Muslim Mobilization Between Self-Organization, State-Recognized Consultative Bodies and Political Participation

Jonathan Laurence

1 Introduction

The practical accomplishments of representative bodies for state-Islam consultations or Islam Councils (e.g., *Conseil français du culte musulman, Deutsche Islamkonferenz*) continue to be a matter of controversy, with some national bodies of Muslim religious representatives lying in disrepair or dysfunction. But these Councils have exerted an important influence on the claims-making behavior of federated Muslim religious associations and thereby contributed to their integration into local repertoires of contention. How can we characterize responses from Muslim organizations to State-Islam Consultations? This chapter addresses the achievements of state-mosque relations and the "incorporation" outcomes that can be measured so far (1989–2011). What is the stability and performance of Islam Councils across the countries? How have the policies to create representative bodies conditioned political claims making, and what impact do they have on the long-term prospects of Muslims' everyday integration in Europe? I will empirically trace the effects of European policy approaches and demonstrate that they have had a dramatic effect on Muslim communities: on their domestic orientation, their reformed organizational structures, their outspoken distancing from violence and radicalism, and their outward commitment to playing by the rules of the game. This chapter will provide evidence that host societies as well as Muslim community leaders—and the scope of their agendas—have been transformed by the experience

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of institutional integration. "State" and "community" know one another better and have begun to identify areas of common interest—from religious education in public schools to the appointment of chaplains in prisons and the armed forces—where institutionalized cooperation has proven mutually beneficial.

Muslims in Europe today have yet to experience full political integration—their residual foreign citizenship will prevent that until a majority are European citizens over the voting age—but increasing numbers of leaders are being received in the halls of power. The predominant scene of state-Islam interactions is not just of unabated conflict but of government officials sitting down with Muslims to address issues associated with domestic Islamic observance. As a result of meticulous institution-building by Interior Ministries across the continent, these meetings are no longer the ad hoc gatherings of foreign dignitaries they once were. In practice, authorities have effectively opened up communications channels that serve both as a sounding board for the putative Muslim community and as a temporary substitute for the millions of citizens and residents of Muslim origin who are, for the time being, without significant electoral representation. Islam Councils have even begun to achieve some concrete instances of "domestication," such as the oversight of halal slaughter, the nomination of chaplains in the military, the organization of religious education in public schools, the endowment of university departments of Islamic theology, and civic training for imams.

Both the diplomatic religious networks and Political-Islam networks have been profoundly changed by their experience in Europe, in unforeseen ways. The content of "Embassy Islam" (Maréchal et al. 2000) has been both multiplied and adapted to the new circumstances of state-mosque relations. And some Islamist groups in Europe have showed signs of a practical-minded evolution. The Islam Councils have begun to demonstrate that over time, a new politics of distinctly European state-mosque relations can emerge.

2 Muslim Responses to the State-Islam Consultations

How have the two organizational protagonists of European Muslim communities—Political Islam and Embassy Islam—responded to Europeans' state-building efforts? This is a topic I treat at greater length in *The Emancipation of Europe's Muslims,* where I argue that the main mosque federations have undergone a process of "domestication" in two significant ways: by participating in the state-mosque relations, and by taking steps to become less "foreign" in terms of personnel and religious content. The state's recognition, however imperfect, has reduced the stridency of

organized Muslims' religious demands and taken federation leaders out of a defensive posture. This chapter makes the argument that Islam Councils have helped achieve an important degree of organizational incorporation, as defined in terms of certain "moderated" and "adapted" behaviors by the representatives of Embassy Islam and Political Islam. Where states adopt a more "neo-corporatist" path—as defined by the formalization of state-mosque relations in a hierarchical and monopolistic Islam Council—we observe a more successful path to the institutionalization, predictability, and moderation of Islamic organizations and the religious accommodation they expect from majority societies. Each Muslim sending state refined its Embassy Islam in response to specific incentives in national host states, and Political Islam groups—originating in Turkey, South Asia, and North Africa—also adapted their own goals to each European country in which they operate. The second half of this chapter will demonstrate how this occurred in the second stage of "incorporation" and not during the earlier "outsourcing phase," suggesting that Islam Councils have provided a set of effective institutional incentives.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, before the inclusion of Political-Islam groups in state-Islam consultations in Europe, many Islamist leaders still exhibited an "old country" mentality reminiscent of the tensions between government-sponsored religion and Islamist political parties in North Africa and Turkey. Embassy-Islam federations ignored their competitors or berated them for their fundamentalism, and Political-Islam groups were in turn confrontational with public authorities and made maximalist demands for religious accommodation in the public sphere.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, by contrast, Political-Islam federations have demonstrated a willingness to work within the system and have toned down their most controversial stances. For Political-Islam groups, the influence of being *included* in state-led consultations—or, often, the mere possibility of being chosen for government consultation—has had a moderating effect. Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, they adopted repertoires of collective action that are typical of their new national contexts. They also asserted their independence from Islamist positions in the "homeland" and, at times, even from the positions taken by European "headquarters" (e.g., the UK-based Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe).

