CONCLUSIONS

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The extensive survey of the situation of Muslims in Europe (the Union and some of the applicant countries) in the preceding pages shows the complexity of the issues. It also serves as a warning against easy generalisations.

1. Past

Firstly, there is the marked differences in historical background between those countries, mostly the current member states, where the Muslim presence is primarily the result of settlement during the late 19th and the 20th centuries and particularly after 1945, and the countries, mostly in central and eastern Europe where the Muslim presence is centuries old.

Second, this division is itself a generalisation. The countries of recent settlement include those with a direct historical colonial relationship with the regions of origin in whole or in part (France, Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and other countries without such a link. Here Germany is in a category of its own in that its relations with the late Ottoman Empire had an economic colonial character which did not develop to political empire.

Third, the main periods of settlement in Scandinavia and most of southern Europe were rather later than in Britain, France and to an extent Germany and the Netherlands. Given that the general process of settlement has gone through phases, this contributes to some noticeable differences in the experiences of various European countries. In general terms it is possible to distinguish three phases, the earliest being of migrant labourers, the second one of family reunion, and the third dominated by refugees and asylum seekers. In countries like Britain, France and Germany where the process of settlement is oldest all three phases can be recorded and have a roughly equal impact on the way in which communities, the public and the state respond. In countries where the settlement is generally

more recent, the picture is predominantly coloured by the priorities associated with refugees and asylum seekers.

In eastern Europe, also, it is difficult to be too general. In some regions, especially the Balkans, the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia has determined the ways in which Muslim communities are seen and see themselves, and thence also the social, economic and organisational priorities being adopted both by the Muslims and the wider society. However, such extreme ethno-religious tensions have not been reflected in countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Poland where Muslims are a much smaller proportion of the national population—although, having said that, it is again easy to identify further differences among the three countries.

Another dimension contributing to difference across Europe is the differences among the countries and cultures of Muslim origin. There can be no doubt that the fact that the largest element of the diverse Muslim communities in Britain originate in the Indian subcontinent impacts very markedly on the character of the Muslim community in Britain, on its relations with its surroundings and on how they are perceived by those surroundings. For the same reason the character of the Muslim communities and their relationships with their national societies in France or Germany have their own very specific characteristics which differ them from each other, sometimes quite markedly. Part of what constitutes such differences are, of course, to be found deep in the long histories of the regions of origin. But it is also to be found in the more recent relationships between those regions of origin and Europe generally, and the countries of settlement in particular. Thus the colonial history of France in North Africa has helped form a set of mutual experiences and perceptions which are very different from those pertaining to Britain and south Asia or Germany and Turkey.

A further factor on the Muslim side of the equation is the various religio-political movements and the expectations they have both of relations with the political power and the public space in general and more specifically of their attitudes as minorities to these questions. Having said that, it is also clear that, on the European side, the shifting balances of power between inclusive and exclusive political movements, including the impact of racist and xenophobic tendencies, and between perceptions of the place of religion in the public space are an equally significant dimension.

2. Present

Having identified the various factors in our common histories which have contributed to the present situation it is essential to emphasise the changes which are currently taking place. These are above all characterised by two processes: a deeply significant demographic change and a growing inter-linkage between Europe and the 'other side' of the Mediterranean.

In western Europe, the Muslim presence is no longer mainly an issue of immigration—and it never was in the east European applicant countries. Increasingly, the Muslims in western Europe are native to their countries of residence. In some countries, the native-born are already a majority, and a new generation is beginning to grow as the grandchildren of the immigrant generation. To this must be added a proportionately small but numerically increasingly noticeable population of converts to Islam. In some countries, particularly France and the UK, the majority already carry the citizenship of the country of residence, while in others the trend towards becoming a citizen is accelerating. Because of the history, the Muslim communities are on average much younger than the wider society. While this creates some specific challenges it cannot be ignored that the immigrant generation is rapidly entering the ranks of the pensioners which raises new challenges to the related institutions and welfare structures.

The 'europeanisation' of the Muslim communities has a number of quite direct consequences. Firstly, the younger generation is in the process of taking over the leadership of community organisations and representative structures. So just as local and national government civil servants had begun to get used to working with the representatives of the immigrant generation, they are now faced with their children, who often have very different perceptions and priorities. In particular, the new younger leaderships have a much better understanding of how the political and administrative processes of their countries function, and they are clearly prepared to use them. On the whole their aims appear to be a much more constructive engagement with the local and national institutions. They want to participate, to be recognised and respected as native citizens, but as Muslim native citizens. It is naive to expect this to mean a process of assimilation into the existing structures, to expect an adaptation on the part of Muslims to inherited European perceptions of the place of religion in the public space. They are looking for an active Muslim presence

in the public space, and their desire coincides, in any case, with a wider renewed debate concerning the place of religion in the public space generally. It is interesting to note, in this context, the extent to which cooperation between the various religious traditions in different European countries, under the broad heading of inter-religious dialogue, is growing both locally and nationally.

