *eternity* of the World, *return*, and *eternal* return.) Now, where there is no place for God's creative action, there is still less place for Man's creative action: Man undergoes History, but does not create it; therefore he is not *free* in Time. On this point, Aristotle does not go beyond Plato. But his System is still less acceptable than the Platonic System, for it excludes even the *transcendent* free act. In fact, since Eternity is *in* Time, and the eternal Concept is related to Eternity *in* Time, all possibility of going outside of Time is excluded. One is *outside* of Time only by being *in* Time. A temporal existence that one could *choose* outside of Time would be conceptually *unknowable*, because it would not be *eternal* in Time, whereas the Concept can be related only to an *Eternity* in Time. In short: to the extent that Man changes, he does not know; and not *knowing*, he is not free (by definition); and to the extent that he *knows*, he does not change and hence is not free either, in the usual sense of the word.

Indeed, for Aristotle as for Plato, one can have an absolute Knowledge of Man only by relating Man to Eternity. The individual soul is too small to be known, Plato says in the *Republic*: to know it, one must see it enlarged—that is, one must contemplate the City. Now for Aristotle, Plato's eternal State is but a utopia; in actual fact, all States sooner or later change and perish; hence there is no absolute political Knowledge relating to *one* of the possible forms of the State. But, happily, there is a closed cycle in the transformation of States, which is *eternally* repeated. Therefore this cycle can be understood *conceptually*; and by speaking of it, one can grasp the different States and Man himself through



concepts. To be sure. But if all this is true, History has nothing to do with what is called "History" today; and in this History, Man is anything but free.

Therefore, by replacing geometry with biology, the Aristotelian variant of the Platonic System explains Man as animal, but does not explain him as historical and free individual; it does not even explain him—as Plato did—as fallen Angel.

Alongside the great philosophies there have always been more or less barbaric or barbarized theories. The Platonic-Aristotelian notion of the Concept has also been barbarized: either by a vulgar and absurd denial, or by a distorted acceptance.

The *vulgar denial* consists in saying that the Concept, far from being eternal, is just as temporal as any other thing existing in Time. It is our possibility IV, of which I shall not speak, since it does away with the very idea of a true or genuine Knowledge. It is Skepticism or Relativism, which Plato denounced under the name of "Sophistic"; which Kant criticized, calling it "Empiricism"; and which Husserl quite recently denounced once more under the name of "Psychologism." Let us speak no further about it.

Let us rather say a few words about the *distorted acceptance*, which is no less absurd, although less *obviously* absurd. People who hold this view continue to say that the Concept is eternal. But while being eternal, it is in Time; which means, they say, that it is related to what is in Time—i.e., to the temporal. (Nor to Time, but to the temporal—i.e., to what is *in* Time.) And being related to the temporal, it is related to it in Time, existing—in Time—*before* the temporal properly so-called. It is the well-known notion of the *a priori* or the "innate idea" that *precedes* experience.

This "apriorism" (called "Dogmatism" by Kant) is what the famous first sentence of the Introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason* is directed against: there is no doubt, Kant says (more or less), that experience—i.e., the temporal reality—always precedes in time the concept that appears in time as *my* Knowledge. And indeed there can be no possible doubt on this subject. Vulgar Apriorism begins from a supposed fact and ends in a truly untenable conception: on the gnoseological level as well as on the anthropological level (where the notorious "free will" is discussed).

One need only develop this Apriorism somewhat in order to come either to Skepticism or Relativism, or to Kant; or, finally, to the return to Plato and Aristotle.

Kant, like every philosopher worthy of the name, knows full well that the Concept can neither be defined as temporal, nor be related to the temporal (which, by the way, amounts to the same thing); for him, as for Plato and Aristotle, the Concept is *eternal*. Now, being *eternal* and not *Eternity*, the Concept must be *related* to something, and *related* in the strict sense of the term—that is, related to something *other* than itself. But, seeing the difficulties that Plato and Aristotle encountered by relating the eternal Concept to Eternity, Kant had the unheard-of audacity to relate it to Time (and not, of course, to the temporal—i.e., to what is *in* Time).

The whole Kantian conception is summed up in this celebrated sentence: "without intuition the concept is empty; without the concept intuition is blind."

But before speaking of this Kantian formula, I want to mention in a few words another solution to the problem, namely, Spinoza's.

As I have already said, Spinoza's System is the perfect incarnation of the absurd. (And that is why, when one tries to "realize" his thought, as we say, one experiences the same feeling of dizziness as when one is faced with a paradox of formal logic or set theory.)

Now, a particularly curious thing: *absolute* error or absurdity is, and must be, just as "circular" as the truth. Thus, Spinoza's (and Parmenides') absolute Knowledge must be symbolized by a closed circle (without a central point, of course): Figure 12. Indeed, if Spinoza says that the Concept is Eternity, whereas Hegel says that it is Time, they have this much in common: the Concept is not a *relationship*. (Or, if you like, it is in relation only to itself.) Being and (conceptual) Thought are one and the same thing, Parmenides said. Thought (or the Concept) is the attribute of Substance, which is not different from its attribute, Spinoza says. Therefore, in both cases—that is, in Parmenides-Spinoza and in Hegel—there is no "reflection" *on* Being. In both cases, Being *itself* is what reflects on itself in and through, or—better yet—as,

Concept. Absolute Knowledge that reflects the totality of Being, therefore, is just as closed in itself, just as "circular," as Being itself in its totality: there is nothing outside of the Knowledge, as there is nothing outside of Being. But there is an essential difference: Parmenides-Spinoza's Concept-Being is *Eternity*, whereas Hegel's Concept-Being is *Time*. Consequently, Spinozist absolute Knowledge, too, must *be* Eternity. That is to say that it must exclude Time. In other words: there is no need of Time to realize it; the *Ethics* must be thought, written, and read "in a trice." And that is the thing's absurdity. [Plotinus, however, accepts this consequence.]

This absurdity was already denounced by Plato in his *Parmenides*. If Being is truly one (or more exactly, the One)—i.e., if it excludes diversity, all diversity—and therefore all change—i.e., if it is Eternity that *annuls* Time—if, I say, Being is the One, a man could not *speak* of it, Plato remarks. Indeed, Discourse would have to be just as *one* as the Being that it reveals, and therefore could not go beyond the single word "one." And even that. . . . For *Time* is still the crucial question. Discourse must be *intemporal*: now, if he has not the time, man cannot even pronounce a *single* word. If Being is *one*, or, what amounts to the same thing, if the Concept is Eternity, "absolute Knowledge" reduces for Man to absolute *silence*.<sup>11</sup>

I say: for Man. That is, for the speaking being that lives in Time and needs time in order to live and to speak (i.e., in order to think by means of the Concept). Now, as we have seen, the Concept *as such* is not (or at least does not seem to be) necessarily attached to Time. The universe of Concepts or of Ideas can be conceived of as a universe of *Discourse*: as an eternal Discourse, in which all the elements coexist. [This is what Plotinus says.] And as a matter of fact, there are (it seems) *nontemporal* relations, between Concepts: all Euclid's theorems, for example, exist simultaneously within the entirety of his axioms. [And Plotinus insists on this fact.] Hence there would be a nontemporal *Discourse*.<sup>12</sup> The *idea* of the Spinozist System, then, is not absurd: quite simply, it is the idea of *absolute* Knowledge. What is absurd is that this System is

<sup>11</sup> Plato accepts this: the One is ineffable.

<sup>12</sup> Just as there are nontemporal movements, as Descartes correctly remarks.




Figure 12




Figure 13




Figure 14




Figure 15




Figure 16




Figure 17




Figure 18

supposed to have been fabricated by a *man*, who in actual fact needed *time* in order to fabricate it. [Accordingly, in Plotinus, this system belongs to the eternal Intelligence.] Or else, again: the *System* can exist outside of Time; but, starting from temporal existence, there is no *access* to this System. (The Spinozist System is Hegel's *Logik*, for which there would not and could not be a *Phenomenology* that "leads" to it; or else, it is Descartes' System, to which one could not find access through a *Discourse on Method*.)

The *Ethics* is made in accordance with a method of which an account *cannot* be given in *human* language. For the *Ethics* explains everything, except the possibility for a man living in time to write it. And if the *Phenomenology* explains why the *Logik* appears at a certain moment of history and not at another, the *Ethics* proves the impossibility of its own appearance at *any* moment of time whatsoever. In short, the *Ethics* could have been written, *if it is true*, only by God himself; and, let us take care to note—by a nonincarnated God.

Therefore, the difference between Spinoza and Hegel can be formulated in the following way: Hegel *becomes* God by thinking or writing the *Logik*; or, if you like, it is by becoming God that he writes or thinks it. Spinoza, on the other hand, must *be* God from all eternity in order to be able to write or think his *Ethics*. Now, if a being that *becomes* God in time can be called "God" only provided that it uses this term as a metaphor (a correct metaphor, by the way), the being that has always *been* God is God in the proper and strict sense of the word. Therefore, to be a Spinozist is actually to replace God the Father (who has no Son, incidentally) by Spinoza, while maintaining the notion of divine transcendence in all its rigor; it is to say that Spinoza is the transcendent God who speaks, to be sure, to human beings, but who speaks to them as eternal *God*. And this, obviously, is the height of absurdity: to take Spinoza seriously is actually to be—or to become—mad.

