STRANGERS, CITIZENS AND OUTSIDERS: OTHERNESS, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE COSMOPOLITAN IMAGINARY IN MOBILE SOCIETIES[1]

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ABSTRACT This article deploys a double conceptual framework. One frame is positioned through the ideas of absolute strangers and outsiders. The other frame develops out of, though is distinct from, the first, and refers to the disaggregated forms of modern citizenship. The citizen-as-absolute-stranger in addition to accruing political rights may also accrue social, economic or identity rights, or traverse wider relations between him or herself and other absolute strangers in either national or international settings. It is in this context that outsiders are configured – aliens who have no national-juridical status.

KEYWORDS cosmopolitanism • multiculturalism • nation • outsiders • strangers

The aim of this article is to reflect on the assumed interchangeability between the stranger and the outsider, and to suggest that in contemporary modern or post-traditional societies these categories have become distinct. This article is concerned with strangers and outsiders in the context of the disaggregated condition of contemporary modernity with its variety of logics, imaginary horizons and cultural projects, which together *and* separately co-constitute its complexity and provide no fixed points of reference (Heller,

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1999). In modernity, the stranger is the category of contingency and will be referred to here as the absolute stranger. There are at least three sites through which the absolute stranger has been constituted in modernity: the metropolis, the nation-state, and interstate environments. The images of the metropolis and transnationalism have conventionally generated the image of the mobility of strangers as they move from, or within, one national setting to another, sometimes caught between them. It is this mobility that gives the stranger a sense of contingency.

Against this background, and leaving the issue of exclusion to one side momentarily, there have also been at least two predominant strategies for addressing, thinking about or ordering the contingency of the modern stranger. These strategies cut across, but need not necessarily constitute, the sites indicated above, even if there are affinities between them. One strategy has been that of assimilation, whilst another has been that of the mediation or management of cultural differences, which has emerged under the broad term of multiculturalism (Bauman, 2001: 201). Both are configured by the logic of the nation-state, and its national-juridical category of citizenship.

The argument in this article is that outsiders are also absolute strangers, but with one significant difference. Their status as outsiders is configured not by their contingent existence, but by their *juridical* status with regard to nation-states. This gives them a unique existence as illegalized outsiders. Another no less important, but significantly less mobilized, strategy emerged in modernity to address their different status, that of cosmopolitan hospitality.

In order to throw each of these sites, strategies and modalities into relief, a distinction will be made here between the ontological contingency of the stranger, the potential or real juridical citizen of the nation-state, and the illegalized outsider.[2] Let's begin with the contingent condition of the modern stranger.

1. FROM CONDITIONAL TO ABSOLUTE STRANGERS

The image of strangers has always played a key role in capturing the dynamic of modernity, which has often been couched in terms of the simultaneity of closeness and remoteness between its inhabitants (Simmel, 1978). In Simmel's classical analysis social actors who experience this simultaneity of closeness and remoteness undergo a process of objectification, and as a result, strangers – the objects of remoteness – are not treated as individuals, but are abstracted as a certain type (Simmel, 1971: 143–9). Strangers, be they individuals or groups, are abstractions in the sense that those characteristics, which are not in common with the host group or habitus (in this instance a city – but it could quite easily be a country or an ethnic group), are singled out as the basis for a differentiation between 'us' and 'them'. In this sense, as a member of the host group, a person may have one or two qualities in

common with the stranger; however, these common characteristics are not enough to bind the stranger to that person. Rather, according to Simmel, the person-as-familiar has an organic and necessary relation to the others of his/her group established through ties of kinship, place and shared history. This gives the stranger an unconnected existence, always existing outside the group as if he or she were an historical and social interloper, a permanent exile (Simmel, 1971).

However, a distinction can be made between conditional and absolute strangers. As we shall see, this distinction emphasizes their existential condition, rather than their typological status derived from their boundary position. From the vantage point of their existentiality, conditional strangers can be viewed as outcasts from a home, a country, or a position to which they can potentially return. In this sense, their own centre of gravity, that is, their self-identity, can be maintained as an existential voyage toward home, even if they are perceived as strange by others who either do not understand them, or do not participate in their voyage. It is this ontological certainty of a home once left, and to which the stranger may one day return, that gives security to the mutual self-perceptions of the host group and the conditional stranger (Heller, 2000).