Participants have repeatedly declined to engage in inflammatory rhetoric when presented with the opportunity to defend Islam in public debate, such as during the 2003–2004 legislation against headscarves in France and Germany; the 2006 Danish "prophet cartoon" controversy; the Pope's Regensburg speech; the 2008 Dutch "Fitna" movie broadcast on the internet; or the 2008–2009 legislation against burkas in France, Italy, and the UK. Italian Muslim leaders no longer speak of a Muslim's right to polygamy, French Muslim leaders no longer insist upon ritual burial without coffins, German Muslim leaders have dropped their insistence on religious

education in Turkish language, British Muslim leaders avoid any ambiguity regarding death sentences for blasphemous authors. Islamist leaders have eschewed street demonstrations in favor of lobbying and lawsuits, and demonstrated an interest in keeping hold over administrative gains in the technical realm of state-mosque relations. Political-Islam federations' response to the political violence committed in the name of Islam—notably, the series of the terrorist attacks and hostage-takings between 2001 and 2006—proved to be decisive in eliciting clear denunciations of violence. The institutional opportunity of state-Islam consultations created a channel of communication and a political opportunity structure.

For Embassy Islam, on the other hand, the possibility of being *excluded* from government consultations—or at least seeing their role greatly diminished—has led to a similarly dramatic overhaul. Embassy-Islam federations that once did business only in their mother tongue, staffed their operations with diplomats, and refused to acknowledge the existence of unofficial religious groups, have changed their ways. The offering of official Islam from the erstwhile "sending countries" has been multiplied and adapted to the new circumstances of greater national oversight in European host states. And Turkish, Moroccan, and Algerian ministries of religious affairs have begun to accept greater oversight by European governments over the religious infrastructure they organize for Muslim diasporas. Thus, even while more personnel and infrastructure is exported toward Europe, a degree of autonomy has also been granted to national European branches of Embassy-Islam networks, and the sending states are more likely to work in concert with European governments. They have oriented and adapted their religious programs to the national contexts of European receiving societies. Imams who arrive from national capitals in Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey, for example, now attend destination-specific civic, political, and linguistic training courses. Groups with close home-country links have appointed greater numbers of European-born Muslims to executive positions, and regularly meet with rival federations in official contexts.

Councils are in their relative infancy compared with state-religion organs for Christians and Jews. Some Islam Councils have already experienced crises of legitimacy, instances of corruption, and, occasionally, resignations. Even the most "successful" consultations—e.g., in France and Germany—are not a panacea for eliminating extremism and all undesired foreign influences over religious practice, but they do provide a crucial institutional link between the state and community leaders. This relationship has already served the mundane purposes of technical accommodation of religious needs and acted as a sounding board during extraordinary times of crisis. Populations of Muslim origin in Europe today are not yet politically integrated, but institutionalized government consultations on religious matters involve ever-greater numbers of Muslim association leaders. As a result of

meticulous institution-building by interior ministries across the continent, authorities have opened up new conduits for addressing the material needs and religious sensibilities of a minority population that is, for the time being, without significant electoral representation.

The impact of cross-national variation in the design of Islam Councils is observable in the councils' institutional stability and concrete outcomes, and the main factor appears to be the organizational strength and mobilizational capacity of the principal sending states' religious institutions, i.e., Embassy Islam. Where it is more institutionalized and dominant in the homeland, its indirect mediation offers European governments a stronger interlocutor. Where it is weaker, the religious landscape tends to be dominated by religious NGOs with more political views, and institutional progress stalls. The most successful councils are sturdy enough to contain these religious NGOs. Embassy Islam plays a moderating role and foil for extremists. The irony of this situation is that it perpetuates foreign governments' influence on "European" Islam, and this explains why it is still premature to speak of an "Italian Islam" or "French Islam" or "Euro-Islam."

This chapter examines the political behavior of Islamic associations before and after incorporation and shows how they have responded to the neo-corporatist political opportunity structure. "Radicals" have moderated their demands, trading in their earlier ideological and obstructionist positions for newly pragmatic and cooperative stances: they went from street protests and intimations of violence, to lobbying and pledges of constitutional loyalty. Sending states are adapting the content of their religious programming to the new demands of European host societies. In many cases their adaptations are attempts to seek a competitive edge vis-à-vis their public interlocutors: a French official compared this dynamic to "each pupil wanting to showcase his merits to the teacher."[1] If we examine the positions of leaders of federations in the periods before and after consultations, the contrast in attitudes and behavior is striking.

Between 2002 and 2006, four major Political-Islam organizations were invited—directly or indirectly—to participate in official state-Islam consultations: in France, the UOIF (2002); in Italy, the UCOII (2004); in Germany, the IGMG (2006); in the UK, the MCB (2006).[2] One measure of the impact of state-Islam consultations can be seen in these groups' claims-making activities before and during participation in the recently established Islam Councils. Whereas during the early 1990s Political-Islam leaders started off standoffish in administrative negotiations and

[1] Interview by the author with Didier Leschi in Paris, Chef du Bureau central des cultes, March 2009.

