Russian Foreign Policy During the Putin Presidency
The Impact of Competing Approaches

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As his foreign policy priorities evolved over the course of his presidency, Vladimir Putin grew increasingly wary of Western policies and determined to exclude the United States and NATO from Russia's backyard. Dmitry Medvedev has been more inclined to a realist approach, willing to accept Western positions and to compromise on some issues.

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DURING the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russian foreign policy underwent several major, even dramatic, shifts in substance and emphasis. Putin's foreign policy went through four distinct phases—the first three each lasting about a year, the final one about four years. While changes in foreign policy are not unusual and certainly took place under previous Russian and Soviet rulers, truly major, far-reaching shifts are not the norm, especially during the tenure of a single leader. Significant change rarely occurs with the frequency witnessed in the Russian Federation between 2000 and 2008.

Although these changes were, in part, a response to external events, they cannot be fully understood without taking into account the impact of the competing approaches to foreign policy that vied for the allegiance of the president during Putin's eight years in office. These diverse approaches are still part of the discourse on foreign policy in Russia and, to varying degrees, are likely to shape its character in the years to come.

This article focuses on Russian policy toward the West, particularly the United States and NATO. The selective focus of the discussion oversimplifies a much more complex reality. The policies of a major power toward any one region or group of countries affect—and are affected by—its relations with others. Washington was not always the center of attention for decision-makers in Moscow, and its other relationships were not simply a byproduct of its interactions with and polices toward Western countries. However, Russia's relations with the West did have a significant impact on its policies toward countries in other regions. Hence, Russia's actions in

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Newly built NATO air-defense radar base near Nepolisy, some 85 kilometers east of Prague, Czech Republic, photographed on January 20, 2007. Under President George W. Bush, the United States proposed installing components of its own missile defense system in the Czech Republic, a suggestion denounced by Moscow. (AP Photo/CTK, Alexandra Mlejnkova)

those regions often shed light on the views and goals of its leadership vis-à-vis the West.

The Evolution of Russian Policy Under Putin

When President Boris Yeltsin resigned on New Year's Eve 1999, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin became acting president. He was elected to the presidency in March 2000 and re-elected in February 2004. He did not run for a third term in 2008 because the constitution limits the president to two consecutive terms, and instead became prime minister.

Phase One (2000–2001). For the first year and a half after Putin was elected president, Russia's approach to the United States was wary, tense, and rhetorically confrontational. Moscow vehemently condemned nearly every action by Washington that affected Russia—particularly the bombing of Yugoslavia, the expulsion of fifty alleged Russian spies, proposals for withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and building a national missile defense (NMD) system, and advocacy of continued eastward expansion of NATO. Putin sought to form a unified alliance of former Soviet republics under Russian leadership, probably as a means to exclude Western influence from the Near Abroad. He courted China assiduously and visited North Korea and Cuba, erstwhile Soviet allies that were both still intensely anti-American, in an effort to revive lapsed relationships. He reinforced Russia's ties with Iran and Iraq, countries viewed by the United States as threats to international peace because of their nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their support for terrorists. By the fall of 2001, Russia had gone on record as opposing Washington's policy on a long list of issues important to both countries. These included the future of the Baltic states, the role of the West in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Transcaucasian energy routes, implementation of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) II, negotiation of a new strategic arms treaty, sanctions on Iraq, the Iranian nuclear program, and North Korea.[1]

Phase Two (2001–2002). Russian policy changed radically on September 11, 2001. On the day of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Putin signaled his complete and enthusiastic support for U.S. objectives in the war on terror.[2] He immediately assured the United States that Russia would not object if Central Asian states allowed U.S. troops to use former Soviet military bases.[3] Not long afterward, he told U.S. officials that he did not consider Central Asia an exclusively Russian sphere of influence, and he endorsed a substantial expansion of the U.S. military presence in Georgia.[4] In a major television address, the Russian president promised the United States that he would share intelligence on terrorist operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, provide military aid to U.S.-led anti-Taliban forces, open Russian airspace to humanitarian flights to Afghanistan, and participate in search-and-rescue operations to aid the effort to destroy Al Qaeda's presence in that country.[5]

The shift toward cooperation with the United States extended well beyond the war on terror. High Russian officials assured their U.S. counterparts that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty "would not alter the relationship of trust between the two countries." Threats of an "asymmetrical response" if the United States deployed a national

missile defense ceased abruptly. Putin even suggested that such a system might allow Washington to "respond appropriately to future threats," such as those posed by terrorists.[6] Russia dropped its long-standing insistence that any future strategic arms control agreement must require destruction, rather than merely decommissioning, of nuclear warheads. This opened the way for the rapid conclusion of a new treaty.[7] Suddenly, too, Putin announced that his government would "reconsider" its opposition to the eastward expansion of NATO and was eager for closer ties with it, even eventual membership.[8] On every front, it seemed, Russia was now prepared to accommodate the United States and create, as one Moscow analyst put it, a "completely new," supportive relationship with Washington.[9] Putin himself would later describe his new policy as one that gave "unconditional priority" to "a partnership with the U.S. based on trust."[10] Observers hailed the change as "seismic."[11] Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov proclaimed the emergence of a "new world order."[12]

Phase Three (2002–2003). Putin's commitment to this new partnership lasted no more than a year. By the fall of 2002, he had begun to oppose U.S. policy unequivocally, publicly attempting to thwart Washington's plan to wage war on Iraq. Insisting that military action was "unwarranted," he flatly rejected a U.S. invitation to join a coalition to enforce the UN Security Council demand that Saddam Hussein eliminate all weapons of mass destruction and cooperate fully with UN inspectors. [13]

To ensure that the Russian position would prevail at the UN, Putin traveled to Europe to meet with German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French president Jacques Chirac, the leading European opponents of military action against Iraq. The three leaders held a joint press conference, during which they issued a joint declaration rejecting military measures. In an interview on French television, Putin warned that Russia was prepared to use its veto power on the Security Council to block a U.S.-sponsored resolution authorizing force.[14] Russian commentators proclaimed the emergence of an "antiwar entente," crediting Russian diplomacy with achieving a "breakthrough in world politics," the dissolution at last of the power blocs that had characterized the cold war world.[15] The principal fruit of the new collaboration was a joint memorandum calling for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq. This document was submitted to the Security Council in February 2003, as a counter-proposal to a new U.S.-sponsored resolution authorizing force. In effect, the Security Council was asked to choose between two competing visions of how to deal with the threat posed by Iraq. Some argued that these were opposing visions of the future course of international relations.[16] Putin personally lobbied President Jiang Zemin to obtain China's support for the joint memorandum.[17] After the invasion began, Putin made a few conciliatory gestures in Washington's direction, describing the United States as "Russia's major partner."[18] However, by the end of 2003, it was clear that this partnership was no longer a high priority for Moscow.

Phase Four (2004–2008). During Putin's second term, Russia's relationship, not only with the United States, but with NATO and the European Union as well, deteriorated markedly. Although cooperation continued on a number of specific matters, the range of issues on which Putin vehemently denounced Western actions grew steadily larger.[19] A tone of deep suspicion, even outright hostility, began to enter into official Russian comments on Western policy. NATO was put on notice that unspecified forms of retaliation would follow if it expanded into the Baltics.[20] In the fall of 2004, Putin told his countrymen that the recent seizure of a school in Beslan by Chechen rebels, and the entire Chechen insurgency, had been assisted by unnamed actors who "think that Russia, as one of the greatest nuclear powers of the world, is still a threat, and this threat has to be eliminated."[21] Western encouragement of Ukraine's Orange Revolution the following winter was met with angry accusations of unjustified interference in Russia's legitimate "zone of influence."[22] After the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 2005, Moscow began to refer to a Western plan to foment pro-democracy color revolutions throughout the CIS in order to surround Russia with pro-Western regimes and ultimately instigate regime change in Russia itself.[23] Putin responded with a series of steps to strengthen his government.[24] He tried to bolster Russia's military ties with China and friendly CIS regimes and eliminate any Western military presence from Central Asia.[25] U.S. tests of components of a national missile defense were met with Russian tests and deployments of weapons that could penetrate that system and would bolster Moscow's offensive capability.[26]

Moscow repeatedly found ways to punish countries from the former Soviet sphere that cultivated ties with the West. Ukraine was confronted with an immediate fourfold increase in the price of the natural gas it received from Russia.[27] When Kyiv insisted that it could not pay, Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine early in 2006 and again in January 2009. [28] A series of incidents seemed designed to intimidate Georgia after it announced a strong interest in

U.S. president Bill Clinton, right, breaks into laughter after Russian president Boris Yeltsin, left, made a comment about journalists during a news conference in Hyde Park, NY, October 23, 1995. (AP Photo/Wilfredo Lee)

joining NATO. These incidents culminated in a wholesale blockade of the country imposed in 2006, the dropping on Georgian territory of a large air-to-surface missile in 2007, and the shooting down of a Georgian reconnaissance aircraft over Abkhazia in 2008.[29]

Far more than he had in the past, Putin sought out opportunities to lecture, berate, and castigate his Western counterparts. He lashed out repeatedly at Western governments and organizations that criticized the erosion of democracy and respect for human rights in Russia. Putin insisted that NGOs were merely channels for funds provided by Western governments to influence the Russian political process. "This is not about democracy. This is about one country [surreptitiously] influencing another." The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was, in Putin's words, "a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries." The Russian president reserved his harshest criticism for the United States, which he publicly accused of provoking a new nuclear arms race, undermining international institutions, attempting to divide Europe into hostile camps, and plunging the world into "an abyss" of armed conflict, with the result that "political solutions are becoming impossible."[30]

Moscow also began to reconsider its participation in the key East-West security structures of the post–cold war period. In 2007 Russia formally declared that it was suspending its commitments under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Henceforth, it would reject any limitations on deploying heavy weaponry on its western and southern borders and would halt inspection of its deployments by other signatories to the treaty.[31] The commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Forces announced that if the United States followed through with its plans to base components of a missile defense in Poland or the Czech Republic, Russia might also withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty and would then be free to make those two countries targets of a missile strike. "[Russia's] Strategic Missile Forces will be capable of carrying out this task," the commander warned.[32] By the time Putin became prime minister, Russia's stance vis-à-vis the West had become more hostile than at any time since the last decade of the cold war.

