1

POPULISM, ROMA AND THE EUROPEAN POLITICS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

Michael Stewart

This collection of essays examines a wide range of phenomena found in different European countries, putting the case that, for the first time on a continental scale, Roma are becoming a central focus of radical, xenophobic politics. In order to understand these developments better, it will help to place them in a broader context. I argue that the way in which, over the past six or seven years, Roma and Gypsies have increasingly been treated in an intolerant and hostile fashion, reflects broader and deeply disturbing trends in European politics which have made anxiety, resentment and hostility towards 'strangers in our midst' increasingly prominent features of public life. In each of the cases discussed in this book, under various structural and social pressures, we see European actors testing the limits of the 'social imaginary' and beginning to flesh out new ways of thinking about the ties that bind and connect citizens in modern Europe. In this chapter, I focus on three forces that feed this new boundary making: the unintended impact of the European Project which, paradoxically, creates the broad conditions of receptivity to xenophobic politics across the whole continent; changes in European social and economic structures which threaten traditional redistributive systems and place poor 'others' in an unflattering spotlight; and, finally, alterations to the way citizens are linked to polity which

seem to render populist formations peculiarly attractive at the outset of what may prove to be a long-lasting, conservative cultural mood.

In this broader context, hostility to the Roma is, *mutatis mutandi*, the counterpart of various forms of hostility to Muslim immigrant minorities in other countries. In both cases the social problems associated with the presence of a reasonably easily identifiable 'other' are being re-presented as the consequence of inherent, unchangeable features of an alien, 'non-' or 'un-European' culture. Like its mainly western counterpart, anti-Gypsy politics has largely left behind the crude 'colour' racism of the middle of the twentieth century, replacing it with a form of culture conflict modelled on popular versions of Huntingdon's 'clash of civilisations'. It is no accident, as we shall see, that it is the image of 'criminal Roma' or 'workshy Roma'—rather than Roma *per se*—that provides one of the clarion calls of the new xenophobic politics.

Europe and its unexpected others

The European Project—that grand conception of an economic union and growing political coordination alongside some kind of cultural marriage of the ever feuding nations of Europe—was conceived, in the years just after the Second World War, as a space of cosmopolitan democracy and a well-spring of toleration. The writings of the German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, provided perhaps the most compelling, if always critical, exegesis of this project. But times have changed. Sixty years on, at the start of the second decade of the new millennium, this project is profoundly challenged. All readers of this book will be familiar with the profound institutional difficulties thrown up by the adoption of a single currency as well as by painful issues around (the tragically now all-but-forgotten) enlargement. This collection focuses instead on a less visible challenge that arises in the form of a recurrent and widespread transformation of 'the social weight of difference' (Berezin, 2009)—a transformation that, it can be argued, derives in large part from the inachieved and hesitant nature of the European Project.[1]

Differences in 'race', 'ethnicity', religion and nationality are always more or less present in modern societies. Sometimes these have historical roots, as in eastern European states where the legacy of imperial collapse and the ethnic division of labour in early modern society have produced large, territorial patchworks of cultural difference. In western Europe such differences derive either from the history of colonialism and withdrawal or, more

recently, under the weight of impending demographic collapse, with countries compelled to bring in migrant labour to meet the demands of the local labour market. The free movement of persons and labour, which is one of the fundamental planks of the European Project, also encourages new forms of ethnic mixing within EU Member States. Now, under a series of endogenous and exogenous shocks to both the European Project and the nation states that constitute it, the tendency to categorise these various 'others' not just as different, but as agents of disorder or bearers of an unspecified 'threat' to national identity is gaining cultural and political momentum.[2]

An alteration in 'the social weight of difference' poses of course a dissipate challenge to a programme of restructuring as vast and apparently robust as 'the European Project'. But because of the power of electoral revolts, changes of tide in the currents of public opinion have a nasty habit of producing sudden and unexpected political shifts, as Europe's political leaders discovered to their embarrassment (if not any real cost) with the systematic rejection by their peoples of the 2005 European Constitution. Moreover, this change in the way difference is experienced, these new ways of thinking about society and reciprocal social bonds, acquire compelling force because they appear to offer one way of seeing off the huge social changes being driven by the tectonic shifts in the global economic and political order since the 1980s. The result is that the conceptual space for thinking about tolerance and co-existence has radically changed since the boom years of postwar Europe, when the European Project emerged. I will, shortly, explain why I place Europe at the centre of the problem, but first let me establish the evidential case that the conditions in which we deal with 'difference' are truly shifting.

Data in support of this claim are multifarious and the changing attitudes towards Roma and Gypsies—some of which I discussed in the introduction and which is, with the exception of Italy, perhaps more visible in eastern and southern Europe than in the north and west—are just one small part of this. In many western European countries, in the wake of the, historically speaking, recent immigration of religiously distinct populations to a number of north European countries, Muslim minorities have been brought into the political spotlight. In Belgium, as a result, we have had the stupefying example of the Members of Parliament, who, in May 2010, while allowing their country to totter one more step towards dissolution, were willing to take time out from staring into the political abyss to pass a law that would affect less than a hundred women in their country, by banning them

from wearing what might, in jollier times, be plausibly glossed as a fashion accessory promoted by a tiny group of mullahs in the Persian gulf. Likewise, in the midst of the greatest international financial crisis since the 1930s, the Swiss population thought it a proper moment to outlaw further constructions of minarets in their country. In the Netherlands, a party that brilliantly combines paternalist and xenophobic discourses about religious others with a democratic rhetoric of rights and entitlements has managed to reshape the national political field and, in September 2010, threatened to enter government as a junior coalition partner. In each case, the idiom of hostility and exclusion varies—anything that challenges the French totem of secularism is the enemy in the Hexagon, while in their mountain fastness the Swiss appear to be overcome by a true form of Islamophobia—but in all these cases the mere fact of cultural diversity is deemed to present an unacceptable challenge to peace, order and the good life.[3]

In Italy, we see just how far a regional government is willing to put its Roma in a 'state of exception' where the standard considerations from which full citizens benefit no longer apply (Giovanni Picker, this volume). In May 2008 Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi signed a decree declaring a 'state of emergency in relation to settlements of communities of nomads'.[4] An ordinance followed, ordering identification (including fingerprints) of people 'also of minor age' living in the 'nomad camps'.[5] The European Parliament condemned the decree, stating, 'collecting fingerprints of Roma [...] would clearly constitute an act of direct discrimination based on race and ethnic origin'.[6] Nevertheless, the Italian government continued to collect personal data and, on 27 July, the Minister of Interior, Roberto Maroni, gave a justificatory speech to the Italian Parliament claiming in a moment of inspired cynicism that he was merely providing legal identities to those nomads whose lifestyle had prevented their acquisition through more regular channels. As Mr Sarkozy has learnt at his cost, and as the Czechs have long known, the essential move is formally to de-ethnicise in order to avoid accusations of racism. So, Mr Maroni pointed out that 'in the ordinance we never speak about Roma, but only about nomad camps. Therefore, this is not an ethnicity-based measure, but one which deals with a *de facto* situation [*situazione di fatto*], meaning the unauthorised nomad camps'.[7]

This series of events in spring and summer 2008 has become the standard of everyday national politics vis-à-vis Roma in contemporary Italy; since the Berlusconi election of 2008 the government seems to have been carrying out a consistent boundary-making process separating 'us' from 'them'

(Wimmer, 2002: 52). Frequent forced evictions, a political rhetoric blaming Roma for creating insecurity, and intolerance in political speeches, characterise the political discourse in this country.