[2] The IGMG via the Islamrat; the MCB had already been an interlocutor from 1997 to 2005.

were reluctant to denounce fellow Muslims' use of political violence, their participation 10 years later in neo-corporatist councils has coincided with their evolution into interlocutors who are more likely to distance themselves from extremism and who have become amenable to discussion and debate. The following examples will provide side-by-side comparisons the reactions and behavior of Political-Islam federations during crises of religious sensibility in the first period (1990–1999) with roughly equivalent moments in the second period (1999–2009).

2.1 Early Consultations: "It's in the Qur'ân"

Because of Embassy Islam's dominant position, Political-Islam leaders had little invested in early consultations, and acted as though they had little to lose. In negotiations with administrators, they took an all or nothing approach, they defended literalist interpretations of Qur'ânic injunctions, and they would obstinately repeat themselves when administrations asked for clarification of their intentions.

Upon making their first overtures of consultation at the outset of the second stage, administrators encountered in Political-Islam organizations an inflexible negotiating partner. From the Islamische Föderation in Berlin (linked to *Millî Görüş*) which in the late 1990s declined the German standard ministerial oversight for its religion curriculum; to the UCOII in Italy, which demanded the rearrangement of work schedules around Muslim holidays and free land on which to build mosques.[3] The Islamische Gemeinschaft-Hamburg published a fatwa restricting schoolgirls' participation in school trips if their male chaperoneswere more than one day's camel ride away (Nouripour 2007). Political-Islam leadership did not display much interest in establishing nonviolent credentials; some were accused of downplaying Islamist violence—especially in Israel and the occupied territories—or even silently granting their approbation of terrorist methods. Islamist leaders in Europe did not have many incentives to demonstrate tolerance toward other religious groups or to engage in interreligious dialogue, and similarly, they had no real institutional opportunity structure to compel them to engage in professionalization.

During the transition from "outsourcing" to "incorporation, Political-Islam leaders lived up to administrators' low expectations. Advisors to the French, German, and Italian interior ministries said in interviews conducted by the author that Political-Islam leaders discussed issues such as Muslim sections in cemeteries (in

[3] Interview by the author with Renate Eichenhorn in Berlin, Berlin State Ministry of Education, June 2000; interview by the author with Fabrizio Spinetti, January 2000.

France) or religious curriculum (in Germany) in a confrontational fashion (Laurence 2012). These early proto-consultations, which were mostly informal and never officially institutionalized, encountered Political-Islam leaders who were contemptuous of bureaucratic inquiries. As a result, these initial attempts at state-mosque relations suffered from blockage and even collapse at the hands of uncooperative Political-Islam leadership.

2.2 1989: The Rushdie and Headscarf Affairs

Three defining moments for Political Islam's public position in European societies took place between 1988–1990—the Rushdie affair, the first headscarf affairs, and the first Gulf War—and each incident elicited decidedly confrontational behavior and maximalist rhetoric from Political-Islam leaders at the time. Whereas Embassy-Islam envoys reacted limply, with diplomatic aplomb, the recently created Political-Islam federations found their niche as public defenders of Islam. Their confrontational stances and sharp rhetoric were a mark of their outsider status, as they were excluded from state-mosque relations such as they existed in the late 1980s. This helped raise concerns within interior ministries and contributed to a reassessment of their exclusion and the eventual end of Embassy Islam's monopoly.

The publication of the *Satanic Verses* elicited much scorn from Political-Islam groups. Millî Görüş (IGMG) affiliates in Germany asserted that *Satanic Verses* had been published by the CIA, and that the UK government was participating in a "slander campaign" against Muslims. The head of the IGMG in Denmark said that Judaism was the source of decay and social unrest, and that the ideologies of capitalism and communism could be traced back to Jewish origins (Pederson 1999, p. 93). In France, UOIF spokesmen warned that they could not hold their constituents back from taking to the streets. Some associations even expressed support for the fatwa against the author Salman Rushdie. The UOIF and FNMF held demonstrations in February and March of 1989 in Paris to demand the book's withdrawal, and other Political-Islam associations held a protest in March in Lyon. UOIF and FNMF leaders used ominous rhetoric while asserting their demands. A FNMF spokesman said, "There are going to be confrontations. We risk being overcome by uncontrollable elements" (Tincq and Lesnes 1989); and a UOIF leader warned, "If the book is displayed in store windows there could be spontaneous reactions." (Tincq 1989a) The Socialist Party spokesman equated the subsequent demonstration of one thousand opponents to the publication of Rushdie's novel to a "call for murder." (Tincq 1989b) The culture minister and his Socialist Party supported demonstrations in favor of the book's publication in France, and the

Mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, expressed his "outrage" at the image of Muslim demonstrators in Paris: "If they're French, they must be prosecuted and if they're foreign they must be deported. . . we cannot tolerate calls for murder in the capital of human rights." (Tincq 1989b) A UOIF leader said he "would have expected more neutrality from the government."

