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DIVERGENT PATHS OF POSTCOMMUNIST DEMOCRACIES

Herbert Kitschelt

Herbert Kitschelt *is professor of political science at Duke University. His extensive work on the changing West European party systems includes* The Transformation of European Social Democracy *(1994) and* The Radical Right in Western Europe *(1995). His study of the transformation of clientelist politics, "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Politics" appeared in* Comparative Political Studies *(2000).*

After the collapse of communist rule across Eastern Europe, the initial hunch of many comparative political theorists, including this author, was that *all* postcommunist party systems in the emerging democracies would share essential properties that derived from their common experience of state-socialist economics and the "Leninist legacy" of communist party rule.[1] By 1998, it was obvious that, aside from a few common underlying patterns of interest mobilization, *diversity* across the former communist countries was much more impressive than *commonality* of democratic development and party-system formation. For a start, some communist regimes never became democracies, including Belarus, Serbia, and most of the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Other countries, particularly Croatia and Slovakia, were backtracking on their democratic commitments under the tutelage of semiauthoritarian rulers who had emerged from the old communist party establishment, even though their current parties might not directly trace their origins to the communist parties of the past. Also, among those former communist countries that had become democracies, the diversity of parties' programmatic appeals and abilities to build electoral coalitions often overwhelmed crossnational commonalities. In this chapter, I submit that crossnational diversity among postcommunist democracies is not random but derives from both historical legacies and current institutions.[2] Moreover, the linkage between legacies, institutions, and party systems is not accidental and chaotic but mediated by deliberate strategies of rational, power-seeking

actors, even though miscalculations, variations in the sequencing of interactions, and unique bargaining opportunities may dilute the causal connection between these aspects of the postcommunist democratic transition.

I will sketch a set of hypotheses to account for diversity in postcommunist democracies in two respects. First, why do individual parties mobilize in different ways in the new democracies? Second, why do national party systems, as aggregate phenomena, vary across Eastern Europe? My concern will primarily be with the *modes of linkage building between citizens and parties and the resulting strategies of party competition*. Political entrepreneurs may attract voters with one of three linkages: personal charisma, direct selective inducements to and exchanges with constituents (clientelism), and the programmatic promise of public policy, if elected to office. The thrust of my argument is that no single model of party or party system is likely to characterize East European polities. Moreover, a standard model of party mobilization in Western Europe after World War II—mass parties with primarily programmatic appeals—is unlikely to dominate Eastern Europe. In the new democratic polities, parties often remain organizationally small framework parties. Where mass parties appear, they are more typically associated with clientelist linkage patterns.

In the first section, I elaborate these distinctions and identify organizational correlates of different tactics of linkage building. The subsequent three sections are devoted to developing hypotheses accounting for the variability of East European parties and party systems and illustrating, but not rigorously testing, their validity. In the final section, I speculate about the consequences of different linkage strategies. My analysis draws on an in-depth empirical study of party formation in four East Central European countries[3] and exploratory research on the relation between trade openness, democratic institutions, and party systems in the region.[4]

Why Parties in Democracies?

If democratic governance is about establishing linkages of accountability and responsiveness between citizens and competing political elites, democracies must create organizational vehicles that overcome problems of *collective action* and problems of *social choice*. Parties are the devices that can, but not always do, address these challenges.[5] Problems of collective action occur in citizens' demand for and politicians' supply of candidates for representative office. By pooling resources in a party, candidates can more effectively address electoral constituencies and advertise their purpose of running. Conversely, parties have the means to lower the voters' costs of gathering information about alternatives and even to assist them in turning out to

the polls. Efforts to overcome collective-action problems thus warrant *investments in organizational infrastructures* that coordinate politicians and voters.

Social-choice problems result from the complexity of political agendas. Modern democracies build on the principle of territorial representation through electoral districts, not the functional representation of policy areas and sectional interests. In legislatures, representatives are asked to take policy positions on an uncertain and indefinitely variable set of issues legislators place on the agenda. With great probability, the variance of the representatives' preference schedules over each issue and over the entire set of issues on the agenda at any time is great. As a consequence, no set of policies may be uniquely preferred according to simple criteria of democratic choice, for example that the ultimately winning alternative in a democratic choice process has to beat all the other contending alternatives when pitted against each of them in a pairwise contest ("Condorcet winner"). To prevent cycles of decision making in which each victorious bill is displaced by a new alternative, politicians make *investments in consensus building* to bundle policy choices and establish common preference orderings. In the short run, they accomplish this through *log-rolling*. In the long-run, politicians reduce transaction costs of preference aggregation by a *legislative committee system* and especially by *programmatic party formation*. Politicians here commit themselves to the entire bundle of issue positions offered by a party, which are advertised to the electorate through simple cues, such as the location of a party program on the left-right dimension.

The distinction between investments in organizational infrastructure and consensus building permits us to typologize alternative forms of political interest articulation and aggregation in the arena of electoral competition.[6] If politicians make investments *neither* in organizational infrastructure *nor* in modes of consensus building, all they can hope for is that people rally to their cause based on some unique quality of their personality ("charismatic linkage"). They neither hold out material incentives for their following nor commit themselves to a policy program that results from investments in political consensus building. Charismatic authority tends to be unresponsive and unaccountable to the electorate, something Guillermo O'Donnell captured in the notion of "delegative democracies."[7] But over time, followers of charismatic politicians demand accountability and responsiveness. Then charisma has to give way to politicians' accomplishments, which manifest themselves in the capacity to disburse direct favors to electoral constituencies (clientelism) or to propose and implement public policies.

If politicians invest in consensus building, but not at all in organizational infrastructure, they may come up with joint preference schedules—such as in a legislative caucus—but with no effective vehicle

to advertise their politics to voters. Most of the time such strategies of legislative coordination, by themselves, are insufficient to get politicians elected in a mass democracy. What does not follow from this, however, is the inverse conclusion that the more investments a party makes in organizational infrastructure and encapsulation of the electorate, the better its electoral performance.

Where politicians care above all about organizational infrastructure but do not invest in modes of consensus building around common policy programs, they create *clientelist parties*. They approach constituents with requests for funds and votes. Some of the funds that they receive from capital-rich, vote-poor constituencies they hand over to vote-rich, capital-poor constituencies in the form of direct material inducements to surrender their vote (personal gifts). Both vote-rich and capital-rich constituents also expect direct compensation for their support, once party politicians have been elected and can disburse favors to their clients out of public funds (jobs, housing, business contracts, regulatory rulings). Because direct exchanges and side-payments get politicians elected and constituencies compensated, neither side might bother about the existence of a general program of party policies.