In Hungary, the Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik for short, has successfully colonised 'the Gypsy question' (as this has long been known). It draws on and reinforces a series of widespread myths and genuine conflicts. Hungarian public culture has long been concerned with a purported demographic collapse of the Magyar people and this has for two or more generations fed fears about 'swamping' by the Roma. In 1981, Hungarians believed (wrongly) that Roma made up over 12 per cent of the population (researchers reliably estimated 5 per cent). In 2001 respondents claimed that Roma were nearly 23 per cent of the population and estimated that by 2021 they would be over 35 per cent of the Hungarian citizenship (they remain, in reality, c. 7 per cent).[8] Jobbik politicians link this phantasmagorical demographic explosion to fears of welfare dependency and the collapse of the Hungarian welfare state. At the same time, by focusing on high levels of petty criminality among the long-term poor and battling to get the label 'Gypsy crime' accepted for this, Jobbik has managed to run an extraordinarily successful campaign. Often they have simply argued that 'Gypsy crime exists'[9] and by doing so aim at a double target: the Roma who, they (falsely) say are responsible for most violent crime and the political elite, NGOs, liberals, ex-communists, etc., who want to cover this truth up and lie to the people.

In Slovakia, the governing authorities seem to have accepted that all Roma-related initiatives have so far yielded little result and have considered adopting more radical solutions, including separating Roma children from their families and placing them in boarding schools. In the words of the Slovak Prime Minister, the relevant programme would 'gradually put as many Roma children as possible into boarding schools and gradually separate them from the life they live in the settlements'.[10] The problem here is not so much the idea of providing collegium for children of impoverished families, but the tone of the proposal which is entirely cast as an assault on the 'inadaptables', the Roma.

In Bulgaria these days one does not need to go far to encounter the strands of intensely negative discourse towards Roma—in 2009, the nation's most popular politician (the former mayor of Sofia) Boyko Borisov pleaded to a large Bulgarian immigrant meeting in Chicago for expatriates to return to their country to help deal with the problem of the 'bad human capital', that is the 1 million Roma, 700,000 Turks and 2.5 million retirees.[11] Con-

trary to the media's immediate assessment that Borisov had committed political suicide, the message resonated with deeply held sentiments in Bulgaria. Borisov was elected Prime Minister a few months later. Once it was the Turkish speaking and Muslim minority—as cross-border kin of the neighbouring Turkish state (and behind that as symbolic embodiments of the Ottoman behemoth)—that were the national enemy. How times change. As Efremova shows (this volume) the young, passionate, educated, and patriotic members of the flourishing 'National Guard' see their organisation as 'the guardian of Bulgarians against Gypsy terror'.[12]

Several of the authors in this book point to the role of political elites, who use the 'Gypsy issue' to reframe broader policy areas like welfare and security (see, e.g., Picker and Zolnay). But none of these changes can be laid simply at the door of politicians who take possession of an issue to whip up an obfuscating nationalist fervour and draw clear lines around a constituency of voters. Politicians, of course, have a central role in disseminating ideas—both those who adopt this powerful form of rhetoric and, those on the other side, who in their feeble and mealy-mouthed manner fail to make a case for the benefits of cultural diversity and avoid confronting xenophobic discourse head-on—but they are feeding upon fears, anxieties and discourses that arise independently of their activities. We can see this in the way the newfound fear of otherness bursts out in the lives of 'ordinary' individuals. On Saturday 15 May 2010, in a shop in Trignac, in north-western France, a sixty-year-old lawyer, aided by her daughter, ripped the veil of a younger Muslim customer, after making remarks about her 'black burqa'.[13] And in the same month, after a shoot out between two local families of Serbian descent in the sleepy Swiss town of Martigny, locals called for all 'criminal foreigners' to be expelled. A motion to this effect was put before the Swiss federal parliament by the Democratic Union of the Centre.[14] So when figures like President Sarkozy attack the presence of Roma migrants living in shanty towns under bridges, alongside motorways and in other lost spaces of the urban jungle, though he is attempting to legitimise a hyperbolically exaggerated policy initiative, he is also drawing on widespread concern, disquiet and even revulsion at these living conditions and those who appear to bring them into being.

From suburban fisticuffs, through 'radical policy initiatives' in the speeches of mayoral candidates, to parliamentary antics and the speeches of Prime Ministers-in-waiting or presidents in polling trouble, there lies a common thread: with respect to culturally or religiously different minori-

ties, the norms of reciprocal respect and trust among peoples who live alongside each other in European countries are coming under threat. Difference is being reframed as incompatibility and purportedly culturally distinct behaviour is being used to justify radical demands for 'root and branch' reform of educational, welfare and, in extreme cases, citizenship regimes. And it is often the mere fact of persistent 'otherness' that is given social value in these diverse claims and assertions.

As this cultural politics of difference widens its scope throughout Europe what is at stake is a debate over the very nature of society—a debate the proponents of the new politics are both able and ready to 'colonize politically' (Holmes, 2000: 36). And they are able to do so rather effectively because of the new (intended and unintended) possibilities for coordination of events across the EU. So, at the very moment of increased migration of Roma to the west from countries like Romania and Bulgaria (giving rise to new tensions in western European countries at the end of a long period of increased labour mobility) we have witnessed a rise in populist fury at economic and political stagnation in countries of the east (Hungary and Bulgaria in particular). Local populists did not miss the opportunity to capitalise domestically on the role of the migrant Roma in giving their country a poor name abroad. This way of bringing together events in different parts of our continent to political advantage may harbinger a longer term danger. The very fora designed to enable European integration, such as the European Parliament, may in time be turned by the forces of populism—so often divided by the national particularism inherent in this political style—into a space where they can discover the echo of each other's contempt for 'the Roma' and achieve further and more frightening metamorphoses of anti-Roma politics.[15]

Anti-Roma politics in the context of the new populist and integralist politics

Drawing on the research brought together in this volume I have come to the conclusion that the increasing salience of anti-Roma politics today is not only not simply, but is only barely the product of economic crisis and 'structural adjustment'. While such forces do drive the engines of pessimism, disillusion and a receptivity to radical politics, the idioms and framing of anti-Roma politics have much deeper roots than this and are best seen as but one expression of a wider phenomenon in which the European

social imaginary is mutating.[16] Across the continent, the idioms, concerns and stakes that define political practices in their everyday, localised forms are altering in such a way that ethnic or religious others come to have a newfound political prominence (see Hansen, 1999: 14). In the former communist countries of central and eastern Europe, as democratic discourses and procedures are 'vernacularised', we find processes that closely parallel a slightly older phenomenon in western Europe where far too many politicians now claim that they are able and willing to defend national culture against immigrant groups, 'foreign values', or even the unwanted influence of their neighbouring states in domestic affairs.