Similarly, when three schoolgirls were expelled from a Creil middle school for wearing headscarves in 1989, the UOIF took up their case, vowing resistance and calling for street demonstrations to protest the decision. Across Europe, Political-Islam leadership, which was just beginning to form peak associations to compete with Embassy-Islam organizations on European soil, took a hard line. One German Muslim activist, who nearly two decades later would become head of the ZMD, defended headscarves with the comment: "Girls lose their sense of modesty as early as elementary school." A French FNMF co-founder said on the topic of the obligation to wear the headscarf, "if the Conseil d'Etat does not decide in our favor, we will withdraw our girls from French schools." (Tincq 1989c) While the leader of the Embassy Islam-affiliated Grande Mosquée de Paris (GMP) spoke of finding "amicable solutions," and tried to tamp down the confrontation, competing Political-Islam federations held demonstrations in Paris on October 22 and November 5, 1989 (the GMP leader called those street protests "regrettable") (Tincq 1989d).

2.3 After: Auditioning for the Role of "Privileged Interlocutor"

Many of the most prominent Political-Islam federations across Europe have moderated their stances and repertoires of political participation: the Muslim Association of Britain (a constituent organization of the Muslim Council of Britain), *the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* (UOIF is part of the CFCM), *Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazzioni Islamiche in Italia* (UCOII was a member of the *Consulta per l'Islam*), *Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş* and *Zentralrat der Muslime* in Deutschland (member organizations of the *Islamrat* and the *Koordinierungsrat der Muslime*, respectively, both of which participated in the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz*). The effect seems to have been atmospheric and not merely tied to the circumstance of being officially "co-opted" as an official interlocutor. Even for those Political-Islam federations not currently consulted by the interior ministry in a given European country, their public statements and policy positions appear to reflect a fundamentally state-friendly stance.

In various political contexts, Islamist leaders have gradually bound their organizations to institutional confines, political norms, and expectations of state-mosque relations. They no longer made "maximalist" demands for immediate religious

accommodation; they countenanced restrictive policies on religious freedom like headscarf wearing; they increased their denunciations of terrorism committed in the name of Islam; in response to perceived attacks on Islam in the public sphere, they opted for lobbying and lawsuits over street protests; without abandoning their solidarity with Palestinians (nor, often, their disdain for Israeli leaders), they distanced themselves from expressions of anti-Semitism (Laurence and Vaïsse 2006).[4] The CFCM in France has met regularly with the Jewish umbrella organization CRIF; the Italian Political-Islam federation, UCOII, organized a visit for its leaders to the extermination camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau in the spring of 2009.

The "Charter of Muslims in Europe" signed in Brussels in 2008, for example, can be evaluated in light of the political opportunity structure created by state-Islam consultations. The six pages of bullet points—pledging allegiance to their host societies—were issued by the Federation of Islamic Organizations of Europe (FIOE), the thriving network of mosques and prayer spaces in twenty-seven countries that is considered the European branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The charter outlines "how we should act as positive citizens and not be a threat," a spokesman said. The document, ratified by FIOE representatives in all European Union member-states, includes a call for all Muslims in Europe to "enhance the values of mutual understanding, work for peace and the welfare of society, moderation and inter-cultural dialogue, removed from all inclinations of extremism and exclusion." By enjoining its membership to strike "a harmonious balance between preservation of Muslim identity and the duties of citizenship," the FIOE charter of January 2008 continues down a path strewn with earlier such unilateral declarations of good intentions: a 1990 Bozza d'Intesa in Italy, the 1995 Charte du culte musulman en France, and the 2002 islamische Charta in Germany, among others. In response to the Italian interior ministry's announcement of plans for the Council, a number of prominent Muslims published a "Loyalty Pact to the Italian Republic" in May 2003.

Though all Political-Islam federations strongly denounced the 9/11 attacks, they also issued statements condemning the American-led invasion of Afghanistan and later, Iraq. But they also routinely condemned hostage taking and the deaths of Western journalists and aid workers—and even soldiers—in the two battle zones (e.g., Italian Carabinieri who died in Nassiriya in 2004 and French soldiers killed in Afghanistan in 2008).[5] In the last 6 years, Political-Islam federations across Europe

[4] Also, a Norwegian affiliate of the ECFR condemned the remarks of Yusuf al-Qaradawi in which he said the Holocaust was "divine punishment."