Finally, politicians may invest in organizational infrastructure and modes of consensus building to create *programmatic parties*. Politicians compensate voters and activists for their support indirectly, via policies whose impact is not confined to party supporters. Programmatic parties require some organizational infrastructure in addition to investments in consensus building in order to build vehicles that can effectively advertise policy positions in electoral campaigns. These investments, however, are likely to be less costly than in parties crafting direct material exchange (clientelist) relations with voters and financial donors.

In the comparative analysis of party organization, a party's investment in organizational infrastructure is often captured by its *membership size in relation to the size of its electoral constituency,* that is, its capacity to "encapsulate" the vote-rich electorate. No party achieves encompassing membership without offering material incentives. Investments in mechanisms of consensus building are harder to measure at the process level. They manifest themselves in the formalization of binding internal collective-choice procedures—for example by party conventions and elected leaders—and also in the informal investment of time and effort activists and party leaders make to ensure the convergence of most party faithful on key programmatic issues. While concern with programs is likely to fuel internal conflict, if not factionalism, on average programmatic parties are likely to be more *cohesive* in their policy outlook than clientelist parties in which consensus building about policies is irrelevant and may not even be attempted. Thus procedural codification of decision making and programmatic cohesion may be suitable indicators of investments in consensus building.

Approximations of the different models of party organization tend to cluster around different regions. In Latin America, for example, the major parties tended to follow the clientelist model until recently. In Western Europe, the programmatic-party model prevailed, but particularly large mass parties, such as the Christian Democratic and socialist parties, always needed to rely on a significant dosage of selective incentives and clientelist linkage. In the interwar years, social democrats, for example, were hegemonic in Berlin and Vienna not just because of their programmatic appeal to blue-collar constituencies but also because they ran city governments that engaged in large public-housing projects and controlled access to city-owned flats.[8] Material incentives thus played a rather large role in the construction of mass parties, and it is only with the growing affluence and individualism of European societies that the attractiveness of party-controlled incentives has declined and become politically controversial. Where parties never provide direct material compensation for members, they rarely become mass parties but typically stay closer to the model of legislative-framework parties with limited investments in organizational infrastructure. This applies to most European liberal parties and more recently to the cohort of "left-libertarian" Green parties.[9] My illustrations of different party types around the world suggest two potential causes for diverging modes of party formation: the basic ideological orientation of parties and the institutional and cultural contexts of the democratic polities in which they thrive. Let us now turn to Eastern Europe and explore how we may account for more clientelist or more programmatic parties and party systems in light of these determinants.

The Effects of Party Ideology

The types of citizen-politician linkages that prevail in a democratic polity may vary from party to party. In Colombia and Uruguay, for example, the major liberal and conservative parties are highly clientelist with far-flung organizations but little programmatic cohesiveness. Since the 1970s, they have been challenged in both countries by leftist competitors who explicitly reject clientelist organization. In a similar vein, clientelism and factionalism in Italian and Japanese parties is much more pronounced in the large ruling center-right Christian and Liberal Democratic parties than in the leftist opposition. More generally, quantitative crossnational research has found a rather robust linkage between party ideology and organizational structure.[10]

What are the theoretical arguments that might lead us to expect that, in postcommunist Eastern Europe as well, the modes of citizen-party linkage in a given country might vary across parties? *Ideology* and *opportunity* are the two critical variables that deserve close attention. Ideologies that claim a *universalist* representation of societal interests

are much more likely to yield programmatic parties than ideologies that highlight *particularist* group claims. Thus liberalism and socialism propose universalist programs for a viable societal organization that are explicitly aimed at eradicating unfair advantages accruing to individuals and rent-seeking groups. They rely on universalist standards of fairness either as equal rights to participate in the marketplace of voluntary exchange (liberalism) or as equal entitlement to basic societal goods (socialism). Both liberals and socialists thus have a basic revulsion against rent-seeking special interests that get their way through direct exchanges with clientelist party politicians.

Thus in postcommunist societies, market-liberal parties are least disposed to build mass party organizations based on material exchanges with contributors. With regard to the communist-successor parties, the circumstances of the communist collapse may create some complications. Politicians fight not only for an ideology but also for survival. In the immediate aftermath of the communist collapse, *socialist ideology is so widely discredited that communist-successor parties cannot possibly rely on it to appeal to voters*. In this circumstance, communist-successor politicians may tone down their universalist conception of social order and attempt to maintain linkages to electoral constituencies through direct material exchange. Moreover, in electoral campaigns they will highlight the local popularity of individual party candidates rather than their ideological affiliation.

Whether the tactics to replace programmatic appeals with clientelism and the personal charisma of politicians work for communist-successor parties depends on *opportunity*. Where communist-successor parties remain entrenched in the state apparatus even after the collapse of the old order, they most likely opt for clientelist network building. Here, their old universalist ideology is useless because the party presides over a gradual economic decline, as long as it fights against market-liberalizing reforms and the associated severe economic dislocations. At the same time, the party has control over resources to serve select constituencies. *Nomenklatura* privatization, cheap credits to party-affiliated enterprises, and subsidies (particularly to the countryside where communists remain strong) are typical phenomena associated with this process. Among countries with moderately fair elections, the reign of quasi-communist parties and local politicians in Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine in the 1990s illustrates such developments. Opportunities for clientelist linkage building are even greater in all those authoritarian and semiauthoritarian regimes where communists were never displaced from power, such as Belarus, Macedonia, Serbia, and most of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.[11]

In some other countries, however, several forces may eventually drive communist-successor parties back to a more programmatic orientation. First, where they lose the founding elections, change their

labels, credibly dissociate themselves from the old regime, and embrace democracy and market capitalism, they reconstitute their universalist ideology on a reformist, social-democratic programmatic basis. This process has taken place most unambiguously in Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic countries. Not by accident is it in these countries that the communist-successor parties have shed upwards of 95 percent of their pre-1989 members, whereas in countries with communist parties more firmly rooted in the old ways, and consequently equipped with a stronger penchant to cultivate clientelist linkages, their organizational decline has been much less steep.