Competing Approaches to Russian Foreign Policy

Russian foreign policy during the Putin presidency clearly changed over time and in dramatic ways. Russian officials have explained that the changes were necessary responses to Western initiatives. Of course there is some validity to this claim. Putin's policies were clearly affected by Western actions. However, a close look at Russia's relationship with the West during the Putin presidency suggests that acts by Western governments cannot fully account for Russia's policies or for the pattern of change they displayed.

Between the first and second phases of Putin's foreign policy, there was no change in U.S. policy on any of the issues that divided the two countries. While the United States eventually modified its rhetoric on Chechnya in a way that undoubtedly pleased the Russian leader, his approach to the West changed well before Washington made that accommodation. The third phase of his policy toward the West was dominated by the war in Iraq. This was certainly a major new U.S. initiative—one that could have set a precedent with major negative implications for Russia. However, its implications could have been addressed when and if they materialized. In the meantime, the invasion was not clearly inimical to Russian interests, and Russia stood to gain a great deal by supporting U.S. policy.[33]

The principal new Western actions in the fourth phase of Putin's policy (starting in 2004) were the admission of the Baltics to NATO, the U.S. proposal to place components of a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland, and NATO members' support for a pro-Western candidate in the 2004

Ukrainian presidential election. NATO assured Russia that no major weapons systems would be based on the territory of the Baltic states. Many Russian analysts asserted that the very limited missile defense installations planned for Eastern Europe could not undermine Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent.[34] Russian policymakers might well have feared that NATO would not keep its promises or that the handful of planned radars and defensive missiles in Eastern Europe might later be expanded to include a much larger network that could conceivably affect Russian security. However, Putin himself had evinced no such fears after 9/11, when he promised to reconsider his opposition to NATO expansion and acknowledged that a missile defense system might be an appropriate response to the possibility of future proliferation of nuclear weapons. The impact of Western intervention on events in Ukraine, as some Russian commentators noted, was probably not crucial to the outcome.[35] Moreover, many of Putin's policies appear to have been counterproductive for Russia in important ways. Military cooperation with China, which included the sale of sophisticated technologies, helped to strengthen an arsenal that might someday be used to intimidate or deter Russia. Opposition to the American presence in Central Asia impeded U.S. efforts to combat the self-same Islamic extremists that Russia feared. The use of energy cut-offs as a political weapon created the image of Russia as an unreliable supplier, spurring European efforts to find other sources of natural gas. The restrictions on weapons deployments and the confidence-building measures in the CFE treaty were important to Russian security in the post–cold war era; scuttling the agreement was not to Russia's advantage.

In short, the changes in Russia's external environment were not so profound as to require major policy shifts. Putin's responses to Western actions mentioned above were by no means the only reasonable ones a Russian leader might have adopted. His moves to ally Russia with the United States after 9/11 were widely criticized at home. But well-informed Russian observers argued publicly that Western actions after 2002 posed little threat to Russia. If Putin's policies cannot be viewed as the only rational Russian reaction to Western initiatives, another explanation of the substance of and changes in Russian policy during the course of his presidency is needed.

An alternative explanation may be found in the array of competing approaches to foreign policy advocated by various segments of Russian elite opinion during Putin's tenure (*see Table 1*). All of these approaches sought to define a course of action in foreign affairs that would best serve Russia's interests, but they differed considerably on the question of what kind of policy toward the West would do this. Associated with each of these approaches was a distinct set of assumptions about the goals of Western policy vis-à-vis Russia, the objectives Russia should pursue in dealing with the West, how Moscow could realize those objectives, and the kind of relationship Russia should seek with Western governments and the Western alliance as a whole. Most of these approaches were initially formulated and articulated before Putin came to power; all were part of elite debate during his presidency. In each successive period of Russian policy during Putin's tenure, a different approach seems to have been more persuasive to the president.

Liberal. A legacy of the Gorbachev era, the liberal approach emphasized the importance to Russia of developing a robust market economy and democratic institutions and protecting human, including civil and political, rights. According to this approach, which was promoted by post–Soviet Russia's first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, there might be disagreements on specific polices, but there is no fundamental conflict between Russia and the West. Their basic interests are the same, as are the threats to those interests. Both seek to construct an international order based on free markets and political freedom. While Western governments and organizations may sometimes be blind to Russian concerns, their intentions are not basically hostile. Russia will flourish only in a close partnership with the West, and preserving and nurturing that partnership should be given the highest priority.[36]

Nationalist. Present in foreign policy debate from the moment the Soviet Union dissolved, the nationalist approach insisted that Russia has a unique heritage that differentiates it from the West. It must not try to remake itself as a Western country, but should preserve the distinctive identity that is central to its greatness. The Western economic and political model is not appropriate for Russia, at least not without substantial modification that takes account of Russia's different needs and traditions. Nor is the West a natural partner for Russia. Western governments want to keep Russia weak and inferior. Russia should give very high priority to the cultivation of its relationship with the Near Abroad, where many ethnic Russians and other Slavic peoples reside. These are areas whose close ties with Russia go back centuries, and whose resources are critical to Russia's prosperity. Above all, Russia must avoid dependence on the West, thwart the expansion of

Table 1

Approaches to Russian Foreign Policy

Approach	Period of influence on Putin	Prominent spokesmen	View of West/ United States	Objectives	Means/relations with others
Liberal	N/A	Andrei Kozyrev	Natural allies, no fundamental conflicts of interest with Russia	Promote free markets, democratic institutions, human rights in Russia and the world	Close partnership with West
Nationalist	2000–2001	Leonid Ivashov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky	Completely alien, seeks to weaken Russia	Protect Russia's unique heritage, independence; strengthen Russian state	Cultivate relations with Near Abroad; build up Russia's military
Realist	2001–2002	Igor Ivanov	U.S. has different, not necessarily opposing, interests	Modernize Russian economy	Bargain, cooperate with West
Great power activist	2002–2003	Evgenii Primakov	U.S. aggressive competitor, seeks world hegemony	Global influence for Russia; counter U.S. ambitions	Active diplomacy; maintain multiple centers of world power; strengthen international organizations
Assertivist	2004–2008	Sergei Ivanov, Vladislav Surkov	Hostile to Russia, seeks to impose own system on Russia	Preserve Russian sovereignty; protect system of "managed democracy"	Exclude West from former Soviet sphere; rebuff Western criticism

Western power, and do whatever is necessary to restore the strength of the Russian state, both internally and externally.[37]

Great Power Activist. Initially propounded and implemented by Evgenii Primakov, foreign minister from 1996 to 1998 and prime minister from 1998 to 1999, the great power activist approach focuses on the challenge to Russia from the United States, the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States is viewed as an aggressive competitor that seeks to weaken all other centers of power in its quest for world domination. Russia's security and well-being depend on its ability to counter this quest by maintaining multiple centers of power in the international system to balance U.S. power. This implies developing political, military, and economic relations with regimes that feel threatened by U.S. power or policies, including some members of the Western alliance system. Ultimately Russia should seek to construct coalitions of states that will cooperate with it to curb U.S. influence. As a great power, Russia should play a role on the entire world stage, seeking allies even in far-flung regions. Russia can also benefit from bolstering international organizations in which it wields influence to constrain U.S. actions. It should emphasize and attempt to enlarge the role of the United Nations, especially the UN Security Council, where Russia can use its veto power to thwart U.S. initiatives. Great power activism prescribes cool but correct relations with the United States. Direct confrontation should be avoided because Russia will not prevail.[38]

Realist. The realist approach to foreign policy may have arisen as a response to the great power activist perspective. It was articulated by Primakov's successor as foreign minister, Igor Ivanov. Although it recognizes America's unique position of power, realism does not assume that the United States is intent on weakening Russia. Rather, Washington has *different* interests, which are by no means always opposed to Russia's. Unlike great power activism, which emphasizes that diplomatic skill and activity, as well as the determination of a state's leaders, can be important sources of strength in international affairs, realism underscores the limits of Russian power vis-à-vis the United States. Russia can try to resist U.S. initiatives that are inimical to its interests. If it fails, it should try instead to shape U.S. actions to make them less threatening or negotiate concessions in exchange for supporting U.S. positions on specific issues. Instead of building coalitions to try to curb the United States, Moscow should attempt

to work with Washington in the hope of influencing its policies in ways that will benefit Russia.[39]