In order to specify these general roots of the new anti-Roma politics and to demonstrate why I believe that this phenomenon is here to stay we need to take a look into the nature and the social bases of what one might, hitching together the work of two social scientists, call the new populist-integralist politics. I have found the works of Douglas Holmes and Mabel Berezin—both of whom view Europe from a distant vantage, transatlantically—particularly inspiring. In a wide-ranging investigation, Douglas Holmes argues that the novelty of 'integralist' politics today lies in the attempt to link the search for lost or disappearing socio-cultural solidarities with a new way of imagining society. He calls this project integralism, perhaps because of its use of rich and distinctive local life-worlds to model and indeed provide the institutional scaffolding for socio-cultural integration at regional or state level. Mabel Berezin, for her part, has focused on the disruptions imposed on the traditional order of national citizenship as a result of pan-European transformations and the anxieties these engender. Taken together, Holmes and Berezin's work provides a compelling basis for understanding the rise in a politicised anti-Romany sentiment.

The nature of the populist-integralist programme and its European context

Following Douglas Holmes, we can see that the movements that have recently promulgated anti-Roma politics draw on a long tradition of European political thought that Isaiah Berlin once identified as 'the counter-Enlightenment' and that also came to be known in the early twentieth century as 'populism'. Populism is understood here, following Berlin, as based less on a set of political assumptions than on postulates about the essence of human nature. Populism is, in brief, the belief in the political and

social value of belonging to a group or culture. It is, therefore, inextricably linked with the threat of alienation—the uprooting of persons, their deracination and cultural estrangement—all themes that provide vivid imagery to modern populist-integralisms.[17]

Populism takes what are, in reality, the dispersed and hugely diverse human practices and beliefs of a population in a territory (mostly a national territory) and endows them with a collective significance, creating in this way distinctive political possibilities for reframing the image of a society.[18] In order to do so it draws, according to Berlin, on a number of different strands or styles of thought. One of these is a tradition of expressionism, according to which all human creations have a 'voice', which, in effect, articulates a deeper, and more real, 'inner truth' and ideal. The institutions, and all the creations of a people, at least when the people is free, give voice to its inner nature. In this way all the nation's acts can be seen as expressions of a collective will. The concomitant of this is, of course, that the people's voice can be smothered (by a small powerful clique of 'foreigners' or, as today, by masses of impoverished, pampered 'aliens').

Populism also draws on a strand of pluralism that rests on a belief in the multiplicity and, above all, the incommensurability of the values of different cultures and societies. Resistance to all forces that can be represented as threatening the unique culture of a people is thus built into such movements. In this way, populists appear to offer a means for circumventing the, supposedly, alienating and homogenising forces of modernity, by calling on the aid of culturally based solidarities. The duty, then, of the populist politician is to preserve cultural distinctions among 'an enduring plurality of different groups' and this provides the rationale for discriminatory practices of inclusion and exclusion that we see popping up in Czech towns (Albert, this volume) and Italian cities alike (Picker, this volume).

But there are crucial new features to the politics that Holmes analyses and that lead him to give them the 'integralist' moniker. The recent populist realignment has used incongruent aspects of the European Project to rethink the very terms of reference of what a European agenda might mean and, in so doing, built an anti-European and anti-cosmopolitan politics. Just as President Sarkozy, in the aftermath of the French 'no' to the new constitution in 2005, ended a tradition of denouncing nationalism as the enemy of Europeanism by declaring Europe to be the best means of defending national interests (see Fassin, 2011: 515) so, in a more systematic fashion, have the populists taken up and transformed to their own ends

quasi-theoretical, quasi-administrative schemas that have operated in this institutional setting for some fifty years. Modern populist-integralism's love affair with the strong state and its promotion of cultural plurality derives as much from the use of this model by the EU as from this oppositional movement's own historical-intellectual roots. It thereby, as we shall see, ties itself into dominant socio-cultural models of what a modern Europe should look like, even as it effectively drastically limits and undermines central tenets of those models.

The European Project has been based in a broad societal theory that blends a complex moral vision and technocratic practice, but lacks a formal constitutional theory or philosophy of its own (Judt, 2005: 100–129). Holmes' survey of the treaties that serve as constitutional instruments uncovers a highly pragmatic organisational emphasis but a lack of any overarching, openly articulated, theoretically grounded vision of where Europe is headed and on what basis. Discrepancies between the administrative agenda and national practice have been historically resolved, at least within the bureaucratic elite that sits in the European driving seat, through merging two discursive frameworks: Catholic social doctrine and French social modernism. These have served, albeit not as official doctrines or policies of the EU, as conceptual approaches that underpin a loose European federalism.

The EU's model of technocratic governance appears to have been inspired by French social modernism's concept of society as 'a field of human interdependence susceptible to planning and administration through the application of scientific norms and principles' (Holmes, 2000: 29). Though drawing on the works of de Tocqueville, Le Play, Proudhon and Durkheim, in its ultimate expression it envisages a highly pragmatic, state-led social project coalescing around what Holmes calls 'a school of solidarity'. The state is to be led by societal technicians seeking to create a distinctive social order through administrative interventions in infrastructures, industry, public services and social welfare. Thus, what Paul Rabinow once termed the 'middling modernism' that was imposed in France since the 1950s, became the basis of the technocratic practice of the EU, which drew its method of 'convergent action' as well as the paradigm of institutional decision-making from this model.

The second strand of European technocratic thought derives from German Social Catholicism which, like the above, also has its roots in ideas that emerged coterminous with industrial societies in the late nineteenth century. This too seeks to create an intricate moral discourse connecting society

and the individual, providing an account of the conditions of individual autonomy and its source in social interdependencies. According to this doctrine, man is a social person who achieves perfection only in society; the state exists to help the persons who live in society, by providing the complex conditions that enable people to live in groups ('the common good'); and allows individuals to take care of their own needs (Mulcahy, cited in Holmes, 2000: 48).[19]

For their part, integralist politicians have an ambivalent relationship with these ideological legacies—for, just like progressive resistance, its populist counterpart is constrained to follow the contours of power. So, while the populists resist the radical restructuring of the social order that French social modernism has sought, haltingly, to impose since 1980 or so, they dream still of a strong state that will defend the people and its nation. Likewise, they reject the extensive social solidarity of the Catholic doctrines—rejecting its application to immigrants in the west and the Roma in the east—but they still draw on the ideas of subsidiarity, the protection of cultural groups and state intervention to sustain the cultural diversity that is at the root of their objection to the modernist social project.[20]

The integralists are thus part and parcel of fierce debates around what Europe might stand for. Holmes identified three sub-strands of 'cultural' discourse that jostle for attention and hegemony in current discussions about what a modern Europe should look like. Each of these is imbued with varying intensities of emotion and conceptual rigour and each of them impacts on attitudes towards poor minorities, like the Roma. We need to assess them all briefly as these strands of discourse are to a limited, but important, extent mutually constitutive, and help shape what is fast becoming the fourth strand in European debates, populist-integralism itself.