Spinoza, like Hegel, identifies Man (that is to say, the Wise Man) and God. It seems, then, that in both cases it could be said indifferently either that there is nothing other than God, or that there is nothing other than Man. Now in point of fact, the two assertions are not identical, and if the first is accepted by Spinoza,

only the second expresses Hegel's thought. And that is what Hegel means by saying that Spinoza's System is not a pan-theism, but an a-cosmism: it is the Universe or the totality of Being reduced to God alone, but to a God without World and without men. And to say this is to say that everything that is change, becoming, time, does not exist for Science. For if the *Ethics* is, in fact, concerned with these things, how or why they appear in it is not known.

With the use of our symbolic circles, then, the difference between Hegel's and Spinoza's Systems can be represented in the following manner:

Let us start with the theistic System. In its pure form, it is Plato's System. But in general it symbolizes possibility II (see Figure 13). For Aristotle, several small circles must be inscribed in the large circle to symbolize the relation of Eternity and Time (Figure 14); but these circles ought to have fitted together; in the end, there would again be the Platonic symbol with only one small circle. (That is to say: all truly coherent theism is a monotheism.) As for Kant, the same symbol can serve; but the small circle must be drawn with a dotted line, to show that Kant's theology has, for him, only the value of an "as if" (Figure 15). In short, the symbol of the theistic System is valid for every System that defines the Concept as an *eternal* entity in relation to *something other* than itself, no matter whether this other thing is Eternity in Time or outside of Time, or Time itself. But let us return to Spinoza. Starting with the theistic system, Hegel does away with the small circle (reduced beforehand, by his predecessors, to a single *point*): see Figure 16. Spinoza, on the other hand, does away with the large circle: see Figure 17.

Hence the symbol is the same in both cases: a homogeneous closed circle. And this is important. For we see that it is sufficient to deny that the Concept is a *relation* with *something other* than itself in order to set up the ideal of *absolute*—that is, *circular*—Knowledge. And indeed, if the Concept is related to *another* reality, an *isolated* concept can be established as true by adequation to this autonomous reality. In this case there are *partial* facts, or even *partial* truths. But if the Concept is revealed Being itself, it can be established as true only through itself. The proof itself no longer differs from *that* which has to be proved. And this means that the truth is a "System," as Hegel says. The word "system"

is not found in Spinoza. But the thing itself is there. Setting aside Parmenides, Spinoza is the only philosopher who understood that the principle of all or nothing is valid for Knowledge: either one knows *everything*, or else one *knows* nothing; for one sees that one *truly* knows something only by seeing that one knows *everything*. And that is why the study of Spinoza is so instructive, despite the *absurdity* of his point of view. Spinoza sets up the ideal of *total*, or "systematic," or "circular," Knowledge. However, *his* System is *impossible in Time*. And Hegel's whole effort consists in creating a Spinozist System which can be written by a *man* living in a *historical* World. And that is why, while admitting with Spinoza that the Concept is not a *relation*, Hegel identifies it not with Eternity, but with Time. (On this subject see the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, pp. 19ff.)

We shall see later what this means. For the moment, I want to underline once more that the symbols of both systems are identical. They differ only in their *source* (which is not seen in the drawing): doing away with the small or the large circle. And again, this indeed corresponds to the reality. It is understandable that a *temporal* Knowledge could finally embrace the *totality* of becoming. But it is not understandable that an *eternal* Knowledge could absorb everything that is in Time: for the simple reason that it would absorb us ourselves. It would be the absolute Knowledge of *Bewusstsein*, which would have completely absorbed *Selbstbewusstsein*. And this, obviously, is absurd.

I shall stop here. To know what the identification of the Concept with Eternity means, one must read the whole *Ethics*.

Let us proceed, or return, to Kant.

Kant agrees with Plato and Aristotle (in opposition to Parmenides-Spinoza and Hegel) that the Concept is an *eternal* entity, in *relation* with something *other* than itself. However, he relates this eternal Concept not to Eternity, but to Time.

We can say, moreover, that Kant defines the Concept as a *relation* precisely because he sees the impossibility of Spinozism (just as Plato had done to avoid the impossibility of Eleaticism). Perhaps he did not read Spinoza. But in the "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories" and in the "Schematismus" he says why the

Spinozist conception of Knowledge is impossible: it is impossible, because for us—that is, for man—"without intuition the concept is empty."

The Parmenidean-Spinozist (and Hegelian) Concept, which is not *in relation* with a Being *other* than itself, but which is Being revealing itself to itself—this Parmenidean-Spinozist Concept is called the "transcendental I" or the *transcendentale Synthesis der Apperception* in Kant.

"Transcendental" in Kant means: that which makes experience *possible*. Now, experience is essentially *temporal*, and *everything* that is temporal belongs to the domain of experience. "Transcendental," therefore, means: that which makes the temporal as temporal possible. Kant says that the transcendental entity is "before" Time or "outside of" Time. Hence the transcendental is "eternal" or, as Kant himself says, *a priori*; this is to say that it precedes "the temporal taken as temporal." To say that there is *epistēmē*, absolute Knowledge, truly true truth, is to say that there are universally and necessarily valid concepts—that is, concepts that on the one hand are valid at *every* moment of time, and on the other hand *exclude* Time from themselves (that is, can never be *modified*); therefore, it is to say that there are *a priori*, or transcendental, or *eternal*, concepts.

Now, the eternal Concept (like every eternal entity) is not eternal in and by itself. It is eternal by its coming from Eternity, by its origin. Now, the origin of the eternal Concept is the "transcendental I" or the "transcendental Synthesis." This I or this Synthesis, therefore, is not *eternal*; it *is* Eternity. Therefore, Kant's transcendental Self-Consciousness is Parmenides' Substance conceived of as spiritual subject—that is, God. It is the real Eternity, which reveals itself to itself in and by the Concept. It is the source of all Being revealed by the Concept, and the source of all conceptual *revelation* of Being; it is the *eternal* source of all temporal Being.

However, Kant says, we men can say of the "transcendental I" that it *is* and that it is *one*; but that is all we can say of it. In other words, Kant accepts the Platonic critique of Parmenides: if the Concept *is* Eternity, then absolute Knowledge reduces to the single word "iv" or "ov," and there is no possible *Discourse*. (Moreover,

strictly speaking, one cannot even say of the "transcendental I" that it *is* and that it is *one*. For, as we shall soon see, the categories of Being and Quantity cannot be applied in this case. Therefore, the most that can be said is that it is "Something" and not Nothingness; but one cannot say that it is a *thing* having such or such qualities; now, this Being, of which one can only say that it *is*, is a *Sein* which, as Hegel will say, does not differ from *Nichts*, from Nothingness.)

The Parmenidean-Spinozist System is therefore impossible, Kant says. The essential self-conscious unity of Eternity has twelve aspects, which are the twelve famous categories-concepts. These twelve aspects of Eternity are obviously eternal; they "precede" everything that is in Time, they are "before" Time; hence they are valid at every moment of Time, and, since they exclude Time, they cannot be modified; they are *a priori*. Now, Parmenides' and Spinoza's error (or illusion) consisted in this: they believed that the eternal which *comes* from Eternity *reveals* this eternity by *determining* it—that is, by qualifying it. For Parmenides and Spinoza, the concepts-categories are attributes of the One which is, and can be *attributed* to it. Now for Kant, none of this holds true.<sup>13</sup>

None of this holds true, because it is impossible. And at the end of § 16 of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant explains why.

A determination of Eternity by the eternal concepts-categories would be possible only by an Understanding (*Verstand*) "through the Self-Consciousness of which," he says, "the whole *Manifold* (*das Mannigfaltige*) would be given at the same time"; or else, again: by an Understanding such that the objects of its representations exist through the sole fact of the existence of these representations themselves; in other words—by a *divine* (or "archetypal") Understanding. For in point of fact, the being which, by thinking of *itself*, thinks of *everything* that can be thought, and which creates the objects thought by the sole act of thinking of them, is God. Hence Spinoza was right to give the name "God" to Parmenides' *ἑν-ὄν* which *coincides* with the Concept that reveals

<sup>13</sup> For Plotinus, they cannot be attributed to the One. But they can be attributed to the One-which-is, which for him is the second Hypostasis: Intelligence or the intelligible Cosmos.

it. But he was wrong to forget that God alone can apply this Concept to himself. For us who are not God, to apply *our* Concept to *God* is to relate the Concept to something other than this Concept itself. Now, the Concept which is a *relation* in the proper sense of the word—that is, a relation to *something else*—is, at most, eternal, but not Eternity. This is to say: either the very basis of Spinozism is false (the Concept is *not* Eternity); or else, if the Concept is Eternity, only God can be a Spinozist. To assert that one is not God and to write the *Ethics* is not to know what one is doing; it is to do something of which one cannot give an account, to do something "absurd."