Second, where communist parties are cut off from access to the material resources necessary to construct and maintain clientelist networks, they are likely to revert to a universalist ideological appeal, particularly once anticommunist governments have inflicted serious economic pain on the electorate—such as unemployment and declining standards of living—in the course of market-liberalizing reforms. The resurgence of the Russian communists may become an example of this trajectory.

Postcommunist party systems are not confined to party families relying in principle on universalist ideologies. There are a number of parties that appeal to "sectional" constituencies and explicitly seek to draw boundaries between "friends" and "foes" in a *particularist sociocultural* fashion. These parties run under religious, peasant, nationalist, and ethnocultural (minority or majority) labels. In each case, at least two mechanisms often, but not always, favor clientelist linkage building between politicians and voters rather than programmatic politics. First, because the favored constituencies are clearly identifiable, it is easier for such parties to organize and monitor direct exchanges between voters and politicians in clientelist networks. Parties with a universalist appeal face a more amorphous electorate and encounter greater problems in monitoring contracts. For this reason, Donald Horowitz concludes with regard to ethnic politics that "the ethnic party is the interest group."[12] Second, sociocultural and sectional parties *lack a theoretical conceptualization of the imperatives of economic reform, the most important item on the postcommunist legislative agenda*. They shun firm commitments on economic policy making for fear of dividing their sociocultural constituencies. Because they cannot build comprehensive programs that address the most important economic policy issues of the day, they attempt to resort to clientelist linkages.

The importance of clientelist constituency encapsulation for many sociocultural, peasant, and national parties shows up in their member/voter ratios, which tend to be higher than those of their liberal or social-democratic counterparts. Again, in addition to ideology, opportunity (that is, access to state resources) is a critical issue. Thus member/voter ratios tend to be comparatively high in Czech and Hungarian Christian Democratic parties, which have participated in government, and in the

Polish Peasant Party, which has built effective clientelist networks in its time in office since 1993.[13] The extreme case of a nationalist government party building a far-flung clientelist network is Vladimir Mečiar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia.

Where sectional parties are excluded from power, they encounter greater difficulties obtaining resources to build clientelist networks successfully. In these instances, the charismatic authority of the leader must often substitute for investments in organizational infrastructure. Examples are Ganchev's Bulgarian Business Bloc, Torgyan's Independent Smallholders in Hungary, Sladek's Republicans in the Czech Republic, and Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats in Russia.[14] I have little doubt that these parties would build clientelist machines if they were to participate in government. The record of Hungary's Independent Smallholders since its entry into the government in May 1998 suggests that this hypothesis may be correct.

To summarize my propositions, ideology does affect the techniques politicians employ to build citizen-party linkages. Liberal-democratic parties emphasize investments in consensus building to promote their programmatic agenda more than investments in organizational infrastructure, although a modicum of the latter is unavoidable. They are likely to remain "framework parties" with a limited encapsulation of the electorate. Basic ideological dispositions by themselves are not sufficient to predict the nature of organizational investments made by communist-successor parties. Here my discussion has already invoked systemic contingencies. Under some circumstances, they become democratic reformists and tend to develop framework parties with limited encapsulation of the electorate; under other circumstances, they remain more intransigent in their views of liberal democracy and aim at a more encompassing encapsulation of the electorate and typically employ clientelist linkage techniques.

So far, I have advanced hypotheses about the variability of party formation *among parties within the same party system.* Only in the case of communist-successor parties have I made party structure contingent upon the systemic context. In order to advance from individual parties to the characterization of crossnational divergence among entire party systems, we must examine the variable systemic context of postcommunist politics more closely to show why certain types of parties and linkage strategies dominate in different East European polities.

Historical Legacies in Eastern Europe

Democratic party systems do not come into being overnight but typically require extensive periods of *learning* on the part of electorates and politicians. Moreover, where the introduction of democracy coincides with momentous economic changes, as in all postcommunist democ-

racies, the trial-and-error period—during which parties and voters learn to take advantage of the new rules of democratic competition without achieving stable modes of operation ("equilibria")—is prolonged. During this learning period, institutionalized rules, such as electoral laws, are unlikely to constrain the conduct of actors in the same way as in established democracies. For example, whereas single-member districts restrict the effective number of parties in established democracies, in newly emerging polities large crowds of competitors may enter the electoral market, all hoping to become the lucky contenders to survive the selection process.[15]

Although institutions constrain political conduct less in emerging postcommunist democracies than in consolidated polities, the former are far from chaotic. Politicians' and voters' learning processes are guided by the communist regime's legacies, which provide powerful mechanisms that allow parties to create political resources, images, and orientations shaping the dynamic of the new parties and party systems. In a stylized fashion, one might therefore distinguish "early" postcommunist parties and party systems that can be empirically observed now from whatever party systems solidify in "later" periods of learning, when institutions gain more independent weight in shaping actor strategies. Even then, however, the legacies of the precommunist and communist past "lock in" power relations that congeal around democratic institutions shaping political actors' strategies for a long time to come. In accounting for divergence among parties and party systems in contemporary Eastern Europe, we must examine how these historical legacies systematically vary across countries.

In Eastern Europe, history did not begin with communist rule. Communist regimes were themselves a passing phase in a longer trajectory of economic, institutional, and cultural development that left its imprint on communist party governance. The variability of communist rule influenced the transition process to democracy, the democratic institutions, and the early patterns of party system formation.

Precommunist rule. I distinguish three configurations of rule in this period.[16] First, there are regions of Central Europe where both the working class and the urban middle strata mobilized politically before the advent of communism around liberal, religious, social-democratic, and communist parties (Eastern Germany, Bohemia/Moravia). In these regions, liberal democracy successfully worked for some or all of the interwar era. In a second area, the working class remained comparatively small and insignificant, but urban middle-class and rural peasant constituencies mobilized around a variety of parties (the Baltic countries, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, possibly Croatia). This second region had less luck with liberal democracy in the interwar period and was primarily governed by semiauthoritarian

dictators who manipulated elections and legislative representation, but did not suffocate civic pluralism entirely. In a third area, middle-class politics was confined to a thin urban stratum of administrators servile to authoritarian rulers, and the working class was all but nonexistent as a socioeconomic entity and an associational voice. These countries experience mass mobilization only around the poor peasantry (Southeastern Europe, Russia, Slovakia).