[5] A CFCM Communiqué stated, in part, "The CFCM joins the whole of the nation to give homage to the French soldiers who died in Afghanistan while accomplishing their mission

have loudly condemned terrorist incidents from Madrid to London, Glasgow, and Mumbai, as well as hostage situations involving European citizens and aid workers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. This too represents a change in behavior and message from an earlier era. Oğuz Ücüncü, general secretary of Millî Görüş in Germany, said that his federation was committed to using sermons and programming in mosques as a counter-terrorism measure:

> We condemned the terrorist attacks of March 11 [in Madrid] as we did on September 11, and we condemned any other act of terror. So as a Muslim organization we did our duty and we condemned the terror on the very first day of any such attack. . . But what we did as an Islamic organization is more than just demonstrating. We have been using our infrastructure in order to condemn the terrorist attacks and violence in general, but also to inform our people to not give any kind of support or sympathy to terrorists.[6]

At regular intervals since 2003, Political-Islam federations involved with State-Islam consultations in Germany, France, and Italy have proposed sending delegations to help free hostages. A CFCM delegation including the UOIF addressed kidnappers of two French journalists at a Baghdad press conference in 2004: "Show us you are good Muslims like us and hand over the hostages." Political-Islam leaders in France refused to call for a repeal of the headscarf law at the time as the kidnappers demanded, saying that amounted to "odious blackmail." (Laurence and Vaïsse 2006) Nadeem Elyas of the German Zentralrat der Muslime even offered to take the place of German hostages in Iraq, and the Muslim Association of Britain called for the unconditional release of British hostages on the Al Jazeera news network.

Despite violent reactions to publication of Danish cartoons mocking the prophet Muhammad, the absence of unrest on the European continent was noteworthy.[7] When the caricatures deemed offensive to the image of the Prophet Mohammed were republished in two French periodicals, furthermore, the UOIF did not take to the streets but instead joined a lawsuit (together with the *Grande Mosquée de Paris*, a rival Embassy-Islam federation).[8] The UOIF "judged that [the cartoons]

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of peace and protection of civilian populations." it also "deplored" the death of civilians, but ended by expressing its "respect for the French army for its acts on behalf of world peace." Paris, August 23, 2008.

[6] Ücüncü continued, "At the Friday prayer I talk to about 100,000 people and they are listening to me. I would not be able to get 100,000 people out on the street," (Deutsche Welle 2004)

[7] Although individual arrests have been made in two countries of those who allegedly plotted to kill editors or cartoonists.

[8] The lawsuit was filed in the 7th correctional chamber in Paris, which specializes in press and libel affairs (the suit was dismissed on appeal).

went beyond freedom of expression and constitute an aggression," but asked French Muslims to "take a responsible attitude. . . and allow the law to sort it out." (qtd. in Klausen 2009, pp. 120–124). This response is a far cry from the "broken bookshop windows" evoked by UOIF leaders 17 years earlier. The expression of such provocative language—and the exasperation it represents—would seem out of place in the grand meeting rooms of national Interior Ministries, where today's leaders calmly convey their opinions verbally to ministerial advisors while being served coffee, apple juice and cookies.

3 The Adaptation of Embassy Islam to State-Mosque Relations

With the creation of the Islam Councils, European governments intended to end Embassy Islam's monopoly over religious representation and domination over mosques and imams. The transformation of Embassy-Islam federations and their sending-state sponsors has been less dramatic than that of Political-Islam leadership, but it is no less significant in the emancipation of Europe's Muslims. Embassy-Islam leaders were initially reluctant to accept any change in the formula of state-Islam consultations. European governments' inclusion of Political-Islam federations and other religious figures and institutions in state-Islam dialogues in the 1990s and 2000s ended the monopoly over religious representation that Embassy Islam had enjoyed for more than two decades. Embassy-Islam federations in every national context have tried to defend their advantageous position, and they have employed a variety of obstructive and then adaptive techniques.

The indirect representatives of Turkey, Algeria, and Morocco have responded to Europeans' efforts to create Islamic Councils in the last fifteen to 20 years by undergoing a process of qualified "domestication"[9]: (1) They have accepted to participate in state-mosque relations and have sought to retain a dominant position. (2) When their relative importance has been diminished by the inclusion of other representatives, they have tried to block or obstruct the progress of state-mosque relations. (3) Finally, they have taken steps to become less "foreign" in terms of personnel (e.g., imams, spokesmen), the use of European languages, cooperation with European governments on the training of religion teachers and imams and adapting religious content (e.g., school curriculum, Friday sermons) to the European context. They have also begun to accept the legitimacy of rival organizations

[9] This is a fraught term that is addressed further in Laurence (2012).

in European Muslim communities. Nonetheless, these same countries' authorities have increased their targeting of the diasporas with the exportation of personnel and religious institutions. There has been a flurry of state cooperation with Embassy Islam at all levels of government, most of which has taken place *since* the creation of the Islam Councils.