The first strand is a version of cultural pluralism rooted in an idealised view of European civilisation and results in a vision of cultural diversity transcended by religion: 'Europe unified by Christendom'. This is probably a rather widely held and certainly rarely debated view uniting politicians as distinct as Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, *burqa* banning Belgians, anti-Muslim Bulgarians, Hungarian and Polish conservatives, as well as Popes past and present.

Holmes describes the second strand, as pursuing 'a pluralism manifest institutionally in a decentralized and socially progressive 'Europe of regions' in which ethnic, religious and cultural distinctions could be preserved, if not enhanced' (34).[21] Central to this view is the Catholic concept of sub-

sidiarity, which is the devolution of power as a constitutional guarantee protecting fundamental cultural rights.

Now, up to quite recently, an equally important third strand in European 'moral thought' kept the implications of these various pluralisms in check: a profound opposition to racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and neo-fascism—that is, all the forces that appear most hostile to a humane and tolerant Europe and against which Europe was built in the aftermath of the Second World War. This is also connected to the deep rejection of nationalism (ever since the 1951 Schumann Plan) within the European technocratic elite.[22]

The drawback, however, of this way of tackling the logical implications of pluralism is that by constantly and solely invoking the horrors of the Second World War and the Holocaust as the moral basis of the European Project, it obscures potentially more potent and relevant contemporary models of European unity in plurality and thereby restricts a defence of cultural diversity as a political agenda in its own right, preventing such a defence from finding terms and idioms relevant to the world we live in today (see also Holmes, 1999: 35).

Holmes reached the conclusion that (populist-) integralism now represents the fourth strand in this European socio-moral discourse. This strand is very sceptical of the whole European Project, as currently conceived, and believes that the universalist metaphysics and practices that have provided its foundational architecture, have at every step ridden roughshod over basic facts of human nature and society. For integralists, the European Project should be radically transformed, redirected towards the emergent cultural imperatives, which have been articulated so well by authors in the populist, expressionist and pluralist counter-Enlightenment tradition.

It is this discourse, I would argue, that provides the foundation and strength of modern anti-Romany political strategies and that transforms what were old, stereotyping and oppressive prejudices about Gypsies that had no political import beyond the local level into a national (transnational?) political agenda that could, in the not too distant future, pose very serious threats to Europe's Romany minority.

Populism as pathological normalcy in Europe?

Various academic labels have been attached to the resurgent populist-integralisms, many of which imply this political phenomenon occupies a specific temporality or temporal position: the 'populist moment' (Berezin) or 'zeitgeist' (Mudde), 'neo-nationalism' (Gingrich and Banks) and a 'silent

counter revolution' (Ignazi). Questions inevitably arise then as to how enduring this mood that promotes anti-Roma and anti-migrant politics is likely to be; how deep and wide does it run?

The evidence suggests that there are large electoral bases for a politics of this sort. These include, of course, all or many of those people who have lost out over the past thirty years. In different ways, in different regions of Europe, a profound socio-economic reconfiguration has taken place since the mid 1970s, gaining strength particularly after the end of the Cold War. Fundamental transformations have occurred in the structure of the economy and society: the collapse of Russo-Soviet domination of eastern Europe and the communist economies that went with this; rapid integration of European markets; and new regulations and financial structures and wholesale economic restructuring. All these are compounded by the dawning realisation of the impending and radical transformation of the European demographic profile, which, in turn, has led to a widespread movement of labour into Europe as citizens and states try to cope with demographic imbalance. These have helped produce what Ignazi calls a 'conservative cultural mood'; together all this has made possible the reinterpretation, or new imagining of 'society', that is now generating a redefinition of our political culture.

Specifically, at the level of lived experience, traditional, local orders of distinction and privilege have collapsed, and pre-existing frameworks of social meaning (the value of particular sorts of manual labour, for instance, in Hungarian, Bulgarian or Czech steel towns or Italian alpine villages) have been impoverished. And the moral claims, from communities that sustained such life worlds, to support from the central state, have evaporated. These people form 'the new poor', identified by Holmes and Berezin, as a whole category marked less by the loss of socio-economic status as by their sense of 'expulsion from the public sphere'. These all-round losers feel that relationships binding them 'to a wider social nexus' have been nullified and, as a result, they find it difficult if not impossible to achieve an all encompassing conception of society. In many places of Europe we find these people struggling to resist change, and hoping to reinsert themselves in a social order by creating what Holmes calls 'integral lives'. These lives are sustained by an inner cultural logic, enabling people to retain and even develop cultural practices that they see as defying the deracinating and homogenising effects of EU integration and rapid economic transformation.

But beyond those who have lost out over the past thirty-five years, there seem to be broader electorates that are attracted by a politics built on the

integralist skeleton. Populist-integralists provide a language and practice of identification and, thereby, a living model of an alternative social order in which many of the most threatening social forces appear to have been neutered—and this gives their discursive programme a wide appeal. Where do we find these electorates? A traditional answer would be among those we have just discussed, the most disillusioned and 'the losers from globalisation' or in central and eastern Europe those who perceive themselves as 'the losers of the transition'. But in eastern Europe, in essence, this is the majority of the population, as demonstrated by numerous sociological studies.[23] In any event, it is not possible to draw a firm line between the haves and have-nots, for perception plays a critical role in such social positioning.

Georgia Efremova's paper in this volume demonstrates the wide range of audiences and participants at Bulgarian National Guard events. Her fellow marchers during her participant observational research were students from the university—not the lumpen proletariat. Douglas Holmes made a similar point in his earlier research, remarking on the plurality of audiences he saw at Le Pen events in France (and likewise for the other integralist politicians he studied, including the British National Party). Various sections of society attend these events that see their moral frameworks of meaning eroded and are drawn to 'the politics of loss and dissatisfaction'—including farmers, conservative Catholics, pensioners and schoolteachers, factory workers, owner of small shops and businesses, university students, youth organisations, and police.[24] As far as these people are concerned, the current populism is the rebellion of the 'silent majority'. The populist followers today (of Geert Wilders in Holland, the National Front in France and Gabor Vona in Hungary) include the hardworking, slightly conservative, law abiding citizen, who in silence but with growing anger, sees his world being 'perverted' by progressives, criminals and aliens.