Another, longer term consequence of this demographic change and the associated 'europeanisation' is a process among young Muslims, especially the growing numbers of successfully educated ones moving into the professions, which involves a rethinking of traditional Islamic concepts and their expression in a specific cultural form. The Islamic expression of the immigrant generations was closely integrated with the cultural frameworks and practices of the regions of origin, usually rural rather than urban. The new generation is actively, both consciously and unconsciously, separating the culturally specific from the 'universally' Islamic in a process which is re-clothing the latter in a new cultural 'dress' which is oriented to the European environment and replacing or, at least, significantly re-interpreting the cultural dress carried over from the parents' regions of origin.

This development is already leading to a situation where the traditional categorisation, or typology, of Islamic movements is becoming unsatisfactory. The political and social priorities both of the Muslim communities themselves and of their European interlocutors are beginning to produce new types of Muslim organisation. These are weakening their reference to the regions of origin, and the agendas of the regions of origin, just as they are also becoming more 'ecumenical' in their attitudes to cooperation with Islamic religio-political movements different from their own. New organisations and alliances are coming into being with reference to agendas and priorities associated with the European environment. The centralisation of political decision-making in Britain during the 1980s and 90s has been matched by the rise of national Muslim 'umbrella' organisations, particularly notable in the success of the MCB, the Muslim Council of Britain's various issue-specific negotiations with government ministries. The pressures of central government initiatives in France have likewise influenced the nature of intra-Muslim cooperation in moving towards some degree of consensus on Muslim priorities in France. In both cases, issues related to the countries of origin (e.g. Kashmir and Algeria respectively) continue to play a role, sometimes an important one, in mobilising community political inter-

ests but these issues are now just one part of a broader range in which domestic issues are playing an increasingly important role.

A further dimension of this process is the growing identification of sectors of the younger Muslim population with issues relating to the broader Muslim world, as they increasingly identify with Islam rather than with their parents' (or grandparents') regions of origin. So, for example, younger Turkish Muslims begin to be concerned about Muslim issues in places like Palestine, the northern Caucasus, or the southern Philippines, and not just with Turkish issues. The same has been observed among Muslims of South Asian and North African origin. This has already been reflected in the growth of Islamic emergency and relief agencies working with some success in crisis situations like those of Bosnia, Kosovo and Sudan, and the ability of such agencies to mobilise many young people who have previously had little active mosque connections. (In the case of support for Bosnian Muslims this was associated with a widespread perception that their fate was somehow ominous for the fate of Muslims in Europe generally.) Such broader identification should not be regarded as sinister in itself: essentially it is no different from the tendencies of European Christians in certain situations to identify with the fate of fellow believers in areas of conflict (the southern Sudan might be cited as an example).

But these developments also appear to be part of a wider European tendency which unites east and west. Following the collapse of the Soviet system a decade ago, questions of the relationships between national, ethnic and religious identities have again become a priority after generations of suppression. In former Yugoslavia they were a major factor in the disintegration of the multi-national federation. While the conflictual extremes of Yugoslavia have been avoided in, for example, Bulgaria and Romania, ethnic politics, flavoured with a *soupçon* of religious reference, have played an active part in domestic politics, especially in Bulgaria. The wisdom and restraint of certain political and community leaders in such countries have contributed to the process remaining one of negotiation rather than conflict, but the issue remains live and its negotiation is contributing to changes in both the public discourse and political perceptions as well as in changing self-awareness of national identity. In the west, coming out of very different histories, the presence of large, relatively new ethnic and religious minorities has raised anew precisely the same issues. How do, for example, countries which have inherited a self-understanding

of a *folk* sharing a common history, culture and collective self-awareness, part of which is often, as in the case of Scandinavia or Greece, a shared religious tradition and national church, integrate people who do not share such a common heritage? There are here profound issues of local, regional, national and continental identities and self-awareness which are converging across Europe, east and west. This has implications for how the debate over a common European identity is developed.

3. Future

Having suggested that we are dealing with a situation which is in a high degree of flux, a corollary would seem to be that devising policy responses is likely to be extremely difficult. It would certainly seem to be impossible to devise Europe-wide responses, given the enormous local differences which this study has identified.

