Nuclear Proliferation - reflection No. 1
Sagan contra Waltz - to spread or not to spread?
The fundamental debate in the field of nuclear (non)proliferation between “optimists” and “pessimists” is captured quite well in these two articles.
Where Kenneth Waltz argues that the spread of nuclear weapons in a world full of rationality behaving states aiming for their own survival (be it through a peace achieved by a mutual fear of the other nuclear power), Sagan raises a critique of this idea, mostly through pointing out a certain “dent” in the logic that every state behaves rationally.
This dent is (in his view) the possibility that certain leaders of states can be under pressure by various (mostly military) organizations that can distort the rational thinking of said leaders regarding nuclear weapons.
Personally, I think that both authors raise clear and understandable arguments for their perspective cases, while still somewhat respecting and understanding the point of view of the other.
However, when Sagan introduces his perspective, he does so mostly through the case of the United States. That of course is quite understandable, due to the fact that it offers the most amount of credible information. But is that necessarily a good thing? He focuses on the US as the main protagonist in the world of nuclear proliferation, but I think his work would benefit from focusing on other countries and the notion that it is not only the US that can potentially spread nuclear weapons to other countries.
Sagan recognizes the fact that the position of the US government on proliferation may change, so he also makes a few suggestions, how to manage the potential spread of nuclear weapons. He suggests that the US should promote a civilian system of checks and balances in new nuclear states, share security and technological know-how (where possible) and operational doctrines. Sagan recognizes that these suggestions are most likely not to be implemented due to various reasons, but I think he does not stress one of them quite enough. If the US (or any other nuclear power) was to share some of its most confidential security information with new upcoming nuclear states, who is to guarantee that this information will not be used against its own security? Are the US and other nuclear countries really ready to give this information up? Are they ready to reduce their own arsenals?
And last but not least, I think none of the authors considers the financial question of nuclear (non)proliferation. I feel that a lot of the states do not have the necessary resources to maintain even a small nuclear arsenal, or at least not enough to not sacrifice its economic development.