But in principle, according to Kant, God *could* write the *Ethics*. The whole question, then, is to know whether a man (Spinoza) can *be* God. Now, for Kant, this is impossible, because Man can draw nothing from the content of his *Self-Consciousness*: taken in itself, the human I is a point without content, an empty receptacle, and the (manifold) content must be *given* (*gegeben*) to it, it must come from *elsewhere*. Or, what amounts to the same thing: it is not sufficient for Man to *think* in order that there be *true* knowledge; in addition, the object of which Man thinks must *exist*, and exist *independently* of his act of thinking of it. Or else, again, as Kant says: human Consciousness necessarily has *two* constituent elements: the *Begriff* or Concept, and the  *Anschauung* or Intuition, the latter presenting a (manifold) content *given* to Man and *not produced* by him, or *from* him, or *in* him.

The Concept possessed by a being that is not God is, therefore, a *relation*: in other words, it can be eternal, but it is not Eternity. And that is why Spinozism is "absurd." It is absurd because Spinoza is not God.

But there is still the conception of Plato-Aristotle, which admits that the (human) Concept is a *relation*, but a relation related to Eternity and not to Time. That is to say: Eternity (or God) implies the manifold in its own unity, and it itself creates the manifold which it reveals by the Concept. Therefore, being the eternal development of Eternity in itself, this manifold *itself* is Eternity: it is the (manifold) Universe of ideas-concepts, which has nothing to do with the World of space-time. But it is Eternity itself that develops itself in this Universe; our merely *eternal* Concept does not produce it. Hence this Universe is *given* to us; and

our Concept is related to it. In other words, *our* absolute Knowledge is not the Knowledge which God has of himself; it is the Knowledge which we have of *God*, of a God essentially different from us, of a *transcendent* God. It is a theo-logical Knowledge in the strict sense of the term, a Knowledge which is the *relation* of the eternal Concept to Eternity (and not to *Time*).

Now according to Kant, this too is impossible. For the simple reason that the relation of the eternal to Eternity must itself be eternal or nontemporal, whereas *our* Knowledge is not only in Time, but, even more important, it itself is temporal: we need time in order to think.

In principle, Kant says, there could be a nonspatial-temporal Intuition (*Anschauung*). In principle, the concepts-categories can be applied to any given manifold whatsoever. Therefore a non-divine being could, in principle, develop an absolute Knowledge revealing the nonspatial-temporal Universe of the Platonic Ideas. But the nondivine being called Man cannot do so. If Spinozism is possible only for God, Platonism is possible only for a nondivine intelligence other than human intelligence, an "angelic" intelligence, for example. For, once more (and this is an irreducible and inexplicable fact, according to Kant; cf. the end of § 21): for us human beings, the given manifold is always a manifold given in spatial-temporal form.

We can think only provided that a manifold is given to us. But this manifold must *exist*: in its whole and in each of its elements. Therefore Parmenides' one and unique *Being* must be differentiated into a manifold Being. Now for us, the identical can be diverse only provided that it is Space or is *in* Space. [As a matter of fact, two identical geometrical points can be different only by their positions in space; and space is nothing other than the infinite whole of points which are rigorously identical with respect to their intrinsic character (which, by the way, is the absence of all "character") and are nonetheless different one from another.] But in order that there be knowledge, the diverse must be *identified*: every act of knowing is a *synthesis*, Kant says, which introduces *unity* into the (given) manifold. Now for us, the diverse can be identical only in Time or as Time.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> As a matter of fact, to identify the point A with the point B is to cause the point to *pass* from A to B; generally speaking, to identify two different things is

Therefore for us, knowledge—that is, the identification of the diverse—can be accomplished only *in* Time, because the very identification of the diverse *is* Time. It was always known that the human Concept appears at some moment *of* Time; and it was known that Man needs time in order to think. But Kant was the first to see that this is not accidental, but essential to Man. Hence the World in which Man thinks is necessarily a *temporal* World. And if actual human thought is related to what is *in* Time, the Kantian analysis shows that *Time* is what makes the actual exercise of thought possible. In other words, we can use our eternal Concepts only provided that we relate them to Time as such—that is, provided that we "schematize" them—as Kant says.

Therefore: the "transcendental I" which is simply *Self-Consciousness* is Spinoza's God; and *we* can say nothing about it. The "transcendental I," source of the categories-concepts which are related to a nonspatial-temporal manifold—i.e., to an *eternal* manifold—is the I as it was conceived of by Platonic-Aristotelian or pre-Kantian philosophy in general; now, this I is not human, for it is supposed to be able to think *outside* of Time.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, only the "transcendental I" which is the origin of *schematized* categories—that is, of Concepts related to Time—is the *human* "transcendental I," which makes actual *human* thought possible.

Human thought is accomplished in Time, and it is a temporal phenomenon. As such, it is purely empirical: it is a *doxa*. But in order that the (eternal) Concept be applied to the *temporal*, it is first necessary to "schematize" the Concept—that is, to apply it to Time as such. This application is accomplished "before" Time or "outside" of Time. It is *a priori*—that is, unmodifiable and always valid. Therefore, absolute Knowledge is the entirety of the rela-

to say that they are one and the same thing which has *changed*; and Time is but the infinite whole of all identifications of the diverse—that is, of all *changes* whatsoever.

<sup>15</sup> It is not sufficient to geometrize physics, as Plato and Descartes do; it would still be necessary to geometrize the thought of the philosopher who performs this geometrization—that is, to exclude Time from this thought itself; now, this is impossible. The ideal of the "universal tensor" in modern relativist physics is the ideal of a nontemporal knowledge: the *whole* content would be given *simultaneously* in this formula; but even if this tensor is possible, it is only an algorithm, and not a *Discourse*; all *discursive* thought is necessarily developed in Time, because even the attributing of the predicate to the subject is a temporal act.

tions between the (eternal) Concept and Time; it is the entirety of the *synthetischen Grundsätze*; it is Kant's ontology.

Let us now see the result of this Kantian conception for the World and for Man. In the natural World, Time is represented by motion. The temporalized Concept, therefore, is related to real motion. And what makes the temporalized Concept *possible*—i.e., the "schematism" or the relation to Time "anterior" to Time—corresponds to what makes real motion really possible—i.e., *force*. Therefore, to say that the (eternal) Concept is in relation with Time is to set forth, among other things, a *dynamic* conception of matter and the World—that is, a physics of *forces*. Hence Kantian philosophy will necessarily encounter Newtonian physics. And inversely, if the World actually is as Newton's physics describes it, Kant's philosophy must be accepted as a given truth.

But even leaving aside the fact that the Newtonian World is just as uninhabitable for Man as Plato's geometrical World, we can indicate an insufficiency in the Kantian-Newtonian conception of the purely natural World. The impossibility of relating the Concept to Eternity ultimately means the impossibility of having an absolute *geometrical* understanding of the World. In other words, the notion of the Cosmos—that is, of the *eternal* or static structure of the natural Universe—is denied. And, consequently, the existence of eternal structures *in* the World is not explained: in particular, the biological species cannot be explained, as it is by Aristotle. Generally speaking, purely spatial structure is not explained: the motion of the planets, for example, is explained by force, but the structure of the solar system is not explained. And here the impossibility of explaining is absolute: the fact that in the real World laws apply to *stable* entities is, for Kant, a "transcendental *chance*." One can say that that's the way *it is*; and that is all one can say about it.

To be sure, Kant develops a theory of the living being in the third "Critique." But this theory is valid only in the mode of "as if," since the third "Critique" has no equivalent in the "System."<sup>18</sup> And what is valid for the animal in particular is also valid for the animal in general, that is, for the Cosmos: here too the cosmology

<sup>18</sup> This is so precisely because knowledge properly so-called starts with the relation between the Concept and Time, and not between the Concept and Eternity.

(in other respects like that of Leibniz) has only a "regulative" value. And the same holds for God: God being Eternity, there is no possible *Knowledge* relating to God.

In fine, if Kantian Knowledge is closed—that is, total and definitive or absolute—we again find the theistic or Platonic schema of two circles (see Figure 13). But since the Concept is not related to Eternity, the small circle remains forever purely hypothetical (Figure 15). However, when it is done away with, what is obtained is not the single closed circle of Hegel (Figure 16), but the open circle without fixed limits of Skepticism (Figure 18). Indeed, since the *eternal* Concept is related to *Time*, no *absolute* adequation is possible. At best it is the *infinite* eternal of Time which can completely fill up the framework of the *eternal* concepts-categories. Thought that is *in* Time, therefore, never attains this end. And that is why Kant says that absolute Knowledge is an *unendliche Aufgabe*, an *infinite* task.