The factors of the development of Islam

However, at the same time the study has also suggested some elements which may be common across the continent while they differ in their local specificities. So while it is obvious that neither we nor anyone else have anything like patented solutions to specific issues, it is possible to suggest a number of factors which impact on a national and local situation. In that these factors differ in their detail from one country to another they will contribute to the differences actually playing out on the ground. But identification of the factors as such can be helpful in understanding why a specific national situation has become as it is. It may therefore also assist in guiding speculation as to how a specific situation may develop in the future.

a) *Settlement*: One factor is inherent to the immigrants' dynamic of entry into an arrival area. The circumstances in which the settlement has taken and is taking place forms part of the foundation of local and national situations which remain active. Step by step, they cross the gap with the host country: culture and daily sociability, organisations and institutions, past and future. Moreover, this process is hard, in the European context at least, and, unlike the American context, for two or even three generations. Regarding the social situation, the question is to get to know whether and in what way,

above all for the second and third generations, Islam will be an instrument of social positioning, or even of social mobility. But the future and, above all, the form of European Islam will also be constructed in terms of reactions, positions and reciprocal images which will prevail in the years to come.

b) *Social relations*: The second factor is linked to the social situation of Muslim populations and to relations with non-Muslim Europe. It is important to note the role played by European unification on the one hand and by contemporary means of communication on the other. Many Muslims now have the nationality of a European country and can travel around Europe freely and easily. It is almost the same for those who do not have or have not yet obtained a new citizenship, despite the travel limitations due to the necessity of visas for certain categories of foreigners. Elsewhere, fax, video and audio electronic communications have sped up the circulation of information.

Among the questions connected to the relations of Muslims with the non-Muslim context we must point the following aspects:

- The image of Muslims and Islam purveyed by the media and public figures.
- The experience of discrimination and approaches to the legal and practical implementation of human rights principles.
- The nature and extent of political participation, individually and collectively.
- The purpose, nature and implementation of educational policies and their approach to accommodating young Muslims and other minorities and reflecting the changing nature of society as a whole.
- The development of social and economic policies in response to the different needs of different communities and their response to community-based differences in access to public resources and levels of unemployment.
- The attitudes of cultural policies to the cultural activities of minorities.
- The degree to which the training of public sector workers reflects the full variety of potential client groups.

c) *Muslim world*: The third factor is internal to the Muslim world. This parameter is animated by four dynamics:
A leadership dynamic: here it is a matter of knowing what the profile of future leaders of Islam will be. Until now, 'natural' leaders coming from the first generation have dominated as well as leaders imported from Muslim spaces or Europeans converted to Islam. We have said

that a new generation is beginning to emerge. What models of Islam will it be the bearer of? With what projects? Will it manage to formulate the necessarily original response to their presence as a statistical minority, unprecedented for the Muslims, in a pluralistic and secularized society? And more generally, to what extent will European Muslims be capable of producing a leadership up to the social, cultural and institutional issues European Islam is confronted with?

A second dynamic is organisational and partly linked to the preceding: the local and federative organisational capacity of European Muslims has been considerable. Will they manage or would they want to take the new steps?

A third dynamic is cultural: it is sufficiently clear that the younger generations are proceeding towards a de-culturation of the Islam they have received from their parents and towards an inculturation. The question of its content and form remains open. The challenge will be the formulation of what it means being Muslims in Europe. To that end European Muslims are proceeding to a new formulation of Muslim identity using references to the tradition as well as European discourses, for instance, of human rights, the categories of psychology, and the categories of philosophy. Doing that, European Muslims are obliged to clear a way between the general process of secularisation on one hand and, on the other hand, the process of ethnic identification (Arabs, Turks, Pakistanis, African and so on).

Finally, the fourth dynamic concerns Muslim countries. Beyond events and conjunctures, it seems sufficiently clear that in these countries, the dynamic of the collective and public attestation of Islam is not going to die out, even if it is difficult to envisage the orientations that will prevail in the years to come. But it is certain that for European Muslims these 'centres of Islam' are significant realities from the point of view of symbols, ideas and organisations

d) *Place of religion*: Finally, the last parameter concerns the situation and development relative to the place of the religious within European society. The way in which inherited church-state relations in the countries of Europe have adapted to and made space for the new Muslim communities (or have not as the case may be) influences the way in which Muslims view the public sphere: is it inclusive or exclusive?

On this subject, the various European nation-states do not take the same attitude towards religion. They differ due to their history, their past experience of religious pluralism (intra-Christian) or of religious

struggles, but equally due to the role they attribute to the construction of public space and relations between the civil society and state.

In each European country, the Muslim populations are obliged to answer to specific questions of states and societies. For instance in France the main question is that of '*laïcité*' that is the French formulation of relations between state and religion. The consequence is a strong reflection among the Muslim populations on the relation between religion and state and between religion and society. In Belgium or in Britain the main question is the ability of institutional management of religion. The same in Spain, but in the framework of a peculiar vision of religion and of Islam in this country. In Germany this question is paired with the question of national identity.