Assertivist. Articulated by former minister of defense Sergei Ivanov and Putin's political strategist Vladislav Surkov, the assertivist approach shares with the nationalist perspective a deeply suspicious view of the United States and of the West as a whole.[40] From the assertivist viewpoint, it might be possible to cooperate with the West on specific issues, but Russian and Western interests are fundamentally in conflict. Russian experience indicates that economic and political activity must be carefully guided and managed by the state.[41] The West is bent on imposing its own economic and political models on the rest of the world, including the former Soviet sphere. The United States is prepared to use military power to achieve this end. Even if other Western governments emphasize the use of "soft power," their ultimate objective is the same. Russia must therefore do whatever it can, both internally and externally, to prevent Western interference in the former Soviet space.[42] Since the criticism of Russia articulated by Western governments helps to build support for their policy of intervention, Russia must vigorously rebuff that criticism, expose its hypocritical character, and demonstrate to the world both the dangers posed by Western actions and their moral bankruptcy. Where Russian and Western interests coincide, cooperation can proceed, but Russia need not and must not compromise its interests in order to sustain that cooperation. On the contrary, it must actively assert and defend its interests and demand that Western governments take them into account.[43] With prices for its energy exports notably higher than in the Russian Federation's first decade, the country need not fear that Western economic aid might be withheld. Moscow can also ensure that its military is strong enough to deal with any new challenges the West might pose.

The Approaches During Putin's Presidency

In each of the four phases through which Putin's foreign policy evolved, it appears to have been shaped by a different approach. His objectives and assumptions regarding the United States and the West thus changed substantially between 2000 and 2008.

First Phase (2000–2001). Foreign policy does not appear to have been Putin's highest priority in the first two years of his presidency. Of greater urgency were domestic measures to halt Russia's economic, military, and spiritual decline, and political disintegration after the collapse of the Soviet Union. His overriding goal appears to have been to renew Russia's strength and restore the power of the Russian state, thereby increasing respect for the state both at home and abroad. "The [next] century," he told his countrymen, should be Russia's century."[44] To reverse Russia's decline, Putin sought to revive many of its political, cultural, and spiritual traditions, in part by promoting the role of Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church.[45] He took steps to recentralize the Russian state and thereby enhance its power. He also made the complete suppression of the Chechen insurgency a central part of his agenda. This he saw as necessary not merely to preserve Russia's territorial integrity and prevent the penetration of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, but also to repair the faith of the Russian people in their own government and military and to bolster the image of its military abroad.[46]

Arguably, Putin saw his domestic measures as a necessary foundation for the foreign policy he wished to pursue. The values and priorities embodied in these measures strongly suggest that they were animated by a nationalist outlook. His repeated efforts to transform the CIS into a cohesive alliance under Russian leadership, and thereby re-create Russia's traditional sphere of influence, can be understood as flowing from a nationalist perspective. The same is true of his vigorous pursuit of stronger ties with China, Iran, and Iraq, which was probably motivated by the contribution to national economic strength (and avoidance of dependence on the West) that these policies promised.

Second Phase (2001–2002). By the fall of 2001, these foreign policy initiatives had yielded only limited results. Restoring Soviet-era trade relationships could not provide the capital, technology, and market access needed to modernize Russia's economy. Few former Soviet states seemed interested in closer integration with Russia; some were actively pursuing ties with the United States and NATO. An enlarged military presence in Russia's south could not prevent the infiltration of terrorists. Their growing involvement in Chechnya was making that conflict increasingly dangerous and intractable. Putin may well have been looking for an opportunity to try a different approach to the problems of economic weakness, terrorism, and domestic insurgency.

Al Qaeda's attacks on New York and Washington provided such an opportunity. Putin saw that Washington's newly proclaimed war on terror could be the basis of a comprehensive partnership with the United States.[47] Such

a partnership could lead to Russia's full integration into the world economy, which was essential to its enduring economic strength.[48] Russia could also obtain U.S. understanding and assistance for its own war on terror underway in Chechnya.[49] What would make this partnership feasible was the existence, for the first time since World War II, of a vital objective shared by the United States and Russia—the defeat of Islamic radicalism. Russian assets could be vitally important to the United States as it waged its war: intelligence on the Taliban and Al Qaeda, knowledge of Afghanistan and experience in combat there, and influence over Central Asian regimes that could provide over-flight rights and base facilities. Russia's support in the UN Security Council could provide international legitimacy and support. Its influence with regimes that supplied arms and funding to terrorist groups might be helpful, and its oil and gas reserves could replace supplies from potentially hostile Muslim nations.[50] As prescribed by the realist approach, Putin could hope to make gains for Russia by cooperating—and bargaining—with the United States. Russian analysts began to speak of a "Putin Doctrine" in foreign policy: a "radical shift" from an attempt to continue the great-power policy of the Soviet Union to an "unconditional" commitment to a partnership with the United States that would decide Russia's economic fate and enable it to cope with the threats to its security from terrorism, ethnic and religious extremism, and separatism.[51]

Third Phase (2002–2003). For a while, the realist approach did seem to bear some fruit. There were both economic and security rewards for Moscow's newly cooperative stance.[52] However, the deal grew less and less favorable to Russia as time passed. The concessions Putin made when he acquiesced in a U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus turned out to be substantially greater than was probably anticipated. U.S. officials had explicitly assured their Russian counterparts that the U.S. deployments there would be temporary and brief. Yet even after the Taliban and Al Qaeda appeared to have been routed from Afghanistan by the spring of 2002, U.S. forces continued to use military facilities in four Central Asian states.[53] By the summer of 2002, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan had announced that the American presence in Central Asia would increase and military relations with the governments in the area would expand. A visiting congressional delegation emphasized the U.S. intention to stay there indefinitely, while U.S. troops had become involved in a major program to train the Georgian army, and U.S. military ties with Azerbaijan were intensifying. By the fall, U.S forces in the region amounted to several thousand personnel. To Putin this seemingly permanent deployment violated U.S. commitments.[54] It portended an enduring geopolitical realignment inimical to Russian interests.

One of Putin's foremost objectives in adopting a realist strategy and allying with Washington had been to gain U.S. acceptance of the Russian military campaign in Chechnya.[55] However, after halting for about a year, U.S. criticism of Russian operations there resumed in the late summer of 2002.[56] Washington began exerting strong pressure on Russia to conclude a political settlement to prevent the conflict from spilling over the border with Georgia, where Chechen fighters were operating, sometimes aided by Al Qaeda operatives.[57] On the anniversary of September 11, President Bush addressed the UN, appealing for endorsement of military action against Iraq and claiming the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Putin chose the same day to speak to his fellow citizens, invoking the same article to insist that Russia had a right to suppress the rebellion in Chechnya, even if it involved incursions into Georgian territory.[58] Many observers concluded that Putin was seeking a deal: We'll support you in Iraq if you support us in Chechnya and Georgia.[59] This was the sort of bargain a realist strategy might recommend. However, the United States refused to accept any such linkage.

In the economic sphere Russia's gains from its shift to a realist strategy also fell far short of what Putin had hoped for. The United States refused even to discuss writing off Russia's Soviet-era debts.[60] Russian exports to the United States were not increasing, nor were American investments in Russia.[61] Newly imposed U.S. tariffs on Russian steel dealt a terrible blow to sectors of Russian industry that had been increasingly competitive in global markets since the late 1990s.[62] Most significant, Washington announced sweeping new conditions for supporting Russian membership in the World Trade Organization.[63] This meant that Russia could not begin to realize its economic potential, Putin told a gathering of Russian ambassadors.[64]

If these disappointments persuaded Putin that the realist approach was not working, an important development in September 2002 clearly argued for turning to great power activism. This was President Bush's announcement of his new national security doctrine. Most objectionable to Russia was the doctrine's insistence that the United States would not only seek "military strengths beyond challenge," but would employ preemptive, and even unilateral, force against any target it deemed inimical to

U.S. military planes, seen at Manas U.S. military base, in Bishkek airport, Kyrgyzstan, on February 12, 2009. The United States began using the Manas base in December 2001. (AP Photo/Igor Kovalenko)

its security.[65] To Russian observers, this meant that the United States no longer respected state sovereignty, would no longer abide by international law, and would disregard the UN Charter.[66] Iraq was the first demonstration of the new doctrine.[67]

Putin voiced his concerns at a meeting with high-ranking military officers. "We cannot ignore the increasing aggressiveness of certain influential countries [or] the reduced effectiveness of institutions of international security and conflict prevention," he told his audience. "The balance of power in the world has very clearly been disrupted, while a new security architecture has yet to be put in place."[68]

In this context, great power activism was undoubtedly an attractive approach. It envisioned a "security architecture" that might protect Russia: multiple power centers that could unite to constrain any one center that sought hegemony in the international system. Moreover, the prospect of a U.S.-sponsored war against Iraq in defiance of the United Nations made such an architecture much more feasible than it had been. Neither China, nor India, nor the cluster of anti-American regimes whose support Russia could mobilize could be effective counterweights to U.S. power. A divided Europe, with two of its most powerful and influential states ready to cooperate with Russia, made this possible. The eagerness of Germany and France to win Russia's support on the question of Iraq made great power activism a far more promising strategy.[69]

Fourth Phase (2004–2008). The promise was short-lived, however. Once the invasion of Iraq occurred, Russia's hoped-for allies became increasingly receptive to U.S. efforts to heal the breach in the Atlantic Alliance.[70] The leaders of France and Germany usually felt uncomfortable about siding publicly with Russia against the United States. Beginning in 2004, almost all NATO members began to find their views converging with Washington's on most of the issues that deeply concerned Russia.