Let us now see what the Kantian conception means on the anthropological level. The Concept is eternal, but it is related to Time. If the Concept is *eternal*, it is because there is something in Man that places him outside of Time: it is *freedom*—that is, the "transcendental I" taken as "practical Reason" or "pure Will." If there is *relation* of Concept to Time, there is also *application* of "pure Will" to the temporal reality. But to the extent that there is *a priori* concept (which means, here: act of freedom), the relation to Time is accomplished "*before*" Time. The act of freedom, while being related to Time, is therefore outside of Time. It is the renowned "choice of the intelligible character." This choice is not temporal, but it *determines* Man's whole temporal existence, in which, therefore, there is no freedom.

Thus we again meet Plato's myth. However, in Plato, the Concept is related to Eternity, while in Kant it is related to Time. And this difference finds expression here in the fact that the "transcendental choice" is effected *not*, as in Plato, with a view to what Man is (or "has been") *outside* of Time, but with a view to what he is (or "will be") *in* Time. In Plato, it has to do with an *affirmation*, in Kant—with a *negation*; there it has to do with becoming in Time what one *is* eternally; here—with *not being* eternally what one has become in Time; there—*acceptance* of eternal Nature, here—*negation* of temporal Nature. Or, to restate it: there—

freedom of the Angel who clings to or separates himself from God; here—freedom of fallen Man who repudiates his sin in a single extratemporal act.<sup>17</sup>

Therefore, here, as in the description of the natural World, there is a progress. But, in both cases, there is an irreducible insufficiency. Man, as historical being, remains inexplicable: neither the World of *concrete* things in which he lives, nor the History that he creates by *temporal* free acts, is understood.

In fine, we end with the following result:

Possibility I is excluded, because it cannot be realized by Man. Possibility IV is likewise excluded, because it does away with the very idea of a truth in the proper sense of the term. Possibility II gives partial explanations. But in none of its three variants does it manage to give an account of History—that is, of Man taken as free creator in Time; in any case, even if one can barely manage to speak of an infinite historical evolution in the Kantian or “criticist” variant, it is impossible to attain an absolute Knowledge relating to History, and hence to historical Man.

In consequence, if philosophy is to attain an absolute Knowledge relating to Man, as we currently conceive of him, it must accept possibility III. And this is what Hegel did, in saying that the Concept is Time. Our concern is to see what that means.

#### EIGHTH LECTURE

With Hegel, we move on to the third possibility: namely, the one that identifies the Concept with Time.

At the dawn of philosophy, Parmenides identified the Concept with Eternity. Hence Time had *nothing* to do with the Concept; with absolute Knowledge, *epistēmē*, or truth; nor, finally, with Man, to the extent that, as the bearer of the Concept, he is the

<sup>17</sup> The Christian act must indeed be conceived of in such a way: since it must be compatible with eternal divine grace, the Christian act must be “transcendental.”

empirical existence of Knowledge in the temporal World. Moreover, this *temporal* existence of the Concept in the World is inexplicable from Parmenides’ point of view. Man’s *temporal* existence is just as inexplicable for him as it is for Spinoza, who also identified the Concept with Eternity.

With Plato, the existence of Man becomes necessary for Knowledge. True Knowledge—that is, the Concept—is now a *relation*. Therefore, absolute Knowledge necessarily implies two elements, and one of them can just barely be called “Man.” But the Concept is *eternal*, and it is related to Eternity situated outside of Time. The Eternal, to be sure, is not Eternity. The eternal Concept is something other than Eternity; already it is closer to Time, if I may say so, than the Parmenidean-Spinozist Concept. But, although not Eternity, it is nonetheless related to Eternity, and the Eternity to which it is related has nothing to do with Time.

Only with Aristotle does Time make its way into absolute Knowledge. The Eternity to which the (eternal) Concept is related is now situated *in* Time. But Time enters into *absolute* Knowledge only to the extent that Time itself is *eternal* (“eternal return”).

Kant is the first to break with this pagan conception and, in metaphysics itself, to take account of the pre-philosophical Judaeo-Christian anthropology of the Bible and the *Epistle to the Romans*, which is the anthropology of *historical* Man endowed with an *immortal* “soul.” For Kant, the Concept—while remaining *eternal*—is related to Time taken as Time.

Therefore, there remains only one possibility of going further in the direction of bringing the Concept and Time together. To do this, and to avoid the difficulties of earlier conceptions, one must *identify* the Concept and Time. That is what Hegel does. And that is his great discovery, which makes him a great philosopher, a philosopher of the order of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant.

Hegel is the first to identify the Concept and Time. And, curiously enough, he himself says it in so many words, whereas one would search in vain in the other philosophers for the explicit formulas that I have used in my schematic exposition. Hegel said it as early as the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, where the paradoxical sentence that I have already cited is found: “*Was die Zeit*



*betrifft, . . . so ist sie der daseiende Begriff selbst*" (As for *Time*, it is the empirically existing Concept itself). And he repeats it word for word in Chapter VIII.

This sentence marks an extremely important date in the history of philosophy. Disregarding Parmenides-Spinoza, we can say that there are two great periods in this history: one that goes from Plato to Kant, and one that begins with Hegel. And I have already said (although, of course, I was not able to prove it) that the philosophers who do not identify the Concept and Time cannot give an account of History—that is, of the existence of the man whom each of us believes himself to be—that is, the *free* and *historical individual*.

The principal aim, then, of the reform introduced by Hegel was the desire to give an account of the fact of History. On its *phenomenological* level, Hegel's philosophy (or more exactly, his "Science") describes the existence of Man who sees that he lives in a World in which he *knows* that he is a *free* and *historical individual*. And on its *metaphysical* level, this philosophy tells us what the World in which Man can *appear* thus to himself must *be*. Finally, on the *ontological* level, the problem is to see what Being itself must be in order to *exist* as such a World. And Hegel answers by saying that this is possibly only if the real Concept (that is, Being revealed to itself by an empirically existing Discourse) is Time.

Hegel's *whole* philosophy or "Science," therefore, can be summed up in the sentence cited: "*Time* is the Concept itself which is *there* in empirical existence"—that is, in real Space or the World.

But of course, it is not sufficient to have read that sentence in order to know what Hegelian philosophy is; just as it is not sufficient to say that the *eternal* Concept is *related* to Time in order to know what Kant's philosophy is, for example. It is necessary to *develop* these condensed formulas. And to develop the formula *entirely* is to reconstruct the *entirety* of the philosophy in question (with the supposition that its author has made no error in his own development of the fundamental formula).

Of course, we cannot try to reconstruct here the entirety of Hegelian philosophy from the identification of the empirically existing Concept and Time. I must be satisfied with making several quite general remarks, like those that I made in discussing the

other conceptions of the relation between the Concept and Time.

The aim of Hegel's philosophy is to give an account of the fact of History. From this it can be concluded that the Time that he identifies with the Concept is *historical* Time, the Time in which human history unfolds, or better still, the Time that realizes itself (not as the motion of the stars, for example, but) as universal History.<sup>18</sup>

In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel is very radical. As a matter of fact (at the end of the next to last paragraph of the book and at the beginning of the last, page 563), he says that Nature is Space, whereas Time is History. In other words: there is no natural, cosmic Time; there is Time only to the extent that there is *History*, that is, *human* existence—that is, *speaking existence*. Man who, in the course of History, reveals Being by his Discourse, is the "empirically existing Concept" (*der daseiende Begriff*), and Time is nothing other than this Concept. Without Man, Nature would be *Space*, and *only* Space. Only Man is in Time, and Time does not exist outside of Man; therefore, *Man is Time*, and *Time is Man*—that is, the "Concept which is there in the [spatial] empirical existence" of Nature (*der Begriff der da ist*).

But in his other writings, Hegel is less radical. In them, he admits the existence of a cosmic Time.<sup>19</sup> But in so doing, Hegel identifies cosmic Time and historical Time.<sup>20</sup>

But for the moment, no matter. If Hegel identifies both Times, if he admits only one Time, we can apply everything that he says about Time in general to *historical* Time (which is all that interests us here).

Now, curiously enough, the crucial text on Time is found in the "Philosophy of Nature" of the *Jenenser Realphilosophie*. Mr. Alexandre Koyré has done a translation and commentary of this

<sup>18</sup> Therefore, the identification of Time and the Concept amounts to understanding History as the history of human *Discourse* which reveals Being. And we know that actually, for Hegel, *real* Time—i.e., universal History—is in the final analysis the history of *philosophy*.

<sup>19</sup> It may be that it is actually impossible to do without Time in Nature; for it is probable that (biological) life, at least, is an *essentially* temporal phenomenon.

<sup>20</sup> This, in my opinion, is his basic error; for if life is a temporal phenomenon, biological Time surely has a structure different from that of historical or human Time; the whole question is to know how these two Times coexist; and they probably coexist with a cosmic or physical Time, which is *different* from both in its structure.

text in an article which resulted from his course on the writings of Hegel's youth: a conclusive article, which is the source and basis of my interpretation of the *Phenomenology*. Here I shall merely reproduce in a few words the principal consequences implied by Mr. Koyré's analysis.