Communist rule. Building on these initial conditions, after 1917 in the Soviet Union and after World War II elsewhere in Eastern Europe, communist parties were able to draw on different resources and bargaining capacities to shape their apparatus of rule. Where both the working class and the middle class had a strong political voice, the new ruling parties could mobilize working-class constituencies within a formidable organizational weapon that allowed them to institute strictly *bureaucratic-authoritarian communism* and repress other potential political contenders rooted in the peasantry, the urban middle class, or associated religious and sociocultural causes. Where the middle class and the peasantry had been mobilized but working-class organizations had been weak in the interwar period, the entrenchment of communist rule remained sufficiently feeble that party leaders were motivated to seek at least tacit accommodation with potential opponents after direct Soviet control of domestic politics began to wane after 1955–56. In subtle ways, the local communist rulers invoked the preservation of national autonomy from the Soviet Union as an argument to request compliance and restraint from a sometimes visible, sometimes virtual opposition camp. The implicit exchange between rulers and their antagonists eventually yielded a less repressive form of *national-accommodative communism,* with economic market reforms or a modicum of civil rights. Gomulka and Gierek in Poland, as well as Kadar's "goulash communism" in Hungary, highlight this strategy.

Third, where both working-class and middle-class mobilization had been weak before World War II, the new communist rulers neither enjoyed the benefits of a politically disciplined working class or a bureaucratic party machine nor experienced the constraints of urban middle-class opposition when building the new regimes. In this vacuum, the new rulers drew on patrimonial-statist methods of repressive and clientelist political rule and engaged in a rapid forced industrialization that destroyed the peasantry and created new, politically inexperienced and compliant working-class and middle-class sectors whose members could easily be coopted through material favors. Thus, while in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and in Bulgaria, Romania, and even Slovakia after World War II more than 80 percent of the gainfully employed were peasants, communist rule transformed these countries into industrial societies in the span of a single generation.

Transition process. Once the structural economic crisis of communist regimes set in, the repressiveness of communist rulers and the (virtual) resourcefulness of the opposition shaped the transitions to democracy in the late 1980s. Under bureaucratic-authoritarian communism the ruling parties were intransigent to reform and clung on to power until the bitter end, but an urban middle-class opposition was potentially resourceful against the backdrop of historical memories and practical experiences in the interwar period. Communism here disappeared at a late stage by *implosion* when the ruling parties could no longer contain demands for fundamental change. The collapse of East Germany and of the Czechoslovak regime in November 1989 exemplify this case.

Under national-accommodative communism, where the incumbent party was more flexible in granting reforms and limited civil rights and thus allowed opposition groups to become comparatively resourceful, democracy evolved through a *negotiated transition* between rulers and representatives of the opposition. Prolonged bargaining characterized the transitions in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and possibly in Croatia and the Baltic countries, where the communist party leaderships began to accept oppositional representation before the communist regimes collapsed.

Under patrimonial communism, by contrast, rulers had relied on repression and cooptation and opposition forces remained weak and isolated, thus never creating a serious threat to the political incumbents. When communism was crumbling in one country after the other, elements of the ruling communist parties themselves chose *preemptive reform* to salvage as much of their power as possible into a new postcommunist era in which they expected to continue their domination over a passive civil society. Preemptive reform was the idea behind Gorbachev's initial innovations, as well as the regime changes in Bulgaria, Romania, some of the Yugoslav republics, and many of the Soviet republics in 1990–91.

Institutional choice. The new institutions of democracy and capitalism resulted from the traits of the old regimes and the strategic bargaining power of the emerging actors in the transition process. Path-dependency appeared but was diluted by contingencies of the situation: Timing and sequence, for example, mattered in the construction of new democracies. In the moment of transition, communist ideology was discredited, and liberal-democratic politics became the most attractive programmatic alternative. Because politicians in communist-successor parties therefore wished to deemphasize programmatic competition and adopt personalist or communitarian-nationalist appeals with little programmatic content, they advocated democratic governance structures that would put a premium on personality and direct exchange between voters and clients rather than on programmatic party competition:

candidate-oriented electoral systems and a strong, directly elected executive presidency. As a rule of thumb, the stronger the leverage of former communists and nationalists in the choice of democratic institutions, the more such institutions emphasized the personal character of competition between candidates as well as direct relations between voters and representatives, to the detriment of programmatic competition among parties.[17] Conversely, the stronger and more self-confident liberal-democratic forces were, the greater were their chances to press for democratic institutions emphasizing competition among ideas rather than personalities. Since multi-member districts with closed party lists depersonalize electoral competition, politicians who wished to personalize the electoral system embraced single-member districts with first-past-the-post winners or multimember districts that permitted preference voting, gave parties limited or no influence over the nomination of candidates, and prohibited vote pooling among candidates running under the same party label.[18] Only where liberal politicians had weak anchors in mass electorates and faced strong communist parties did they tend to opt for personalizing political institutions in the hope of electing a popular liberal politician to the executive presidency, which could then become the stronghold of liberal reforms.

As a consequence, former bureaucratic-authoritarian rule and transition by implosion are associated with parliamentary rule and closed-list proportional representation. Here communists had little bargaining power and the diverse liberal-democratic protoparties agreed on depersonalizing democratic competition. In democracies emerging from national-accommodative communism, where reformist communists and oppositional groups tended to balance each other's power in negotiated transitions, democratic institutions often combined both personalist and programmatic principles of interest aggregation. For example, if the communists wanted an executive presidency, the opposition forces got proportional representation (Poland, 1989–91). If parliamentarism prevailed, the communists received a mixed electoral system with some single member districts (Hungary, Lithuania).

Most democracies emerging from patrimonial communism have rather powerful executive presidents or electoral systems that highlight a personal relation between voters and politicians. Here, former communists who engineered the preemptive reform typically attempted to impose their preferred institutional design but did not always succeed. In Bulgaria, the anticommunist opposition managed to discredit the sitting communist president and force the ruling party to accept a democratic constitution with depersonalizing political competition. In the all-important case of Russia, the anticommunists captured the office of the presidency in 1991, but the liberal-democratic party structure was too weak for them to opt for a democratic design with depersonalizing competition. Here, an anticommunist president imposed a strongly

personalist democratic constitutional design over the opposition of communists and elements of the liberal-democratic opposition.