The case is quite different with the absolute stranger, for he or she has no home to which to return. The absolute stranger's voyage is one of disconnection from home and thus also the past. In this way, the absolute stranger's existential sense is orientated towards, and even defined by, the host group to which they wish to belong. As Heller goes on to say:

> Absolute strangers are not estranged from their world because the world in which they live has never been theirs. They are not strangers because they act against the expectations of others, just the contrary – they are expected to act as strangers. Their relation to the world is accidental, for the territory of their actions has nothing to do with their roots, upbringing and tradition. (Heller, 2000: 150)

Heller's notion of the absolute stranger belongs to the specificity of the experience and attraction of modernity generally, because this experience is one of dislocation and diremption. Rather than viewing this experience as symptomatic of a cultural crisis, in the manner of Toennies or even Simmel, Heller views it as a coalescence of freedom and contingency. More specifically, in her view the modern condition is, ontologically speaking, a world of open possibilities in which destiny or a pre-described voyage home cannot be undertaken from birth. This kind of open contingency is also a type of freedom, but one that is empty, that is, is constantly open to substantivization. As she remarks:

> If being free means being born socially contingent, it is an empty kind of freedom, freedom as nothing. Actually, being thrown into freedom or being thrown into nothing means exactly the same thing. But this nothing (our

> contingency) is, nevertheless, something because it promises that men and women can (equally) become free as no pre-set destination (teleology) bars their way from self-created freedom. Both logically and (onto)logically, the empty freedom of social contingency became the condition of those other freedoms, as much as the condition of self-created slavery. (Heller, 1992: 13)

Heller's notion of the absolute stranger emphasizes the contingency of modern societies in which membership to family, community and status groups is subsumed to, or replaced by, functional criteria and democratizing horizons. This also entails that the binary codes that classify the relation between the familiar and the strange, the proximate and the distant – and which are found in Simmel's and more classical sociological versions – are opened, become more porous or collapse altogether. Moreover, whilst historically the contingency of the stranger has been an experience derived from and located in the metropolis, this contingent condition is now the generalizable condition of modernity, irrespective of where one is located. With the increasing complexity of contexts and patterns of interaction, as well as the multidimensionality of roles and possibilities, the stranger is decomposed from a homogeneous 'other' to an array of heterogeneous indifferences (Stichweh, 1997). In this sense we are all absolute strangers. The experience and position of absolute strangers is the experience of contingency.

In the light of the category of the absolute stranger, Simmel's seminal essay 'Metropolis and Mental Life' can now be interpreted from the vantage point of this inner condition of contingency or empty freedom, an inner condition that also throws into relief the way the social bonds of interdependence are lengthened and made both more and less complex, and where the same and the different are brought together incessantly. In his portrayal of, now, contingent modernity, Simmel sees it constituted as difference, flux, individuality and quality. From another vantage point, though, it is portrayed as indifference, a world of abstraction, intellectualization, calculating quantification and impersonality. Individuality is lost, and the modern, contingent man or woman becomes 'a single cog as ever against the vast overwhelming organization of things and forces' (Simmel, 1971: 337). In other words, Simmel portrays a double-sided contingency – one that is existential, and the other that is constructed as an array of differentiated but equally contingent systems.

According to Simmel, and in the context of this contingent complexity, a blasé attitude is the normal one that emerges from this experience (Simmel, 1971: 329). The blasé attitude is the generalized attitude of the absolute stranger, once we are all absolute strangers, that is contingent, and only interacts in highly mediated and distanciated ways. The mutual indifference of interactions between strangers, interactions once located in the city but now more generalized, is an indifferent mutuality between absolute strangers, who each from his/her own perspective constructs the other as an absolute stranger to him/herself.