The text in question clearly shows that the Time that Hegel has in view is the Time that, for us, is historical (and not biological or cosmic) Time. In effect, this Time is characterized by the primacy of the Future. In the Time that pre-Hegelian Philosophy considered, the movement went from the Past toward the Future, by way of the Present.<sup>21</sup> In the Time of which Hegel speaks, on the other hand, the movement is engendered in the Future and goes toward the Present by way of the Past: Future → Past → Present (→ Future). And this is indeed the specific structure of properly *human*—that is, *historical*—Time.

In fact, let us consider the *phenomenological* (or better, anthropological) projection of this *metaphysical* analysis of Time.<sup>22</sup> The movement engendered by the Future is the movement that arises from Desire. This means: from specifically human Desire—that is, creative Desire—that is, Desire that is directed toward an entity that does not exist and has not existed in the real natural World. Only then can the movement be said to be engendered by the Future, for the Future is precisely what does not (yet) exist and has not (already) existed. Now, we know that Desire can be directed toward an absolutely *nonexistent* entity only provided that it is directed toward another Desire taken as Desire. As a matter of fact, Desire is the presence of an *absence*: I am thirsty because there is an *absence* of water in me. It is indeed, then, the presence of a future in the present: of the future act of drinking.

<sup>21</sup> It may be that the Time in which the Present takes primacy is cosmic or physical Time, whereas biological Time would be characterized by the primacy of the Past. It does seem that the physical or cosmic object is but a simple *presence* (*Gegenwart*), whereas the fundamental biological phenomenon is probably *Memory* in the broad sense, and the specifically human phenomenon is without a doubt the *Project*. Moreover, it could be that the cosmic and biological forms of Time exist as Time only in relation to Man—that is, in relation to historical Time.

<sup>22</sup> On the ontological level, the problem would be to study the relations between Thesis = Identity, Antithesis = Negativity, and Synthesis = Totality. But I shall not talk about this.

To desire to drink is to desire something (water) that *is*: hence, it is to act in terms of the present. But to act in terms of the desire for a *desire* is to act in terms of what does not (yet) exist—that is, in terms of the future. The being that acts thus, therefore, is in a Time in which the Future takes primacy. And inversely, the Future can really take primacy only if, in the real (spatial) World, there is a being capable of acting thus.

Now, in Chapter IV of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel shows that the Desire that is directed toward another Desire is necessarily the Desire for *Recognition*, which—by opposing the Master to the Slave—engenders *History* and moves it (as long as it is not definitively overcome by Satisfaction). Therefore: by realizing itself, the Time in which the Future takes primacy engenders *History*, which lasts as long as *this* Time lasts; and this Time lasts only as long as *History* lasts—that is, as long as human acts accomplished with a view to social *Recognition* are carried out.

Now, if Desire is the presence of an *absence*, it is not—taken as such—an empirical *reality*: it does not exist in a positive manner in the natural—i.e., spatial—Present. On the contrary, it is like a gap or a “hole” in Space: an emptiness, a nothingness. (And it is into this “hole,” so to speak, that the purely temporal Future takes its place, within the spatial Present.) Desire that is related to Desire, therefore, is related to nothing. To “realize” it, therefore, is to realize nothing. In being related only to the Future, one does not come to a reality, and consequently one is not really in motion. On the other hand, if one affirms or accepts the present (or better, spatial) real, one *desires* nothing; hence one is not related to the Future, one does not go beyond the Present, and consequently one does not move either. Therefore: in order to *realize* itself, Desire must be related to a *reality*; but it cannot be related to it in a *positive* manner. Hence it must be related to it *negatively*. Therefore Desire is necessarily the Desire to *negate* the real or present given. And the *reality* of Desire comes from the *negation* of the given *reality*.<sup>23</sup> Now, the *negated* real is the real that has *ceased* to be: it is the *past* real, or the *real* Past. Desire determined by the

<sup>23</sup> The *desire* to drink is an *absence* of water, but the quality of this desire (thirst) is determined not by *absence* as such, but by the fact that it is an absence of *water* (and not of something else), and this desire *realizes* itself by the “negation” of *real* water (in the act of drinking).

*Future* appears, in the *Present*, as a reality (that is, as satisfied Desire) only on the condition that it has negated a real—that is, a *Past*. The manner in which the *Past* has been (negatively) formed in terms of the *Future* is what determines the quality of the real *Present*. And only the *Present* thus determined by the *Future* and the *Past* is a human or historical *Present*.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, generally speaking: the *historical* movement arises from the *Future* and passes through the *Past* in order to *realize* itself in the *Present* or as temporal *Present*. The *Time* that Hegel has in view, then, is human or historical *Time*: it is the *Time* of conscious and voluntary action which realizes in the *present* a *Project* for the future, which *Project* is formed on the basis of knowledge of the *past*.<sup>25</sup>

Therefore, we are dealing with historical *Time*, and Hegel says that this "*Time* is the *Concept* itself which *exists empirically*." For the moment let us disregard the term "*Concept*." Hegel says, then, that *Time* is something, an *X*, that *exists empirically*. Now, this assertion can be deduced from the very analysis of the Hegelian notion of (historical) *Time*. *Time* in which the *Future* takes primacy can be realized, can *exist*, only provided that it *negates* or annihilates. In order that *Time* may exist, therefore, there must

<sup>24</sup> Indeed, we say that a moment is "historical" when the action that is performed in it is performed in terms of the idea that the agent has of the future (that is, in terms of a *Project*): one decides on a *future* war, and so on; therefore, one acts in terms of the *future*. But if the moment is to be truly "historical," there must be *change*; in other words, the decision must be *negative* with respect to the given: in deciding for the future war, one decides *against* the prevailing peace. And, through the decision for the future war, the peace is transformed into the past. Now, the *present* historical act, *launched* by the idea of the future (by the *Project*), is *determined* by this past that it creates: if the peace is sure and honorable, the negation that relegates it to the past is the act of a madman or a criminal; if it is humiliating, its negation is an act worthy of a statesman; and so on.

<sup>25</sup> As an example of a "historic moment" let us take the celebrated anecdote of the "Rubicon." What is there in the *present* properly so-called? A man takes a walk at night on the bank of a small river. In other words, something extremely banal, nothing "historic." For even if the man in question was Caesar, the event would in no sense be "historic" if Caesar were taking such a walk solely because of some sort of insomnia. The moment is historic because the man taking a nocturnal walk is thinking about a *coup d'état*, the civil war, the conquest of Rome, and worldwide dominion. And, let us take care to notice: because he has the *project* of doing it, for all this is still in the *future*. The event in question, therefore, would not be historic if there were not a *real presence* (*Gegenwart*) of the *future* in the real World (first of all, in Caesar's brain). Therefore, the present

also be something other than *Time*. This other thing is first of all *Space* (as it were, the place where things are stopped). Therefore: no *Time* without *Space*; *Time* is something that is in *Space*.<sup>26</sup> *Time* is the *negation* of *Space* (of diversity); but if it is something and not nothingness, it is because it is the negation of *Space*. Now, only that which really exists—that is, which *resists*—can be really negated. But *Space* that resists is full: it is extended *matter*, it is *real Space*—that is, the natural *World*. Therefore, *Time* must exist in a *World*: it is indeed, then, something which "*ist da*," as Hegel says, which is *there* in a *Space*, and which is *there* in *empirical Space*—that is, in a sensible *Space* or a natural *World*. *Time* *annihilates* this *World* by causing it at every instant to sink into the nothingness of the past. But *Time* is nothing but this *annihilation* of the *World*; and if there were no *real World* that was annihilated, *Time* would only be pure nothingness: there would be no *Time*. Hence *Time* that *is*, therefore, is indeed something that "exists empirically"—i.e., exists in a real *Space* or a spatial *World*.

Now, we have seen that the presence of *Time* (in which the *Future* takes primacy) in the real *World* is called *Desire* (which

is "historical" only because there is in it a relation to the *future*, or more exactly, because it is a function of the future (Caesar taking a walk *because* he is thinking of the future). And it is in this sense that one can speak of a *primacy of the future* in historical *Time*. But this is not sufficient. Suppose that the person taking a walk is a Roman adolescent who is "dreaming" of worldwide dominion, or a "megalomaniac" in the clinical sense of the word who is constructing a "project," otherwise identical to Caesar's. Immediately, the walk ceases to be a "historic event." It is historic solely because it is *Caesar* who, while taking a walk, is thinking about his project (or "making up his mind," that is, transforming a "hypothesis" without any precise relation to real *Time* into a concrete "project for the future"). Why? Because Caesar has the *possibility* (but not the *certainty*, for then there would be no *future* properly so-called, nor a genuine *project*) of realizing his plans. Now, his whole *past*, and only his past, is what assures him of this possibility. The past—that is, the entirety of the actions of fighting and work effected at various present times in terms of the project—that is, in terms of the future. This *past* is what distinguishes the "project" from a simple "dream" or "utopia." Consequently, there is a "historic moment" only when the *present* is ordered in terms of the *future*, on the condition that the future makes its way into the present not in an *immediate* manner (*unmittelbar*; the case of a utopia), but having been *mediated* (*vermittelt*) by the *past*—that is, by an *already accomplished* action.