Historical Legacies and Party Systems

The relative strengths of different types of parties and their access to power in the divergent postcommunist regimes determine whether the new polities adopt more programmatic or more clientelist party competition. After *patrimonial communism,* communist parties tend to remain dominant and face weak, divided liberal opponents who are not able to put forth a clear, coherent, and popular programmatic alternative. Whereas communist-successor parties rely on patronage, as long as they can hold on to office, their liberal opponents engage in individual representation and charismatic appeals with only limited investments in consensus building and party infrastructure. In Russia, communists were cut off from such networks, but they have begun to reappear around the presidential office, for want of effective liberal-democratic parties that could organize a presidential coalition.

After national-accommodative or bureaucratic-authoritarian communism, chances for programmatic party competition are more favorable where the old communist party loses most of its grip on valuable economic and administrative resources. Here noncommunist liberal-democratic parties have more popular support, practical skills, and political capacities to develop programmatic appeals. At the same time, communist-successor parties can make a comeback only once they adopt a new social-democratic outlook. Programmatic competition takes hold early, as my empirical research in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland demonstrates.

In the longer run, the new democratic institutions reinforce the divergence between postcommunist party systems that rely on programmatic competition and those that emphasize clientelist and personalist linkages. Strong presidentialism and personalist electoral laws promote programmatically amorphous parties that loosely hold together constituency-serving representatives who are constantly exposed to the temptations of clientelism in their direct dealings with local voters. This particularly applies to communist-successor and nationalist parties, for the reasons elaborated in the previous section. Conversely, closed-list proportional representation and parliamentary government centralize political power in the national party organization and force individual politicians to become team players supporting a common programmatic appeal.

In a variety of ways, the legacies of the three types of communist rule also influence the *political divisions around which programmatic competition unfolds* in the years after the adoption of democracy. This applies foremost to the division between supporters and opponents of

the new democratic regime. The regime divide is likely to subside most rapidly in the former national-accommodative communist countries, where communist parties made a credible commitment to democracy and capitalism in the negotiated transition. In Hungary, the government coalition between the communist-successor party and the party that rallied the most prominent dissidents under communism, the Alliance of Free Democrats, symbolizes the bridging of the regime divide. This divide is also likely to subside after bureaucratic-authoritarian communism, because the communist-successor forces are too weak and marginalized to stage a significant challenge. A deep regime divide, however, is likely to remain after patrimonial communism, where a strong communist-successor party continues to confront a weak and divided democratic camp. The deep hatred between those who happen to belong to communist or anticommunist social networks reinforces the personalist and clientelist character of democratic competition in these countries. Even when parties do emphasize programmatic issues, often they are actually highlighting the struggle of warring camps for control of the state apparatus rather than stating sincere and effective commitments to policy programs.

All former communist countries have a common line of political division and competition between parties: the economic divide between winners and losers of market liberalization. Depending on historical legacies of communism, however, these economic divides are combined with sociocultural divisions in the arena of party competition. How such sociocultural divisions relate to economic conflict, however, varies across postcommunist polities according to their unique pathways and legacies.

After *bureaucratic-authoritarian communism,* the sharp polarization between a strong liberal-democratic party camp and a weak but intransigent communist-successor party—which may gradually be displaced by social-democratic alternatives—focuses the competition on economic issues, while secondary issues of religion, civil rights, ethnicity, and nationality attract voters only to minor niche parties.[19] In contrast, after *national-accommodative communism,* the economic policy divide between communist-successor and anticommunist parties is much narrower and sociocultural conflicts are likely to crosscut the economic divide. The precommunist political mobilization of the middle class typically relied on societal divisions that are now being revived by new parties (religion, urban-rural divisions). Given the limited interparty competition on economics, politicians in multiparty systems gladly seize upon secondary cultural, religious, or ethnic political divides to distinguish their programmatic message from those of other parties. In this vein, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries have two dimensions of competition.

After *patrimonial communism,* finally, chances are greatest for mutually reinforcing and polarizing economic, political, cultural, and

ethnic divisions. Still powerful and often unreconstructed communist-successor parties engage in populist appeals to rally the losers of the economic liberalization and reinforce their campaigns by invoking national closure and authoritarian law-and-order policies to set themselves apart from a fragmented field of liberal-democratic opponents depicted as rootless cosmopolitans with criminal connections. The insistence on national identity, compliance with collective norms, and ethnic status provides ascriptive criteria to undercut open, universalistic competition for resources among all members of society. For this reason, the losers of market liberalization seek protection under the umbrella of group categories that justify principles of economic distribution outside the realm of the competitive market. In addition to communist-successor parties, nationalist and ethnic-particularist parties stand to benefit from such voter demands.

The differentiation of types of communist rule and their antecedents and consequences brings Robert Putnam's "social capital" approach to bear on the problem of postcommunist party formation.[20] Citizens' and politicians' cognitive skills, resources, moral-political dispositions, and associational networks shape their capacity to build new democratic institutions and processes. In contrast to Putnam, however, whose Italian case study of social-capital differentiation relies on "long-distance causality" over a span of more than seven hundred years, the theoretical model of communist legacies identifies plausible "intermediate-term" mechanisms and rational-actor strategies that build bridges from precommunist regimes to communist rule and from there, via modes of transition, to current postcommunist democracies.

The Table on page 315 summarizes the argument. Of course, the hypothesized correlations and causations have a statistical character, implying that there are always exceptions where historical contingencies not accounted for in a parsimonious framework create outliers. From the perspective of political actors, it may be a relief that history is not destiny and that path-dependency at times will be broken, a critical observation we have to keep in mind when making predictions about individual postcommunist countries.

My discussion of systemic conditions has built a bridge between individual parties and entire party systems. In formerly bureaucratic-authoritarian communist states, clientelism tends to be weak because ideological party families and institutional rules of democratic party competition prevail that foster programmatic competition. Here politicians focus most of their energy on consensus-building inside parties and legislative caucuses and relatively less on the construction of extensive organizational infrastructures, such as mass parties. The reverse applies in former patrimonial communist polities, where communist and nationalist parties tend to be dominant. Party ideology and systemic opportunity here support, on balance, more clientelist

linkage strategies. In particular, the more-or-less unreconstructed former communist ruling parties, which often remain entrenched in the state apparatus, seize the opportunity to bind voters to the party through clientelist networks. In a similar vein, sociocultural particularist parties tend to be prominent, yet unable to coordinate supporters around synthesizing political programs, especially around issues pertaining to economic reform. After patrimonial communism, market-liberal parties have the greatest incentive to appeal to voters around cohesive programs, but they remain weak and divided and thus cannot give the party system much momentum to crystallize around programmatic competition.