Anyway the reflection does not concern only Muslim populations but also non-Muslims. It is clear that the presence of Islam has obliged European societies to reflect again on the relations between religion and the public life: for instance in France after the 'affaire des foulards' there is a new reflection on '*laïcité*'. And in other countries there is a new reflection on the privileged status of old European religions.

e) *International relations and images*: The impact of events abroad and the response of European foreign policy, both in terms of its substance and in terms of its domestic presentation

Hypotheses relating to the models of implantation of Islam

Currently various models for the implantation of active forms of Islam seem possible. They are probably not exclusive of one another.

a) *The intra-European models*

In some models the religious action is mainly oriented in relation to the European existence and to European society. We can observe four different models:

a1) *De-islamization/culturalization*: in proceeding in parallel with a movement observable in European space, Muslims progressively abandon their references to Islam as a religion, perhaps maintaining references to it as a fact of culture and civilisation.

a2) *Assimilation to western models of religion*, which signifies that Muslims draw their inspiration from the dominant model of religions in Europe and develop a privatised and spiritualised Islam, which is elaborated

within a perspective of autonomisation of the religious sphere. If one considers the developments which have taken place until now, this model may appear rather improbable, but this spiritualisation of Islam, copied from the model of contemporary Christianity, does not seem to be rejected by some younger Muslims. So it can be a possible model of development for the future.

a3) *Cosmopolitan-autonomous integration*: This is a variant of the preceding model more oriented to the cultural global integration of Islam. Muslims are worried about an institutional integration of Islam and are developing a European Islamic discourse, all the while maintaining cultural and symbolic ties with worldwide Islam.

a4) *Protest implantation*: in this case Islam becomes a tool of social protest for groups which are or just perceive themselves as 'marginalised'; it draws its inspiration from and is linked with Islamic expressions of protest. It meets up with a refusal of the west and its models. The Islam of Malcolm X might seem to be a sort of paradigm of this model but more articulated and with dynamics similar to what is going on in the Muslim world.

b) *The extra-European models*

In other models the religious action continues to be mainly orientated by currents external to Europe concerning values, society references or organisation. We can observe two different models.

b1) *Dependent geopolitisation*: Muslims consider themselves and are considered as an appendix, an expression of geopolitical strategies developed on the basis of centres of Islam. From the viewpoint of its generalisation, this model seems the least probable, but it could exist and be advanced by quasi-diplomatic actors, elected by the central powers of Islam, based on their strategies of religious geopolitics.

b2) *The Diaspora Network*: Muslims above all worried about being regrouped are not in the least concerned about the question of their implantation in the context. Their primary social horizon is constituted by all the connections which link them to groups, associations and brotherhood movements.

c) *The in-between models*

In some models we can observe a tension, more or less accentuated, between religious action with European references and religious action with external references. Two models can be observed.

c1) *Externalised integration*: Muslims are worried about an institutional integration into European spaces, but retain cultural and normative references and inspirations from the whole Muslim world. This model corresponds to one deriving from the Catholic churches during modernity. A sort of tension arises here between two references, two loyalties or two interests between the strategy of insertion into European space and the maintenance of references to spaces pulsating with Islam.

c2) *Dualisation*: In this case Muslims consider that it will be impossible to have a relation with the European society and culture. They conclude that the only possibility is to separate themselves from the context and to leave in a kind of communitarian ghetto.

d) *Absorption model*

In this model we observe an effort of religious conquest of Europe. This model is just the opposite of the model of assimilation.

d1) *Islamisation*: Muslims might envisage a massive investment in European space in order to bring it into the Islamic fold. This model would thus tend to reverse the present situation.

Many of these models will probably cohabit in the future. Some of them seem less probable today (for example: model d1). But beyond this plurality of forms, it is striking to observe a relative convergence of Muslim dynamism.

From the point of view of sociological categories, it is not correct to speak of a Muslim 'community'. The notion of community is used in reference to social groups having intense face-to-face emotional relations, founded on the tradition. For the moment, the sociological categories to name this social and cultural entity, which is in the process of constituting itself in western Europe, are lacking.

Underlying such specific factors and responses lies a blunt choice for European society with regard to the presence of ethnic and religious minorities, and in particular the presence of Muslim communities: integrate or expel. There is no 'third way' in this question, least of

all denial of the realities of immigration and its consequences. The economic and political choice in favour of integration has essentially been made, even if to some extent by default rather than by deliberate decision. If the option of integration is to succeed we have to be reminded of the fundamental assumptions of the European democratic traditions, namely that good government and socio-political stability rests on a foundation of the consent of the governed, a 'contract' where loyalty and consent are granted in exchange for participation and access to the social and political 'goods'.