<sup>26</sup> I said that *Desire*—that is, *Time*—is a "hole"; now, for a "hole" to exist, there must be a space in which the hole exists.

is directed toward another Desire), and that this Desire is a specifically human Desire, since the Action that realizes it is Man's very being. The real presence of Time in the World, therefore, is called *Man*. Time is Man, and Man is Time.

In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel does not say this in so many words, because he avoids the word "man." But in the Lectures delivered at Jena he says: "Geist ist Zeit" ("Spirit is Time"). Now, "Spirit" in Hegel (and especially in this context) means "human Spirit" or *Man*, more particularly, collective Man—that is, the People or State, and, finally, Man as a whole or humanity in the totality of its spatial-temporal existence, that is, the totality of universal History.

Therefore, Time (that is, historical Time, with the rhythm: Future → Past → Present) is Man in his empirical—that is, spatial—integral reality: Time is the History of Man in the World. And indeed, without Man, there would be no Time in the World; Nature that did not shelter Man would be only a real *Space*.<sup>27</sup> To be sure, the animal, too, has desires, and it acts in terms of these desires, by negating the real: it eats and drinks, just like man. But the animal's desires are *natural*; they are directed toward what is, and hence they are *determined* by what is; the negating action that is effected in terms of *these* desires, therefore, cannot *essentially* negate, it cannot change the *essence* of what is. Therefore, in its *entirety*—that is, in its *reality*—Being is not modified by these "natural" desires; it does not essentially change because of them; it remains *identical* to itself, and thus it is *Space*, and not Time. To be sure, an animal transforms the aspect of the natural World in which it lives. But it dies and gives back to the earth what it has taken from it. And since the animal is *identically* repeated by its offspring, the changes that it brings about in the World are repeated, too. And hence in its entirety, Nature remains what it is.<sup>28</sup> Man, on the other hand, *essentially* transforms the World by the negating Action of his Fights and his Work, Action which arises from *nonnatural* human Desire directed toward an-

<sup>27</sup> Of four dimensions.

<sup>28</sup> If there is Time, it is biological Time, Aristotle's circular Time; it is *Eternity* in Time; it is Time in which everything changes in order to remain the same thing.

other Desire—that is, toward something that does not exist really in the natural World.<sup>29</sup> Only Man creates and destroys *essentially*. Therefore, the natural reality implies Time only if it implies a human reality. Now, man essentially creates and destroys in terms of the idea that he forms of the Future. And the idea of the Future appears in the real present in the form of a Desire directed toward another Desire—that is, in the form of a Desire for social *Recognition*. Now, Action that arises from *this* Desire engenders History. Hence there is *Time* only where there is *History*.

Therefore: "*die Zeit ist der daseiende Begriff selbst*" means: *Time is Man* in the World and his real History. But Hegel also says: "*Geist ist Zeit*." That is to say, *Man is Time*. And we have just seen what this means: Man is Desire directed toward another Desire—that is, Desire for Recognition—that is, negating Action performed for the sake of satisfying this Desire for Recognition—that is, bloody Fighting for prestige—that is, the relation between Master and Slave—that is, *Work*—that is, historical evolution which finally comes to the universal and homogeneous State and to the absolute Knowledge that reveals complete Man realized in and by this State. In short, to say that *Man is Time* is to say all that Hegel says of Man in the *Phenomenology*. And it is also to say that the existing Universe, and Being itself, must be such that Man thus conceived of is *possible* and can be *realized*. Hence the sentence that identifies Spirit and Time sums up Hegel's whole philosophy, just as the other schematic formulas enumerated above sum up the whole philosophy of a Plato, an Aristotle, etc.

But in those schematic formulas, the *Concept* is what was mentioned. Now, Hegel too says not only "*Geist ist Zeit*," but also "*die Zeit ist der Begriff der da ist*."

To be sure, these are two different ways of saying the same thing. If *Man is Time*, and if *Time is* the "empirically existing Concept," it can be said that *Man is* the "empirically existing Concept." And so, indeed, he is: as the only speaking being in the World, he is Logos (or Discourse) incarnate, Logos become flesh

<sup>29</sup> Thus the olive tree of Pericles' time is "the same" olive tree as that of Venizelos' time; but Pericles' Greece is a past that never again becomes a present; and, with respect to Pericles, Venizelos represents a future that as yet has never been a past.

and thus existing as an empirical reality in the natural World. Man is the *Dasein* of the *Begriff*, and the "empirically existing Concept" is Man. Therefore, to say that Time is the "empirically existing Concept" is indeed to say that Time is Man, provided that Man is conceived of as Hegel conceives of him in the *Phenomenology*. Hence everything that Hegel says of Man in the *Phenomenology* is also valid for Time. And inversely, everything that can be said of the "appearance" (*Erscheinung*) or "*Phänomenologie*" of Time (that is, of Spirit) in the World is said by Hegel in the *Phenomenology*.

Therefore, to understand the paradoxical identification of Time and the Concept, one must know the whole of the *Phenomenology*. On the one hand, one must know that the Time in question is human or historical Time—that is, Time in which the Future that determines the Present by way of the Past takes primacy. And on the other hand, one must know how Hegel defines the Concept.<sup>80</sup>

It remains for me, then, briefly to go over what the Concept, the *Begriff*, is for Hegel.

In Chapter VII of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel said that all *conceptual* understanding (*Begreifen*) is equivalent to a *murder*. Let us, then, recall what he had in view. As long as the Meaning (or Essence, Concept, Logos, Idea, etc.) is embodied in an empirically existing entity, this Meaning or Essence, as well as this entity, *lives*. For example, as long as the Meaning (or Essence) "dog" is embodied in a sensible entity, this Meaning (Essence) *lives*: it is the real dog, the living dog which runs, drinks, and eats. But when the Meaning (Essence) "dog" passes into the *word* "dog"—that is, becomes *abstract* Concept which is *different* from the sensible reality that it reveals by its Meaning—the Meaning (Essence) *dies*: the *word* "dog" does not run, drink, and eat; in it the Meaning (Essence) *ceases* to live—that is, it *dies*. And that is why the *conceptual* understanding of empirical reality is equivalent to a *murder*. To be sure, Hegel knows full well that it is not necessary to kill a dog in order to understand it through its Concept—that is,

<sup>80</sup> The *Hegelian* Concept is identified with *Hegelian* Time. But the *pre-Hegelian* Concept cannot be identified with *pre-Hegelian* Time; nor the *Hegelian* Concept with *pre-Hegelian* Time; nor the *pre-Hegelian* Concept with *Hegelian* Time.

in order to give it a name or define it—nor is it necessary to wait for it actually to die in order to do so.<sup>81</sup> However, Hegel says, if the dog were not *mortal*—that is, essentially *finite* or limited with respect to its duration—one could not *detach* its Concept from it—that is, cause the Meaning (Essence) that is embodied in the *real* dog to pass into the *nonliving* word—into the *word* (endowed with a meaning)—that is, into the *abstract* Concept—into the Concept that exists not in the dog (which realizes it) but in the man (who thinks it)—that is, in something *other* than the sensible reality which the concept reveals by its Meaning. The Concept "dog" which is *my* Concept (of the dog), the Concept, therefore, which is something *other* than the living dog and is *related* to a living dog as to an *external* reality—this *abstract* Concept is possible only if the dog is *essentially* mortal. That is, if the dog dies or is annihilated at *every* instant of its existence. Now, this dog which is annihilated at every instant is precisely the dog which endures in Time, which at every instant ceases to live or exist in the Present so as to be annihilated in the Past, or *as* Past.<sup>82</sup> If the dog were eternal, if it existed outside of Time or without Time, the Concept "dog" would never be *detached* from the dog itself. The empirical existence (*Dasein*) of the Concept "dog" would be the living dog, and not the *word* "dog" (either thought or spoken). Hence, there would be no *Discourse* (Logos) in the World; and since the empirically existing Discourse is solely Man (actually speaking Man), there would be no Man in the World. The Concept-word

<sup>81</sup> Let us note, however, that a conceptual or "scientific" understanding of the dog actually leads, sooner or later, to its *dissection*.

<sup>82</sup> Therefore: for Aristotle there is a concept "dog" only because there is an *eternal* real dog; namely, the *species* "dog," which is always in the present; for Hegel, on the other hand, there is a concept "dog" only because the real dog is a *temporal* entity—that is, an essentially finite or "mortal" entity, an entity which is annihilated at every instant: and the Concept is the permanent support of this nihilation of the spatial real, which nihilation is itself nothing other than *Time*. For Hegel too, then, the Concept is something that is preserved ("eternally," if you will, but in the sense of: as long as Time lasts). But for him, it is only the *Concept* "dog" that is preserved (the Concept—that is, the temporal *nihilation* of the real dog, which nihilation actually lasts as long as Time lasts, since Time is this nihilation as such); whereas for Aristotle, the real dog is what is preserved (eternally, in the strict sense, since there is *eternal* return), at least as *species*. That is why Hegel explains what Aristotle cannot explain, namely, the preservation (in and by Man) of the Concept of an animal belonging, for example, to an *extinct* species (even if there are no fossil remains).