Former national-accommodative communist countries have intermediate historical conditions and new democratic institutions for programmatic or clientelist party competition, but they generally tilt toward the liberal-democratic variant. Here, both liberal-democratic parties and social-democratized communist-successor parties refrain from heavy organizational investment and clientelist linkage-building. Such strategies are more typical of sociocultural parties that tend to have rather diffuse programmatic appeals.

Rival Hypotheses

The sociological and political science literature yields a wealth of hypotheses about the conditions under which parties and party systems develop more programmatic or more clientelist features. I will briefly review the applicability of these arguments to Eastern Europe, drawing on as yet uncompleted macro-comparative quantitative research on all postcommunist democracies.[21] For reasons of space, I cannot introduce the operationalization of all variables and report estimations of different statistical models. The most contentious aspect of this work may be the operationalization of clientelism, a concept inherently difficult to measure. I rely on the judgment of country risk analysts evaluating the severity of problems of corruption in each postcommunist polity. Corruption involves the exchange of money for political favors. In democracies at least, this exchange is most often mediated through party channels. Where corruption is a standard, institutionalized form of linkage between politicians, administrators, and electoral constituencies, it tends to congeal around clientelist networks.

The most common theory relates clientelist or programmatic competition to conditions of development.[22] Poor, uneducated voters have short time horizons and weak capacities to conceptualize causal chains leading from the election of politicians to public-policy outcomes years later. They opt for quick and certain material gratifications derived from direct clientelist exchanges rather than the indirect and uncertain benefits resulting from politicians' policy commitments. At the same time, facing poor clients, political entrepreneurs are more likely to be

Table—Antecedents and Consequences of Three Types of Communist Rule



able to raise the funds necessary to satisfy their material demands than those of an educated middle class. Hence, clientelist parties prevail in poor countries (system level) and primarily appeal to poor voters (party level). Increasing affluence and education stirs up "progressive" movements, led by urban middle strata, that undercut clientelist networks.

A second theory of clientelism, proposed by Martin Shefter, argues that political structure is key for clientelism.[23] It evolves only if, at the time of suffrage expansion, no rational-bureaucratic civil service exists. This allows self-interested, calculating politicians who already have a foothold in oligarchic assemblies to employ the state apparatus as a resource for political deal-making and attracting a mass electorate. By contrast, parties faced with an absolutist state apparatus—built on a professionalized civil service—and those excluded from oligarchic assemblies build programmatic parties.

My threefold typology of precommunist and communist regime types essentially blends developmentalist and state-structuralist arguments together. Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism relies on early industrialization and bureaucratization and thus makes it difficult to form clientelist parties. Patrimonial communism, by contrast, emerges from agrarian societies with little rational bureaucratization, such as in Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, or Ukraine. In fact, the statistical association between communist regime type and level of political corruption, as scored by business risk analysts in 1996, is almost perfect.

A further argument on citizen-party linkages associates clientelism with ethnocultural pluralism in the polity.[24] At the present time, however, East European countries do not exhibit a pronounced correlation between cultural pluralism and corruption. This does not rule out that in a broader sample of countries the postulated relationship would emerge.

A fourth argument relates a country's trade dependence to programmatic competition.[25] In open economies, politicians rally strong public support for measures that prevent less competitive sectors from obtaining rents from the government and that endanger trade relations and undercut national competitiveness (in forms such as tariffs or trade restrictions). Less economically "efficient" institutions that provide more opportunities for rent-seekers, such as first-past-the-post plurality electoral rules or strong executive presidencies, prevail only in more closed economies. In fact, in Eastern Europe, trade openness, "efficient" democratic institutions, and levels of corruption are rather strongly associated. Once we control for communist regime type and other domestic polity variables, however, the independent effect of trade on democratic institutions and on levels of corruption all but disappears.

If corruption is a valid measure of the propensity toward clientelism in the new postcommunist democracies, then communist regime type, democratic institutions, and a dummy variable for a country's origin in the former Soviet Union explain the bulk of the variance in national

levels of clientelism. Former bureaucratic-authoritarian communist countries now have democratic institutions that are less conducive to clientelism (parliamentary government, proportional representation). Moreover, they have always been located outside the borders of the Soviet Union. In these countries, market-liberal reform has progressed swiftly, and the state sector has shrunk dramatically, thus removing potential resources for building clientelist networks. At the other extreme, former patrimonial-communist countries mostly have political institutions that facilitate direct clientelist exchange networks and undercut programmatic party structures (personalist voting systems, strong presidential authority). These countries maintain a large, non-competitive state or quasi-state sector offering politicians resources to act on this propensity. The former national-accommodative communist countries now exhibit intermediate conditions for clientelist or programmatic competition, although most are closer to the institutional arrangements and political-economic reforms of democratic polities emerging from bureaucratic-authoritarian communism.

The Consequences of Parties and Party Systems

Does this structural divergence—postcommunist countries with stronger market-liberal parties, more depersonalizing political institutions, and more programmatic citizen-party linkage, on the one hand, versus countries with weaker market-liberal parties, democratic institutions of representation that emphasize personality, and more clientelist citizen-party linkage, on the other—actually matter? In fact, in postcommunist Eastern Europe, parties and party systems are elements of alternative political configurations that exercise considerable impact both on public satisfaction with and trust in the new political institutions, as well as on economic performance, mediated by a country's propensity to engage in economic reform and its attractiveness for business investors. Technically it is difficult, however, to isolate the independent causal contribution of parties and party systems to the economic performance and legitimacy of the new democracies because the former are strongly multicollinear with other correlates of regime structure and development, such as the nature of preceding communist regime or geographic proximity to the European Union (EU).