In the 1980s, Embassy Islam in France, Germany, and Italy worked to win over new mosques and to consolidate control over rising federations. They did this first by blocking or boycotting state-Islam consultations that included rival organizations, then by insisting on presiding over the consultations, and occasionally working outside the margins of official consultations in side agreements with individual ministries (or threatening to sabotage Islam Councils) when they feel marginalized. Embassy-Islam officials—some of whom hold diplomatic status in the European host country—are not a natural match for national state-Islam consultations, which are supposed to oversee the "citizen-ization" (*citoyennisation* or *Einbürgerung*) of Islam. Foreign governments have displayed a cautious interest in immigrant participation in host societies: Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan famously referred to assimilation as "a crime against humanity," and the Moroccan minister for Moroccan community abroad stated simply that "Integration is an objective, but it must not constitute a rupture with the mother country." (La Gazette du Maroc 2003).

Embassy-Islam representatives in state-Islam consultations did not stand by quietly during the consultation process. They vigorously asserted themselves and increased their activities. They were motivated by several fears: of losing influence within Muslim communities—exacerbating their vulnerability to radicalization that host societies have not adequately addressed—as well as of losing remittances, and of losing a chance to have a voice in European institutions. Some of this resistance was rooted in national rivalries between competing homeland governments, e.g., Moroccans or Algerians in France, or between dominant sects and minority sects, e.g., Sunnis and Alevites in Turkey. When the rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris rails against "fundamentalists," for example, he is sometimes just expressing his competitive spirit vis-à-vis the rising power of Moroccans, who are numerically superior to—and more likely to attend mosques than—Algerians in France.

3.1 Embassy Islam Strikes Back

The content of "Embassy Islam" has been both multiplied and adapted to the new circumstances of state-mosque relations. Thus, even while homeland governments export more personnel and infrastructure, a degree of autonomy has also

been granted to national European branches of Embassy-Islam networks, and the sending states are more likely to work in concert with European governments. They have appointed greater numbers of European-born Muslims to executive positions, begun to address gender disparities on governing boards and among prayer leaders, and regularly meet with rival federations in official contexts. Imams who arrive from Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey now increasingly attend destination-specific civic, political, and linguistic training courses.

Although sending states have redoubled their involvement in providing religious infrastructure in Europe—increasing the number of imams they send and mosques they build—they no longer operate as independent subcontractors. They have been constrained to work together with Political-Islam leaders in the Islam Councils, or they work in cooperation with European governments on the design and content of training for religious personnel. Thus, even while Political-Islam federations have been allowed into consultations, the prominent leadership positions in Islam Councils remain in the hands of Embassy Islam. In 2010 as in 1990, Embassy-Islam leaders are the face and voice of Muslim communities in European countries.

The appearance of reversion to an unmitigated, pre-consultation, outsourcing state of affairs more typical of the 1970s and 1980s has led some officials involved in the construction of state-mosque relations, as well as some leaders of Political Islam federations, to despair that there is no hope for a European Islam. "To say that we're going to build a French Islam," an advisor to the French interior ministry said, "all that is over now."[10] As former interior minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement put it in an interview, "the problem is that we haven't been successful in weakening the ties between the various French Muslim communities and the countries of origin which are trying to keep the influence they have in France."[11]

3.2 Back to Square One?

In reality, both European and homeland governments have been complicit in extending the dominance of Embassy Islam in state-led consultations. The French and Italian officials quoted above highlight an important limitation of state organization of religious communities and the compelling reasons for continued strong

[10] Interview by the author with Raoul Weexsteen in Paris, Former Advisor to the French Interior Minister, June 2002.

[11] Interview by the author with Jean-Pierre Chevènement in Paris, Former Interior Minister of France, November 2003.

relations with Embassy Islam: the requirement of international cooperation on terrorism, and the inability to cut off financing from abroad. "The fate of French Islam is not being played out in the consultation," said a leader of one of France's five grand mosques. "It is being decided in the chancelleries" of Paris.

European states never intended that consultations meet the standards of direct democratic procedures: the state-Islam dialogue was always meant to be a compromise among competing interests, using indirect elections and ministerial appointments to determine the composition. But Political-Islam leaders have nonetheless expressed disappointment at the prominent role accorded to Embassy-Islam federations and homeland governments in the CFCM and the DIK.

Further evidence of the enduring role played by homeland governments in European Islam comes in the form of their continued funding to build mosques in Europe and their increased exportation of imams for rotation and Ramadan service. Embassy Islam's reluctance to relinquish political control over Islam among the diaspora—and their collective realization that European governments were determined to "domesticate" Islam—led Embassy-Islam federations to frame their activities within the spirit of the state-led Europeanization movement. "One of the only advantages of a state-led consultation," a French official stated, is that it gave the homeland governments "a wake-up call: they realized that their influence and their implantation had been somewhat diminished."[12]

European governments have created training programs to help acclimatize the newly arrived religious personnel from abroad each year, to lessen their "foreignness" and orient them to their new surroundings. The Dutch government established a complementary training program for imams arriving from abroad. Munich and Berlin have set up pilot programs between imams and local administrative officials to familiarize Islamic prayer leaders with the German school system and bureaucracy (Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009). DİTİB sends imams to participate in the civic training program begun in 2007 by the French interior ministry at the Institut Catholique in Paris, and collaborates with a pre-departure training program at the German Goethe Institute in Ankara. In April 2008, the British home secretary announced a plan to bring "moderate imams" from Pakistan and Bangladesh to "counter the threat of violent extremism," claiming that this would "complement work already underway to ensure imams are firmly rooted in the communities they serve." Germany has a similar agreement with Turkey, and the Netherlands, Belgium, and France also arranged such an exchange with Morocco.