And so, though populism, like the charismatic authority of its most characteristic leaders, has a reputation as an unstable, episodic political force with a cyclical dynamic, this new populist-integralism may present a different kind of beast. In the traditional model, drawn of course from Weber's foundational discussions, when an explicitly populist, outsider group gains prominence, parts of the establishment react with a combined strategy of preventing them from gaining a toehold in the system, and including populist themes and rhetoric in their own discourse and policies. It was this dynamic that led Mudde to talk of a 'populist Zeitgeist' (2004) when the political atmosphere is clouded by populist concerns and rhetoric. As soon

as the populist challenge seems to have peaked, the zeitgeist evaporates. But, today, in part because of the structural challenges discussed below in the nature of European polities, it may be that populism will prove to be a more regular feature in liberal democracies, erupting whenever significant sections of the 'silent majority' feel that the governing elite no longer represents them (Mudde, 2004: 563). In other words, we may be dealing with a new ideological concoction that represents a profound and lasting change in the political culture, rather than a social programme expressing a purely local and temporary pathology. Or, as Mudde puts it, we may be witnessing a paradigmatic shift from populism as a 'normal pathology' to populism as a 'pathological normalcy'.[25]

So what are the characteristic and distinctive features of this new politics and its context that may render it troublingly enduring? First, it is crucial to understand that this phenomenon is novel. In the period 1950–94 or so, with the memory of the 1930s so present and with (until the mid-1970s), the living example of dictatorships in the Iberian peninsula, extremist politics remained marginalised in European societies. Radicalism represented a savage exception to mainstream national politics and only managed to garner very limited support, with movements of resurgence being snuffed out as rapidly as they emerged (Goodwin, 2011: 1). It appeared then as if these 'normal' circumstances would last forever. However, since the mid-1990s, when, for the first time since 1945, an extreme right-wing party entered a democratic government (in Italy), a range of new parties and political actors have entrenched themselves in the European political scene (Berezin, 2009).[26]

Second, the kind of cultural solutions to enduring socio-economic problems that populist-integralisms promote—the recasting of social solidarity in a culturally particularistic framework in order to undermine the idea of a pluralist Europe—is also ideologically novel in the sense that it is not a replaying of the politics of the 1930s, however familiar certain of its (mainly symbolic) gestures appear to be. Its modern features include targeting those beneath (welfare claimants) not those above (financiers, lawyers, Jews) apart from the ever-loathed 'establishment'; its lack of interest in militaristic expansionism and rewriting past injustice and its far more rigorous adherence to democratic forms and electoral legitimacy. The focus in eastern Europe on criminal and workshy Roma and on immigration and religion in western Europe are even clearer examples of the way culture rather than race has been politicised by these movements.[27]

Third, the truly radical nature of the European Project and the ways in which the policy momentum of European integration has disrupted local life-worlds have provided a peculiarly potent and, commonly, infuriating image of a political elite divorced from the concerns of ordinary (national) citizens, which plays straight into the traditional hinterland of populism.[28] As Holmes argues, structurally, the EU is a political project concealed as a series of technical tweakings of European economic arrangements, a point its founder, Jean Monnet, once conceded.[29] As a result, the European Project appears to involve a multiplicity of layers of informal, inter-governmental agreements that rarely come under public scrutiny—that are not subject to any obvious democratic scrutiny at the voting urns. Notoriously, Europeans cannot name their MEPs and have minimal understanding of the workings of the Brussels/Strasbourg machine. At the same time those 'technical tweakings' emanating from the Leviathan have very tangible consequences in peoples' lives from the trivial—like the type and shape of bananas that Europeans were able to eat in the early 1990s—to the hugely significant—like the number of hours Europeans are allowed to (declare to) work each week or the imminent and potentially permanent destruction of European fish stocks, or, for members of the Eurozone, the fiscal framework within which nationally elected governments have to operate.

Furthermore, as Mabel Berezin points out, on a macro level, European integration has disequilibrated the mix of national cultural practice and legal norms that have governed European nation states. For instance, national constitutions have had to be changed in order to adapt to EU law, or, as in France, the constitution was altered in order to be able to call a referendum on the EU constitution. Perhaps even more pertinently, on a micro level, integration violates longstanding habits of collective national attachment and national experience through regulatory harmonisation amongst other things (Berezin, 2009: 195). So, the accelerated process of integration produces a combination of macro and micro disequilibration; it threatens to make the nation space 'unfamiliar' to many citizens and this opens the door to contestation; hence we find national identities and nation-ness are reasserted across the political spectrum as a consequence.[30] As Berezin puts this, Europeanisation disaggregates and reaggregates established national political space, but never resolves the central tension inherent in its attempt to reconceptualise the polity while retaining the territorial nation state as its primary building bloc (2009: 194).

Like it or not, the nation state has been and still is the cultural compromise of modernity (Wimmer, 2002). As a political form it is not just geo-

graphically situated and territorially bounded, and as such a material entity, but it is also an experiential entity, because it gives 'cultural form to collective interpretations of the past and evaluations of the future' (Berezin, 2009: 46). As Andreas Wimmer has argued, national experience is the collective experience of living on a territory with a distinct set of cultural and legal norms which produces attachments (based on national security, individual enfranchisement and shared language/culture) and it is this national experience, which demonstrates and confirms that passion for the nation is not an isolated emotion held by political extremists, but something much wider and deeply seated. The force of such attachments were manifested, by way of example, in the multiple 'nos' to the European constitution. As this book goes to press they are being asserted even more fiercely in the diverse responses to the crisis of the euro. In this way we see, following Benedict Anderson's pioneering study (1983/1991), that nations are not only political categories, but they are also constituted as moral ontologies, or collectively defined ways of being in the world. As Berezin puts it, 'national experience is a committed and committing phenomenon, a part of daily life that lies dormant with the collective and individual consciousness, until an internal or external force threatens that experience and makes it manifest' (Berezin, 2009: 49).

And this is precisely what Europeanisation has done: threatened national experience and made it manifest as well as simultaneously failing to provide a plausible cultural explanation of what will replace the 'moral ontology' of the nation.[31] This is the same point that Douglas Holmes has been making for some time: the consolidation of a vast multicultural and multiracial Europe is a central dimension of the emerging social order but remains unmatched by a fundamental constitutional philosophy, let alone political structures that could underpin this kind of integration.[32] Europe as a cultural concept and project (neither a 'melting pot' nor nation-building) remains undefined, the language of its descriptions in various treaties elliptical. And the very real damage done by leaving this central ambiguity becomes obvious when it is the negation of Europe (what it is 'not') that is the only category available to define Europe's terms of reference. Thus, for example, the terms 'non-EC nationals', 'third countries', and 'non-Europeans', all of which are categories of administrative action, serving as organising principles at the borders and boundaries of the new twenty-seven state Europe, have come to shape core understandings of 'Europe'. And this, in turn, provides one of the sources for integralist politics of exclusion in our case too—Roma as non-Europeans.

But it is not just the way the European Union has operated and the unintended consequences of the impact of its bureaucracy that lies behind the success of populist-integralism. There are other pan-continental forces at work as well.

