Feminist standpoint theory has a particularly important place among feminist theories in the sense that it critically approaches to politics of epistemology and questions the legitimacies of scientific knowledge. According to this theory, for a ‘truer’ knowledge, objectivity is required, however, the approach/aim is quite different from how the physical scientists have been traditionally described it. While traditional scientific approach conceives of objectivity with a hierarchal duality between subject and object in which the former has absolute power on the knowledge of the latter, feminist standpoint theory claims quite an opposite understanding. Objectivity cannot provide a ‘God-trick’ (Haraway 1988: 581; Harding 1993: 128) in which the subject of knowledge can access to all the information about the object from every position and perspective in the same way. However, as a critic of the omnipotent positioning of the subject, this theory describes objectivity as ‘’partial, locatable and critical’’ (Haraway, pg. 584) through which perspective and positioning of the subject can diversify the knowledge on the object. In this sense, disregarding the absolute power of the subject, the standpoint theories claim that knowledge of the subject cannot be separated off from her/his position and strong objectivity can take place with strong recognition and reflection of this positionality.
According to Harding, the subject of knowledge for standpoint theories can be identified with four main characteristics (pg. 129-131). Articulating that the subject is embodied, symmetrical to object, (not individual but) a part of a community, and heterogeneous, Harding proposes that standpoint epistemology and objectivity take place as ‘democracy-advancing practices’ (pg. 136). Those practices can be related to the logic of epistemic privileged developed by Marxist theory. While the Marxist theory prioritises the class issue and constructs its epistemology from economically marginalised perspectives, the feminist standpoint theories deploy a similar logic privileging the perspective of subjects of feminism. These epistemologies, in a different word, ‘’start thought from marginalised lives and take everyday life as problematic’’ (Harding, pg. 127), since the perspective of marginalised lives has been articulated so rarely and quite wrongfully through the history of scientific knowledge. In this sense, while the Marxist theory has provided ‘’a rich tradition of critiquing hegemony’’ (Haraway; pg. 578), feminist standpoint theory, to an extent, lies on this tradition of critique but directs its perspective intensely on gender-based hegemonies. However, if we try to forge a more intersectional perspective through which all marginalised positions (not only gender or class but also ethnicity, sexuality, disability and so on) gain an epistemological privilege, the complexity of feminist objectivity may be apparent. Privileging the perspective of historically marginalised gender, sexuality, ethnicity/race, class positions, in this regard, appears not only as a symmetrical critique of different hegemonies, but also a democracy-advancing practice through subjects’ ‘’socially-situated knowledge’’ (Harding, pg. 127). Even though sometimes (mostly?) the subject of feminist epistemology is not able to analyse all the marginalised positions and different hegemonies in the same degree and with a similar intensity, at least revealing the intersectionality of marginalised positions holds ethical importance. Quite critical to masculine epistemologies which claim to hold an omnipotent, god-like perspective, feminist standpoint theory gives values to the partiality of knowledge. As the feminist subject, in this regards, does not claim a fixed vision or disengagement from ‘object’ of knowledge, the intersectional-marginalised perspective may provide the subject with a ‘truer’ knowledge of intertwined hegemonies.
Reference
Harding, Sandra (1993) ‘Rethinking standpoint epistemology: What is ‘strong objectivity’? In Sandra Harding (Ed.) The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies, pp. 127-140, New York: Routledge.
Haraway, Donna (1988) ‘Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective’, Feminist Studies 14 (3): 575-599.