In the immediate aftermath of communism's collapse, the assertion of market-liberal, anticommunist parties in government led to distinctly better economic performance by the mid-1990s. But this success took place against the backdrop of diverse democratic transitions, communist regime patterns, and precommunist institutions of economy and polity. These can be traced back even further to the predominant religious denominations and types of rule prevailing in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries.[26]

Resistance to reform, organized by the tenacious obstruction of strong communist parties, locks in a pattern of gradual but accelerating economic decline with a simultaneous pilfering of public assets by former *nomenklatura* members,[27] whereas dramatic economic restructuring leads to a sharp but short economic crisis and an ensuing economic recovery. Power relations blocking economic reform are most likely in new polities that build on patrimonial-communist foundations, that preserve the power of communist politicians, and that offer them opportunities to steal public resources or to divert them to rent-seeking groups that are incorporated into clientelist networks. Thus, by 1995–98, countries emerging from bureaucratic-authoritarian or national-accommodative communism (with comparatively strong market-liberal parties and communist-successor parties that had essentially adopted social democracy) showed, on average, more robust economic performance over the entire restructuration cycle since 1989 than those emerging from patrimonial communism. The most efficient predictors of economic recovery, however, are not our master variables, such as former communist regime form or corruption, but phenomena rather closely associated with them, such as distance of a country's capital from the EU, the implementation of economic reform measures in 1990–95, and the strength of legal safeguards in 1995.[28]

Democratic institutions and economic performance leave their mark on public trust in democracy and optimism that one's country is heading in the right direction. At the macro-level, a crossnational comparison of levels of popular regime satisfaction is quite hazardous in post-communist democracies, however, because different countries' mass publics have different anchor points for their evaluations. Thus asking Romanians about their evaluation of the new democratic order may yield a more positive response than that of Hungarians. This is not because Hungarians are intrinsically less supportive of democracy but because the anchor point for Hungarians is the "good old days" of national-accommodative goulash communism in the 1970s, whereas for Romanians it is the repressive and economically deteriorating late Ceausescu regime.

Nevertheless, taking these difficulties of crossnational analysis into account, where patrimonial-communist party elites have continued to wield a great deal of power, mass publics appear generally less happy with the direction of their country's pathway and express much less trust in democracy than in other East European countries.[29] Moreover, a better business climate is directly related to more democratic trust and optimism about a country's future. Both of these measures, in turn, are also associated with the nature of democratic institutions. Where these institutions depersonalize political competition, democratic trust and business optimism tend to be substantially greater than in countries with more personalized democratic rules.

Because of the multicollinearity of communist regime features, current institutions, levels of corruption, and economic achievements, it is at this time statistically impossible to sort out the independent effect that each of these variables has on democratic trust, public optimism, and the business climate in a precise and reliable macro-quantitative comparison. But the sharp contrast between alternative clusters of countries is impressive. In one cluster of countries, proximity to the EU, former bureaucratic-authoritarian or national-accommodative communism, depersonalizing democratic institutions, low levels of corruption in politics, strong legal safeguards, and advanced market reforms coincide. Outside this cluster, countries that lack one of these elements typically also lack most of the others. Political parties and party systems are unlikely to have caused these starkly diverging patterns, but they are indicators and catalysts of policy processes that reproduce diversity among the former communist countries.

Advantages of Backwardness?

My analysis has emphasized the diversity of postcommunist pathways of regime transformation with regard to the emergence of political parties and party systems. New democracies in Southern Europe and other parts of the world may display important features of diversity scholars have also accounted for in terms of path dependency.[30] But path dependency as a theoretical framework, mediated by rational actor strategies, must not be reified into historical determinism. Fundamental crises that shake the basic institutions of a country, together with external political and economic pressures and the demonstration effects of successful reform elsewhere, may at times dislodge polities from their paths. From the normative perspective of advocating democracy and economic efficiency, one might very much hope for a rupture with path dependency in much of Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. But at the time of this writing, I remain skeptical. It appears that mechanisms of path-dependency have configured postcommunist polities around highly diverse institutions and power relations that are likely to last for some time to come. Even in countries that may be most responsive to West European influences, particularly the lure of joining NATO and the EU, the power of path dependency is undeniable at this time. Against the backdrop of deep economic crisis precipitated by the half-hearted reforms and corrupt practices of communist-successor party governments, two formerly patrimonial-communist countries, Romania in 1996 and Bulgaria in 1997, voted for new liberal party governments that promised to catch up with the economic and political reforms of East Central Europe and lead their countries toward Western Europe. While both governments managed the easy part of reform, imposing a tight fiscal and monetary macroeconomic policy, they subsequently

proved much less capable of delivering structural microeconomic and administrative reform that would have helped to lay the foundations for democratic political parties no longer enjoying the option of clientelist linkage-building.

Inspired by the path dependency claim, my analysis does not suggest a simple imitation of Western experiences anywhere in Eastern Europe. From the vantage point of West European experiences, the surprising result of my inquiry is that the new postcommunist democratic polities that have the least chance of building encompassing mass parties appear to have the best chance of consolidating around strong liberal-democratic and social-democratic parties and of experiencing the best relative economic performances. Skeptics might point out that in these countries, the volatility of party support is also still very high compared to established democracies. This volatility, however, is not associated with the rapid appearance of new parties but takes place within rather well defined blocs and ideological sectors of the political issue space.

It thus appears that democracies need not "encapsulate" electorates with heavy investments in party infrastructure, particularly via the construction of mass parties employing at least some material selective incentives built into direct clientelist exchanges. In Western Europe, the era of mass parties came to an end because political professionals tended to displace amateur activists in the task of mobilizing the vote and because the traditional clientelist incentives and exchange mechanisms became increasingly ineffective and illegitimate when faced with an electorate that responded to policy positions. In the face of changing voter demands, large party apparatuses may in fact reduce the strategic mobility of parties—and thus their democratic accountability and responsiveness—by infusing considerations of patronage and political network politics.[31]

Compared to Western Europe, at least some East European countries enjoy the "advantages of backwardness" of never having made investments in mass parties and of facing political demand structures and institutional opportunities that make the construction of mass parties unlikely. At least after bureaucratic-authoritarian and national-accommodative communism, most parties tend to remain small cadre parties with politicians who routinely must construct and reconstruct their electorates based on updated programmatic appeals on salient competitive issue dimensions. It is unreasonable to measure the future of party democracy in these East European polities against the past of West European party formation. In some postcommunist countries, however, the formation of mass parties with rather pronounced clientelist linkages is more plausible. But the extension of such structures may be detrimental to their economic performance and, as a consequence, to their democratic procedures and popular legitimacy as well.