In Heller's terms, this blasé attitude is one manifestation of the 'imaginary' of empty freedom in modernity. It assures – to quote Simmel – 'the individual of a type and a degree of personal freedom to which there is no analogy in other circumstances' (Simmel, 1971: 332). As Simmel goes on to say, 'in an intellectualised and refined sense, the citizen of the metropolis is "free" in contrast with the trivialities and prejudices which bind the small town person' (p. 334). Moreover, this type of contingent, empty freedom entails that all freedoms can be created, from aesthetic and cultural, to economic and political. Here freedom, because it is not prescriptive and is without foundations, can only be an ontological condition. It provides no content, no transcendentally construed point of orientation, only interpretations through which one can become an artist, a consumer, a technical expert, a capitalist, a democrat – and even all of these (Heller, 1999: 54–63).

Moreover, apart from functional, non-functional and political interpretations, forms and ways of life, the contingent freedom of the absolute stranger's condition is also constituted from his or her position as a citizen, as someone whose home is the nation-state into which they are born or have settled. Whilst the range of sites for self-creation and interpretation by absolute strangers is diverse and manifold, and has become more so, the nation-state and its category of citizenship continues to be a predominant field for further interpretations by absolute strangers and mediated interactions between them. Absolute strangers do not simply inhabit a nation-state: they create and participate in the cultural projects and politics that give it form.

2. CITIZENSHIP AND THE CLOSURE OF NATION-STATES

The nation-state, and its category of citizenship, provides an imagined community, the supposed comfort of integration, and a common point of reference which mediates interactions between absolute strangers, often across their life span. It is the category of, and the context for, the long durée in modernity, notwithstanding even longer civilizational contexts (Anderson, 1983).

However, the contemporary notion of citizenship is not wholly exhausted by its reference to the nation-state; it can be divided into four broad types that may or may not intersect, and which may or may not be more or less totalitarian or democratic and limit or promote violence. These types are national-juridical citizenship, political-public citizenship, economic-social citizenship, and cosmopolitan citizenship. In other words, a cleavage was forged in which the nation-state's inhabitants live, or between, these four worlds. They live as citizens of a territorial state, as real (or potential) sovereigns of it, as bearers of rights, and in international settings (Rundell, 1998: 321–30). In this modern configuration, citizenship can be viewed from the vantage point of the nation-state, and from the vantage point of the

citizen who may aspire either to participate in the nation-state's condition of power or who may accrue, in addition to political rights, social, economic or identity rights.

From the vantage point of the modernity of *nations* – and leaving to one side the cosmopolitan citizenship form for the time being – national-juridical citizenship is a point of condensation where the territorially determined nation-state, its juridical and administrative prerogatives, and its identity-securing mechanisms intersect and coalesce. In this context, national-juridical citizenship may also be a point where identity and the nation coincide, where boundaries – both legal and existential – are invoked. The territorial imperative of conquest and control by colonial empires, nations, and nations-in-the-making was supplemented by an imperative of internal identification and monitoring of those who lived in a particular place or came to settle, either permanently or temporarily, in it.

Accompanying this imperative of conquest and control, although irreducible to it, a myth of an ethnic core was often activated as a basis for nation-building and social integration. Old World national communities, as well as New World settler-colonial ones, were viewed as sharing a myth of descent, which has often become the basis for contestation. The conflict and violence involved struggles concerning the participation in nation-building itself, that is, which groups were to be included and which were not. In this latter case the power-figurations occur between groups who, in an act of indeterminate fate, find themselves in the same territory, and perhaps under the same flag, struggle to constitute the field of the nation-state itself, its institutions and its forms of meaning and symbols, and not simply to share in its spoils. In this context, an idea of the nation emerged that subsumed these conflicting identities. This idea of the nation became the predominant one that was constituted through a constructed sense of shared history, a language and culture that became predominant, and an association with a shared territory (Arnason, 1990: 217; Smith, 1986; Wolfe, 2001).