*detaches* itself from the sensible *hic et nunc*; but it can thus detach itself only because the *hic et nunc*—i.e., spatial being—is temporal, because it *annihilates* itself in the Past. And the real which *disappears* into the Past *preserves* itself (as nonreal) in the Present in the form of the Word-Concept. The Universe of Discourse (the World of Ideas) is the permanent rainbow which forms above a waterfall: and the waterfall is the *temporal real* which is annihilated in the nothingness of the Past.<sup>83</sup>

To be sure, the Real *endures* in Time as *real*. But by the fact of enduring in *Time*, it is its own *remembrance*: at each instant it realizes its Essence or Meaning, and this is to say that it realizes in

<sup>83</sup> Kant himself saw that conceptual knowledge implied *Memory*, and Hegel maintains this idea (which is Platonic, in the final analysis). For Hegel too, the *Er-innerung*—that is, the internalization of the objective real effected in and by the Concept which reveals this real but is *in me*—is also *Erinnerung*—that is, remembrance. Now, there is Memory only where there is Time, where the real *present* is annihilated through becoming unreal past. Generally speaking, in his theory of the Concept, Hegel merely makes more precise (and consequently transforms) the Kantian theory of the *Schematismus*. For Kant, the Concepts (= Categories) apply to given Being (*Sein*) because Time serves as their "Schema"—that is, as intermediary or "mediation" (*Vermittlung*, in Hegel). But this "mediation" is purely *passive*: Time is contemplation, intuition, *Anschauung*. In Hegel, on the other hand, the "mediation" is *active*; it is *Tat* or *Tun*, Action negating the given, the activity of Fighting and Work. Now, this Negation of the given (of *Sein*) or of the "present" *is* (historical) Time, and (historical) Time *is* this active Negation. In Hegel as in Kant, therefore, Time is what allows the application of the Concept to Being. But in Hegel, this Time that mediates conceptual thought is "materialized": it is a *movement* (*Bewegung*), and a *dialectical* "movement"—that is, precisely, it is active—hence it negates, hence it transforms (the given), hence it creates (new things). If Man can understand (reveal) Being by the Concept, it is because he *transforms* (given) Being in terms of this Concept (which is then a Project) and makes it conform to it. Now, the transformation of given Being in terms of the Concept-project is, precisely, conscious and voluntary *Action*, *Tun* which is *Arbeit* and *Kampf*. For Kant, Being *is* in conformity with the Concept, and the "mediation" by Time merely allows one to move from one to the other without modifying either the one or the other. And that is why Kant cannot *explain* this conformity of Being and the Concept: for him, it is a given, that is to say, a *chance* (*transcendentale Zufälligkeit*). Hegel, on the other hand, *explains* this conformity (which for him is a *process* of conforming) by his dialectical ontology: Being *becomes* conformable to the Concept (at the end of History) through the completed totality of negating Action which *transforms* Being in terms of this same Concept. Therefore: in Kant, Time is "schema" and passive "intuition"; in Hegel, it is "movement" and conscious and voluntary "action." Consequently, the Concept or the *a priori* in Kant is a "notion," which allows Man to *conform* to given Being; whereas in Hegel, the *a priori* Concept is a "project," which allows Man to *transform* given Being and *make* it conform.

the Present what is left of it after its annihilation in the Past; and this something that is left and that it re-realizes is its *concept*. At the moment when the present Real sinks into the Past, its Meaning (Essence) *detaches itself* from its reality (Existence); and it is here that appears the possibility of retaining this Meaning *outside* of the reality by causing it to pass into the Word. And this Word reveals the Meaning of the Real which *realizes* in the Present its own Past—that is, this same Past that is "eternally" preserved in the Word-Concept. In short, the Concept can have an empirical existence in the World (this existence being nothing other than human existence) only if the World is *temporal*, only if *Time* has an empirical existence in the World. And that is why it can be said that Time *is* the empirically existing Concept.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>84</sup> On the ontological level, this "metaphysical" (or cosmological) statement means: Being must have a *trinitary* structure, as "Synthesis" or "Totality" which unites "Thesis" or "Identity" with "Antithesis" or "Negativity" (this presence of the *negation* of Being in *existing* Being is, precisely, Time). In order better to understand the identification of the Concept with Time, it is useful to proceed as follows: Let us form the concept of Being—that is, of the *totality* of what *is*. What is the difference between this concept "Being" and Being itself? From the point of view of content, they are identical, since we have made no "abstraction." And nonetheless, in spite of what Parmenides thought, the concept "Being" is not Being (otherwise, there would be no Discourse, the Concept would not be Logos). What distinguishes Being from the concept "Being" is solely the *Being* of Being itself; for Being as Being *is*, but it does not *exist* as Being in the concept "Being" (even though it "is" present by its content—i.e., as the *meaning* of the concept "Being"). Therefore the concept "Being" is obtained by *subtracting* being from Being: Being minus being equals the concept "Being" (and does not equal Nothingness or "zero"; for the negation of *A* is not Nothingness, but "non-A"—that is, "something"). Now, this subtraction of being from Being, at first sight paradoxical or even "impossible," is in reality something quite "common": it is literally done "at every instant" and is called "Time." For Time is what, at every instant, takes away from Being—i.e., from the totality of what *is* (in the Present)—its being, by causing it to pass into the Past where Being *is* not (or *no longer is*). But for there to be Time, there must "be" a Past (the pure or "eternal" Present is not Time): therefore, the Past and Being that has sunk into the Past (past Being) are not Nothingness; they are "something." Now, a thing *is* something only in the Present. In order to *be* something, therefore, the Past and past Being must preserve themselves in the Present while ceasing to be present. And the *presence of past* Being is the concept "Being"—that is, Being from which one has taken away the being without transforming it into pure Nothingness. If you will, the concept "Being," therefore, is the "remembrance" of Being (in both senses: Being is what "remembers," and it "remembers" its being). But on our present level, one does not generally speak of "memory"; the "memory" that we have in mind is called "Time" (or more exactly "Temporality"—this general "medium" of Being, in which "in addition" to the Present there is something else: the Past—

Therefore: no Concept in the World as long as there is no empirically existing Time in this World. Now, we have seen that the empirical existence of Time in the World is human Desire (i.e., Desire that is directed toward a Desire as Desire). Therefore: no conceptual understanding without Desire. Now, Desire is realized by negating Action: and *human* Desire is realized by the Action of the Fight to the death for pure prestige. And this Fight is realized by the victory of the Master over the Slave, and by the latter's work in the Master's service. This Work of the Slave is what *realizes* the Master's Desire by *satisfying* it. Therefore, and Hegel says so expressly in Chapter IV, no Concept without Work; it is from the Slave's Work that *Denken* and *Verstand*, Understanding and Thought—that is, conceptual understanding of the World—are born.

And now we understand why. It is Work, and only Work, that transforms the World in an *essential* manner, by creating truly *new* realities. If there were only animals on earth, Aristotle would be right: the Concept would be embodied in the eternal species, eternally identical to itself; and it would not exist, as Plato claimed

and the Future; but I shall not talk about the Future here). Therefore: if there is a concept "Being," it is because Being is *temporal* (and one can say that the Concept *is* Time—i.e., the coexistence of the Present and the Past). Now, it is obvious that Being is "in conformity" with the concept "Being," since the latter is Being itself minus being. One can say, then, that Being is the *being* of the concept "Being." And that is why Being which *is* (in the Present) can be "conceived of" or revealed by the Concept. Or, more exactly, Being *is* conceived of at "each instant" of its being. Or else, again: Being is not only Being, but also *Truth*—that is, the adequation of the Concept and Being. This is simple. The whole question is to know where *error* comes from. In order that error be possible, the Concept must be *detached* from Being and *opposed* to it. It is Man who does this; and more exactly, Man *is* the Concept detached from Being; or better yet, he is the *act* of detaching the Concept from Being. He does so by negating-Negativity—that is, by Action, and it is here that the Future (the Project) enters in. This detaching is equivalent to an inadequation (the profound meaning of *errare humanum est*), and it is necessary to negate or act again in order to achieve conformity between the Concept (= Project) and Being (made to conform to the Project by Action). For Man, therefore, the adequation of Being and the Concept is a *process* (*Bewegung*), and the truth (*Wahrheit*) is a *result*. And only this "result of the process" merits the name of (discursive) "truth," for only this process is Logos or Discourse. (Before its negation by Man, Being does not *speak*, for the Concept *detached* from Being is what *is* in the Word or Logos, or as Word-logos.) Hegel says all this in a passage in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, which gives the key to understanding his whole system (p. 29, l. 26-p. 30, l. 15).

it did, *outside* of Time and the World. But then it would not be understandable how the Concept could exist outside of the species, how it could exist in the temporal World in the form of a *word*. Therefore, it would not be understandable how Man could exist—Man—i.e., that being which is not a dog, for example, and in which the Meaning (Essence) "dog" nonetheless exists just as much as in the dog, since there is in it the Word-Concept "dog." For this to be possible, Being revealed by the Concept must be essentially temporal—that is, finite, or possessing a beginning and an ending in Time. Now, not the natural object, nor even the animal or plant, but only the product of human Work is essentially temporal. Human Work is what *temporalizes* the spatial natural World; Work, therefore, is what engenders the Concept which exists in the natural World while being something other than this World: Work, therefore, is what engenders Man in this World, Work is what transforms the purely natural World into a technical World inhabited by Man—that is, into a historical World.