[12] Interview by the author with Raoul Weexsteen in Paris, Former Advisor to the French Interior Minister, June 2002.

3.3 Morocco

The Moroccan government has tried to influence religious developments abroad—the 3.2 million abroad constitute 10 % of the total Moroccan population—by sponsoring mosques and Arab language instructors, and nurturing relationships with key Moroccan nationals residing abroad. King Muhammad VI (1999) has pursued an activist policy of exporting the kingdom's religious practices, including the annual delegations of imams and Qur'ân reciters sent throughout Europe as well as a new Ulama Council for Europe in Brussels—a group of learned religious scholars who aim to influence religious observance by Moroccans in Europe. Armed with a budget of circa 12 million €, a handful of institutions in the Moroccan capital, Rabat, offer support and guidance for the religious practices of MRE's: the Hassan II Foundation, the Ministry for Habous and Religious Affairs, the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad (located within the foreign ministry), and the Council for the Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME, see Fig. 7.5).

A "restructuration" of the religious affairs ministry in 2005 led to an increase in the exportation of religious personnel. In 2005, King Mohammed VI announced the creation of a Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad (Conseil de la communauté marocaine de l'étranger, or CCME) which would hold conferences and publish books on best practices of Islam in Europe, from mosques and imam training to the religion's legal status in host societies. The Hassan II Foundation announced a program "in continuous expansion" to locate imams and preachers from Moroccan universities, grand mosques, and civil service. In 2004, Morocco sent only 12 year-round imams to Europe—mostly from Moroccan universities—of whom four resided in France (El-Ghissassi 2004). In 1998, 60 preachers were sent, but by 2009, this number increased to 206 imams (both seasonal and temporary) in addition to hundreds of language instructors.

3.4 Turkey

The *Diyanet İşleri Başkanliği* (DİB) has also pursued the internationalization of Turkish religious activities in an effort to expand Turkish influence over the country's European diaspora. DİB has funded chairs of theology departments in a handful of European universities, trained teachers in religious education, and developed religious curriculum for use in European schools (Aşıkoğlu 1993, pp. 142–148). At a 2004 conference, DİB leaders adopted a policy of "preference for Turkish religion teachers over European teachers, and for religion lessons conducted in Turkish over lessons conducted in any other language" and resolved to

"increase the quota of Turkish imams and muftis overseas." (Zaptcioğlu 2004). At a DİB conference in Ankara in September 2004, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proclaimed his ambition that the European branches of DİTİB would one day "be accepted as the EU's only partner on related issues" in recognition of the "leading role played by Turkey in the Islamic world." The organization announced its goal of ensuring the presence of "at least one Islamic cleric in the catchment area of each consulate"(Zaptcioğlu 2004).

3.5 A Changed Playing Field

In the year 2010, most adult Muslims in contemporary Europe are still third country nationals, (Hackett and Grim 2012) and thus a degree of foreign government involvement in their religious lives is to be expected. This is especially foreseeable when the foreign governments in question have an "official" religion in place at home. The gradual transformation and adaptation of Embassy Islam, however, is a significant element of what could be referred to as "the partial emancipation"—in contrast to "full emancipation"—of Europe's Muslims.

Even as the integration of second, third, and fourth generations progresses, European governments will still need the cooperation, expertise, and support of the former sending states. This practice of relying on a continued strong contribution from Embassy Islam does not necessarily have the same adverse integration effects of earlier outsourcing. The willingness of foreign governments to adapt to the use of European languages and imam training programs, in concert with host states, will pose fewer integration issues. And indeed, Embassy Islam has its advantages: They are uniquely placed to contribute to Islam's "normalization" in many European cities in several ways. Foreign governments can afford the construction of visible and dignified prayer spaces, and they can help coordinate the training of imams who are versed in European languages and cultures. Their cooperation with European authorities can build up a transparent religious infrastructure that earns greater acceptance from host societies.

Embassy Islam's hierarchical structure and law-abiding nature has also had a net positive effect on Islam Councils' stability. The notable exception is in the United Kingdom, where the absence of a strong state Islam in Pakistan, for example, has led to a more chaotic organizational environment in British state-mosque relations. The reliance on Embassy Islam is a logical short- and medium-term solution to the lack of prayer spaces and imams in Europe, but this practice could lead to complacency by European governments and the entrenchment of new drawbacks. In particular, the persistent involvement of Embassy Islam constitutes an attempted

usurpation of Europeans' efforts to build "national Islams" by way of state-mosque consultations.