Apart from the construction of a myth of nationhood, this tension between competing identities and ethnicities was also partly resolved at the political level through the category of citizenship. The category of citizenship, at least when it referred to national-juridical sovereignty, became a point of conjuncture at which identity-based and cultural groupings were integrated into the formal transcommunalism of the nation-state's regulatory system, mediated and indeed constituted by versions of rulership, irrespective of their democratic or despotic character. National-juridical citizenship, then, became a mechanism for not only the administrative control of the movement of a nation's inhabitants within and across its borders, but also a point of condensation where the claims for both a dominant ethnicity in the field of conflicting ethnicities, and the nation, coincided.

Seen from the perspective of national-juridical citizenship, even democratic citizenship can be interpreted as being subsumed under the

coalescence of ethnicity and nation. Here, 'the democratic component of the citizenship principle is interpreted to entail self-rule by a demos' that is ethnically determined, and if this idea of an ethnically determined demos merges with the concept of the national-juridical state that rules all the inhabitants of a territory, 'then such a polity will be a nation state, and the demos will inevitably understand itself as a nation' (Cohen, 1999: 254).[3]

However, ethnic pluralism *is* an empirical reality that has to be acknowledged in some way by the nation-state and its sovereign demos, notwithstanding the claims for ethnic homogeneity within its borders. Multiculturalism emerged as a non-assimilationist strategy in some modern societies, especially those with large immigrant populations such as New World societies, which addressed the empirical reality of ethnic pluralism. Multiculturalism has become part of the contemporary political and cultural fabric, and now functions as a background social imaginary in these societies. As Castles points out, ethno-cultural pluralism as multiculturalism has become a normative position that accepts the diversity of national populations composed of discrete immigrant communities with regard to language, culture and social organization (Castles, 1997: 9).

There have been at least two ways in which the multicultural version of ethno-cultural pluralism has been acknowledged in modern national polities. The first version, typical of the USA, adopts a laissez faire approach in which difference is not only tolerated but also viewed as existing within a cultural market that develops its own cross-overs and hybridities and is subject to whims, tastes and prejudices, just like any other market. A marker of difference is not only the particularization of ethnic groups – as diverse groups of collective absolute strangers – but also the way in which prestige can be accrued for different languages, styles of dress, music or cuisine. In this laissez faire context, the state is not viewed as a mechanism by which social integration is assisted, or specific ethno-cultures maintained (Bauböck et al., 1996; Castles, 1997).

In the second version, more typical of Canada, Sweden and Australia, the state is viewed as the legitimate resource that actively intervenes to assist ethno-pluralism. Multicultural corporatism became the way for the many Old and especially New World polities to manage differences of geography, history and identity as cultural differences. This managed multiculturalism has occurred through the development of explicit policies, for example, language, media and other programmes, which aimed to maintain the 'other's' culture. Apart from promoting multicultural difference, the state is simultaneously mobilized to promote ways that ensure social cohesion in terms of both legislative and social organizational goals and outcomes (Bodi, 1996; Castles, 1997, Wieviorka, 1996[4]). This second version has become synonymous with multiculturalism as a set of corporatistically-mediated institutional practices with its own practitioners, advocates and, later, professionalized personnel (Castles, 1997).

Multicultural corporatism has been especially successful in articulating, mediating and integrating the demands of non-functional and identity-deploying interest groups that exist alongside, or at times even replace, the empirical constituencies of electors and electorates, through various advisory councils and ethnic affairs commissions (Bader, 1998).[5] In this way, a system of interest representation has been built in which its constituent elements have been brought together into a limited number of singular, non-competitive categories organized according to identity criteria, recognized, licensed and even created by the state. As such, this system of interest representation has been granted a deliberate representational monopoly, in this instance within the category of identity (Castles, 1997; Schmitter, 1974; Triado, 1984: 33–51).

Nonetheless, these migrant and multicultural groupings, irrespective of whether they are left to the vagaries of the market of taste or integrated and mediated corporatistically by the state, function in the mode of absolute strangers. Existentially, they move from the world of the contingent stranger to that of the absolute stranger as they break or re-mould ties and traditions, as much as continue them. This is especially the case from one generation to the next, where the first generation looks to the past, as much to the present and the future, whereby the second and subsequent generations live as absolute strangers. Moreover, interactions between all groupings within nation-states occur in the mode of absolute strangerhood. The nation-state, and by implication the juridico-national category of citizenship, provides the mediating point of reference for, and link between, each ethnic group. In other words, an imagined community of the nation and its national-juridical category of citizenship, especially, mediates multicultural difference.