Mabel Berezin points to some of the further sources of these peoples' dissatisfaction with the existing structures and their search for 'a new European political, social and cultural space' (2009: 29) and, in particular, points to the changing nature of the relationship of the people to the polity that has left many feeling that they have no public voice. Until recently, European party structures have been, in the *longue durée* since the end of the nineteenth century, remarkably stable. This is not to say that individual parties have been long lived, but that the type of parties, the style of their politics and their typical constituencies, have been so. In the past thirty years or so, however, this has begun to alter. Signs of emerging disconnections have included the appearance of fringe and new parties, voter apathy ('the disappearing voter') and electoral instability—unprecedented rates of abstention on the local, national and European level have produced electoral fluctuations on an unprecedented scale (2009: 29). Whereas party affiliation used to be rooted in a whole way of life, and loyalties were transmitted in the workplace, the café or the kitchen, now the much greater role media plays in the dissemination of political information contributes to the shift away from the ideological commitments of old-style European politics.[33]

Much the same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for eastern Europe, where the emergence of new political forces after the end of Soviet occupation, and the failure of almost all the historical (pre-1949) parties to re-establish themselves, has produced a rather similar result. In general then, if Berezin is correct that one of the functions of political parties in European democracies has been to mediate the relationship between people and polity, then there is analytic work to be done in capturing how the 'folk' can today be linked to the state. The emergence of new forms of 'civic engagement' especially around the integralist agendas is surely one sign of such structural adjustment. This is the reason, it seems to me, that Hungarian and Bulgarian students can join with such abandon populist movements (Jobbik and the Bulgarian National Guard or its successors) that have uniformed wings attached to them. At least in the Hungarian case the uniform's design is brilliantly ambivalent—you would say it was a Hungarian folk dancer's suit until the insignia of the militia and the armbands are attached. It is as if, in a strange way, the presence of this kind of semi-militaristic force acts as a

guarantee of a form of representation that has, as I argued above, been lost along with the life-world of labour, welfare and social security for life.

Integralist politicians address a wide range of groups, who are deeply dissatisfied with and distrustful of the political system, and feel almost wholly unrepresented on their own terms. They reassure them that they do not need 'to divest themselves of their idiosyncratic identities'; on the contrary, the only way they can guarantee themselves meaningful social participation is from the standpoint of their own particular sensibilities and consciousness (Holmes, 2009: 59).

The strong focus on family, gender and sexual policy in many of these movements—from Bulgaria where Romany prostitution and transvestism provides a rich source of outrage, through to Denmark and Holland where the pressure from the opponents of multicultural tolerance impose tests on non-western migrants to ensure, for instance, that they understand that tolerance of nude bathing is a part of the national way of life, provides another way in which the new populism successfully links the normative practices of the everyday and domestic to the national and the political. Eric Fassin talks of 'sexualised democracy' to refer to these forms of sexualised nationalisms and Douglas Holmes of 'experimental identity projects', but at its simplest the politics of exclusion, through enforcing gender and kinship codes, looks very like traditional politics—establishing order through controlling the types of families and sexual relations people may legitimately enter into. This is, of course, immediately recognisable to anyone familiar with the literature on South Asian nationalisms where conflicts over veiling and purdah go back as long as the life of nationalist movements. The novelty lies less, then, in the content or form of such politics, than in the intensity with which such concerns are felt today in Europe and the extent to which, therefore, populist-integralists are able to mobilise support around the defence of 'our way of life'. It is, as anthropologists teach their students in Kinship 101, the apparent naturalness of our way of doing family that makes it such a powerful tool for justifying, in democratic terms, the exclusion of others.

Taking an eagle-eye, then, to the rise of populist politics, we find changes in public culture that favour radicalisation and system polarisation—that is to say the rise of a neo-conservative cultural mood and a tendency towards radicalisation and polarisation in response to the emergence of issues not treated by the mainstream parties (of left or right), including, especially, immigration or Roma, and security issues; all of this leads to the

presence of an underground and mounting legitimacy crisis of the political and party system.[34]

This has a crucial consequence for minorities in European states and the Roma in particular. As Holmes insists, populist-integralism presents political meaning as expressed in collective experiences and forms of solidarity rooted in town, class, community or nation. This doctrine leads integralist audiences straight back to questioning current, dominant conceptions of human collectivity as rooted in shared humanity, and towards experimental identity projects which aim to fill the perceived 'gaps' in today's public culture.[35] And since nationalism is the main 'cultural compromise' of modernity, and the drawing of group boundaries occurs invariably along national and ethnic lines (with the nation state as the primary form of social closure even today), it is more or less inevitable that populism will use ethnic and ethno-religious markers to define who is in and who is out of the new society. So, one way integralism offers its constituency a 'way back in' is through removing the symbolically offending and wounding 'other' (be they Muslims or Roma) who are imagined to have unjustly occupied the public space from which such constituencies feel excluded (see Horváth, this volume).[36] And it is for this reason that integralists are so emotionally violated by everyday practices that try to institute a cosmopolitan and tolerant space, such as the much maligned 'politically correct' language, or monitoring of public spending (and appointments) for evidence of discrimination. This is why their supporters take such visceral pleasure when their leaders theatrically violate the conventions of political discourse with self-consciously 'outrageous' comments. They are, in such gestures, taking back the space they feel has been lost to them.

If all this is correct, anti-Romany politics will require a rich and complex cultural-political response. It will, in fact, require a careful rethinking of the nature of the political and social community that is Europe and its constituent states—one that will, in my view, inevitably and quite correctly have to deal with (and in some sense integrate) the culturalist challenge thrown down by the integralists. The populist voters and, far beyond them, all those who find an echo of their feeling of cultural threat in the rhetoric of the populist parties, need to be joined in conversation about these 'threats'. In that conversation the case for cultural diversity in its modern forms, the understanding that otherness in our midst is the inevitable, irreducible condition of human culture (what else is gender and kinship, at base, than a means of establishing difference between 'us' and 'them') and the additional understanding that diversity is the great source of dynamism in human history, have to be argued carefully and constructively. The dangers of not doing so (as well as the possibility of achieving this) are beautifully illustrated by two of the Hungarian papers in this volume. In Hungary, the communist political regime from 1958 till 1986 denied Roma their cultural-historical status as a minority and produced, as Horváth and Kovai show, horrific torsions in the lives of Roma in consequence. Now, Hungary faces the challenge of acknowledging and integrating Romany presence, rather than denying it as in the past or trying to violently suppress and exclude it as the integralists wish. But this cannot be done without arguing the case that diversity breeds cultural strength, not vice versa.

This may seem like a daunting task in a Europe that is fracturing politically but there are, I would argue, some grounds for optimism. Take the fact that the issues at stake are not confined to Roma—Muslim minorities in immigrant-receiving countries are as much a source of populist fury. Lessons learnt in dealing with the populist-integralists in one part of Europe can, I suspect, be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, in other parts too.[37] This is, perhaps, one of the upsides of European integration.

But we will also require a new 'elite' discourse of what Europe is 'for'. In response to the serial 'nos' to the Treaty of Maastricht, politicians like Nicolas Sarkozy (who was then only a candidate for president) proclaimed that the solution was to return to a 'Europe of Nations', to reassure voters that Europe was constituted by and acted in the interest of 'nations'. This 'quick fix' (which worked electorally) left, of course, no space for the numerous minorities of our continent (religious, ethnic, regional, etc.) but worse, it is a strategy that simply postpones the problems inherent in the European Project to later and, meanwhile, provides legitimacy to all those populist-integralists who oppose the transnational, trans-community solidarity and polity that Europe has to try and build in the century ahead. To create a Europe which strengthens the rights of its citizens, that offers new freedoms and pleasures to its inhabitants, that offers a vision of social life that is more attractive than the return to the fictive ethnic-communal cradle offered by the new populists, will require a return to our roots and a reconception of what this grand political project might offer to its people and the world beyond. In this sense, the plight of the Roma is truly Europe's plight and successfully combating the populist drive to exclude them may contribute centrally to a positive reformulation and reconstruction of the overall European political project.

before. Each story referred to the alleged perpetrators or accused persons as 'Gypsies', although ethnic data is not held by the police.