NOTES

1. See Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), and Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," *Politics and Society* 20 (March 1992): 7–50.

2. Compare Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures," *Comparative Political Studies* 28 (July 1995): 171–99.

3. See Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radek Markowski, and Gábor Tóka, *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For an extension of this framework to the study of Russian party formation, see Herbert Kitschelt and Regina Smyth, "Issues, Identities, and Programmatic Parties: The Emerging Russian Party System in Comparative Perspective," paper prepared for presentation at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

4. Readers of my earlier work will notice that this essay and the book on East Central Europe build on but modify previous theoretical statements and initial empirical analyses. See Herbert Kitschelt, "Patterns of Competition in East Central European Party Systems," paper prepared for the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago; Herbert Kitschelt, "Party Systems in East Central Europe? Consolidation or Fluidity?" *Studies in Public Policy* 241 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1995); Herbert Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies," *Party Politics* 1 (October 1995): 447–72.

5. John Aldrich, *Why Parties?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

6. Of course, also outside electoral politics, vehicles of interest articulation and aggregation differ in terms of their investment strategies. Social movements, for example, invest neither in organizational infrastructure nor in modes of consensus building and therefore have only an intermittent existence. When their activists attempt to pursue their causes in a durable fashion they make investments in organizational infrastructure and become interest groups.

7. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (January 1994): 55–69.

8. In other Christian Democratic and social-democratic mass parties, the close association between unions and parties—often combined with the administration of unemployment, pension, or health insurance by party or union—provided the material incentives for mass membership. This applies to the Scandinavian countries as well as to Belgium and the Netherlands.

9. On the organization of these parties, see Herbert Kitschelt, *The Logics of Party Formation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).

10. See Kenneth Janda and Desmond King, "Formalizing and Testing Duverger's Theories on Political Parties," *Comparative Political Studies* 18 (July 1995): 139–69. As I have argued above, this does not rule out that social democrats also employ some techniques of material citizen-party linkage.

11. Clientelist practices result in a halfway house of economic reforms where beneficiaries of privatization closely tied to the old elites entrench themselves and block further moves toward a more efficient set of economic institutions. See Joel

S. Hellman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," *World Politics* 50 (January 1998): 203–34.

12. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 344.

13. For a description of the Hungarian Christian Democratic People's Party, see Zsolt Enyedi, "Organizing a Subcultural Party in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Hungarian Christian Democrats," *Party Politics* 2 (July 1996): 377–96.

14. Zhirinovsky's party, however, has developed the most comprehensive organizational structure.

15. On non-equilibrium strategies of politicians under the condition of new institutions, see Mikhail Filippov and Olga V. Shvetsova, "Political Institutions and Party Systems in New Democracies of Eastern Europe," paper delivered at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago; and Robert G. Moser, "The Impact of the Electoral System on Post-Communist Party Development: The Case of the 1993 Russian Parliamentary Elections," *Electoral Studies* 14 (October 1995): 377–98.

16. For the historical reconstruction of divergence in Eastern Europe, see Daniel Chirot, ed., *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Andrew C. Janos, "The Politics of Backwardness in Continental Europe, 1780–1945," *World Politics* 41 (April 1989): 325–58; and George Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

17. Exceptions confirm the rule. In Bulgaria, in a moment of weakness, the communist-successor party had to give up on its preferred personalist institutional design, that is, a rather powerful presidency together with a first-past-the-post electoral system.

18. See John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas," *Electoral Studies* 14 (October 1995): 417–39.

19. On the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, the decline of the communist-successor party has been halted by the party's success in presenting itself as the voice of East Germans against the dominant Western part of the country. See Gero Neugebauer and Richard Stöss, *Die PDS. Geschichte. Organisation. Wähler. Konkurrenten* (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1996).

20. Robert Putnam (with Robert Leonardi and Rafaella Y. Nanetti), *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

21. Elements of this research are included in Herbert Kitschelt, "Accounting for Outcomes of Postcommunist Regime Change. Causal Depth or Shallowness in Rival Explanations," paper prepared for the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 3–6. Also, Herbert Kitschelt and Edmund J. Malesky, "Constitutional Design and Postcommunist Economic Reform," prepared for presentation at the Midwest Political Science Conference in Chicago, 28 April 2000.

22. For a summary of the literature, see Shmuel Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

23. Martin Shefter, *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

24. See Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict,* ch. 8.

25. Ronald Rogowski, "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions," *International Organization* 41 (Spring 1987): 203–23.

26. See M. Steven Fish, "The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World," *East European Politics and Societies* 12 (Winter 1998): 30–78. He finds that the countries' economic-reform trajectories are determined by the victory of noncommunist parties in the first democratic election, not by the historical properties of path dependency (such as the dominant religious denomination of a country), which also capture the development of state structure and political economy. In a multivariate regression, religion washes out when initial election results are entered as an additional predictor of postcommunist countries' economic reform efforts (p. 55). Given that Fish's coding of the religion variable (p. 41) is very strongly correlated (r = +.80) with the initial election results (p. 49), high multicollinearity should have prevented Fish from entering both items as independent predictors of economic reform effort. It is more reasonable to claim that historical legacies, of which religion may be an indicator, affect initial election outcomes which, in turn, affect postcommunist polities' economic-reform efforts.

27. Anders Åslund, Peter Boone, and Simon Johnson, "How To Stabilize: Lessons from Post-Communist Countries," paper prepared for the Brookings Institution Panel on Economic Activity, Washington, D.C., 28–29 March 1996.

28. Our operational measures of these concepts are correlated with former communist regime form at the level of .75 to .87.

29. I am relying here on survey data reported in Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Democracies Barometer III: Learning from What is Happening," *Studies in Public Policy* 230 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1995); and data from Anders Åslund, Peter Boone, and Simon Johnson, "How To Stabilize," Table 15.

30. See most recently Richard Gunther and José R. Montero, "The Anchors of Partisanship: A Comparative Analysis of Voting Behavior in Four Southern European Democracies," in Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunther, eds., *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming 2001).

31. I have argued in a comparison of West European social-democratic parties that voter encapsulation or "organizational entrenchment" reduced parties' strategic flexibility in the 1970s and 1980s. See Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 5.