It is here that one can make a categorial distinction between strangers and outsiders. To reiterate, the notion of the absolute stranger is one that is constituted through the open contingent condition of modernity. So too is the category of the outsider. However, the category of the outsider has an additional dimension in that it is generated from the position of a boundary that is marked between 'us' and 'them', and as such is not generated only from a position of existential contingency. Drawing on Elias' work, the most bounded category in modernity is the one that belongs to the field or figuration of the nation-state and its juridical power (Elias, 1994; 1996). In this context of the juridically-instituted and legitimated boundaries of the nation-state, a distinction can also be made between absolute strangers and outsiders. *Outsiders are those absolute strangers without legal entitlement* to either arrive or settle within a given territory. In this context,

> citizenship in such a state is an instrument of social closure. It always has an ascriptive dimension and it always establishes privilege insofar as it endows members with particular rights denied to non-members (today, primarily, the [legal] resident alien or foreigner). (Cohen, 1999: 252)

In the contemporary context, the paradigmatic form of the outsider is the refugee who is not only an absolute stranger. He or she is also the absolutely foreign, the absolutely alien. Notwithstanding the politics of managed or marketized (in)difference, the relations engendered between absolute strangers, even if they are constituted as groups and not only as individuals, are distinct from the relation that can be engendered between those who are within the nation-state and those who are outside it. Relations between absolute strangers can be multidimensional, ranging from indifference to festive conviviality to hostility.[6] However, an uneasy and particularistic vantage point of nationalism is the most usual attitudes mobilized towards outsiders. In this context, relations between absolute strangers and outsiders often can be one-dimensionalized, reduced to elements of unease, fear and stigmatization.

3. THE COSMOPOLITAN IMAGINARY OF AN OPEN CITIZENSHIP FORM

Outsiders exist in no-man's lands of refugee camps and stateless settlements awaiting a right to settlement or nationhood. The outsider is caught in a nether world in which their modernity is one of bureaucratic and juridical processes and dependent upon the 'generosity' of quotas. However, another attitude is possible that draws on an image of open relations between absolute strangers and outsiders. This is the cosmopolitan attitude, and in the first instance is associated with hospitality, rather than philanthropy or customary sociability pertaining to traditional societies. Hospitality conventionally belongs to the language of rights pertaining to publicly constituted political modernity that is universalistic in character (Cavallar, 2002: 8). Against this backdrop of cosmopolitan hospitality the outsider as refugee can be given a quasi-legal status, and hence be subject to rights, protocols and conventions. However, there are some tensions within the idea of cosmopolitan hospitality, tensions that may reinforce, rather than demolish, the condition of the outsider, and it is these tensions that will be explored below, beginning with Kant's seminal essay 'Perpetual Peace', which rightfully continues its relevance as a constant point of reference.[7]

In 'Perpetual Peace' Kant uses the more generic category of the stranger in order to reflect on the relation between a modern polity and its national form, and its obligation to those outsiders seeking refuge in it. He deploys the notion of cosmopolitanism, first, as a critique of nations, their violence and enclosure, and second, as a principle of right conduct towards others who are not legally recognized under the juridical notion of citizenship and are thus aliens or outsiders (Kant, 1991a).

In the context of his critique of the state, Kant points to a form of the state that normalizes war, which, for him, is despotic. Here, 'the supreme power is also the legislative authority which must be obeyed without

argument' (Kant, 1991a: 120). In other words, in this dominion of violence and cruelty the normal form of the state is either autocratic or democratic despotism. Kant extrapolates these in his own terms with his civilizational distinction between barbarism and maturity (Kant, 1991b). The barbaric dominion includes ancient warrior civilizations and empires, and modern European state formation where slavery and forms of serfdom existed. Moreover, Kant includes in this litany of modern cruelties the imperial-colonial adventures in which indigenous peoples were butchered, or juridically invisibilized, or brought under new regimes of domination (Kant, 1991a: 106). It is here that Kant alludes to the stranger *qua* outsider as someone who is not simply an enemy combatant, but as someone so unfamiliar and alien, so threatening to the sovereign power, that he or she is vilified, or even exterminated (Bauman, 2001: 201; Kant, 1991a: 106).