As the opportunity to implement the great power activist approach rapidly diminished, the need for a new foreign policy strategy intensified. In the space of little more than a year, from the spring of 2004 to the spring

of 2005, the Russian government found itself confronted with a series of seemingly major threats to the country's internal stability and external security.

Western condemnation of the undemocratic policies and practices of the Putin administration began to escalate sharply in response to the arrest of the oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky in late 2003 and the conduct of Russia's presidential elections in the spring of 2004. Initially confined mostly to Western media outlets, allegations that the Kremlin was abandoning the rule of law, throttling political dialogue, restoring authoritarianism, and trampling on the rights of its people were gradually articulated at higher and higher levels of government in the United States and the EU.[71] To Putin this public criticism constituted an effort to delegitimize his government in the eyes of the Russian people. Western journalists, officials, and leaders seemed to be instigating, even sponsoring, opposition to his rule and to the country's political institutions.[72]

Soon after the incorporation of the Baltic states into NATO in March 2004, former Soviet military installations in those countries were made available for use by the Western alliance. The Russian minister of defense acknowledged that the Baltic states could not contribute much to NATO's collective military potential, and thus that their accession actually weakened the organization.[73] Nonetheless, this development was significant as an indication of Western attitudes and intentions toward Russia. In 1999 Russian officials had viewed NATO's inclusion of three former Warsaw Pact members as a betrayal of solemn assurances given to Moscow by Western leaders. For NATO now to move into territory that had been part of the Soviet Union was to cross a "red line."[74] Such a move could only be interpreted as hostile. "We have the right to ask," Putin declared, "against whom is this expansion directed?"[75]

Against this background of perceived Western efforts to undermine the Russian government and its ability to protect its borders, Putin's explanation of the Beslan school seizure in the fall of 2004 becomes intelligible. The Beslan raid seemed calculated to force his government to make concessions to the Chechens that could lead to the disintegration of Russia. At the same time, it discredited his government as unable to prevent such raids and unprepared to deal with them. Who would have wanted this? The answer seemed obvious: Only Western governments that saw Russia's military power as a threat. The tragic event in Beslan, so Moscow reasoned, must have been the result of a Western effort to direct Islamic fundamentalism toward Russia.[76]

Putin's perception of a grave Western challenge to Russia, both internally and externally, only deepened with the color revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2004 and 2005. Western backing for opposition movements directed against pro-Russian governments in these countries could only be understood by the Kremlin as part of a program of undermining Russian security and prosperity. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was Russia's legitimate sphere of influence.[77] That sphere was now disintegrating as a result of Western efforts.

If Putin had harbored any doubts as to the role of the West in promoting the color revolutions, President Bush put them to rest in the spring of 2005, when he announced the creation of an Active Response Corps. This force would always be ready for action, able to support political change wherever pro-democracy groups needed help and to intervene to back them in a crisis. Bush voiced his confidence that there would be many opportunities for the corps to act, including more color revolutions in the post-Soviet space.[78] Russian commentators protested that the United States was claiming "a general right to change political systems in various parts of the world."[79] The Russian political system, Putin concluded, would surely be a target in the near future.[80]

Putin's sense of threat from developments in Russia's "backyard" may have increased with the uprising in Andijon, in Uzbekistan's Ferghana Valley, in May 2005. The Kremlin concluded that Islamist organizations operating from Afghanistan, and not Western governments or NGOs, were responsible.[81] However, the link between the West and the machinations of Islamic fundamentalists had already been established in Putin's mind after Beslan. Might terrorists seize power on Russia's borders in the wake of the unrest during a new color revolution or a bungled regime change? Russia urgently needed a strategy to deal with the combination of internal and external threats it faced.

Putin embraced assertivism in response to this need. The assertivist approach emphasized that the West must be given no opportunity to affect the political process in Russia. Western influence and presence in the post-Soviet space had to be contained and minimized. This could be accomplished, in part, by deterrence and intimidation, techniques inherited from the cold war era. Putin's moves to bolster Russia's strategic forces and demonstrate their capabilities had this objective, as did Russian saber-rattling against Georgia. The United States and its allies had to be shown that they faced the threat of destruction.[82] This might require the abrogation of international treaty commitments that prevented new deployments of conventional and intermediate-range

nuclear forces. Assertivism dictated that whatever levers Russia could manipulate to protect itself from the threats it faced should be employed.

Russia's control over vast energy resources and the means of delivering them was another lever that could be used to dissuade its neighbors from cooperating with the West. Moreover, Moscow would take care to ensure that its control was not diluted by foreign investment in Russia's energy resources.[83] The ability to manipulate separatist conflicts in the CIS was also a potential lever. By escalating such conflicts at will, Russia could induce more compliant behavior on the part of its neighbors or convince NATO that their accession to membership would be a severe and risky liability.[84] Where possible, Moscow would also bolster its ability to counter Western military power and economic and political influence farther afield.

Close to Russia's borders, the Middle East offered special opportunities for Russia to assert itself, and Putin moved to exploit them. Russia concluded an agreement with Syria to reopen Soviet-era naval bases on its territory. Israeli sources believe this was part of an intelligence effort that the Russians regarded as necessary in the light of the missile defense system the United States planned to erect in Europe.[85] Putin made a presidential visit to Saudi Arabia to discuss the future of the Middle East and joint economic ventures with a traditional U.S. ally.[86] Further, when Washington and the EU refused to recognize the newly elected Hamas government in Gaza, Moscow hosted its leaders and promised them economic aid, despite the fact that they had links to Chechen terrorists.[87]

The assertivist approach also required the government to rebut criticisms of its actions emanating from the West and to discredit the governments and organizations voicing criticisms. Western disparagement of Russia's performance in the areas of democracy and human rights, Putin told visiting journalists, was no more than an effort to bring pressure to bear on Moscow in order to procure concessions on unrelated issues.[88] The entire project of "democratization," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov averred, was merely a means of encouraging anti-Russian sentiment throughout the CIS. Putin's government began to defend world leaders who claimed to be targets of the Western program of global regime change.[89] Moreover, the Kremlin sought to persuade domestic and foreign audiences, international law did not countenance external intervention to undermine or remove the leaders of other countries even if their governments were repressive.

Putin's embrace of assertivism was strongly condemned by realists and liberals. Realists argued, for example, that the color revolutions had been the result of the internal situation in the countries where they occurred, not Western intervention. They warned against use of the "gas weapon" because it was sure to harm Russia by undermining its reputation as a long-term supplier of energy to the international community.[90] Liberals welcomed democratic change anywhere in the CIS and urged the Russian government to abandon futile efforts to oppose it.[91]

Russian Foreign Policy After Putin's Presidency

Russian foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin underwent remarkable shifts in substance, tone, and style. As explained above, these occurred in four distinct phases, with each phase embodying distinctive behaviors and rhetoric. The actions and pronouncements of external parties unquestionably played an important role in shaping Russia's conduct. They posed opportunities and challenges to which Putin responded. However, in each policy phase, there were many different ways Putin might reasonably have reacted to changes in Western behavior. Moreover, these changes were never so marked as to compel the dramatic shifts that occurred in Russian policy. Indeed, at each point in time there were voices in Russia arguing against (as well as for) the adoption of a new approach to relations with the United States and NATO. Thus an understanding of the approach to foreign policy that Putin favored in each phase, and of the reasons why that approach seemed compelling to him at the time, is essential to comprehending his policy choices.

When Dmitry Medvedev acceded to the presidency in May 2008, there were hints that the liberal approach to foreign policy, which had never seemed to hold much sway during the Putin presidency, might exert more influence. Both before and since he took office, President Medvedev has repeatedly emphasized his commitment to liberal values, including "unconditional" governmental protection of human rights and freedoms, both civil and economic, political competition, and respect for the law. Such an approach to domestic policy, Medvedev has said, would strengthen Russia in the world community, make it more open to the world, and facilitate dialogue with other countries.[92]

One Russian commentator has suggested that the appeal of assertivism to Russia's leaders lies in the fact that the image of Western hostility it embodies justifies authoritarian rule. If Medvedev were to pursue a more liberal course at home, he would not need that justifica-

tion and would be free to change course in foreign affairs.[93] At the outset, however, Medvedev's actions did not indicate that he intended to adopt a new approach to foreign policy. His rhetoric vis-à-vis the West initially differed little from Putin's. The positions his government took at the UN reflected the assertivist premise that the efforts of Western governments to promote democracy in other countries constitute illegitimate interference in their internal affairs.[94]

Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 likewise reflected the assertivist strategy Putin had been pursuing. The large scale and geographic scope of the operation and the prolonged occupation of a considerable swath of Georgian territory that followed seemed calculated to demonstrate that the Caucasus was part of Russia's "sphere of privileged interest," which NATO had no right to penetrate.[95] From an assertivist perspective, such a demonstration was long overdue. Russia had taken no action when the Baltics were incorporated into NATO in defiance of repeated warnings that this was unacceptable. This time Russia had to make clear to the West that it would use force to protect its interests in the post-Soviet space. It would be useful, too, to call NATO's bluff by revealing its weakness in the area and its reluctance to confront Russia in its own backyard.