Only the World transformed by human Work reveals itself in and by the Concept which exists empirically in the World without being the World. Therefore, the Concept *is* Work, and Work *is* the Concept. And if, as Marx quite correctly remarks, Work for Hegel is "*das Wesen des Menschen*" ("the very essence of Man"), it can also be said that man's essence, for Hegel, is the Concept. And that is why Hegel says not only that Time is the *Begriff*, but also that it is the *Geist*. For if Work temporalizes Space, the existence of Work in the World is the existence in this World of Time. Now, if Man is the Concept, and if the Concept is Work, Man and the Concept are also *Time*.

If all this holds true, it must *first* be said that there is conceptual understanding only where there is an essentially temporal, that is, historical, reality; and *secondly*, that only historical or temporal existence can reveal itself by the Concept. Or in other words, conceptual understanding is necessarily *dialectical*.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>86</sup> For "dialectical" understanding is nothing other than the historical or temporal understanding of the real. Dialectic reveals the *trinitary* structure of Being. In other words, in and by its dialectic the real reveals itself not *sub specie aeternitatis*—that is, outside of Time or as eternally identical to itself—but as a Present situated between the Past and the Future, that is, as a *Bewegung*, as a

Now, if this holds true and if Nature is only Space and not Time, one would have to conclude that there is no conceptual understanding of Nature. One would understand, in the full sense, only where there is Time—i.e., one would truly understand only History. In any case, it is only History that can and must be understood *dialectically*.

One would have to say so. But Hegel does not. And that, I believe, is his basic error. First of all, there is a vacillation in Hegel. On the one hand, he says that Nature is only Space. On the other, he clearly sees that (biological) life is a temporal phenomenon. Hence the idea that Life (*Leben*) is a manifestation of Spirit (*Geist*). But Hegel also sees, and he is the first to say so in so many words, that truly human existence is possible only by the *negation* of Life (as we know, the Risk of life in the Fight for prestige is *constituent* of Man). Hence an *opposition* of *Leben* and *Geist*. But if this opposition exists, Life is not historical; therefore there is no biological *dialectic*; therefore there is no conceptual understanding of Life.

Now, Hegel asserts that there is such an understanding. He imagines (following Schelling) a *dialectical* biology, and he sets it forth in the *Phenomenology* (Chapter V, Section A, *a*). To be sure, he denies the conceptual understanding or dialectic of non-vital reality. But this merely leads him to say that the real World is a *living* being. Hence his absurd philosophy of Nature, his insensate critique of Newton, and his own "magical" physics which discredited his System in the nineteenth century.

But there is yet more to say. Dialectical understanding applies only to historical reality—that is, to the reality created by Work according to a Project. To assert, as Hegel does, that *all* understanding is dialectical and that the natural World is understandable is to assert that this World is the work of a Demiurge, of a Creator-God conceived in the image of working Man. And this is what Hegel actually says in the *Logik*, when he says that his "Logic" (that is, his ontology) is "the thought of God before the creation

creative movement, or else, again, as a *result* which is a project and as a *project* which is a result—a result which is born of a project and a project engendered by a result; in a word, the real reveals itself in its dialectical truth as a *Synthesis*. (See Chapter 7, "The Dialectic of the Real and the Phenomenological Method in Hegel," in this volume.)

of the World." It would follow that Hegel understands the World because the World is *created* according to the Concept that *Hegel* has. And thus we are in the midst of a paradox. Hegelian anthropotheism ceases to be an image; Hegel is actually God, God the *creator*, and the *eternal* God. Now, (unless he is mad) a man cannot assert that he created the World. If, then, the thought that is revealed in the *Logik* is the thought that *created* the World, it is certainly not Hegel's thought. It is the thought of a Creator *other* than Hegel, *other* than Man in general; it is the thought of *God*. And therefore the *Logik*, in spite of its title, is not simply logic; like Spinoza's *Ethics*, it is *theo*-logy—that is, the logic, thought, or discourse of *God*.<sup>26</sup>

But enough of the natural World. Let us note that Hegel realized an immense philosophical progress by identifying the Concept and Time. For by doing this—that is, by discovering *dialectical* knowledge—he found the means of establishing a phenomenology, a metaphysics, and an ontology of *History*—that is, of Man as we conceive of him today and as he is in reality.

Let us see the decisive consequence for Man following from this discovery.

The Concept is Time. Time in the full sense of the term—that is, a Time in which there is a Future also in the full sense—that is, a Future that will never become either Present or Past. Man is the

<sup>26</sup> Personally, I do not believe that this is a necessary consequence. I see no objection to saying that the natural World eludes *conceptual* understanding. Indeed, this would only mean that the existence of Nature is revealed by mathematical algorithm, for example, and not by concepts—that is, by *words* having a meaning. Now, modern physics leads in the end to this result: one cannot *speak* of the physical reality without contradictions; as soon as one passes from algorithm to verbal description, one contradicts himself (particles-waves, for example). Hence there would be no *discourse* revealing the physical or natural reality. This reality (as presented as early as Galileo) would be revealed to Man only by the articulated *silence* of algorithm. Physical matter is understood *conceptually* or dialectically (it can be *spoken* of) only to the extent that it is the "raw material" of a product of human work. Now, the "raw material" itself is neither molecules nor electrons, and so on, but wood, stone, and so on. And these are things which, if not living themselves, at least exist on the scale of Life (and of Man as living being). Now, it does seem that algorithm, being *nontemporal*, does not reveal Life. But neither does dialectic. Therefore, it may be necessary to combine Plato's conception (for the mathematical, or better, geometrical, substructure of the World) with Aristotle's (for its biological structure) and Kant's (for its physical, or better, dynamic, structure), while reserving Hegelian dialectic for Man and History.



empirical existence of the Concept in the World. Therefore, he is the empirical existence in the World of a Future that will never become present. Now, this Future, for Man, is his *death*, that Future of his which will never become his Present; and the only reality or real presence of this Future is the *knowledge* that Man has in the present of his future death. Therefore, if Man is Concept and if the Concept is Time (that is, if Man is an *essentially temporal* being), Man is *essentially* mortal; and he is Concept, that is, absolute Knowledge or Wisdom incarnate, only if he *knows* this. Logos becomes flesh, becomes Man, only on the condition of being willing and able to *die*.

And this causes us to understand why possibility III, adopted by Hegel, appears so late in the history of philosophy. To deny that the Concept is eternal, to say that it is Time, is to deny that Man is immortal or eternal (at least to the extent that he thinks, to the extent that he is truly a human being). Now, Man accepts his death only *in extremis*; and it was also *in extremis* that philosophy accepted possibility III.<sup>87</sup>

"*Alles endliche ist dies, sich selbst aufzuheben,*" Hegel says in the *Encyclopaedia*. It is only *finite* Being that dialectically overcomes itself. If, then, the Concept is Time, that is, if conceptual understanding is *dialectical*, the existence of the Concept—and consequently of Being revealed by the Concept—is essentially *finite*. Therefore History itself must be essentially finite; collective Man (humanity) must die just as the human individual dies; universal History must have a definitive *end*.

We know that for Hegel this end of history is marked by the coming of Science in the form of a Book—that is, by the appearance of the Wise Man or of *absolute* Knowledge in the World. This absolute Knowledge, being the *last* moment of Time—that is, a moment without a *Future*—is no longer a temporal moment. If absolute Knowledge *comes into being* in Time or, better yet, as Time or History, Knowledge that *has come into being* is no longer temporal or historical: it is *eternal*, or, if you will, it is *Eternity*

<sup>87</sup> Thus we see that the expression "anthropo-theism" is but a metaphor: circular—that is, dialectical—absolute Knowledge reveals *finite* or mortal being; this being, therefore, is not the *divine* being; it is indeed, the *human* being; but Man can know that this is *his* being only provided that he knows that he is *mortal*.

revealed to itself; it is the Substance of Parmenides-Spinoza which reveals itself by a *Discourse* (and not by Silence), precisely because it is the *result* of a historical *becoming*; it is Eternity *engendered* by Time.

And this is what Hegel is going to explain in the text of the Second Stage of the Second Section of the Second Part of Chapter VIII.