In the context of war and modern barbarism, Kant invokes the notion of hospitality towards outsiders under threat as a universal right of humanity. In Kant's view, the outsider – or stranger in his terms – has the right to reside unharmed when arriving in another's territory (Kant, 1991a: 106). For Kant, the outsider's status *qua* humanity is ground enough for this universalizable claim upon another. The host must not treat the outsider as an enemy, but treat him or her as an *end in him or herself*. For Kant, this categorical imperative, which gives secular depth to the heritage of common humanity, is not only the ground of hospitality; it is also its limit. Kant argues that the outsider should not claim to be a guest, and thus expect to be welcomed as a friend into the 'household' of the national community. The relationship here is one of mutual *peacefulness* – as a principle of intersubjective recognition – and not mutual conviviality (1991a: 106). In this sense, for Kant, hospitality is not a gift in the traditional sense of the term, and as such does not imply special obligations of reciprocity by either the host or the outsider. It presumes mutual difference, or mutual indifference or impartiality, and as such is marked by distance. If under the conditions of contingent modernity the outsider were to become a resident, his or her status would change to that of absolute stranger, in which this distance shifts from a condition of indifference, to that of open possibilities.

It is this sense of indifferent distance that gives a certain ambiguity to Kant's reflections on the treatment of the outsider. When taken as a critique of war, violence and cruelty, it is clear that Kant's position is unambiguous. The mutual co-habitation of the Earth *should*, for him, be one orientated to hospitable relations between its co-habitants, whereby 'continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution' (1991a: 106). His preferred model for these peaceful, mutual relations is a federalism of constitutional civic republics (1991a: 102–4).

In the recent history of interstate relations, Kant's preferred model

emerges as forms of cosmopolitanism understood institutionally, as supranational organizations such as the United Nations and regional federations such as the European Union, both of which provide an umbrella for the development of international protocols and systems of justice. As Held and others have indicated, these institutions provide a radicalizable basis for the development of a cosmopolitan, democratic community, which, moreover, is more than a structure for mediation between nation-states. As Held notes, 'cosmopolitanism entails a duty to work toward the establishment of an international community of democratic states committed to upholding democratic public law within and across their boundaries' (Held, 1997: 244). This also entails the development and expansion of cosmopolitan public spheres in which, minimally, dissenting voices, including those of outsiders, can be heard, and, maximally, *all* issues are open to debate, discussion and deliberation in such a way as 'to produce public agreements that would be acceptable from the point of view of everyone affected by decisions made within legitimate political institutions' (Bohman, 1997: 187; Cohen, 1999).

Cosmopolitanism thus assumes, like democracy generally, a vibrant tension between democratic institutions and public spheres, located regionally, nationally and transnationally. It is here that both absolute strangers and outsiders can exist in a mode other than indifferent contingency or one-dimensionalizing nationalism. They can participate in and minimally ascribe to the values of democracy, if not as a way of life then as a mode of deliberation and argumentation (de Greiff, 2002; Habermas, 1997; Held, 1997).

Kant's ambivalence shows through when reference is directed to the condition of outsiders. Kant's remarks on the outsider are brief and unelaborated, and it remains unclear if democratic will formation (to use another phrase) and the public sphere are enough to ensure cosmopolitanism in its mode of hospitality – in other words, in its mode as an open, even if distant, regard for the other. In *Perpetual Peace* Kant states that the outsider '*can indeed be turned away, if this can be done without causing his death*, but must not be treated with hostility so long as he behaves in a peaceable manner in the place he happens to be' (1991a: 105–6, italics added). In order to look at his ambivalence more closely we can leave to one side the latter part of this phrase and concentrate on 'can indeed be turned away, if this can be done without causing his death'. A prevarication can be said to reside in an implicit continuity of the heritage of refuge and hospitality.