25. National Security Office, 2008 yearbook.
26. Zsolt Bayer, Cigányliszka, in Magyar Nemzet, 17 October 2006.
27. Berezin's chosen example of this process is the series of significant events which became part of the French public narrative and challenged collective national perceptions surrounding the rise of the National Front between its 1997 party congress and the 2005 constitutional referendum. Apart from following Berezin, I am also drawing on a sociological theory of events that has been the subject of considerable exegesis in recent years (see e.g. Mahoney, 2000 and Sewell, 1996). Berezin refines their approach to suggest that 'events' can be seen as templates of possibility, permitting us to see relations and interconnections that speak to broader macro- and micro-social and cultural processes.

1. POPULISM, ROMA AND THE EUROPEAN POLITICS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

1. This text was originally written in its current format in spring 2010, long before the coming euro crisis had forced its way onto European kitchen tables.
2. The differences, real or imagined, between members of different 'cultural groups of common descent' have of course provided the ground for more than one episode of communal tension in the past few decades in various European states often glossed as 'racial conflict'. I am suggesting, however, that in our current predicament we are witnessing new and distinctive forms of this fear 'other' and not a reincarnation of 1930s modes of thought.
3. See Fassin, 2011: 519–522.
4. The text of the decree—'Declaration of the state of emergency with regard to settlements of nomad communities in the territories of Campania, Lazio and Lombardia regions'—is, http://www.poslazio.it/opencms/export/sites/default/sociale/social/resourceGalleries/docs/decreti_e_regolamenti/D.P.C.M._21_05_2008.pdf (January 2010).
5. The text of the ordinance is available at http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/Campi_nomadi/ordinanza_campania.pdf (January 2010).
6. The European Parliament resolution can be accessed at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0361+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (January 2010).
7. The text of the Minister's speech is available at http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/stenbic/36/2008/0723/s030.html (January 2010).
8. Data collated from Székelyi et al. (2001).
9. See e.g. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIgDVxBwP1A. Jobbik have been helped by the fact that many of their opponents have tended to bury their heads

in the sand when it comes to the problem of petty criminality in Hungarian villages and small towns.

10. http://euobserver.com/9/29665.
11. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bulgaria/4531391/Mayor-of-Sofia-brands-Roma-Turks-and-retirees-bad-human-material.html. The statement flies in the face of the fact that the government is supposedly making progress to tackle problems of Roma integration and discrimination, especially since the start of the Decade for Roma Inclusion in 2005, launched to great fanfare in Sofia.
12. The following excerpt from a TV programme, 'Gypsies: The privileged citizens', run by the leader of the National Guard gives a flavour of this organisation's rhetoric: 'The Bulgarian state is unjust towards its citizens; it privileges one of its minorities at the expense of the rest of the citizens—and this cannot be called integration. And despite of all the care, the majority of Gypsies do not wish to get an education, and despite the existence of special employment programs, they refuse to work as well; the state in turn builds houses for them, which they destroy; such care for the young Bulgarian families does not yet exist. This integration strategy of the government is wrong because it instils a sense of privilege and impunity, which in turn, very logically, implants a sense of resentment in Bulgarians. If this doesn't change, Gypsies will continue to loot, build their houses illegally (including ramshackle constructions on top of gas pipelines), to travel without tickets in city transportations, and to obtain state assistance paid for from the pockets of Bulgarian taxpayers. They will continue to trade with their children abroad, and in Bulgaria become criminals, beggars, and prostitutes. The only ones taking advantage of these programs [i.e. Roma-related state-supported programs] are neither Bulgarians nor Gypsies themselves, but the so-called human rights organizations and the countless scribblers of integration projects. The Bulgarian state must stop this, and provide care only for those who are truly socially engaged and socially productive—because to work is not only a right but an obligation as well, of every good citizen'. Guests in the studio were Krasimir Kanev (chair of the Bulgarian Helsinki committee) and Toma Nikovael, chair of the Gypsy information agency 'De Facto'.
13. As the fighting escalated in the clothing store, the lawyer's daughter also allegedly joined in. All three women were arrested. The controversy was reported in Le Monde of 20 May, but see: http://themoderatevoice.com/73048/fistsfly-in-burqa-ban-feud-in-france/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+themoderatevoice+%28The+Moderate+Voice%29.
14. See Le Courier 29–30 May, p. 7, Martigny: des delinquents comme les autres ou des criminals etrangers? But for an example of the kind of ethnographic evidence one could collect more or less anywhere in Europe, see Scott Ward's lovely

film about a south London neighbourhood, available at: http://www.mystreet-films.com/content/two-doors-down. Very similar basic sentiments could be recorded in Slovakia, Czech Republic or Hungary.

15. The institutional framework of which already exists in the Alliance of European National Movements based in the EU parliament, connecting extremist-populist and far right parties.
16. In a survey of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim populisms, across western Europe, Oesch reached an identical rejection of the old economic-determinist intuition: 'Cultural questions of identity are more important than economic questions of resources' (2008: 370) and issues of national identity nowadays trump anxieties over labour market and welfare competition.
17. I am following Douglas Holmes' dense account of these issues (2000).
18. It is therefore, in its modern form, inextricably linked to the nation state and nationalism (Gellner, 1983).
19. This doctrine combines a very particular balance of activism and conservatism. It is preoccupied with shifting bases of interdependence that involve all groups of society. It supports state interventions oriented towards sustaining the dynamic base of solidarity expressed in reciprocal types of aid and care or stewardship. At the same time it strongly supports the preservation and protection of groups through policies oriented towards preserving their autonomy and 'active agency', thus in effect sustaining diversity and social differentiation/pluralism.
20. For the sake of British readers, I should explain that subsidiarity is here not used in the narrow technical sense common in British discussions of EU law, but referring to a pivotal concept in Catholic social doctrine which 'denotes a means for circumscribing domains of action for public authorities, establishing formulas for allocating governmental powers, and defining norms of social stewardship and the conditions of individual freedom' (Holmes, 2000: 30). See below.
21. Similar to the cultural autonomy within a European framework advocated by some populist politicians in different parts of Europe.
22. The inherent lack of harmony between policies promoting integration—expanding markets, rendering product control transparent and freeing up the movement of goods, capital, people—and those grounded in the specification of cultural rights' (maintaining cultural traditions or differential national, religious or ethnic autonomies) has acted as a further institutional break on pluralist fracturing (Holmes, 2000: 34).
23. I am grateful to Georgia Efremova for pointing this out.
24. This chimes nicely with Andre Gingrich's analysis of Haider's politics in Austria where he notes the pull on the educated, professional middle class of the charismatic showman's theatrical assaults on a corrupt and apparently totally unpro-

fessional political class (2006). This is, further, what Efremova found in an earlier study of the young supporters of the National Guard in Bulgaria as well as in a shorter study carried out in the Czech Republic—the disproportionate presence of students and young professionals (personal communication).