The scale and scope of Russia's military operations probably reflected Putin's continuing influence on the country's foreign policy. As prime minister, he was the first Russian leader to defend the invasion, blaming the United States for orchestrating it, and making a widely publicized visit to North Ossetia to meet with soldiers and refugees from the conflict.[96] However, there is no evidence that Medvedev viewed the war any differently. He soon began to echo Putin's statements and insisted that the countries on Russia's border (and even some beyond) constituted its sphere of influence.[97]

Following the war, Putin apparently continued to play a major role in the shaping of Russian foreign policy. His eagerness to assert Russia's "privileged interests" in the territories on its border has remained undiminished.[98] By 2009 and 2010, however, Medvedev began to put his own stamp on Russian foreign policy. He now seems to be less willing than Putin to accept the premises of assertivism. Increasingly, he seems to be inclined toward a realist approach to relations with the West. In several key policy areas, Medvedev has indicated acceptance of Western positions or willingness to arrive at compromises through negotiations, while Putin has remained wary of Western intentions and has resisted support for Western initiatives. In the fall of 2009, for example, Medvedev began to signal that he might agree to new sanctions on Iran to induce it to comply with UN Security Council resolutions relating to its nuclear program.[99] As time passed and negotiations with Iran bore no fruit, he began to voice his frustration and publicly chastised Iran for hiding a new enrichment facility.[100] Putin, by contrast, continued to voice opposition to new sanctions.[101]

There is also evidence of disagreement between Medvedev and Putin with regard to the conclusion of a new strategic arms accord with the United States. In this case, too, the divergence suggests that they have increasingly disparate approaches to foreign policy. Putin's assertivist outlook seems to be more interested in enhancing Russia's nuclear arsenal than in pursuing arms control, particularly after Washington announced its intention to deploy components of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Putin responded to that announcement by threatening to withdraw from the INF treaty if the United States carried through with its plans.[102] Medvedev raised the subject of missile defense repeatedly in talks on strategic arms control. However, in characteristically realist fashion, when the United States firmly rejected any linkage between the two issues, he gave way, signing a preliminary agreement to cut nuclear arsenals that did not require the United States to forgo the construction of sites in Eastern Europe. Unhappy with this concession, Putin made a last-minute attempt to condition a strategic arms accord on a U.S. agreement to scrap its missile defense plans, but Medvedev went through with the deal anyway when Washington rejected this condition.[103]

Medvedev's move toward a realist approach was probably facilitated by changes in the international environment. The 2008 elections brought to power a U.S. president eager to "reset" his country's relationship with Russia and willing to negotiate with Iran. The Iranian government's move to accelerate its uranium enrichment program and the revelation of further clandestine activities on its part made the case for new sanctions more compelling. President Barack Obama's decision to reconfigure the U.S. missile defense program in such a way that it would not require placing components in the Czech Republic or Poland was gratifying to some in Russia.[104] The global economic crisis that began in 2008 had a major impact on Russia by significantly reducing world energy prices. Taken together, these developments made cooperation with the United States more important for both parties, while underscoring Russia's relative weakness. However, it is noteworthy that Russia's two leaders responded quite differently to these changes. Their contrasting positions suggest that the inclinations of

Putin's successor are considerably closer to realism (and in domestic affairs perhaps even to liberalism).[105]

It is hard to say which of the approaches that have informed Russian foreign policy debate will prevail in the years to come or whether a new, hitherto unarticulated approach will emerge. During the remainder of his term as president, Medvedev will probably try to sustain a good working relationship with both the United States and NATO. Whether the relationship will be as warm as the one that existed in the months following 9/11 will probably depend on international developments. The closeness of that period was generated to a substantial degree by the sense of a grave danger facing the two sides. A sharp deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, with NATO forces steadily losing ground to the Taliban, or major Islamist violence in Russia or Central Asia could have a similar effect. If much of the world economy remains in recession, Russia will not enjoy the same robust economic growth it experienced in Putin's second term. This will underscore the advantages of a realist approach, which from its inception was intended to enable Russia to make the best of its situation in a time of relative economic weakness. Assertivism, which reflected a confidence born of economic prowess, will have less to recommend it.

In the somewhat longer term, domestic politics are likely to be critical in shaping Russian foreign policy. The outcome of the Russian presidential election in 2012 should be extremely important. Should Putin be re-elected, he probably will restore an assertivist stance in Russian foreign policy, with a concomitant increase in tensions between Russia and key NATO members, especially the United States.

Notes

1. Stephen Blank, "Partners in Discord Only," *Orbis* 44, no. 4 (2000): 57–71.

2. Vladimir Putin, "Statement by Vladimir Putin on Terrorist Acts in U.S," *Kommersant* (September 12, 2001): 1, translated in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* [*CDPSP*] 53, no. 37 (October 10, 2001): 4; Suzanne Daley, "Russia Condemns Attack on U.S. and Vows to Aid NATO Actions," *New York Times* (September 14, 2001): A17.

3. Andrew F. Tully, "Russia: Support for U.S. May Be Self-Serving," *RFE/RL Newsline* (September 20, 2001); Alan Kasayev and Armen Khanbabyan. "Day of the Great Divide," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (September 20, 2001): 1, 5, translated in *CDPSP* 53, no. 38 (October 17, 2001): 5–6.

4. Sergei Guly, "Up for Marriage with a Dowry," *Novye izvestiia* (October 23, 2001): 3, translated in *CDPSP* 53, no. 43 (November 21, 2001): 3.

5. "Televised Address by Russian President Vladimir Putin," *Kommersant* (September 25, 2001): 2, translated in *CDPSP* 53, no. 9 (October 24, 2001): 1–2.

6. Yevgeny Vasilyev, "After Shanghai, Texas," *Vremya MN* (October 23, 2001): 3, translated in *CDPSP* 53, no. 43 (November 21, 2001): 1–3; idem. "Has Opposition to Missile Defense Been Dropped?" *Vremya MN* (September 18, 2001), translated in *CDPSP* 53, no. 38 (October 17, 2001): 4.

7. David Sanger, "Bush and Putin to Sign Pact to Cut Nuclear Warheads; Weapons Can Be Stockpiled," *New York Times* (May 14, 2002): A1, A8.

8. "Suddenly Cosier with the West," *Economist* (October 6, 2001): 50; Suzanne Daley, "Putin Softens His Stance Against NATO Expansion," *New York Times* (October 4, 2001): B2; Lyudmila Romanova, "Russia and the European Union Agree on Nearly Everything," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (October 4, 2001): 2, translated in *CDPSP* 53, no. 40 (October 31, 2001): 5.

9. Svetlana Babayeva, Andrei Lebedev, and Aleksandr Chuiko, "Base Value," *Izvestia* (October 15, 2001): 1, 4, translated in *CDPSP* 53, no. 42 (November 14, 2001): 1–2.

10. Quoted in Katerina Labetskaya, "President Instructs Diplomats to Help Russian Business," *Vremia novostei* (July 15, 2002): 2, translated in *CDPSP* 54, no. 28 (August 7, 2002): 5–6.

11. Yevgeny Bai, "Absolutely New Relations," *Izvestia* (October 6, 2001), translated in *CDPSP* 53, no. 40 (October 31, 2001): 1, 6.

12. Todd Purdum, "NATO Strikes Deal to Accept Russian Help to Stem Nuclear Weapons," *New York Times* (May 15, 2002): A1, A8.

13. Resolution 1441, November 8, 2002. See also "Russia Rejects U.S. Invitation to Join Anti-Iraq Coalition," ITAR-TASS (December 3, 2002), translated in *RFE/RL Newsline* (December 3, 2002); Aleksandr Samokhotkin, "Iraqi Issue Has Divided the Entire World," *Vremia novostei* (January 29, 2003): 6, translated in *CDPSP* 55, no. 4 (February 26, 2003): 2–3; Steven Lee Myers, "Iraq Cancels Oil Contract with 3 Russian Companies," *New York Times* (December 13, 2002): A24.

14. Arkady Dubnov and Pyotr Rozvarin. "Russian President Becomes French TV Star," *Vremia novostei* (February 13, 2003): 2, translated in *CDPSP* 55, no. 6 (March 12, 2003): 1–3.