In this context, one can follow Derrida's own civilizational analysis, which includes Kant's 'Perpetual Peace', in the distinction he makes between conditional and absolute hospitality. In Derrida's view they are two modes that are not empirical but *intermediate schemas* (Kant) – or in another language entirely, imaginary significations – that, although inseparably opposed, 'imply and include each other simultaneously' (Derrida, 2000: 81, 135). There is, for him, an indissociability and heterogeneity between the two modes. The former – conditional hospitality – belongs to the historical

specificity of any form of hospitality, whether it is given in the name of the father, the household, the community, a polis or a nation-state. It has a formal, calculable and juridical dimension to it (Derrida, 2000: 149). As such, the *name* and the *identity* of the outsider matters to the host – once named and identified, the outsider can slip from either the (non)-identity of an indifferently perceived outsider to a potential enemy, or/and become subject to the policing mechanisms of the state, with its defined points of entry and exit. Identity becomes permanent and residence temporary. Universality has reached its limit (Derrida, 2000: 27–9, 77).

Alternatively, unconditional hospitality is, in Derrida's terms, 'a law without a law' (2000: 83). In similar fashion to Kant's view, it must not pay a debt or be governed by duty, and as such is indifferent to the specificity of, and what it expects from, 'the other'. In this sense, it is beyond the law as a code that prescribes and sets the limit to the time and space of hospitality. Unconditional hospitality sets no such limits (2000: 81, 147).

For Derrida, we are 'caught' between these two regimes of hospitality. In a different language, a tension exists between these two modes, a tension internal to the constitution of modernity. In this context, his notion of unconditional hospitality can be given greater shape so that we may not be as fastly caught as Derrida suggests. To be sure, for Derrida, unconditional hospitality is a gesture and one that is asymmetrical at the particular moment that it is invoked. However, as gesture it also belongs and gives content to the empty freedom of modernity as a regard for the other in the context of their contingency. One may be able to speak of a cosmopolitan *attitude*, which is distinct from the blasé and nationalist ones. This attitude is an interpretable universality without borders that takes the categorical imperative internal to both the construction of the modern idea of the subject and of generalized humanity as a background orientating historically constituted value.

From this position, a cosmopolitan attitude can posit that one has the possibility to 'assess the morality of one's acts in light of the acceptability of their consequences by everyone affected by them, regardless of borders, territorial or otherwise' (de Greiff, 2002: 419). In this sense, one can talk of a cosmopolitan citizenship as a horizon of possibility, rather than as an instituted law – even though it may have a legal or juridical expression, especially through the language of rights. As such, it is one of the citizenship forms of a disaggregated modernity with its complex patterns of interaction between the absolute strangers who constitute it and the absolute strangers who may also be, at one time and another, outsiders.[8]

Cosmopolitanism and a cosmopolitan attitude, then, is itself more than a functioning (or non-functioning) form of interstate institutional mediation, more than a deliberative democracy with a vibrant public sphere of opinions, social movements and informal associations. The cosmopolitan perspective outlined here is one of the many attitudes of modernity, in which the gestural

dimension of unconditional hospitality comes from a capacity to recognize the other *qua* other as absolute stranger and not merely as an outsider. In this way, the mobilizing category is not a *right* that is legalized and can be instituted, and into which one either does or does not fall, but rather is one of the movement from outsider to absolute stranger. The outsider is someone who already exists under the umbrella of contingent modernity but only in a partial way, and should be able to participate in all of its forms, including the multidimensionality of its citizenship. In this context, the nation-state can subsume its national-juridical category of citizenship to that of the cosmopolitan category.

Hence, this cosmopolitan attitude is not an empirical one; it is indifferent to the actual 'who' of the outsider. Nation-states and the absolute strangers who inhabit them can have a cosmopolitan attitude to other absolute strangers who come to their borders and shores. The impartial attitude of cosmopolitanism, rather than being cold and hostile, is indifferent to the prejudgements and prejudices that are mobilized around the outsider as a stigmatized, illegal alien. The outsider is *only* an absolute stranger, with the possibility that the multidimensionality of the empty freedom of modernity becomes open to him or her, including all of its choices and cultural projects, whether they be functional and national, democratic or redemptive.