25. See also Bale's prophetic comments about extremists in bipolarising party systems: 'They have a significant number of loyal voters; they seem better able to survive institutionalization than was previously assumed; and xenophobia and welfare chauvinism are endemic in every European electorate. There is every chance, then, that such parties will indeed succeed in securing a permanent niche in Western Europe's emerging political market' (2003: 67).
26. In March 1994, Gianfranco Fini's post-fascist NA entered the governing coalition. Then, in March 1998, Le Pen's Front National made a significant showing in the French regional elections, followed in February 2000 with Haider's FPO becoming part of the governing coalition in Austria and then in April 2002 with Le Pen's strong performance on the first round on presidential elections. Of course, not all countries have witnessed the creation of this type of party.
27. See Goodwin for an outstanding discussion of the role of perceived rates of immigration rather than race as a predictor of extremist interest (2011). Those associated with a broadly defined 'old' left often label the populist-integralists as fascists or neo-fascists (see, e.g. Munková, 2008). Sometimes, as in France, this usage derives from local political traditions but, in general, I think it misleading, even if, as a French colleague, Henriette Asseo, suggests we might compromise on 'post-modern fascism'. It is true that parties like Jobbik need to bring on board the traditional (often aged) anti-semitic right with personal or familial links to the historical fascist parties and make use, in part, of some of the symbolism of those parties (e.g. the use by Jobbik of Arrow Cross iconography in Hungary). But this is only part of the story and the less important part. These parties are not, for example, anti-democratic in principle, whereas a fundamental principle of fascism was opposition to the idea of the multi-party, voter driven, democratic, representative polity. Nor are their programmes to homogenise political culture and drive out 'difference' identical to the anti-egalitarian leadership cults of the interwar period. In cases, like the British, where the neo-Nazi label can be correctly applied (for example to the British National Party) the constituency of these parties remains insignificant and restricted to traditional 'skin colour racists' (Cutts et al., 2009).
28. See Berezin in particular, but see also Maryon MacDonald (in Gingrich and Banks eds., 2006).
29. Speaking of the European project, Monnet once noted that 'technical aspects at first sight masked its political meaning' (cited in Holmes, 2000: 27).
30. In Britain the popular press keeps up a more or less constant and no doubt eagerly acclaimed commentary on the elimination of British 'standards', nota-

bly imperial weights and measures, beloved of 'autochthonous' street stall traders, and the like. See, for example, the lurid tales of Christopher Booker published each weekend in the Sunday Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/.

31. A parallel definition of Europeanisation is 'a discursive strategy and a device of power which in particular, through the institutional and administrative capacities of the EU, reorganized group identifications in relation to territory and "peoplehood" (Bornemann and Fowler, 1997).
32. In fact, the EU really only engages with 'culture' in reference to the 'European culture industry' where 'culture' is reduced to mass culture and understood in commercial terms. As Holmes says, with some justification, 'protectionist directives limiting access to European media markets... have become the core of EU's cultural policy' (2000: 31). Cross national educational harmonisation (Bologna), trans-national degrees and transfer programmes (Erasmus and Marie Curie) are, however, indicators of some broader cultural agenda.
33. The most compelling account of the culture of traditional political allegiance remains Papataxiarchis' doctoral study (1988).
34. Ignazi focuses on the right-wing character of all this—a position I tend to reject, seeing many parallels between right and so-called left-wing radicalism today.
35. As Holmes says, some of these are no doubt marginal, others absolutely essential to understanding the future course and dynamics of European integration.
36. In other words, the roots of today's xenophobia lie precisely in the ethnicised political institutions of modern society and the 'national community of solidarity'. As Wimmer has argued, the constantly shifting balance of power within these institutions leads to an endless renegotiation of the existing 'cultural compromise'—a renegotiation of the major modes of inclusion and exclusion, a reordering of the basic principles of membership and identity (2002).
37. In one country, it seems the issues are even sometimes linked. In the spring 2011 elections for the regional government of Florence the Northern League suggested that if its opponents came to power they would turn the ancient city into a 'Gypsy-Muslim slum' (Nando Sigona, personal communication).

2. ABUSIVE LANGUAGE AND DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES IN HUNGARIAN LOCAL POLICY

1. Hungary's electoral law is among Europe's most complex and combines three systems to elect the 386-member parliament: voting for single candidates from single-mandate district contests (176 seats), voting for party lists in larger territorial districts using proportional rules to award seats (152 seats), and proportionally allocated compensation seats from national compensation lists (58 seats).
2. In Europe there are basically two main models of local municipal systems and

local administration: integrated and fragmented. Administrative rationality is prioritised in the integrated model over the principle that each settlement has the right to elect its own local municipal council and mayor and determine its policy locally, while in the fragmented model these priorities are reversed.

3. Sixty-five per cent of villages were categorised as 'settlements without a purpose' in 1971; these villages were excluded from development resources and their citizens were refused building permits and, therefore, loans from the bank.
4. In 1981, 20 per cent of the active population were employed by agricultural co-operatives and state-owned farms.
5. In 2009 Hungary's employment rate among fifteen to sixty-four-year-olds was the lowest in the region and the second lowest among the twenty-seven EU Member States in 2009, according to data published by Eurostat. Hungary's employment rate in the fifteen-sixty-four age group was 55.4 per cent in 2009. The rate in Slovakia was 60.2 per cent and 65.4 per cent in the Czech Republic. The rate for the EU twenty-seven was 64.6 per cent in 2009.
6. Only 28 per cent of those with an education of only eight grades of elementary schools are employed in contrast to an average of 47 per cent in EU countries.
7. For example, Kaposvár's municipal council reported in 2007 that only 0.02 per cent of their pupils are severely disadvantaged in order to circumvent anti-segregation regulations. Two years later this figure 'increased' to 9.25 per cent due to an application the city decided to submit for funding.
8. Virilism, as a voting system allocating privileged positions to certain social levels, was introduced in Hungary's larger cities in 1870 and in Budapest in 1872. In larger cities the system was abolished in 1920.
9. The interview was conducted in 2002. In the 1990s, the village managed to reopen its elementary school which had been closed fifteen years before. But in the 1998 local elections, the mayor and the majority of councillors were replaced. The new leaders of the village were elected by the influential families of the settlements who had already enrolled their children in schools elsewhere.
10. See the action: http://www.cfcf.hu/miskolc1-keresetlevel_hu.html.
11. See the judgement of the Court of First Instance: http://www.cfcf.hu/miskolc1-elsofoku-itelet_hu.html; and the Foundation's application: http://www.cfcf.hu/miskolc1-fellebbezes_hu.html.

3. INTEGRALIST NARRATIVES AND REDEMPTIVE ANTI-GYPSY POLITICS IN BULGARIA

1. BBT, Balkan Bulgarian Television.
2. This is still a more frequent reference to the ethnic Turkish minority than the Roma. It was the early and successful political mobilisation and representation of the country's largest ethnic group (Turkish minority, through the political