15. Elmar Guseinov, "Vladimir Putin and Jacques Chirac Find a Common Language on Almost All Issues," *Izvestia* (February 12, 2003): 2, translated in *CDPSP* 55, no. 6 (March 12, 2003): 1; Aleksandr Dugin, "Fermentation of the New World," *Izvestia* (February 21, 2003): 4, translated in *CDPSP* 55, no. 7 (September 25, 2003): 5–6; Dubnov and Rozvarin, "Russian President Becomes French TV Star."

16. Igor Maksimychev, "An 'Axis of Peace' as the Beginning of Greater Europe," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (February 28, 2003): 6, translated in *CDPSP* 55, no. 8 (March 26, 2003): 7.

17. "Moscow Steps Up Diplomacy on Iraq," *RFE/RL Newsline* (February 26, 2003).

18. "Putin Touts U.S.-Russia Relations," *RFE/RL Newsline* (June 4, 2003).

19. See, for example, David Kramer, Deputy U.S. Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, "The U.S. and Russia" (remarks delivered before the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, Baltimore, May 31, 2007).

20. Leonid A. Karabeshkin and Dina R. Spechler, "EU and NATO Enlargement: Russia's Expectations, Responses and Options for the Future," *European Security* 16, nos. 3–4 (2007): 307–28.

21. Quoted in Igor Torbakov, Debates Within Russian Political Class Show Moscow's Suspicions of the West," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (September 10, 2004).

22. Artur Blinov and Andrei Terekhov, "Myth of Zones of Influence Is Shattered," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (December 9, 2004): 6, translated in *CDPSP* 56, no. 49 (January 5, 2005): 2004: 11–12.

23. Dmitry Trenin, *Reading Russia Right*, Policy Brief No. 42 (Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, October 2005): 1–12; Sergei Lavrov, "The Foreign Policy of Russia: A New Phase," *Expert* (December 17, 2007).

24. These included the imposition of greater government control over broadcast media, new restrictions on the operation of NGOs, disruption of events sponsored by opposition parties and leaders, and arrests of protesters who opposed government policies, as well as the mobilization of Russian youth in support of these policies.

25. Vladimir Mukhin, "The Shagreen Skin of the Defense Space," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (June 25, 2005) translated in Johnson's Russia List (June 30, 2005); Aleksandra Zaytseva and Kseniya Solyanskaya, "NATO Has Been Asked to Leave Central Asia," Gazeta.ru (July 6, 2005), translated in Johnson's Russia List (July 12, 2005); Stephen Blank, "An Uzbek Airbase: Russia's Newest Achievement in Central Asia," *Eurasianet* (January 11, 2007).

26. Thom Shanker and Mark Landler, "Putin Says U.S. Is Undermining Global Stability," *New York Times* (February 11, 2007), A1; Alexander Golts, "The High Price of Parity," *Moscow Times* (November 8, 2005), translated in Johnson's Russia List (November 8, 2005); Dimitry Litovkin, "The Russians Are Flying," *Izvestia* (August 17, 2007): 1–2, translated in *CDPSP* 59, no. 34 (March 7, 2007): 1–2; Pavel Felgenhauer, "President Blows Strategic Hot Air," *Novaia gazeta* (August 20, 2007): 7, translated in *CDPSP* 59, no. 34 (September 19, 2007): 3.

27. In part, this move was aimed at rationalizing Russian energy prices, raising them to the levels at which energy was bought and sold on the world market. This was something Russia had long sought in negotiations with Ukraine. However, Russia's abrupt insistence on an immediate price change on such a scale, at a time when other former Soviet republics continued to enjoy highly subsidized prices, was widely viewed as intended to punish the new Ukrainian government. See Bernard Gelb, "Russian Natural Gas: Regional Dependence," CRS Report (January 5, 2007), available at www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/4410/, accessed July 10, 2010; "Ukrainian Natural Gas Dispute," interview with Michael McFaul and J. Robinson West, *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, January 2, 2006, www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june06/natgas_1-02.html.

28. Supplies to Moldova were also cut off in 2006, after that country rejected a treaty that would have allowed a long-term Russian troop presence on its territory and began to develop closer ties with the West (William Hill, "Russia's Cat and Mouse Game with Moldova," *OD Russia* [October 24, 2008]).

29. Mikhail Vignansky, Mikhail Kukushkin, and Andrei Denisov. "And Now, a Blockade," *Vremia novostei* (October 3, 2006): 1–2, translated in *CDPSP* 58, no. 40 (November 1, 2006): 3–4; Svante Cornell, David Smith, and S. Frederick Starr, *The August 2007 Bombing Incident in Georgia: Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Region* (Washington, DC: Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, October 2007); C.J. Chivers, "U.N. Inquiry Concludes That Russian Jet Downed Georgian Reconnaissance Drone," *New York Times* (May 27, 2008): A10.

30. Vladimir Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy" (Munich, February 10, 2007), Russian presidential Web site, http://president.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912 type82914 type82917 type84779_118123.shtml, accessed March 15, 2010.

31. Andrew Kramer and Thom Shanker, "Russia Suspends Arms Pact, Citing U.S. Missile Plan," *New York Times* (July 15, 2007): A1.

32. Nikolai Solovtsov, quoted in Claire Bigg, "Russia Warns Czech Republic, Poland on Missile Defense," *RFE/RL* (February 20, 2007).

33. According to one report, the United States assured Moscow before the war that Iraq's multibillion-dollar debts to Russia would be paid by the regime that succeeded Saddam Hussein, and Iraqi oil contracts with Russian companies would be honored (Samuel Charap, "Reading the Tea Leaves on Russia's Iraq Policy," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, July 2002). It was clear that neither of these developments would take place until after Saddam was overthrown.

34. For example, Vladimir Dvorkin, former head of the Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, which deals with problems relating to the development of nuclear weapons, told *Izvestia* that these installations posed no threat to Russia and "won't diminish our nuclear deterrent potential in any way" (Dimitry Litovkin and Georgy Stepanov. "American Missile Defense System Draws Close to Russia's Borders," *Izvestia* [February 9, 2007]: 1–2, translated in *CDPSP* 59, no. 6 [April 2, 2007]: 4–5).

35. Stanislav Belkovsky, "Results of the 'Orange Revolution,' " *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (November 29, 2004): 9, translated in *CDPSP* 56, no. 48 (December 29, 2004): 9–10.

36. Andrei Kozyrev, "A Transformed Russia in a New World," *Izvestia* (January 2, 1992): 3, translated in *CDPSP* 44, no. 1 (February 5, 1992): 22–23.

37. Yuri Glukhov, "The Moles of History Dig Blindly," *Pravda* (February 24, 1992): 1, 3, translated in *CDPSP* 44, no. 8 (March 25, 1992): 8–9; Sergei Goncharov, "Russia's Special Interests," *Izvestia* (February 25, 1992): 6, translated in *CDPSP* 44, no. 8 (March 25, 1992): 9–10; "Zhirinovsky Elaborates on His Program," *RFE/RL Daily Report* (December 14, 1993).

38. See, e.g., Yevgenii Primakov, "Russia in World Politics," *International Affairs* 44, no. 3 (1998): 7–12; Yuri Fiodorov, "Quiet Opposition of the Generals," *Moskovskie novosti* (October 16–21, 2001), translated in *CDPSP* 53, no. 41 (November 7, 2001): 4–5; Alexander Bovin, "Russia Returns to Realm of World Politics," *Izvestia* (December 26, 1997), translated in Johnson's Russia List (December 27, 1997); Aleksei Kiva, "Who Benefits from Russian-American Rapprochement?" *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (July 11, 2002): 2, translated in *CDPSP* 54, no. 8 (August 7, 2002): 6.

39. See, e.g., "Igor Ivanov Defends Post–Sept. 11 Foreign Policy," *Izvestia* (July 10, 2002): 1, 6, translated in *CDPSP* 54, no. 28 (August 7, 2002): 1–4; A. Fedorov, "The New Pragmatism of Russia's Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 45, no. 5 (1999): 47–52; Sergei Karaganov, "The New Foreign Policy," *Moskovskie novosti* (February 29–March 6, 2000): 5, 11, translated in *CDPSP* 52, no. 10 (April 5, 2000): 1–4.

40. Surkov is a prominent proponent of the view that democratic revolutions in the former Soviet Union were orchestrated by Western governments ("Vladislav Surkov's Secret Speech: How Russia Should Fight International Conspiracies," www.mosnews.com/interview/2005/07/12surkov.shtml), cited in Stephen Blank, "The Great Russia Debate," *Journal of International Security Affairs,* no. 10 (spring 2006), www.security affairs.org/issues/2006/10/blank.php, accessed March 18, 2007. Surkov, who served as deputy chief of staff of the presidential administration under Putin, is known primarily as an ideologue who specializes in domestic political issues. However, his views on internal problems, such as the kind of democracy Russia needs, are informed by—and partly based on—his views of Western intentions and behavior toward Russia.

41. Ibid.

42. Ivanov has called for preemptive intervention in the CIS states when Russian interests are threatened. See "Russia Would Consider Preemptive Strike If Interests Require It," *BBC Monitoring* (October 2, 2003). Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has espoused a more moderate version of assertivism, threatening the use of "every conceivable economic pressure tactic" against CIS governments that are "disloyal" to Russia. See "Russia to Pressure Disloyal CIS Countries," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (October 13, 2005), cited in Blank, "Great Russia Debate."