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Notes

1. This article is based on two papers, one presented at 'The City and Fear' colloquium organized by John Friedman at the University of Melbourne, 2001, and another, 'Absolute Strangers and Tensions of Australian Citizenships: From Terra Nullius to Detention Camps', presented at the 'Gone Overboard: Nationalism, Gender, Race and Rights' symposium and the 'Immigration and Human Rights: European Experiences and Australian Resonances' conference, both held at the University of Melbourne in 2002. I would like to thank John Friedmann, Danielle Petherbridge, Vince Marotta and the Department of Sociology at the University of Edinburgh for their critical commentary at various stages over the life of this article.
2. The distinction between absolute stranger and outsider has some affinities with the distinction that Richard Kearney (2002) makes between others and aliens. In Kearney's terms others are the inalterably unique, while aliens are those who are scapegoated and discriminated against.
3. In this context, the strong versions of the globalization thesis overstate the case of the demise of the national-juridical sovereignty of the nation-state, believing

that it is subject to the relentless waves of capital transfers and patterns of one-dimensionalizing mass consumption. As Linda Weiss (1988) has argued, contemporary nation-states still exercise considerable influence in determining, directing and underwriting the nature of capital investment, development strategies, and by implication migration and population flows. Moreover, the contemporary nation-state continues to project and deploy power over those whom it has juridical authority, and citizenship in the national-juridical sense still usually accrues security, status, power and identity for those who possess it (Cohen, 1999).

4. Michel Wieviorka (1996) argues that France is a special case here.
5. From the period when multiculturalism in the form of a social imaginary was institutionalized, 'leaders of ethnic associations were increasingly drawn into government consultative bodies of various kinds' (Castles, 1997: 20). The peak organizations, as well as smaller organizations representing specific ethnic groups, became dependent on government grants. As Castles also points out,

> these growing links between government and ethnic communities were further encouraged by the fact that many second-generation immigrants made their careers in the Public Service: they often had the ambiguous role of being both government officials and ethnic lobbyist. (1997: 20)

   To be sure, since the mid-1980s both state and federal governments, in Australia, at least, have moved away from multicultural policies delivered by special agencies to special target groups (Castles, 1997: 18). This has affected multiculturalism, especially as welfare multiculturalism and ethnic structural pluralism (to use Lopez' terms). In these instances, multicultural policies have become part of mainstream government service delivery through various Access and Equality strategies. Nonetheless, the models of cultural pluralism and ethnic rights multiculturalism remain the signature tunes of Australian multiculturalism in its effort to corporatistically mediate a citizenship form in which both a 'politics of difference' and a 'politics of universalism' are guaranteed by the state in its legislative activities and legal codes.
6. From this perspective, the urban or turf or identity wars typified by the so-called new tribalisms could be seen to be modelling themselves on the paradigm of the nation-state as they try to invent themselves through the model of discrete, coherent and bordered territorialization. These groups marshal and deploy all of the material and symbolic resources which they onesidedly think the nation-state has at its disposal to construct their own version of territoriality, from their monopolization of violence to 'passport' and identity controls.
7. See for example the collection of essays in Bohman and Lutz-Bachman (1997) and Derrida (2000).
8. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees is one such body that was instituted under the umbrella of the cosmopolitan ideal. This was especially the case with its 1951 'Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees', which was updated and amended in its 1967 Protocol. Cosmopolitanism in this context is double-sided. From the one side, it may well be expressed – potentially at least – as a supra – or extra – state citizenship that contests the notion and practices of the discrete sovereignty of the nation-state, especially in the context of vulnerable persons who become stateless. From another side, it may

also be a mechanism through which nation-states breach their own autarky and participate hospitably as a world citizen in this Convention and Protocol. This implies, at some level at least, that the imaginary horizon is neither the territorial state nor the nation of right as such, but the dimension of cosmopolitan citizenship that is both gestural and orientated by the value perspective of autonomous personhood, or treating another as an end in him or herself in the contexts of arguments raised and decisions reached.

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