The homeland governments' droit d'ingérence (right of intervention) will become more legally and politically tenuous over time as their outreach targets mostly European citizens and not their own nationals. Future generations of European Muslims have fewer direct ties to their ancestral homelands (and hold only a European citizenship). Another exception to this is the civil liberties implications: the continued oversight of Muslim communities by the consulates and embassies of sending states can often surpass straightforward security concerns, and nonviolent reformists can get caught up in this net of surveillance and, occasionally, persecution. Foreign intervention by former "sending states" delays the true "domestication" of European Islam, and thus retards the integration of Muslims in Europe. It may also interfere with the development of the independent, reformed practice of Islam in a European context but by filling a void with increasingly thoughtful and adapted religious "content"—including religious curriculum adapted to life as a minority and more contextually relevant Friday sermons.

4 Conclusion

Both Embassy-Islam and Political-Islam federations have adapted and competed in the new political opportunity structure of state-mosque relations. Despite homeland governments' increased activism, they have an incentive to couch their activities within the broad framework of Islam Councils that European governments have established. Embassy-Islam and Political-Islam leaders have come to realize that their fortunes may wax and wane over time and that to participate in state-mosque relations requires an investment of resources. But to withdraw totally would be to forego manifold opportunities for control and influence over the practice of Islam in Europe.

The preliminary evidence suggests that Political-Islam federations have been changed through their participation in Islam Councils. As they have been brought into state-led consultations, they have mellowed. They are now on familiar terms with the administrators whom they negotiate with as well as with their once bitter rivals from the sphere of Embassy Islam (see Fig. 7.7). Their leaders have been received in the style of government ministers, their organizations' membership ranks have been strengthened, and they have gained more access to decision-making and resources. Before Political-Islam federations were granted equal footing in state-Islam consultations, European administrators characterized them as confrontational and

unrealistically demanding. Now, they are more oriented toward institutions and domestic politics. To the extent that Political-Islam federations have engaged in the "public defense of Islam"—promoting religious practices, objecting to the perceived defamation of the Prophet or their religion, etc.—their repertoire of collective action is close to that used by Catholic and Jewish representatives (Alexander 2006). Political-Islam federations across Europe gained tangible advantages from their strategy of participation.

In Germany, the IGMG was provisionally invited as a working group member (though not as one of the fifteen official delegates) of the *Deutsche Islam Konferenz* in 2006(Echo Online 2006). The Muslim-Brotherhood affiliated UOIF and UCOII federations have similarly been rewarded for their cooperative behavior with powerful institutional positions: respectively, the vice presidency of the CFCM in France, and briefly, a seat on the Consulta in Italy.

While the achievement of political moderation among Political-Islam leaders is not a foregone conclusion, significant evidence weighs in favor of neo-corporatism's transformative powers through institutional incentives. Even the CFCM president elected in 2008, Mohamed Moussaoui—who has close ties to the Moroccan government and could thus be expected to consider the UOIF as fundamentalist—said in an interview with the author, "It's better to have all the tendencies together in the CFCM than outside. The UOIF is not so different from other federations, their claims, their declarations, respect the broad orientations of the organization."[13] "The more Islam is 'official-ized,'" French security officials told a journalist, "the more moderate it has been." (Gabizon 2008).

The use of corporatism has engendered more "responsible" political behavior from participating mosque federations. The question of whether the findings are endogenous to the model is worth asking—i.e., those who participate in state consultations by definition must accept government rules and norms—but it should also be recalled that participation in a state-sanctioned Islam Council is no guarantee of docility. Indeed, there are ample incentives for political entrepreneurs to buck the system to earn street credibility and gain an advantage over competing federations. This is a key insight from the literature on neo-corporatism and government relations with trade unions and agricultural groups; when the latter were displeased with their councils, they would storm away from the round table, hold street demonstrations, or even spill their wares on the highway to slow traffic.

The influence of state-Islam consultations—or, indeed, even the *possibility* of being chosen for government consultation—has had a moderating effect on Political-Islam federations and thus contributed to the overall transition of "par-

[13] Interview by the author with Mohamed Moussaoui in Paris, CFCM, September 2008.

tial emancipation." This adaptation can be partly explained by religious leaders' new position as stakeholders in an institutional process: they now have something tangible to lose, i.e., the patina of respectability that undergirds their privileged partnership with the state. Islamists should be judged by their actions, Olivier Roy has argued, not their intentions: "wondering about these actors' sincerity is naïve because they are essentially politicians and politics has nothing in common with sincerity." (Roy 2005, p. 161; Zekri 2008). Political-Islam leadership has repeatedly declined to engage in inflammatory or ambiguous rhetoric and instead has demonstrated an interest in keeping hold over administrative gains in the anodyne realm of technical state-mosque relations. Governments would have far less leverage over any of these organizations in the absence of this incentive structure for political moderation.

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