43. See, e.g., Valery Chernikov, "Bargaining Is Out of Place," *Rossiia* 35–36 (September 6, 2007): 2, translated in *CDPSP* 59, no. 36 (October 3, 2007): 4; Litovkin, "Russians Are Flying."

44. Svetlana Smetanina, "Putin Promises 'Stable' Life in Russia After 2000," *Kommersant* (November 18, 1999).

45. See, e.g., "Putin Sends Christmas Greetings to Orthodox Russians," Interfax (January 6, 2000).

46. Simone Ispa-Landa, "Russian Preferred Self-Image and the Two Chechen Wars," *Demokratizatsiya* 11, no. 2 (spring 2003): 305–19.

47. Kren House and Andrew Higgins. "Putin Warns Bush Against Going It Alone When It Comes to Iraq," *Wall Street Journal* (February 2002): 1, 14; Vasilyev, "After Shanghai, Texas"; Purdum, "NATO Strikes Deal to Accept Russian Help."

48. Michael Wines, "Russia Finds Virtue in a U.S. Victory," *New York Times* (May 14, 2002), A9; Andrei Kosmynin, "Party Politics and Political Opposition in Putin's Russia," lecture delivered at Indiana University, Bloomington, May 7, 2002.

49. "Televised Address by Russian President Vladimir Putin," p. 1.

50. Kasayev and Khanbabyan. "Day of the Great Divide"; Allen B. Lynch, "Russia Reexamined: New Politics and Economy," *Great Decisions 2000* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 2000), pp. 81, 88; Patrick Tyler, "Pulling Russia Closer," *New York Times* (May 14, 2002): A1; "Reaching Out to Vladimir," *Economist* (May 25, 2002): 34.

51. By no means did all Russian elites support this shift. Nationalists denounced it as treasonous. Putin has "ceded the post-Soviet space in its entirety to the U.S." and "forfeited [Russia's] positions in the Muslim world," cried Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, for example (Leonid Ivashov, "Anticipating Major Upheavals in Russia," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* [January 2003]: 2, translated in *CDPSP* 55, no. 3 [February 19, 2003]: 5). See also "The Putin Doctrine," *Vremya MN,* July 25, 2002: 3, translated in *CDPSP* 54, no. 31 (August 28, 2002): 1; Yegveny Grigoryev, "Russia First," *Nezvisimaya gazeta* (July 15, 2002): 2, translated in *CDPSP* 54, no. 28 (August 7, 2002): 5–6.

52. "G8 Rewards Russia for Anti-Terror Role with Full G8 Membership," Agence France-Presse (June 27, 2002); Sanger, "Bush and Putin to Sign Pact"; Tyler, "Pulling Russia Closer"; "Igor Ivanov Defends Post–Sept. 11 Foreign Policy"; Vitaliy Dymarskiy, "Around the World with Igor Ivanov: Foreign Minister Sums Up Results of 2002," *Rossiskaya gazeta*

(December 30, 2002), translated in Johnson's Russia List, December 31, 2002; Pavel Felgenhauer, "A Vicious Circle of Terror," *Moscow Times* (September 27, 2001).

53. *RFE/RL Newsline* (September 11, 2002).

54. Hoonan Peimani, "Military Buildup Ends U.S.-Russian Honeymoon," *Asia Times* (August 28, 2002); Jeanne Whalen, "Vying for Dominance in Georgia," *Wall Street Journal* (October 8, 2002): A26.

55. "Televised Address By Russian President Vladimir Putin."

56. Sergei Strokan, "What's at Stake," *Kommersant* (August 26, 2002): 5, translated in *CDPSP* 54, no. 35 (September 25, 2002): 1–2; "Political Forecasts: The United States Versus Iraq and Russia Versus Georgia," WPS Monitoring Agency (September 18, 2002), www.wps.ru/e_index.html, accessed September 29, 2004.

57. Maksim Makarychev, "Georgia: American-Style Invasion and Defense," *Rossiskaya gazeta* (August 2, 2002): 3, translated in *CDPSP* 54, no. 31 (August 28, 2002): 4–5.

58. Gennady Sysoyev, Ivan Safronov, and Georgy Dvali, "Russian General Staff Is Drawing Up Plan for Special Operation," *Kommersant* 12 September 2002: 1, translated in *CDPSP* 54, no. 37 (October 9, 2002): 1–2.

59. Vladimir Socor, "Putin's New Tune: I've Got Georgia on My Mind," *Wall Street Journal* (August 14, 2002): A12; Whalen, "Vying for Dominance in Georgia"; "Vladimir Putin, Friend or Foe of the West?" *Economist* (September 21, 2002): 46–47.

60. Zoltan Szalai, "Russia Can No Longer Be Written Off," *Nepszabadsag* (December 18, 2002), translated in Johnson's Russia List (December 19, 2002); "Political Forecasts: The United States Versus Iraq and Russia Versus Georgia."

61. "U.S. Grants Russia Market-Economy Status," *RFE/RL Newsline* (June 7, 2002); Szalai, "Russia Can No Longer Be Written Off."

62. William Anthony Hay, "America, Europe and Russia: Bush's Search for Common Ground" (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 2002).

63. Bob Davis, "Zoellick Says Trade Opens Reform Doors," *Wall Street Journal* (September 23, 2002): A2.

64. "Putin Outlines His Foreign Policy Priorities," *RFE/RL Newsline* (July 13, 2002).

65. "Foreign Minister Says No Major Differences Divide U.S., Russia," RIA-Novosti (September 21, 2002), translated in *RFE/RL Newsline* (September 23, 2002).

66. Vladimir Frolov, "Orchestra of Great Powers," *Vremya MN* (June 19, 2002): 7, translated in *CDPSP* 54, no. 25 (July 17, 2002): 5.

67. Sergei Strokan, "What's at Stake," *Kommersant* (March 5, 2003): 9, translated in *CDPSP* 55, no. 9 (April 2, 2003): 4–5.

68. Quoted in Pavel Felgenhauer, "Wiggling Toward Isolation," *Moscow Times* (February 27, 2003); "Vladimir Putin Sets Military a Task of Global Dimensions," *Kommersant* (February 22, 2003): 3, translated in *CDPSP* 55, no. 8 (March 26, 2003): 7.

69. Realists strongly urged Putin not to adopt such an approach. Russia doesn't need a serious conflict with the United States, Duma Deputy Vladimir Lukin declared, for example. It would not help Moscow to achieve what should be its paramount objective: internal modernization. "Forging blocs and coalitions against the U.S., as the USSR used to do, is a futile and costly undertaking." See Vladimir Lukin, "Decades of Peace," *Moskovskiie novosti*, no. 9 (March 11–17, 2003): 5, translated in *CDPSP* 55, no. 9 (April 2, 2003): 4.

70. "Putting the World Back Together Again," *Economist* (June 7, 2003): 20–22.

71. Viktor Kalashnikov, "The Kremlin and the 'The Hand of the West'," *Russki kurier* (March 16, 2004): 6; translated in *CDPSP* 56, no. 11 (April 14, 2004): 6; Dmitry Sidorov and Pavel Belov, "Bush Turns Up the Cold," *Kommersant* (September 17, 2004): 1, 9, translated in *CDPSP* 57, no. 37 (October 12, 2004): 9–10; C. J. Chivers and Erin Arvedlund, "Russia Tycoon Given Nine Years on Tax Charge," *New York Times* (June 1, 2005): A1; Yevgeny Bai, "Condoleezza Rice Accused of Being Devoted to Bush and Soft on Russia," *Izvestia* (January 20, 2005): 5, translated in *CDPSP* 57, no. 3 (February 16, 2005): 9; Sergei Karaganov, "Anticipating the Positive," *Rossiskaia gazeta* (February 22, 2005): 1, 3, translated in *CDPSP* 57, no. 8 (March 23, 2005): 2–3; Steven Lee Myers, "Cheney Rebukes Russia on Rights at Europe Forum," *New York Times* (May 5, 2006): A1; Jim Rutenberg and Andrew Kramer, "Russia Stumbles in Its Bid to Join Key Trade Group," *New York Times* (July 16, 2006): A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Chastising Putin, Bush Says Russia Derails Reform," *New York Times* (June 6, 2007): A1.

72. Kalashnikov, "Kremlin and the 'The Hand of the West.'"

73. Thom Shanker, "Russian Faults NATO Opening to Baltic States," *New York Times* (August 15, 2004): A1.

74. Karabeshkin and Spechler, "EU and NATO Enlargement."

75. Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference."

76. Trenin, *Reading Russia Right*.

77. Vladimir Putin, "Speech to Russian Security Council" (July 19, 2004), www.ghana.mid.ru/nfr/nfr268.html, accessed June 10, 2005.

78. George W. Bush, "Supporting Emerging Democracies" (remarks delivered at International Republican Institute Dinner, Renaissance Hotel, Washington, DC, May 17, 2005); Mikhail Zygar, "Harbinger of Color Revolutions," *Kommersant* (May 20, 2005), translated in *CDPSP* 57, no. 21 (June 22, 2005): 4–5.

79. Anatoly Vasilyev, "Bush Promises Revolutions in Central Asia and the Caucasus," *Trud* (May 20, 2005): 1, 4, translated in *CDPSP* 57, no. 21(June 22, 2005): 5.

80. Trenin, *Reading Russia Right*.

81. "NATO Has Been Asked to Leave Central Asia."

82. See, e.g., Golts, "High Price of Parity."

83. Andrew Kramer, "Shell Cedes Control of Sakhalin-2 to Gazprom," *International Herald Tribune* (December 21, 2006); Miriam Elder, "Gazprom Gets Kovytka Gas Field on the Cheap," *St. Petersburg Times* (June 26, 2007).

84. Svante Cornell, Roger McDermott, William O'Mally, Vladimir Socor, and Frederick Starr, *Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO* (Washington, DC: Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, 2004), p. 17; Paul Geehreng, *Confronting the Ghost of Stalin: Euro-Atlantic Efforts to Secure Georgia* (Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, December, 2007).

85. Uwe Klussman, "An Old Base (Friendship) Gets a Facelift," Spiegel Online (June 22, 2006), www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,422911,00.html, accessed March 18, 2009.

86. "Putin Visits Saudi Arabia" AP (February 11, 2007).

87. Guy Chazan, "Russia Reasserting Itself in Mideast," *Wall Street Journal* (March 3, 2006): A6.

88. Steven Lee Myers, "From Moscow, a New Chill," *New York Times* (May 27, 2007): D1.

89. In 2006 Foreign Minister Lavrov supported the government of Sudan, which denounced as an attempt at "regime change" a pending UN Security Council resolution calling for the dispatch of UN peacekeepers to Darfur (*Strategic Intelligence Review.* September 6, 2006). In 2007 Russia blocked a UN Security Council effort to condemn the conduct of Myanmar's government.

90. Belkovsky, "Results of the 'Orange Revolution' "; Vladimir Milov, "Summit of Missed Opportunities," *Vremia novostei* (January 19, 2006): 4, translated in *CDPSP* 58, no. 3 (February 15, 2006): 2–3.

91. Kira Latukhina, "The Russian Right Supports the 'Orange Revolution,' " *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (December 1, 2004): 4, translated in *CDPSP* 56, no. 48 (December 29, 2004): 8.

92. Clifford J. Levy, "Putin Suggests U.S. Provocation in Georgia Clash," *New York Times* (August 29, 2008): A1; Andrei Denisov, and Vera Sitnina, "In Office—Dmitry Medvedev Is Sworn In," *Vremia novostei*, May 8, 2008: 1, translated in *CDPSP* 60, nos. 17–18 (May 20–May 27, 2008): 1.

93. "Russia Nearing End of 'Confrontational Cycle' with West," interview with Andrei Piontkovsky, executive director of the Strategic Studies Center, Moscow, April 14, 2008, www.cfr.org, accessed July 10, 2008.

94. At a major economic forum in St. Petersburg in June, 2008, Medvedev denounced American "egoism." "White Nights," *Economist* (June 14, 2008): 68. He subsequently told a group of foreign journalists that a United States in an economic depression ought to stop lecturing other countries on how they should function (Clifford J. Levy, "U.S. Is in No Shape to Give Advice, Medvedev Says," *New York Times* [July 3, 2008]: A14). At the 2008 Group

of Eight summit, Russia's new president threatened unspecified "retaliatory steps" if the United States proceeded to place national missile defense components in Eastern Europe (Steve Gutterman, "A Mixed Performance for Medvedev in G-8 Debut," AP [July 10, 2008]). In its first major action at the UN after Medvedev took office, Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution introduced by the United States and supported by all Western members. The resolution would have imposed sanctions against Zimbabwe in order to induce its president to bring the opposition into the government. Russia's ambassador to the UN declared that the resolution represented excessive interference in Zimbabwe's domestic affairs and was therefore "illegitimate and dangerous" (Neil MacFarquhar, "Sanctions Plan on Zimbabwe Vetoed in U.N," *New York Times* [July 12, 2008]: A1).

95. Some Russian defense experts have asserted that the invasion was planned and prepared well in advance and was aimed primarily at ensuring that Georgia would remain in Moscow's sphere of influence. See, e.g., Pavel Felgenhauer, "This Was Not a Spontaneous, But a Planned War," August 13, 2008, www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/08/pavel_felgenhauer_on_russias_p.htm. September 29, 2008; Pavel Felgenhauer, "Russia Is Ready for a Major Confrontation with the West," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* (August 25, 2008).

96. Putin accused the United States of not merely arming and training the Georgians, but also encouraging them to attack South Ossetia. See Vladimir Putin, Interview on CNN, August 28, 2008, www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/28/russia.georgia.cold.war/index.html, accessed July 11, 2010; Levy, "Putin Suggests U.S. Provocation in Georgia Clash"; Alexander Osipovich, "Putin, Not Medvedev, Remains Master of Russian Foreign Policy," EurasiaNet (May 7, 2010).

97. It was also Medvedev who gave the formal order for the operation to begin. See Osipovich, "Putin, Not Medvedev"; Andrew Kramer, "Russia Claims Its Sphere of Influence in the World," *New York Times* (September 1, 2009): A6; Ellen Barry, "President Medvedev of Russia Dismisses Georgia's Leader as a 'Political Corpse,' " *New York Times* (September 3, 2008): A10.

98. Putin took the lead in handling Russia's relations with Kyrgyzstan in the aftermath of the April 2010 coup, for example. He immediately called Roza Otunbayeva, the head of the new provisional government, to affirm Moscow's willingness to accept her leadership and offered $50 million in new loans and aid to her country. This was a characteristically assertivist move to secure Russia's strategic interests there. Putin was likewise the central figure in recently concluded negotiations with Ukraine to allow Russia to maintain its Black Sea fleet in the Crimea for another twenty-five years, another crucial interest from an assertivist perspective. See Osipovich, "Putin, Not Medvedev."

99. While sanctions rarely work, Medvedev told Obama at their September 2009 meeting, "in some cases they are inevitable" ("Russia Open to Tougher Iran Sanctions," CBS News [September 23, 2009], www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/23/politics/main5333035.shtml).

100. Noting the evolution of Medvedev's views, Obama emphasized how gratified he was by the Russian leader's openness to persuasion. See, e.g., Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, "A Cryptic Note from Teheran Ignites Days of Urgent Diplomacy," *New York Times* (September 26, 2009): A1; David Sanger and William J. Broad, "U.S. and Allies Press Iran over Nuclear Plant 'Deception,' " *New York Times* (September 26, 2009): A1; Michael Schwirtz, "Nuclear Plant Built for Iran Is Delayed, Russia Says," *New York Times* (November 17, 2009): A8.

101. Putin appeared to be reluctant to back the use of new coercive measures that he had often criticized the United States for employing in its dealings with the rest of the world. See "Putin: Iran Sanctions Talk Premature," CBS News (October 14, 2009), www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/10/14/ap/asia/main5383850.shtml; David J. Kramer, "Putin Is Medvedev's Biggest Spoiler," *Moscow Times* (January 13, 2010).

102. Daryl G. Kimball, "Missile Defense Collision Course," *Arms Control Today* (July/August 2007), www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_07-08/focus/, accessed July 11, 2010. Putin also refused to discuss cooperation on missile defense unless the United States agreed to abandon its plans for sites in Eastern Europe. Medvedev agreed to proceed with such discussions without an American commitment on this issue (Michael A. Fletcher and Philip P. Pan, "U.S. and Russia to Reduce Arsenals," *Washington Post* [July 7, 2009]: A1).

103. Some observers think Putin was trying to block an agreement unless it embodied such a provision. See "Putin Says U.S. Missile Shield Plan Harms Arms Control Efforts," *NTI Global Security Newswire* (January 4, 2010); Kramer, "Putin Is Medvedev's Biggest Spoiler"; Mary Beth Sheridan and Michael D. Shear, "U.S., Russia Agree to New Arms Control Treaty," *Washington Post* (March 27, 2010): A2. Medvedev also made a significant concession on the ceilings stipulated by the treaty. He had tried to obtain much sharper reductions in the number of delivery vehicles the two sides were permitted (Fletcher and Pan, "U.S. and Russia to Reduce Arsenals").

104. While canceling Bush administration plans to station a radar facility in the Czech Republic and ten ground-based interceptors in Poland, Obama made clear that the United States would proceed with a new program that will involve ground-based interceptors and sensors in Europe. Obama did not rule out either of these countries as possible locations, noting that they would be central to U.S. consultations with NATO allies on the subject of missile defense (Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy, September 17, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe/, accessed July 11, 2010; Peter Baker, "White House Scraps Bush's Approach to Missile Defense," *New York Times* [September 18, 2009]: A1).

105. Obama quickly noted the difference, commenting prior to a trip to Russia in July 2009 that while Medvedev understood that "the old cold-war approach to U.S.-Russian relations is outdated," Putin still "has one foot in the old ways of doing business." See "Obama: Putin Is Keeping One Foot in the Old Ways," *Guardian* (July 2, 2009).